International Politics and German History: The Past Informs the Present

189 Pages·1997·1.09 MB·English

by  Theodore S. Hamerow

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
AND GERMAN HISTORY

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
AND GERMAN HISTORY
The Past Informs the Present
EDITED BY
DAVID WETZEL AND THEODORE S. HAMEROW
Westport, Connecticut
London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
International politics and German history : the past informs the
present / edited by David Wetzel and Theodore S. Hamerow.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–275–95749–7 (alk. paper)
1. Germany—History. 2. Germany—Foreign relations.
3. International relations. 4. World politics. I. Wetzel, David.
II. Hamerow, Theodore S.
DD112.I57 1997
943.08—DC21 96–39840
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright  1997 by David Wetzel and Theodore S. Hamerow
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be
reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 96–39840
ISBN: 0–275–95749–7
First published in 1997
Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this book complies with the
Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984).
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To
Gordon A. Craig
Again

Contents
Introduction
David Wetzel and Diethelm Prowe 1
1. Does the History of International Politics Go Anywhere?
Paul W. Schroeder 15
2. The Diplomatic Revolution of Our Time
Paul Gordon Lauren 37
3. Monarchy, Court, and Society in Constitutional Prussia
David E. Barclay 59
4. Karl Lamprecht: A Historian’s History
Roger Chickering 75
5. “Der Bund für Bürgerrechte”: Transnational Relations and the
Problem of Democratization in West Germany, 1949–1954
Hermann-Josef Rupieper 87
6. German Unity and Military Professionalism: The Officer
Corps of the German Armed Forces Confronts the Legacy of
the Nationale Volksarmee, November 1989–January 1993
Donald Abenheim 103
7. Reflections on the German Question
Gaines Post, Jr. 127
Afterword: Gordon A. Craig and the Old-Fashioned Way of
Doing History
David Wetzel and Theodore S. Hamerow 147
Selected Bibliography 161
viii Contents
Index 171
About the Editors and Contributors 179
Introduction
David Wetzel and Diethelm Prowe
Historians have been writing diplomatic history for a long time, indeed ever
since they penetrated the archives of state. Leopold von Ranke spent the
most productive days of his life poring over the state papers of the republic
of Venice. Albert Sorel wrote a masterpiece, Europe and the French Revolution
(1875), which showed even in its title that the two events were linked. C. K.
Webster reached the same supreme level in his study of The Foreign Policy
of Castlereagh (1925). These historians and others like them set out to write
history out of the foreign office archives. But they had a more important
task. They claimed to be able to write about contemporary events with the
same detachment as if they were treating more remote periods. The claim
may have been justified, but it would be foolish to pretend that the sudden
interest in contemporary events was detached or “scientific.” It was forced
on them by the First World War and particularly over preoccupation with
the question of “war guilt.” Had Bismarckian peace endured, it is doubtful
whether the twentieth century would have shown as much concern with
diplomatic history.
The years between the settlement of 1919 and Hitler’s victory in 1933
were the great days of the “pure” diplomatic historian. People wanted to
understand the contemporary world; historians assured them that they
could do so if all diplomatic secrets were revealed. The result proved
disappointing. For the most part the documents confirmed what the histo-
rians had in mind before they started to write: The Germans demonstrated
that they had not caused the war; Soviet historians continued to blame
capitalist imperialism; and the cynical were convinced that all statesmen
had lurched from one blunder to another.
Thus began the great doubts about diplomatic history. It was not merely
that historians had missed some revelation, or were being denied some
material. They were asking the wrong questions. They had to turn from the