Table Of ContentNian Peng
International
Pressures, Strategic
Preference, and
Myanmar’s China
Policy since 1988
International Pressures, Strategic Preference,
’
and Myanmar s China Policy since 1988
Nian Peng
International Pressures,
Strategic Preference,
’
and Myanmar s China Policy
since 1988
123
NianPeng
National Institute for SouthChina
SeaStudies
Haikou,Hainan,China
ISBN978-981-15-7815-1 ISBN978-981-15-7816-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7816-8
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Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Debates Over Myanmar’s China Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Justification for Using Neoclassical Realist Approach. . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Analytical Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Independent Variable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.2 Intervening Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.3 Dependent Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.4 Causal Chain of the ‘Strategic Preference’ Model . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Main Content. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2 Myanmar’s Contradictory Strategic Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 Myanmar’s ‘Integration’ Strategic Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Myanmar’s ‘Isolation’ Strategic Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Roots of Myanmar’s Opposing Strategic Preference . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 Independent Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2 National Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Geographical Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.4 Relative Political Isolation and Economic Integration. . . . . 32
2.4 Causes of the Significant Changes in Myanmar’s Strategic
Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3 Swung to China: Myanmar’s China Policy (1988–2004). . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Fierce Sino-US Political Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 U.S. Threats and China’s Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Stable Domestic Politics but Rising External Threats . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Khin Nyunt’s Mixed Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Myanmar’s Assessment of External Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
v
vi Contents
3.6 Engaged with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.6.1 Frequent High-Level Visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.6.2 Close Trade Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.6.3 Increasing Chinese Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6.4 Deepened Defence Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.7 Expanded Diplomatic Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4 Alienated from China: Myanmar’s China Policy (2005–2010) . . . . . 69
4.1 Moderate Sino-US Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Low-Level U.S. Threats and Rising Chinese Interference . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Domestic Turbulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Than Shwe: Conservative Leader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Myanmar’s Assessment of External Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.6 Alienated from China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6.1 Declining Political Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6.2 Increasing Economic Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.6.3 Less Defence Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.7 Withdrew from the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5 Hedged Against China: Myanmar’s China Policy (2011–2015). . . . . 97
5.1 Increasing Sino-US Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Rising Chinese Pressures and Multiple Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3 Stable Politics but Rising Ethnic and Religious Tensions . . . . . . . 102
5.4 Thein Sein: Reformist Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.5 Myanmar’s Assessment of External Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.6 Hedged Against China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6.1 Reduced Chinese Investments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6.2 Repaired Damaged Bilateral Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.6.3 Deteriorated Military Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.7 Balanced China’s Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.7.1 Expanded Economic Partnership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.7.2 Diversified Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.7.3 Strengthened Defence Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6 Approached to China: Myanmar’s China Policy (2016–2020) . . . . . 135
6.1 Rising Tensions in SCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.2 U.S. Criticism and China’s Assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.3 Increasing Domestic Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4 Aung San Suu Kyi: Democratic Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.5 Min Aung Hlaing: Conservative Leader. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.6 Myanmar’s Assessment of External Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Contents vii
6.7 Approached to China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.7.1 Revived Close Bilateral Economic Relations. . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.7.2 Properly Handled the Myitsone Dam Conundrum . . . . . . . 146
6.7.3 Built Myanmar-China Community with a Shared Future. . . 151
6.7.4 Sought China’s Assistance to Address Rohingya Crisis . . . 153
6.7.5 Cooperated with China on Ethnic Issue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.8 Continued to Counterbalance China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.8.1 Active Neighbourhood Diplomacy and Multilateralism . . . 158
6.8.2 Promoted Regional Economic Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.8.3 Enhanced Military Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Conclusions ... .... .... .... ..... .... .... .... .... .... ..... .... 175
About the Author
Dr. Nian Peng is the Deputy Director and Associate
FellowoftheResearch Centre forMaritimeSilk Road,
National Institute for South China Sea Studies
(NISCSS), Haikou, PRC. He holds a Ph.D. in
Government and International Studies at Hong Kong
BaptistUniversity.Hismainresearchinterestsareinthe
areas of China-Southeast (South) Asia relations, BRI,
maritime security of the Indo-Pacific. He authored the
book“LengZhanHouYinMianGuanXiYanJiu冷战
后印缅关系研究” [A Study on Indo-Myanmar
Relations after the Cold-War] (Beijing: Shi Shi Chu
Ban She [Current Affairs Press], 2017). His refereed
articles have been notably published in Asian Affairs,
Dong Nan Ya Yan Jiu 东南亚研究 [Southeast Asian
Studies], Nan Ya Yan Jiu 南亚研究 [South Asian
Studies],NanYaYanJiuJiKan南亚研究季刊[South
Asian Studies Quarterly]. He also contributes his
perspectives to various local and international media
outletssuchasAsiaCentre(France),EastAsianForum
(Australia), Lian He Zao Bao 联合早报 (Singapore),
Zhong Guo Ping Lun Xin Wen 中国评论新闻 (China
Review News Agency, Hong Kong), CGTN and Global
Times (China). He can be contacted via email:
[email protected].
ix
Abbreviations
AA Arakan Army
ACD Asia Cooperation Dialogue
ACTI ASEAN Connectivity for Trade and Investment
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BCIM-EC Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor
BCP Burma Communist Party
BGF Border Guard Forces
BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation
BOT Build–Operate–Transfer
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures
in Asia
CITIC China International Trust and Investment Corporation
CMC Central Military Commission
CMEC China–Myanmar Economic Corridor
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
COC Code of Conduct in the SCS
CORPAT India–Myanmar Coordinated Patrol Exercise
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPIC China Power Investment Corporation
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
CREC China Railway Engineering Corporation
DDSI Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence
DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS
E3 Expanded Economic Engagement
xi
xii Abbreviations
ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FIL Foreign Investment Law
FONOPs Freedom of Navigation Operations
GMS Greater Mekong Subregion Cooperation
GSP Generalized System of Preferences
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICOE Independent Commission of Enquiry
IMBAX India-Myanmar Bilateral Army Exercise
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMNEX India-Myanmar Naval Exercise
IR International Relations
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KDNG Kachin Development Networking Group
KIA Kachin Independence Army
KNLA Karen National Liberation Army
KNU Karen National Union
KOGAS Korea Gas Corp
LMI Lower Mekong Initiative
MEIC Myanmar Export and Import Corporation
MFTB Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank
MICC Myanmar International Conference Center
MNDAA Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army
MOGE Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NAM Non-Alignment Movement
NCA National Ceasefire Agreement
NDF National Democratic Force
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NLD National League for Democracy
NPCSC National People’s Congress Standing Committee
NRPC National Reconciliation and Peace Center
NUP National Unity Party
ODA Official Development Assistance
ONGC India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corp
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration
PLA People’s Liberation Army
QUAD Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RNDP Rakhine Nationalities Development Party
SCS South China Sea
SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council
SNDP Shan Nationalities Democratic Party
SPDC State Peace and Development Council
