Table Of ContentInevitable Democracy in
the Arab World
Inevitable Democracy in
the Arab World
New Realities in an Ancient Land
Wissam S. Yafi
INEVITABLE DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD
Copyright © Wissam S. Yafi , 2012.
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the time this was written and when it is read.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-1-137-00802-2
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First published in 2012 by
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ISBN 978-1-137-00849-7 ISBN 978-1-137-01102-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137011022
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Yafi , Wissam S., 1970–
Inevitable democracy in the Arab world : new realities in an ancient
land / Wissam S. Yafi .
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Democracy—Arab countries. 2. Democratization—Arab countries.
3. Arab countries—Politics and government—21st century.
4. Representative government and representation—Arab countries.
5. Political participation—Arab countries. I. Title.
JQ1850.A91Y34 2012
320.917(cid:2)4927—dc23 2011049319
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: June 2012
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my son Karim AB
And his generation of Arab youth
May they live in freedom, peace, and dignity
Contents
List of Tables i x
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xv
List of Commonly Used Abbreviations xvii
Part 1 New Realities
1 Geoeconomic Realities: It’s the Economy, Stupid! 3
2 Geosocial Realities: Babies Everywhere 2 1
3 Technological Realities: Virtual Genie 3 3
4 Geopolitical Realities: Game Changers 4 7
Part 2 Inevitable Arab Democracy
5 The Paradox of Arab Weakness 7 9
6 Change and Potential Outcomes 95
7 Myths and Misconceptions of Arab Democracy 121
8 Islam and Democracy 141
E pilogue: The Impending Arab Dip and the Role of the
International Community 1 69
G lossary of Commonly Used Terms 1 81
N otes 183
B ibliography 199
I ndex 203
Tables
1.1 Human Development Index (HDI) Regional Comparison 6
1.2 Regional Output Growth and Total Factor Productivity 7
2.1 Labor-Force Gender Participation Rate in Economic
Activity (%) 2 6
7.1 Independence Comparison between Arab World and
South America 1 23
7.2 R egional Illiteracy and Years of Schooling in
Comparison with India 1 34
8.1 Form of Government Constitutional Establishment per
Arab Nation 154
Preface
We call to mind the Realities, seen and unseen . . . And we know the straight from
the crooked path
C.43 Introduction to SURAH 1—Al-FATIHAH,The Holy Qur’an
I
began work on this book in the spring of 2003. I tend to think it was
the result of three factors, all of which make it unique. The first was my
postgraduate studies at an interesting new program at Harvard’s Kennedy
School of Government. Founded under the auspices of Jeffrey Sachs and the
Center for International Development, the rigorous program’s objective was
to bring together multiple disciplines under a single umbrella of economic
development. This interdisciplinary approach had a profound effect on how
I saw the region, analyzed its issues, and projected its potential future. What
originally had seemed to me as linear geopolitics, transformed into a multi-
dimensional model. Ultimately, it resulted in the book having a holistic view
of events basing its conclusions on what I hope would be seen as hard and
undeniable facts and objective realities that have emerged within the Arab
world.
The second factor was the September 11, 2001 (9/11) calamity. Stuck in
a hotel in Sao Paolo, Brazil, and unable to return home to the United States
because of airspace closure, I recall being shocked into realizing that things
could never be the same again. American continental impregnability had
been shaken to the core by a small group of men armed with knives and a
devious plan. It was one of those surreal moments that alter history. As an
Arab American belonging to the Muslim faith, it saddened me deeply to
see so much innocent bloodshed caused by a group of people whose history
tragically warped them into committing such a global atrocity. It did not
have to be that way. Unlike what others simplistically saw as a region and
religion bent on exporting violence, I knew that historically the contrary
had been true.
For centuries, the region was a backwater for much larger conflicts occur-
ring in Europe, Latin America, the Soviet Bloc, and other parts of Asia and
Africa. Over the past few decades, however, violence had begun pervading
the region, and with 9/11 it had spilled in a most grotesque manner to the
other side of the globe. I knew intrinsically that the geopolitical status quo
governing the region for so long simply could no longer be maintained, and it
led me to want to study more closely the implications and potential direction
xii Preface
of events. Since then, I have been fortunate to be able to travel all over the
region from the Mashriq (East) to the Maghreb (West) to learn firsthand
and witness what was going on, why, and what the region’s thoughts and
tendencies were.
The third factor was the United States’ decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
I am generally against military invasions, occupation, and violence. Having
been raised in Beirut, Lebanon, during its civil war, I knew the pain and suf-
fering that it causes. And yet, in all honesty, I have to admit that I was indeed
in favor of the invasion ridding Iraq and its people of its brute once and for
all. My justification at the time was simple. I felt that such an invasion was
the lesser of two evils. The other evil, which seems to have been forgot-
ten by now, was the international embargo slapped on Iraq throughout the
1990s to punish Saddam’s regime. Applying among the toughest wide-rang-
ing economic sanctions in history, the Iraq embargo had brought what was
once one of the most vibrant Arab countries to its knees. The fact that the
sanctions occurred under the auspices of the United Nations (UN)—and
Western officials argued that Iraq did indeed have enough money flowing
from the oil for food program to buy food and medical supplies needed—
had not prevented the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children due
to malnutrition and sickness. These sanctions had persisted for more than a
decade even though they had never met the goal of getting rid of Saddam’s
menacing threat. He carried on nonchalantly quite content on seeing his
increasingly impoverished people pose less of a threat to his rule. Ironically,
the rather precarious premise of the 2003 invasion of Iraq was that Saddam
had managed to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which threat-
ened the security of neighbors and the world at large. If anything, was this
not an implicit confession by the UN of the failure of the embargo? And so,
I was relieved to finally see a US administration willing to step up and break
from what I perceived as a cynical policy collectively punishing Iraq instead
of its dictator. My hope was that removing him would put a stop to Iraq’s
tragedy once and for all. In retrospect, of course, it pains me that the second
Gulf War ended up causing so much death and destruction. Occupation and
humiliation are two sides of the same coin, and the Iraqi people bore the
brunt once more; this time though it was caused by bad planning and execu-
tion on the part of the Americans and their allies. It is of some consolation
nonetheless to see that the country did eventually rid itself of its dictator and
adopted democracy. While I pray for the souls of all those lost in the con-
flict, I remain convinced that in the long term, Iraq and its good people will
prevail. And I leave it to alternative history enthusiasts to imagine whether
another two decades of stifling sanctions on a Saddamist Iraq would have
resulted in much better results for Iraq, its people, the region, and the world
as a whole.
Notwithstanding the seismic events that both 9/11 and the Iraqi inva-
sion caused in the region, as I began to write the book, I quickly realized
that geopolitics was not going to be the only factor at play. In fact, many
voices from within the region—even the intelligentsia that traditionally
Preface xiii
abhorred despots like Saddam—vehemently opposed any form of outside
imposition. They were justified in arguing that true change needed to be
organically conceived, not imported, and certainly not through violence
(although as argued in chapter 7 , historically speaking, a militarily imposed
democracy is not necessarily a doomed undertaking). The fact that regional
democracies did not emerge immediately after the invasion of Iraq would
tend to support their claim. Still, their arguments seemed primarily focused
on the geopolitical and cultural aspects of the conflict, ignoring other more
subtle but no less influential elements.
So, I started looking at other factors. Fortunately, wherever I looked I
began finding bits and pieces that seemingly fit a trend. Four categories
emerged: geopolitical, geoeconomic, geosocial, and technological all work-
ing unknowingly but rather concertedly toward inevitable regional change.
Arab populations were burgeoning. The demographics showed a huge influx
of young. Development jumps were massive, especially in education, life
expectancy, and degrees of urbanization. Technology, both seen and unseen,
was advancing by leaps and bounds playing a major role in interconnecting
the entire Arab region in ways never before witnessed, and the list goes on.
Unfortunately, all this was being paralleled with hopelessly slow economic
growth, unproductive industrial sectors, low levels of value-added exports,
almost nonexistent foreign direct investment, and dangerously high levels
of unemployment. All the while, globalization was affecting every nook and
cranny within the region, with salient cases such as Dubai and Qatar lead-
ing the charge. Even the regional periphery, as far flung as Yemen in the east
and Morocco in the west, was reeling from its effects. Sitting in a hotel in
Casablanca and flipping through more than a 100 Arab channels transmitting
from Dubai to Libya, and Iraq to Mauritania, openly discussing issues dealing
with society, politics, economics . . . brought the message home loud and clear.
My research would eventually lead me to conclude that the autocratic status
quo in the Arab region was untenable. Furthermore, it became clear to me that
the incumbent regimes could not reform as much as they needed to—because
it is a self-inflicting exercise. I argued as far back as 2005 through published
Opinion Editorials that regionally it wasn’t change that needed to be paced, but
rather pace that needed to be changed.1 Indeed, by making change eternally
slow, the autocrats’ real hope was to ultimately avoid it. The best one could
hope for from them is a semblance of reform with carefully paced change. All
this would lead me to conclude that a tipping point was imminent.
In the lectures that I have given on the book, the inevitability of democ-
racy argument typically proves to be a contentious point, with some of those
attending arguing for much worse scenarios. While the book is indeed opti-
mistic, it is not based on wishful premise. It argues by looking at the issue
holistically and over the long term. It questions: if change is inevitably hap-
pening, then considering the different possible outcomes, which is the one
that can alleviate and solve the underlying problems—regardless of how
many iterations it might take to get there? The ensuing framework reaches
the conclusion that democracy (in some cases, liberalized autocracy) is the
