Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War Two: The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43

273 Pages·2009·1.91 MB·English

by  Brad William Gladman (auth.)

Intelligence and
Anglo-American Air
Support in World War Two
The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43
Brad William Gladman
Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in
World War Two
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Intelligence and
Anglo-American Air
Support in World War Two
The Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43
Brad William Gladman
Strategic Analyst, Operational Research and Analysis, Canada Command
Headquarters
© Brad William Gladman 2009
Foreword © John Ferris
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2009 978-0-230-22133-8
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2009 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-349-30684-8 ISBN 978-0-230-59512-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230595125
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the
country of origin.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gladman, Brad William.
Intelligence and Anglo-American air support in World War Two : the
Western Desert and Tunisia, 1940–43 / Brad William Gladman.
p. cm. – (Studies in military and strategic history)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. World War, 1939–1945–Aerial operations, British. 2. World War,
1939–1945–Aerial operations, American. 3. World War, 1939–1945–
Military intelligence—Great Britain. 4. World War, 1939–1945–Military
intelligence—United States. 5. World War, 1939–1945–Campaigns–
Egypt–Western Desert. 6. World War, 1939–1945–Campaigns–Tunisia.
7. Close air support–History. I. Title.
D786.G54 2009
940.54’2311–dc22 2008029972
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09
For my parents, Betty and Bert Gladman,
and my loving wife Lynn.
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Contents
List of Maps viii
Forewordby John Ferris ix
Acknowledgements xv
List of Abbreviations xvi
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 The Fall and Rise of Air Support Doctrine 19
Chapter 2 Air Support from ‘Compass’ to ‘Crusader’ 41
Chapter 3 Air Support between ‘Crusader’ and the 74
Consolidation of the El Alamein Line
Chapter 4 Air Support during Alam Halfa and El Alamein 99
Chapter 5 The Pursuit from El Alamein to Tunisia 116
Chapter 6 Air Support during Operation ‘Torch’ 131
Chapter 7 Air Support after the Reorganization of 152
February 1943
Conclusions 179
Notes 192
Bibliography 233
Index 244
vii
List of Maps
Map 2.1 Wavell’s Offensive 1940–41 48
Map 2.2 Rommel’s First Offensive in 1941 57
Map 2.3 Operation ‘Crusader’ 1941 68
Map 3.1 Rommel’s Second Offensive, 1942 75
Map 3.2 Gazala 1942 91
Map 3.3 Gazala ‘The Cauldron’ 1942 93
Map 5.1 The Pursuit to Tunisia 117
Map 5.2 The Pursuit to Tunisia – Missed Opportunities 126
Map 6.1 Operation ‘Torch’ 8 November 1942 134
Map 6.2 Algeria and Tunisia 1942 140
Map 6.3 Tunisia 1942–43 147
Map 7.1 The Battle of Kasserine Pass 167
Map 7.2 Tunisia January–February 1943 168
Map 7.3 Tunisia March–April 1943 170
Map 7.4 Final Allied Offensive in Tunisia, May 1943 175
viii
Foreword
Intelligence and Anglo-American Air Support in World War II is a major con-
tribution to the study of airpower and military operations. For decades,
issues like C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence),
ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), C4ISR (command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance), air-land battle and strike warfare, have been central to
ideas about war. Characteristically, they have been treated as new mat-
ters, and as separate ones. In fact, they are interrelated. C3I, or C4ISR,
combine signals and data processing technology; command as thought,
process and action; the training of people; and individual and bureau-
cratic modes of learning. They shape operations and strike warfare, the
way that generals command, formations act, and firepower hits. These
matters, as parts and whole, also have a history. Strike warfare was prac-
ticed effectively by 1917, while air-land battle characterised operations
in Europe and Africa between 1939–45. This history rarely is treated as
a topic in its own right. Brad Gladman does so.
1914 witnessed a head-on collision between mass armies and novel
military characteristics: unprecedented force to space ratios, reinforce-
ment capabilities, and firepower; the General Staff system; new modes of
communication and intelligence, particularly radio, aerial reconnais-
sance, imagery and signals intelligence; and the rise of weapons firing at
targets moving fast at long range, or else beyond the sight of their oper-
ators, and thus forced to use directing systems and predictive fire. This
crash produced complex relations between command, weapons, forces
and operations. Between 1914–18, C3I was well suited to support opera-
tions, better than forces were to fight them. Problems of signals and com-
mand declined faster than did those of action, as forces were dogged by
high force to space ratios on narrow fronts, fire which could kill but not
move, and advance limited to the speed of foot or hoof. Operations often
worked as planned, far more than ever before, but only if many things
went right at once, which was harder to do than in 1940, when forces
were aided by mobile firepower, radio and the internal combustion
engine. Where force to space ratios were at their lowest, as on the east-
ern front and in the Middle East, breakthrough, exploitation and
manoeuvre were possible, but far less so on the western front.
Conversely, systems of C3I and ISR filled the tactical needs of strike
ix