Individual criminal liability for the international crime of aggression

383 Pages·2008·1.62 MB·English

by  Kemp, Gerhard

Individual criminal liability for the
international crime of aggression

Gerhard Kemp

Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Law at
Stellenbosch University

Promoter: Prof MG Erasmus
Co-promoter: Prof SE van der Merwe

March 2008
Declaration

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the
work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the
copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have
not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Date: 19 February 2008

Copyright © 2008 Stellenbosch University
All rights reserved

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Summary

Aggression is regarded as one of the core crimes under customary international
law, but the definition of aggression is still contentious. At present there is no
international instrument that provides for effective individual criminal liability for
the crime of aggression. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
provides for the inclusion of the crime of aggression within the court’s jurisdiction,
but the Statute needs to be amended to include a definition of aggression and
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC. This dissertation seeks to
identify the elements of the international crime of aggression, for purposes of
individual criminal liability. It is submitted that the creation of the ICC provides
the international community with an historic opportunity to establish effective
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.

Part A puts the research problem in its proper context. The international political
and legal system, based on state sovereignty, provides the background to the
analysis. The problem of individual criminal liability for aggression is also put in the
context of the evolving system of international criminal law.

In Part B the normative roots of the criminalisation of aggression are analysed.
Collective security and the jus contra bellum (the international prohibition of the
use of force) form part of the normative framework in terms of which the
criminalisation of aggression has to be understood. These features of the
international system are also protected interests underlying the criminalisation of
aggression. It is argued that collective security (as an institutional/political
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response to aggression and other threats to peace and security) must be seen as
complementing the criminal justice response to aggression.

Part C deals with the history of the criminalisation of aggression, in particular the
post-Second World War trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo. These trials resulted in
important judgments that form the essential core of the crime of aggression under
customary international law. The trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo were followed by
various attempts to find a suitable definition for aggression. None of these
attempts (analysed in Chapter 4) were successful.

In Part D the crime of aggression is analysed in the context of the application of
international (criminal) law in national legal systems. In the absence of
international tribunals with effective jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the
possibility to prosecute aggression in national courts is investigated. The customary
international law status of aggression is explored. It is argued that, although
aggression can indeed be regarded as a crime under customary international law,
there are a number of doctrinal, constitutional and other legal problems that
impede the prosecution of aggression in national courts. National legislation would
be needed to remedy (some) of these problems. The adoption of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, 1998 provides states party with an opportunity
to adopt a suitable definition of aggression. In turn, this will be an impetus for
states to provide for aggression in domestic criminal law.

The diplomatic and legal drafting processes concerning the amendment of the
Rome Statute to provide for a definition of aggression and for conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, are dealt with in Part E. The conclusion arrived
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at and submissions made in Part F are that any definition of aggression for purposes
of the ICC jurisdiction must have a rational basis. The essential elements and
protected interests underlying the criminalisation of aggression are identified. It is
submitted that the interests of peace and security are best served by
acknowledging the different (but complementing) political and criminal justice
responses to aggression. A realistic definition of aggression and conditions for the
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC that acknowledges the role of the institutions of
collective security will furthermore result in a framework for states to provide for
aggression as a crime in domestic law.

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Opsomming

Aggressie word as een van die kern misdade in die internasionale gewoontereg
beskou. Die definisie van aggressie is omstrede. Daar is tans nie ‘n internasionale
konvensie wat voorsiening maak vir individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid vir
die misdaad aggressie nie. Die Rome Statuut van die Internasionale Strafhof bepaal
dat die misdaad van aggressie binne die hof se jurisdiksie val, op voorwaarde dat
die Statuut gewysig word om voorsiening te maak vir ‘n definisie van aggressie en
vir voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van jurisdiksie. Hierdie proefskrif het ten doel
om die elemente van die internasionale misdaad van aggressie (vir doeleindes van
individuele strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid) te identifiseer. Daar word aan die hand
gedoen dat die totstandkoming van die Internasionale Strafhof ‘n historiese
geleentheid vir die internasionale gemeenskap bied om effektiewe jurisdiksie oor
die misdaad van aggressie te vestig.

Deel A plaas die navorsingsprobleem in behoorlike konteks. Die internasionale
politieke en regsstelsel wat op soewereiniteit van state gebaseer is, vorm die
agtergrond tot die analise. Die probleme rondom individuele strafregtelike
aanspreeklikheid vir aggressie word ook in die konteks van die ontluikende stelsel
van internasionale strafreg gestel.

In Deel B word daar ondersoek ingestel na die normatiewe basis vir die
kriminalisering van aggressie. Kollektiewe sekerheid en die jus contra bellum (die
internasionale verbod op die gebruik van geweld) vorm deel van die normatiewe
raamwerk waarbinne die kriminalisering van aggressie beskou moet word. Die
kenmerke van die internasionale stelsel is ook die beskermde belange wat die
kriminalisering van aggressie onderlê. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat
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kollektiewe sekerheid (‘n institusionele/politieke reaksie op aggressie en ander
bedreigings vir vrede en veiligheid) beskou moet word as aanvullend tot die
strafregtelike reaksie op aggressie.

In Deel C word die geskiedenis van die kriminalisering van aggressie (in die
besonder die post-Tweede Wêreldoorlogse verhore te Nuremberg en Tokyo)
behandel. Hierdie verhore het gelei tot die belangrike uitsprake wat in essensie die
kern van die gewoonteregtelike misdaad van aggresssie uitmaak. Na die verhore te
Nuremberg en Tokyo was daar verskeie pogings om ‘n geskikte definisie van
aggressie te formuleer. Hierdie pogings (wat in Hoofstuk 4 behandel word) was
grootliks onsuksesvol.

Deel D behels die toepassing van internasionale strafreg in nasionale regstelsels.
Aangesien daar tans geen internasionale tribunale is met jurisdiksie oor die
misdaad aggressie nie, is dit nodig om vas te stel of dit moontlik is om die misdaad
in nasionale howe te vervolg. Die gewoonteregtelike status van aggressie word vir
die doel ondersoek. Ten spyte van die gewoonteregtelike status van die misdaad
aggressie is daar tog etlike dogmatiese, grondwetlike en ander regswetenskaplike
redes wat die vervolging van aggressie in nasionale howe bemoeilik. Nasionale
wetgewing sou van die probleme kan aanspreek. Die aanvaarding van die Statuut
van Rome bied aan state wat partye is tot die Statuut die geleentheid om by te dra
tot die proses om ‘n geskikte definisie vir aggressie te formuleer. Hierdie proses
kan help dat state ook op nasionale vlak voorsiening maak vir die misdaad
aggressie.

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In Deel E word daar ondersoek ingestel na die diplomatieke en regsskrywende
prosesse tov die wysiging van die Statuut van Rome. Dit het ten doel om ‘n
definisie van aggressie en voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van jurisdiksie deur die
Internasionale Strafhof te formuleer. Daar word tot die gevolgtrekking gekom en
die voorstel word in Deel F gemaak dat enige definisie van aggressie vir doeleindes
van jurisdiksie van die Internasionale Strafhof ‘n rasionele basis moet hê. Die
wesenlike elemente en beskermde belange onderliggend aan die kriminalisering
van aggressie word identifiseer. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die belange
van vrede en sekerheid die beste gedien word deur aanvaarding van die
verskillende (maar aanvullende) politieke en strafregtelike reaksies op aggressie. ‘n
Realistiese definisie van aggressie en voorwaardes vir die uitoefening van
jurisdiksie deur die Internasionale Strafhof wat die rol van die instellings wat
gemoeid is met kollektiewe sekerheid erken, sal bydra tot ‘n raamwerk waarbinne
state vir die misdaad van aggressie in nasionale reg voorsiening kan maak.

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For my parents;

and for Andra

Soli Deo Gloria
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Acknowledgements

A number of individuals and institutions have supported me in this project. I would
like to acknowledge in particular:
• Andra, for her love and support;
• My supervisors, Prof MG Erasmus and Prof Steph van der Merwe, for their
guidance and critical input;
• My parents and sisters, for their support and encouragement;
• Prof Christine van den Wyngaert (Judge of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; Professor of International Criminal Law
at the University of Antwerp), for introducing me to the fascinating and fast
developing field of international criminal law, and for her continued support
and friendship;
• Prof Erik Jurgens (Professor of Law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and
former member of the Dutch Parliament) for his support during my research
visit to the Netherlands in 2004;
• My colleagues in the Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University, for
their support and encouragement;
• Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Stellenbosch University for financial and
research assistance.

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