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Interpreting Chinese Philosophy
A New Methodology
Jana S. Rošker
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Cover image: Stone wall carvings of ancient chinese philosophy in ‘Seven Star Park’
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Names: Rošker, Jana, 1960-author.
Title: Interpreting Chinese philosophy: a new methodology / Jana S. Rošker.
Description: London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2020055562 (print) | LCCN 2020055563 (ebook) | ISBN 9781350199866
(hardback) | ISBN 9781350199873 (ebook) | ISBN 9781350199880 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Philosophy, Chinese–Methodology.
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Contents
Acknowledgments vi
Prologue: Chinese Philosophy—Fact or Fiction? 1
1 Referential Framework 9
1.1 Problems of Transcultural Research 11
1.2 A Contrastive Analysis of Two Frameworks 30
1.3 Specific Features of the Chinese Model 35
2 Basic Paradigms 57
2.1 A Structural Network of Dynamic Relations 57
2.2 Vital Potential or Vital Creativeness 64
2.3 Dialectical Thought and Proper Measure 68
3 Chinese Logic as a Basis of Classical Chinese Theory 73
3.1 Semantic Nature of Chinese Logic 74
3.2 Chinese Analogies 83
4 Methods and Approaches 101
4.1 Analytical and Hermeneutic Procedures 102
4.2 Problems of Transcultural Comparative Philosophy 121
Epilogue: Relation as the Core of Understanding 137
Notes 141
Glossary 165
Sources and Literature 170
Index 184
Acknowledgments
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Slovenian Research
Agency (ARRS) in the framework of the research core funding Asian
Languages and Cultures (P6-0243) and in the scope of the research project N6-
0161 (Complementary scheme) Humanism in Intercultural Perspective: Europe
and China.
I am sincerely grateful to many of my precious friends and colleagues who
have supported, inspired, and encouraged me in the writing of this book. Here
are the names of just a few of them: Selusi Ambrogio, Roger Ames, Federico
Brusadelli, Robert A. Carleo, David Chai, Paul D’Ambrosio, Carine Defoort,
Bart Dessein, Fabian Heubel, Huang Chun-chieh, Yong Huang, Lee Hsien-
chung, Lee Ming-huei, Li Chenyang, Eric Nelson, Gregor Paul, Graham
Parkes, Karl-Heinz Pohl, Dawid Rogacz, Geir Sigurðsson, John Makeham,
Ady Van den Stock, Andrej Ule, Ralph Weber, Brook Ziporyn, and—last but
not least—my most treasured friend and colleague, who is also my spouse and
lover, Téa Sernelj.
I dedicate this book to one of my dearest and oldest friends (and most
reliable partners in crime), Evi Wollner.
Jana S. Rošker
Prologue
Chinese Philosophy—Fact or Fiction?
Chinese philosophy still represents a riddle for most Western intellectuals.
First of all, they have not yet succeeded in clarifying the question of whether
it can be denoted as philosophy at all. Of course, we could well try to avoid
the dilemma which will be described in the paragraphs that follow and simply
designate it with the term traditional Chinese thought, but the meaning and
the connotations of this word are much too broad, for they also pertain to lit-
erary, sociological, medical, spiritual, or even artistic content of Chinese intel-
lectual heritages. Why is the term Chinese philosophy problematic?
Whenever sinologists speak of Chinese philosophy, they are unavoidably
confronted with the question of the suitability of this term. In the best case
they have to accept the necessity of explaining certain specific features of
traditional Chinese thought, its epistemological roots and its methodology to
Western-trained philosophers and to the colleagues from other disciplines of
humanities. This interdisciplinary issue, however, has been preconditioned by
a necessity to clarify and to define certain concepts and categories, which have
been rooted in East Asian traditions.
Scholars trained in Western philosophy, on the other hand, have only
limited access to the general theory and genuine philosophical aspects of
Chinese thought. Hence, for the majority of them, these features of classical
Chinese discourses continue to appear obscure, unsystematic and therefore
lacking any theoretical reliability. Consequently, we must inspect the basic
dilemma or question of whether it is possible at all to declare that certain
discourses of traditional Chinese thought are philosophy. This question
becomes increasingly significant, for especially in our present, interconnected,
and globalized world, efforts to obtain a cross-cultural understanding of
reality are more essential than ever. It seems rather clear that any attempts to
2 Interpreting Chinese Philosophy
gain an insight into the modes of such comprehension without considering the
philosophical perspective of others seem to be not only arrogant, but also—to
put it mildly—quite naïve.
In his article entitled “There Is No Need for Zhongguo zhexue to Be
Philosophy,” Ouyang Min—as many other scholars—argues that philosophy
is a Western cultural practice and cannot refer to traditional Chinese thinking
except in an analogical or metaphorical sense. Hence, he proposes to replace the
term “Chinese philosophy” with the notion “sinosophy” (Ouyang 2012, 199).
However, the original meaning of this notion, which represents a compound
of the ancient Greek words for “China” and “wisdom” is, in fact, nothing other
than the translation of the Western expression “Chinese wisdom” into ancient
Greek language. The philosophizing or abstract traditions within Chinese
thought, on the other hand, go far beyond the sole notion or the discourses of
wisdom; therefore, they cannot be reduced to it.
It is certainly not our intention to reinterpret Chinese tradition in terms of
Western concepts, for philosophy as an academic discipline has arisen from
the essential human need to philosophize. This need or this feature of human
thought and sentiment is something universal, as for instance, the human
ability to generate language. Although the ability or the potential to create
language and thus linguistic communication is universal, each individual
language and the grammatical structures by which it is defined is culturally
conditioned. Thus, the expression “Chinese philosophy” does not refer to a
geographic dimension of this universal term, but is rather an expression of
the cultural conditionality which defines a certain form of philosophizing,
or of a certain system of philosophical thought with a typical paradigmatic
structure. As Carine Defoort (2001, 394) exposes, we are perfectly accustomed
to use “Continental” or “Anglo-Saxon” philosophy, denoting different types or
genres within the philosophical tradition; the problem with the term Chinese
philosophy, however, goes further.
The simplest and most frequent argument against the notion of “Chinese
philosophy” is based on the assumption that philosophy as such designates
a system of thought, which arose exclusively within the so-called European
tradition. In this context, philosophy is thus defined as a theoretical discipline
that is based on the specific and unique premises and methods of the Western
humanities. According to this supposition, every system of thought, which
arose within the context of any other tradition, is thus necessarily irrational (or
Prologue 3
at least unscientific). Hence, it cannot be applied within any “truly” academic
discipline; because it cannot contain abstract academic theories of any kind,
it can by no means be regarded as philosophical. During his visit in China in
2001, Jacques Derrida also stated:
There is no problem with talking about Chinese thought, Chinese history,
Chinese science, and so forth, but obviously, I have a problem with talking
about the Chinese “philosophy” of this Chinese thought and culture before
the introduction of the European model. . . . Philosophy in essence is not just
thought. It is linked with a sort of specific history, with one type of language,
and with an ancient Greek invention. It is an ancient Greek invention, which
then underwent “transformation” by Latin translation and German translation
and so on. It is something European. There may be various kinds of thought
and knowledge of equal integrity beyond Western European culture, but it is
not reasonable to call them philosophy. (Derrida, quoted in Jing 2005, 60–1)
According to such statements, we are allowed to say that China has thought,
but absolutely not “philosophy” in the strict sense of the word. Hence, various
forms of ideology and intellectual discourses of all civilizations in the world
are “thought,” but Western thought is “philosophy.” This means that “Chinese
civilization, Indian civilization, and Western civilization all had ‘thought,’ but
only Western thought took the form of ‘philosophy,’ and is therefore called
‘philosophy’” (Zhang 2006, 40).
Two centuries earlier, Hegel explained the issue more in detail: he upheld
that “genuine” philosophy originated in ancient Greece. In his view, the
thought of the “people from the East” was still permeated with the holistic one
substance; hence, they were hitherto unable to acquire individuality and had
yet to attain spiritual consciousness and self-awareness. What people generally
called “Chinese philosophy” was in his view not yet a philosophy but merely
some moral preaching. Hegel even wrote the following about Confucian
works: “For their reputation, it would have been better if they had never
been translated” (Hegel 1969, 142).1 Hegel described Confucius as an ancient
“master” who had disseminated a collection of thoughts on morality without
creating any real philosophy. This naturally implies that his work did not
contain any transcendent dimensions. This superficial (mis)understanding of
ancient Chinese texts continues to hold sway in Western theory not only with
respect to Confucius, but in terms of Confucianism in general, and the whole
of traditional Chinese thought.
