Table Of ContentScientific Series
''International Migration o f Population:
Russia and the Contemporary World"
Volume 28
INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION OF POPULATION
AND DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT
-PROSPEKT I
2014
УДК 314.7
ББК60.7
М43
Scientific Series " International Migration of Population:
Russia and the Contemporary World"
Volume 28
Editoral Board:
V. Iontsev (Editor-in-Chief),
L Ivakhnyuk (Executive Secretary), L AIeshkovsky, G. Ananyeva,
E. Krassinets A. Magomedova V. Petrov, L. Rybakovsky,
1 1
Y. Prokhorova, D. Coleman (Great Britain), G. Kumskov (Kyrgyzstan),
I. Pribytkova (Ukraine), Z. Ragimova (Azerbaijan), M. Tolz (Israel)
M43 International Migration of Popu 1 ation and Demographic Development
/ Scientific Series "International Migration of Population: Russia and
the Contemporary World" / Edited by V. Iontsev. — Moscow : Prospekt
j
2014. — VoL 28. — 108
ISBN 978-5-392-15909-3
The 28th volume of the series "International Migration of Population: Russia and the
Contemporary World" is dedicated to one of the most important issues of demographic
development, namely, the role of international migration in this development.
This edition contains articles that examine different sides to this role. It is about the
theory of demographic transition, and the impact of migration on the reproduction of the
population, and the role of mixed families (where one of the spouses worker), the impact of
migration on demographic development, etc.
The authors are responsible for the reliability of data and other materials used. The
series is both of scientific and educational character and can be accordingly used in
teaching process.
Please refer for electronic version of the present and previous volumes at the Department
of Population (Faculty of Economics of the Lomonosov Moscow State University) web
site www.demostudy.ru in the "Library" Section.
© Faculty of Economics
of the Lomonosov
ISBN 978-5-392-15909-3 Moscow State University, 2014
Contents1
Introduction 4
TVibune of Scientist
Paul Demeny
Geopolitical Aspectsof Population in the Twenty-First Century 6
David Coleman
Migrants and migration in Europe in the 21st Century —
trends, policies and the future 22
Dalkhal Ediev, David Coleman, Sergei Scherbov
New measures of population reproduction for an Era of high migration ., . .49
Giampaolo Lanzieri
Two Projectionsby Foreign/National Background
for Twenty-Seven European Countries 50
Vladimir Ionlsev YuIia Prokhorova
1
International migration of population and nuptiality in the light
of the concept of the fourth demographic transition 78
Young Researchers' Studies
Dmitriy Savelenko
The impact of international labor migration on demographic
development of Iaborexporting countries 86
Scientific Life Reviews
International Conference Demographic Development: Challenges
of Globalization (The Seventh Valenteevskiye Chteniya)
(Moscow, Russia, 15-17 November 2012) 93
The XXVII International Population Conference,
Busan Korea August 2013 97
1 1
International Conference «Intermarriage through history*
(Cluj-Napoka, Romania) 100
Book reviews
Cross-border Marriage. Global Trends and Diversity
(Edited by Doo-Sub Kim) 102
What is integration of migrants and how to elaborate
migration policy in anti-immigrant times? IOS
Notesaboutauthors 108
The articles of the present volume are arranged in alphabetic order.
Introduction
In the 28th volume of the scientific series international Migration of
Population; Russia and contemporary world» we return to the initial structure
of the contents, namely, besides the section «Articles», which presents con
tributions of well-known researchers of international migration, the further
volumes will include the section «Young Researchers' Studies» assigned for
papers of students and post-graduate students; the section ^Scientific Life
Reviews» with information about international conferences and workshops
dealing with cross-border migration issues; and the section «Book Reviews».
We believe that the theme ofthe 28th volume is really urgent forthe
contemporary world and many particular nations. The role of inter
national migration is especially topical for more developed countries,
most of which are facing demographic crisis. The main point of the
demographic crisis relates to both quantitative and qualitative shifts in
populations. From the demographic perspective, this is the worsening of
reproductive health, which is the result of destructive life-style; negative
changes in reproduction behavior and attitudes towards child-bearing;
assumption of the «child-free» model; encouragement of same-sex mar
riages, which lead to a demographic deadlock, etc.
The modern population development inevitably puts a question whether
the existing demographic problems can be solved by means of international
migration, followed by another question: can inflow of immigrants result in
replacement of local populations by newcomers? These questions stimulate
a variety of investigations related to the role of international migration in
demographic development. Some of them are represented in this volume.
The paper by Paul Demeny which is the first paper ofthe book may
seem not to be closely related to the issue of international migration but
its major conclusion deserves attention: without consideration of the role
of international migration it is hardly possible to evaluate geopolitical
aspects of population in the twenty-first century.
The second article1 deals with analysis of one of scenarios of the
future global population development which is closely related to the core
1 The articles in the book are arranged in alphabetical order
Introduciior 5
idea ofthe «forth demographic transition* concept. The key point of this
concept is formation of the «new population* consisting of children born
from marriages between immigrants and locals. This concept calls for
policy aimed at encouragement of mixed (inter-national, inter-ethnic,
etc.) marriages. It is worth noting that this theme is becoming the focus
ofthe growing number of researchers worldwide. One of examples, the
book edited by Doo-Sub Kim, is presented in this volume in the section
«Book Reviews*.
Very close topic is developed in the article by Italian researcher
D. Lanzieri: taking the sample of 27 countries of the European Union
he analyzes the role of mixed families in demographic development of
these countries and makes it the basement for population projections.
The contribution of David Coleman professor ofthe Oxford Uni
1
versity is also interesting in this context. Since 2006, he elaborates the
«third demographic transition* concept, which has encouraged research
of demographic prospects of more developed countries and the role of
migrants inflow. The new paper by David Coleman continues his studies
in this field.
The article by Dalkhat Ediev, David Coleman and Sergey Scherbov
deserves particular attention because in contrast to many other papers
dealing with the impact of international migration on fertility, mortality
and reproduction of population, the authors go deeply in this issue by
elaborating a number of original indexes designed to give exact evalua
tion of this impact.
In the «Young Researchers' Studies» section, the paper by Dmitry
Savelenko is focused on the impact of international labor migration on the
demographic development of the countries which experience large-scale
outflow of labor force, i.e. population in most active reproductive age.
Negative demographic aspects of this process were highlighted already
by Alfred Sauvy in his «General Theory of Population* in the 1950s.
The issues identified in the papers of this volume are both of theo
retical and applied importance, and they call for further investigation.
This volume is published with financial support ofthe Faculty of
Economics of the Lomonosov Moscow State University, which partially
sponsors publishing of the scientific series International Migration of
Population: Russia and contemporary world»,
Vladimir lontsev,
Editor-in-Chief of the series
T R I B U N E O F S C I E N T I S T
Paul Demeny
GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Throughout much of human history, population — characterized,
above all, by its size — was a distinctly minor determinant of geopolitical
weigh and power in relations between peoples. Indeed, when differences
were measured in terms of political organization, social cohesion, and
technological and military prowess — as expressed by the ill-defined
but nevertheless well-understood modern concept denoting the level of
economic development — population size mattered very little.
The modern age, if we date it from the fifteenth century, provides
convincing illustrations of this proposition. European countries with
relatively small populations, like the Netherlands or Portugal, could with
relative ease acquire geographically distant possessions, greatly exceeding
the mother countries in size of territory and population. And a small,
and by today's standards underpopulated, European island, England,
became the center of a vast empire with large colonial populations over
which the sun never set. What mattered was not relative demographic size
but superior technology and institutional and organizational structures.
In some instances expansion was of course facilitated by relative
demographic weakness in some of the territories not yet conquered.
A handful of British settlers could take possession of a near-empty North
American continent. Czarist Russia became a country stretching from
the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. But in conflicts between nations of
comparable levels of development, population became an increasingly
important factor. During the Napoleonic wars, the relative size ofthe
populations that could be mobilized was a crucial determinant of the
outcome. Within Europe, some fifty years later, the shifting power bal-
PatJl Demeny. Geopolitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty-First Century 7
ance between France and a now united and ascending Germany reflected
a shifting balance between population sizes. Andinthe two world wars of
the first half ofthe twentieth century between the then dominant powers
of the modern world — all located in the Northern Hemisphere — the
combined relative demographic size ofthe opposed parties also reflected
a superiority of the size of industrial capacities and access to natural
resources. The far greater relative population size of the powers allied
to defeat the expansionist objectives first of Imperial, and in the second
round of Nazi, Germany (and one should add here also the ambitions of
Imperial Japan) was of decisive importance.
But rny topic is not an examination of history and the geopolitical
importance in it of the population factor. What I focus on is the contem
porary world and its perspectives for the twenty-first century, or, more
modestly, for the coming decades. This cannot be done without a glance
back to what happened after the end of World War II.
Forsome forty-five years, economic and political power remained, as
it was in the preceding several centuries, disproportionately «Northern».
History continued to revolve around Europe, if that concept includes that
now well-grown-up daughter of the Old Continent, the United States. Or
at least so it seemed. That Northern world was divided into two parts by
an Iron Curtain. The powers on the two sides were armed to the teeth,
one dominated by the military and industrial might ofthe Soviet Union,
the other by the United States. The enmity between these opponents,
representing two very different political and economic systems, seemed
unresolvable and ominous, menacing another conflagration with incal
culable consequences.
Yet the ominousness of this division, and the potential military
conflict between the East and the West of that Northern world, were
tempered by the fact that war between the two sides was never in the
perceived interest of either side. Thus, in sharp contrast to Europe's
experience in the first half of the twentieth century, peace was preserved
between the great powers during the second half, post-1945. Wasteful as
the long-standing competition between the two sides was in economic
terms, this peace, once the immediate postwar reconstruction was over,
brought fast advances in technological and economic development. This
was translated into an unprecedentedly rapid if uneven expansion of
incomes and general improvement in material well-being.
Despite widespread fears of a resumption of the sharp drop of fertility
experienced by European populations during the 1920s and 1930s, the
1950s brought a baby boom nearly everywhere in the North. Although, if
8 International Migration of Population and Demographic Development
at varying speed, a baby bust fairly soon returned, this temporary demo
graphic rejuvenation was a welcome development. It reflected, and indeed
contributed to, one of the driving forces of postwar economic expansion.
There were some positive occurrences in the domain of formal inter
national cooperation between countries, exemplified by the creation of
the United Nations. Dominated by the winners of the just-fought war, as
was itsprewarpredecessor, the League of Nations, the U N was neverthe
less global in participation. Principles of international coexistence and
cooperation were adopted and a charter of human rights was subscribed,
providing, at least pro-forma, guidelines for the foundations of a peaceful
world and for material progress.
During the decades of the Cold War, what was happening in the
globe s South seemed, from a European perspective, a side show of no
major consequences. De-colonization happened rapidly, one might say
to the general relief of the former colonial powers; a welcome freeing
from future formal responsibilities and obligations. The largest of prior
dependencies of Europe, India, became independent in 1947, and this
momentous change was followed by the creation of two dominantly
Islamic states, Bangladesh and Pakistan. In Africa and also in South
Asia and the Middle East ,scores of newly independent states emerged
with new names and with often freshly carved borders. Militaryclashes
often accompanied these developments. And as a sideline of US-Soviet
competition, there were wars in South East Asia, reflecting America's
concerns with extension of Communist China's influence, then seen as
a poor less developed country but one in close alliance with the Soviet
Union.
Yet the development that really changed the long-term geopoliti
cal map was not the birth of new sovereign states and newly delineated
frontiers: it was demographic change itself. With the rapid introduction
of Western medical interventions, mortality almost everywhere in the
global South fell precipitously, generating what was soon dubbed, infe-
licitously but not entirely unreasonably, a demographic explosion. With
fertility change understandably lagging behind the fall in death rates, just
as was the case in Europe's demographic transition, population growth
was rapid, indeed far more rapid than any of its historical precedents.
The speed of population increase experienced by the less developed world
also greatly exceeded the rate of growth generated by the Northern baby
boom. It was also more sustained.
Although I need not describe the resulting drastic transformation of
the world's demographic picture, a few illustrative figures are worth citing
Paul Demeny» Geopoiitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty-First Centurv 9
as a reminder. The world's population at mid-century was 2,5 billion.
By the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, this figure has more than
doubled. Today it is 7 billion. The vast majority of this huge expansion
of human numbers occurred in what was called the less developed world.
Europe's demographic weight within the global total shifted sharply
downward. Numerical proportions between countries in the «North»
and in the «South» changed markedly.
Germany (within its present territory, combining its former east
and west portions) is Western Europe's most populous country. Its 1950
population was 68 million. Today it is 82 million. Pakistan's population
in 1950 was 38 million. Today it exceeds 180 million. France is regarded
as one of Europe's signal success stories in demographic terms, albeit, like
Germany, its growth has been enhanced by large-scale net immigration.
The French figures for those two years, separated by some six decades,
are 42 million and 63 million. Compare this, for example, with Iran's
corresponding growth. There, the figures changed from 17 million in
1950 to 74 million in 2010.
By the early 1960s, the rapid acceleration of population numbers
driven by a widening gap between birth rates and death rates was clearly
perceived by the West, The main worry was manifested in an updated
Malthusian concern. Would rapid population growth defeat efforts for
social-political modernization and consequent economic development?
Could the resulting numbers be fed? Were other physical resources suf
ficient to sustain such rapid population growth? Would the expansion be
moderated and eventually halted by rising mortality?
The needed medicine was identified as a reduction of fertility. Pro
grams were initiated by the United States and other Western countries
as part of official foreign aid to spread modern methods of birth control.
Organizations from the private sector also became active participants
in such efforts. There was plenty of evidence, it was said, that couples in
less developed countries were not as competent as Europeans in practic
ing effective family limitation in the era preceding the pill. Provision of
modern birth control methods through organized programs, advocates
of such programs asserted, would solve this problem.
There were critics who saw these efforts as inspired by fear within the
West of growth in countries ofthe so-called Third World. Yet advocates
of these programs were in fact motivated by the best intentions to help
economically backward low-income populations. Sustained rapid popu
lation growth, especially in countries already populous and not richly
endowed by natural resources that would command ready demand on
10 International Migration of Population and Demographic Development
world markets, can in fact be a major hindrance to economic develop
ment. This understanding was reached after many agonizing scientific
and political debates and elicited intermittent dissenting criticisms. By
the late 1960s it emerged as a clear majority opinion of policymakers and
development economists.
That this perception of the deleterious effects of rapid population
growth on economic development was not a malevolent imperialist
invention received clear conformation in, of all places, Communist
China. China's post-Мао leadership was vehemently growth-oriented,
and it saw the danger posed by rapid population growth in the same light
as did Western analysts. It decided to apply brakes in a fashion that was
hardly conceivable in any other society or in any other political system.
In 1979, the «one-childpolicy» was introduced as a measure considered
necessary to counteract the negative economic consequences of rapid
population growth. After more than three decades, this policy, though
in a slightly relaxed form, is still in effect. It resulted in sharply reduced
rates of fertility, with clear short- and medium-term economic and social
benefits for the country.
On the individual level, in the rest of the economically less developed
world (as was also the case in China), access to efficient birth control
methods was no doubt a blessing for those who were ready voluntarily to
accept them. But the underlying rationale for the programs, that such
access alone would make a big difference, was indeed a wrong prognosis.
That a large proportion of children born in high-fertility countries are
«unwantedbirths» was a grossly invalid assumption. To reduce fertility by
voluntarily restricting their fertility, individual couples have to perceive
that a smaller family is an advantage both to them and to their children.
That crucial perception, as was the case in all historical precedents of fer
tility decline, is the driving force in achieving loweraggregate birth rates.
Changing preferences concerning the number of children desired are
generated by successful economic development and its underlying fac
tors: industrialization, urbanization, and adoption of successful models
from othercountries of more advanced social, educational, and political
institutions. Within that context, female emancipation and increased ac
cess of women to education and their entry as equals into modern sectors
of the labor force are especially important. The introduction of modern
technologies and increased interaction with the outside world through
international trade and exposure to lifestyles and consumption levels
achieved in countries enjoying higher levels of income are also powerful
generators of lower fertility.
