Information Hiding: 8th International Workshop, IH 2006, Alexandria, VA, USA, July 10-12, 2006. Revised Selcted Papers

395 Pages·2007·8.12 MB·English

by  Patrick Bas

Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4437
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TakeoKanade
CarnegieMellonUniversity,Pittsburgh,PA,USA
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JonM.Kleinberg
CornellUniversity,Ithaca,NY,USA
FriedemannMattern
ETHZurich,Switzerland
JohnC.Mitchell
StanfordUniversity,CA,USA
MoniNaor
WeizmannInstituteofScience,Rehovot,Israel
OscarNierstrasz
UniversityofBern,Switzerland
C.PanduRangan
IndianInstituteofTechnology,Madras,India
BernhardSteffen
UniversityofDortmund,Germany
MadhuSudan
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,MA,USA
DemetriTerzopoulos
UniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles,CA,USA
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UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,CA,USA
MosheY.Vardi
RiceUniversity,Houston,TX,USA
GerhardWeikum
Max-PlanckInstituteofComputerScience,Saarbruecken,Germany
Jan L. Camenisch Christian S. Collberg
Neil F. Johnson Phil Sallee (Eds.)
Information Hiding
8th International Workshop, IH 2006
Alexandria, VA, USA, July 10-12, 2006
Revised Selcted Papers
1 3
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JanL.Camenisch
IBMResearch
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LNCSSublibrary:SL4–SecurityandCryptology
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Preface
These proceedings contain the 25 papers that were accepted for presentation at
the Eighth Information Hiding Conference, held July 10–12, 2006 in Old Town
Alexandria,Virginia.ThepaperswereselectedbytheProgramCommitteefrom
morethan70 submissionsonthe basis oftheir novelty,originality,andscientific
merit.Wearegratefultoallauthorswhosubmittedtheirworkforconsideration.
The papers were divided into ten sessions [Watermarking, Information Hiding
and Networking, Data Hiding in Unusual Content (2 sessions), Fundamentals,
Software Protection, Steganalysis, Steganography (2 sessions), and Subliminal
Channels],showingthe breadthofresearchinthe field.Thisyearwasanimpor-
tant one in the history of the IHW: “Workshop”wasdropped fromthe name to
showthatthefieldhasmaturedandthattheconferencehasbecomethepremier
venue for the dissemination of new results.
The conference employed a double-blind reviewing process. Each paper was
examinedby atleastthree reviewers.Paperssubmitted by ProgramCommittee
members were held to a higher standard. We relied on the advice of outside
colleagues and would like to extend our thanks for their contribution to the
paper selection process and their dedication to excellence in research.
We thank our sponsors Booz Allen Hamilton and Johnson & Johnson Tech-
nology Consultants for their financial and logistic support, including local ar-
rangements, printing the pre-proceedings, and organizing the registration. The
walkingtourofOldTownAlexandriaorganizedbyIraMoskowitzandthedessert
cruiseonboardtheMissChristinwereenjoyablehighlightsofthesocialprogram
and we thank the organizers!Roger Zimmermann helped to run the submission
server and without the help of Bjo¨rn Assmann you would not be holding these
proceedings in your hands. Thank you guys!
Finally, we wish to thank the many researchers who have contributed to
extending the state of the art for information hiding research and hope these
proceedings will be helpful for future developments.
January 2007 Jan Camenisch
Christian Collberg
Neil F. Johnson
Phil Sallee
Organization
Program Committee
Ross J. Anderson (University of Cambridge, UK)
Mauro Barni (Universita` di Siena, Italy)
Jack Brassil (HP Laboratories,USA)
Jan Camenisch (IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Switzerland)
Christian Collberg (University of Arizona, USA)
Ee-Chien Chang (National University of Singapore, Singapore)
Ingemar J. Cox (University College London, UK)
Jessica Fridrich (SUNY Binghamton, USA)
Neil F. Johnson (Booz Allen Hamilton and JJTC, USA)
John McHugh (SEI/CERT, USA)
Ira S. Moskowitz (Naval Research Laboratory,USA)
Stefan Katzenbeisser (Philips Research, The Netherlands)
Darko Kirovski(Microsoft Research, USA)
Richard C. Owens (University of Toronto, Canada)
Andreas Pfitzmann (Dresden University of Technology, Germany)
Phil Sallee (Booz Allen Hamilton, USA)
Michiel van der Veen (Philips Research, The Netherlands)
External Reviewers
Farid Ahmed Andrew Ker Dagmar Scho¨nfeld
Richard Bergmair Johannes Kinder Ashwin Swaminathan
Mike Bergmann Patty Lafferty Morton Swimmer
Rainer Boehme Aweke Lemma James Troupe
Roberto Caldelli Keye Martin Dan Wallach
Mehmet Celik Ginger Myles Andreas Westfeld
Massimiliano Corsini Alessandro Piva Greg Zaverucha
Scott Craver Mila dalla Preda Min Wu
Alessia De Rosa Victor Raskin
Shan He Antje Schneidewind
Susan Hohenberger Franz Schneidewind
Table of Contents
Hamiltonian Mechanics
Natural Watermarking: A Secure Spread Spectrum Technique for
WOA .......................................................... 1
Patrick Bas and Fran¸cois Cayre
An Improved Asymmetric Watermarking System Using Matrix
Embedding ..................................................... 15
Scott Craver
A Cryptographic Method for Secure Watermark Detection ............ 26
Michael Malkin and Ton Kalker
Steganographic Communication in Ordered Channels................. 42
R.C.Chakinala, A.Kumarasubramanian,R.Manokaran, G.Noubir,
C. Pandu Rangan, and R. Sundaram
Analyzing Network-Aware Active Wardens in IPv6................... 58
Grzegorz Lewandowski, Norka B. Lucena, and Steve J. Chapin
Video Watermarking by Using Geometic Warping
Without Visible Artifacts
Video Watermarking by Using Geometric Warping Without Visible
Artifacts........................................................ 78
Dima Pro¨frock, Mathias Schlauweg, and Erika Mu¨ller
Time-Scale InvariantAudio WatermarkingBasedon the Statistical
FeaturesinTimeDomain ......................................... 93
Shijun Xiang, Jiwu Huang, and Rui Yang
Content-Aware Steganography: About Lazy Prisoners and
Narrow-Minded Wardens.......................................... 109
Richard Bergmair and Stefan Katzenbeisser
Noisy Timing Channels with Binary Inputs and Outputs.............. 124
Keye Martin and Ira S. Moskowitz
A Computational Model for Watermark Robustness .................. 145
Andr´e Adelsbach, Stefan Katzenbeisser, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Hiding Information Hiding ........................................ 161
Adam Young and Moti Yung
VIII Table of Contents
Reversible Watermarking of NURBS-Based CAD Models.............. 172
Wolfgang Funk
A High-Capacity Data Hiding Method for PolygonalMeshes........... 188
Hao-tian Wu and Yiu-ming Cheung
Steganographyfor Radio Amateurs—A DSSS BasedApproachfor Slow
Scan Television .................................................. 201
Andreas Westfeld
Delayed and Controlled Failures in Tamper-Resistant Software......... 216
Gang Tan, Yuqun Chen, and Mariusz H. Jakubowski
A Model for Self-Modifying Code .................................. 232
Bertrand Anckaert, Matias Madou, and Koen De Bosschere
A Markov Process Based Approach to Effective Attacking JPEG
Steganography................................................... 249
Yun Q. Shi, Chunhua Chen, and Wen Chen
Batch Steganography and Pooled Steganalysis ....................... 265
Andrew D. Ker
On Steganographic Embedding Efficiency ........................... 282
Jessica Fridrich, Petr Lisonˇek, and David Soukal
Bandwidth Optimal Steganography Secure Against Adaptive Chosen
Stegotext Attacks................................................ 297
Tri Van Le and Kaoru Kurosawa
Modified Matrix Encoding Technique for Minimal Distortion
Steganography................................................... 314
Younhee Kim, Zoran Duric, and Dana Richards
Statistically Secure Anti-Collusion Code Design for Median Attack
Robustness for Practical Fingerprinting............................. 328
Jae-Min Seol and Seong-Whan Kim
A Collusion-Resistant Video Watermarking Scheme .................. 343
Amir Houmansadr and Shahrokh Ghaemmaghami
An Elliptic Curve Backdoor Algorithm for RSASSA .................. 355
Adam Young and Moti Yung
A Subliminal-Free Variant of ECDSA............................... 375
Jens-Matthias Bohli, Mar´ıa Isabel Gonza´lez Vasco, and
Rainer Steinwandt
Author Index.................................................. 389
Natural Watermarking: A Secure Spread
Spectrum Technique for WOA
Patrick Bas1,2 and Franc¸ois Cayre2
1 CIS / Helsinki Universityof Technology
P.O. Box 5400
FI-02015 HUTFINLAND
2 LIS/INPG
961, rue dela Houille Blanche BP 46
F-38042 St. Martin d’H`eres Cedex, France
Abstract. This paper presents a spread spectrum (SS) watermarking
techniquethatissecureagainstcarriersestimationinaWatermarkOnly
Attackframework.Afterreviewingthesufficientconditionstodesignse-
curealgorithmsforwatermarkingandsteganography,wepresentasetup
based on Blind Source Separation (BSS) theory to assess the lack of
security of classical SS techniques such as classical SS or ISS. We mo-
tivate a new SS watermarking algorithm called Natural Watermarking
(NW)wheretheestimationofthesecretcarriersisimpossibleandwhich
achieves perfect secrecy thanks to unchanged Gaussian distributions of
the secret carriers. The theoretical evaluation of the NW security is
carried out and the case of multi-bit embedding is addressed. Finally,
a robust extension of NW is presented and the properties of NW and
Robust-NWare both practically verified.
1 Introduction
Robustness,capacity andimperceptibility have alwaysbeen considered,since the
verybeginningofwatermarking,asthemainthreeconstraintstorespectinorder
to build a valuable watermarking scheme. Recently the watermarking commu-
nity has thrown light on the problem of security which appears also to be a
fundamental constraint to respect in order to guaranty the usability of a wa-
termarking technology. Several authors [1][2][3] showed that some information
about the secret key may leak from several observations of watermarked pieces
ofcontent.Usingthis information,itmaybe possibleto estimatethe secretkey,
and then to destroythe security of the consideredscheme by removing,copying
or altering the embedded messages. Several studies address also the security of
practical watermarking techniques for digital images [4][5].
In this paper, we tackle the problem of security for the well-known class of
spread spectrum (SS) watermarking schemes. In this case, the secret key which
practically is the seed of a random generator, corresponds to the set of secret
carriers that is used to convey the information. It is important to note that an
attacker does not need the seed used to initialiaze the random number genera-
tor: the secret carriers are good enough to attack the watermark.We propose a
J.Camenischetal.(Eds.):IH2006,LNCS4437,pp.1–14,2007.
(cid:2)c Springer-VerlagBerlinHeidelberg2007
2 P. Bas and F. Cayre
watermarkingschemethatis secure(e.g.itdoesnotofferinformationleakageof
the secret key) for the class of Watermark Only Attacks (WOA). This class of
attacks,proposedby [1], considers an attack that is basedon the observationof
watermarked contents, watermarked with the same key but conveying different
messages. We named the proposed scheme natural spread spectrum watermark-
ing because embedding is achieved without altering the natural distribution of
eachsecretcarrierbeforeandafterembedding.Asshowninthepaper,thischar-
acteristic enables to achieve perfect secrecy. Moreover,when embedding several
bits,weshowthatifeachcarrierisembeddedinthe contentswithanamplitude
following a Gaussian distribution, it is impossible to individually estimate the
carriers.
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. First, the security of clas-
sical SS techniques for WOA are analysed as a Blind Source Separation (BSS)
problem: in section 2 we show that the characterisation of the distributions of
each carrier for the observed contents enables to estimate the different carriers.
Section 3 presents the constraints,principles andcharacteristicsof NaturalWa-
termarking (NW). The embedding, decoding and distortion related to NW are
presentedandthe link with the ScalarCosta’sScheme,anotherscheme preserv-
ing perfect secrecy, is outlined. An extension of NW to increase the robustness
ispresentedinsection4,theimplicationsintermofsecurityarealsomentioned.
Section 5 presents a comparison between the estimations of the secret carriers
for different SS watermarking schemes including NW. We show that for NW it
is impossible to estimate the carriers. For Robust-NW only the estimation of
the watermark subspace is possible. Finally section 6 concludes this paper and
presents open research lines for future works.
2 Assessing the Security of Spread-Spectrum Techniques
Using BSS Techniques
2.1 Notations
Vectors are denoted in bold face (v) and coefficients of vectors with parenthesis
(v(i) is the coefficient number i in vector v). Matrices are denoted in capital
bold face and are generally composed of several realizations of vectors of the
same name, column-wise: the columns of V are several realizations v ...v of
1 N
a “template” vector v.
LetusdenotexthehostvectorofN coefficientsintowhichwewanttohidea
v
binarymessagevectormofN bits.Theresultingwatermarkedvectorisdenoted
c
y. To this aim,we use u orthogonalcarriers,1≤i≤N . The decodedmessage
i c
is denotedmˆ. It is to be estimated from y(cid:3), a potentially degradedversionof y.
Let us further denote z the correlation between a vector v and a carrier u :
v,ui i
1 (cid:2)Nv
z =<v|u >= v(k)u (k) (1)
v,ui i N i
v
k=1
Natural Watermarking: A SecureSpread SpectrumTechniquefor WOA 3
2.2 Information Theoretical Constraints for Perfect Secrecy
Perfect secrecy has different meanings according to the domain of application.
For steganography, perfect secrecy means the impossibility to distinguish be-
tween an original content (x) and a stego content (y). Cachin studied the nec-
essary conditions to obtain a secure steganographic scheme and claims that a
scheme is secure if the Kullback-Leibler divergence D between the distribu-
KL
tions P and P of x and y is null. The quantity D is defined by:
x y KL
(cid:2) P (i)
D (P ||P )= P (i)log x (2)
KL x y x P (i)
y
i
whichmeansthatperfectsecrecymaybeachievedifandonlyifthedistributions
ofxandy areidentical.Apracticalimplementationofasteganographicscheme
satisfying the perfect secrecy constraint has been proposed in [6].
Forrobustwatermarking,theproblemdoesnotconcernapossibledistinction
between the original and the watermarkedcontent: it is not important to know
wether a content is watermarked or not, but is it important not to disclose the
secret carriers based on observations of pieces of watermarked contents. The
concept of information leakage in the context of robust watermarking has been
proposedin [1] and developedin [2][3]. The notion of informationleakage stems
fromthedefinitionofthemutualinformationbetweenN watermarkedcontents
o
Y and the secret carriers U (where the u are the columns of U and the N
i o
observed y are the columns of Y):
I(U,Y)=H(Y)−H(Y|U)=H(U)−H(U|Y) (3)
then awatermarkingscheme is secureifthe mutualinformationbetweenU and
Y is null: in this case there is no information leakage.
2.3 Spread Spectrum Carriers Estimation
As mentioned previously, a SS watermarkingscheme is secure if it is impossible
toestimatethe secretcarriersusingobservedsignals.Onthecontrary,ifagiven
technique enables to estimate the secret carriers u based only on the observa-
i
tionsofy,thenthesecurityofthewatermarkingschemeisgreatlyreduced.Such
a tool can be provided using BSS theory. The goal of BSS is to decompose the
observations as a mixture of signals having special statistical properties.
For example, a Principal Component Analysis decomposes observations into
orthogonalcomponents according to their variances, and an Independent Com-
ponent Analysis decomposes the observations into independent signals. Making
connectionsbetweenBSSandSSwatermarkingisstraightforward.Anoteworthy
property of the class of spread spectrum watermarking schemes is the fact that
the embedding part of a SS scheme can be formulated exactly as a blind source
separation problem:
Y =X+US . (4)
m