Table Of ContentINSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY
General Editors: W. Leinfellner (Vienna) and G. Eberlein (Munich)
Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences
Series B: Mathematical and Statistical Methods
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SERIES A: PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOLUME 33
Series Editor: W. Leinfellner (Technical University of Vienna), G. Eberlein (Technical University of
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INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
An Essay on the Virtues of Cooperation
by
BRUNO VERBEEK
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
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SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-6026-6 ISBN 978-94-015-9982-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5
Printed on acid-free paper
AH Rights Reserved
© 2002 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2002
Softcover reprint of the hardcover lst edition 2002
No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording
or otherwise, without written permis sion from the Publisher, with the exception
of any material supplied specificaHy for the purpose of being entered
and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.
For Cecilia and Nico
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction 1
1.1 Norms 1
1.2 Rationality in action 2
1.3 Norms and rationality 4
1.4 The plan of this work 5
CHAPTER2
Conventionalism and Moral Motives 9
2.1 The two theses of conventionalism 9
2.2 The scope of conventionalism 11
2.3 Characteristics of norms 16
2.4 Conventions of coordination 18
2.5 Intermezzo: learning by experience 25
2.6 More conventions: norms of property 30
2.7 Conventions of reciprocity 35
2.8 Salience 40
2.9 Salient payoffs 44
2.10 The conventional character of salience 48
2.11 Breaking the convention 51
2.12 Sanctions, stability, and social cost 56
2.13 Resentment 65
2.14 Moral force and resentment 67
2.15 Conclusions and prospects 73
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2: the production of sanctions 77
vii
CONTENTS
Vlll
CHAPTER3
Motives for Unconditional Cooperation 85
3.1 A first objection 85
3.2 Altruism 86
3.3 Altruistic cooperation and norm compliance 93
3.4 A cooperative virtue? 99
3.5 Process-oriented preferences for cooperation 102
3.6 Kantianism 106
3.7 The categorical imperative 114
3.8 Kantianism rejected 119
3.9 Unconditional cooperation? 121
CHAPTER4
Motives for Conditional Cooperation: reciprocity, trust and fairness 125
4.1 Introduction 125
4.2 Reciprocity 126
4.3 Reciprocity and cooperation 130
4.4 Trust and trustworthiness 134
4.5 Trust and cooperation 137
4.6 The secondary nature of resentment 142
4.7 Exploitation, parasites, and free riders 145
4.8 Reciprocity and nonexploitation 152
4.9 Reciprocity and fairness 153
4.10 Summary and conclusions 157
CHAPTERS
Virtuous Motives: restraint and spontaneity 159
5.1 Introduction 159
5.2 Aristotle on virtues 160
5.3 Kant on virtues 162
5.4 Hume on virtues 166
5.5 Foot on the virtues 170
5.6 Conclusion 175
CHAPTER6
Evolution of the Cooperative Virtues: an indirect justification 177
6.1 Introduction 177
6.2 The theory of evolution 183
6.3 For the benefit of the group 189
6.4 For the benefit of kin 192
CONTENTS ix
6.5 For mutual benefit 195
6.6 The commitment model 199
6.7 The role of signals in the commitment model 205
6.8 The reliability of signals 208
6.9 How convincing is evolutionary theory? 214
CHAPTER 7
The Rationality of Plans: requirements of dynamic choice 217
7.1 Introduction 217
7.2 Plans and dynamic choice 218
7.3 Can SR, NEC, DC, and SEP always be satisfied? 222
7.4 Three responses 225
7.5 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SR 228
7.6 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: NEC 229
7.7 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: DC 231
7.8 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SEP 235
7.9 SEP and personal identity 239
7.10 On myopia, sophistication, and resoluteness 243
7.11 Changing preferences and the need for commitment 245
7.12 Conclusion 246
CHAPTERS
The Rationality of Strategic Intentions:
a justification of the cooperative virtues 249
8.1 Introduction 249
8.2 The planning theory of intentions 249
8.3 Strategic intentions and the prisoners' dilemma 255
8.4 Limitations of the argument 263
8.5 Conclusions and further issues 268
References 273
Index 283
PREFACE
Many academic authors incur debts in the production of their work, many
of which are intellectual. I am no exception. One of my intellectual debts is
to three remarkable books, which formed the starting point for my thinking
about norms. The first of these books is well known among philosophers:
David Lewis' Convention. In vintage Lewisian prose, the book gives a lucid
and convincing conventionalist analysis of semantic norms. The second
book is Govert den Hartogh's 1985 dissertation Wederkerige
Verwachtingen (Mutual Expectations). Partly because it was written in
Dutch - my native tongue -partly because of the occasionally impenetrable
style, it never got the attention it deserves. In that book, Den Hartogh
extends Lewis' analysis of semantic norms to moral norms. Den Hartogh
introduced the notion of cooperative virtues that is the focus of much of
this book. The third book is a book on economics, largely ignored by
economists, which only lately has started to receive some recognition
among philosophers: Robert Sugden's The Economics of Rights, Co
operation and Welfare. Sugden's book explains the emergence and stability
of norms in terms of social evolution. Though all three books develop a
conventionalist account of norms, their arguments and constructions are
very different. Lewis and Den Hartogh take the picture of rational man
deliberating about his course of action very serious; Sugden rejects this
picture as unrealistic and unnecessary. Lewis and Sugden argue the
salience is primitive and necessary for the emergence of norms; Den
Hartogh rejects the importance of salience. Sugden and Den Hartogh
develop a conventionalist account of rules in games other than coordination
games; Lewis believed this was not possible. These agreements and
differences formed the fertile soil for the gestation of this book.
In addition to books, I have debts to people. I owe Govert den Hartogh.
This book is based on my 1998 dissertation and Den Hartogh was my
supervisor. In the course of my studies with him, it became clear we
disagree fundamentally about some of the basic ideas in this work.
However, he has always been fair and sympathetic to my arguments. He
was quick to point out their weaknesses as well as possible ways to
xi
xii PREFACE
strengthen the conclusions. His unwavering support for me until this day is
a constant source of gratitude, respect, inspiration, and - indeed - debt.
I have had numerous discussions with several people about the themes in
this dissertation. Without exception, these exchanges have proven to be
illuminating and helpful. My friend and mentor Ned McClennen needs
special mentioning, as do Robert Sugden and the late Jean Hampton. In
addition, I need to acknowledge Don Bruckner, Eric Cave, Maarten
Franssen, Maarten Janssen, the late Gregory Kavka, Bill Kline, Tom May,
Christopher Morris, and Michael Robins. Gijs van Donselaar and Peter
Rijpkema have been constant companions at the University of Amsterdam.
Over many cups of coffee, glasses of beer, and bottles of wine, we have
discussed each other's research in detail. One could not wish for a better
"philosophical laboratory" than Cafe De Jaren and these two.
Research for this book has been made possible through the generous
support of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO),
the Netherlands America Committee for Education Exchange, the
Fullbright Program, and the Debussy Foundation.
My most formidable debt, however, is not to these books or these people.
Instead, I have to declare my gratitude to two people who have been very
important at various stages of this project: Cecilia Nalagon and Nico
Verbeek. Cecilia corrected my limp English, copy-edited the entire
manuscript, advised me on the lay out, gave me important critique, cooked
me dinner - even at times I was supposed to prepare it -, and supported me
throughout. Nico has been a constant source of joy and a true blessing. This
book is dedicated to them.
Like all insolvent debtors, I cannot repay these debts. However, I hope to
avoid the sin of ingratitude as well as the greater sin of conceit by
acknowledging my many creditors. I would be but a poor pauper without
them.
Bruno Verbeek
Canberra
