Intelligence success and failure: the human factor

281 Pages·2017·2.244 MB·English

by  Bar-Joseph Uri, McDermott Rose

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Advanced Praise for Intelligence Success and Failure
“Psychological dysfunctions have long been a preoccupation of post-
mortems on intelligence failures. Bar-Joseph and McDermott contribute
important insights of this sort regarding failures in warning and response.
More importantly, however, they go further to apply them in powerful
ways to the all-too neglected dimension of intelligence studies: cases of
success in assessment and decision. Their study provides new perspectives
on old cases and useful lessons for future analysts.”
Richard K. Betts, Director, Saltzman Institute of War
and Peace Studies, Columbia University,
and author of Enemies of Intelligence
“This fascinating book, based on a series of important case studies,
moves the reader squarely into the realm of psychology—a discipline too
often ignored in political science and national security studies—as these
outstanding authors search for reasons why some policymakers are unable
to understand and cope with indicators that point toward an incipient
surprise attack.”
Dr. Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of
International Affairs, University of Georgia
“This finely crafted study makes a major contribution to the intelligence
literature. It is an extraordinary combination of theory and historical
detail that enriches and adds a new dimension to our understanding of
intelligence and deterrence failure.”
James J. Wirtz, Dean, School of International
Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School
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Intelligence Success and Failure
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Intelligence Success
and Failure
The Human Factor
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Uri Bar- Joseph and Rose McDermott
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© Oxford University Press 2017
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ISBN 978– 0– 19– 934173– 3 (hbk)
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In memory of Alexander George,
Michael Handel, and Amos Tversky,
and the ever vital presence of Robert Jervis.
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1
PART I: The Theoretical Framework
1. Surprise Attack: A Framework for Discussion 9
a. The concept and the context 9
b. Surprise attacks: success and failure 13
c. Surprise attacks: academic comparative studies 17
d. Pearl Harbor: uniqueness and methodological implications 19
e. Warning failures: the human factor 25
2. Examining the Learning Process 27
a. Psychological factors 29
i. Psychological factors and the learning process 29
ii. Social psychological factors: universal contributions 31
b. Unique psychological issues 41
i. Personality style: openness 42
ii. Narcissism 45
c. Applying the learning process to examine the nature
of failure and success 48
PART II: The Empirical Evidence
3. The First Dyad: Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow 53
Introduction 53
Case Study I: The Failure 56
a. Hitler’s road to war 56
b. The Soviet surprise 61
i. The Soviet intelligence assets 61
ii. The information 67
iii. Intelligence estimate and the decision-m aking process 74
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