Table Of ContentResearch Series, No. 74
Sheth Bholabhai Jeshingbhai Institute of Learning and Research
AN D I A L E C T I CS
Methods of Philosophical Discussion
V o l u me II
Esther A. Solomon,
M.A., Ph.D. (Bombay)
Professor of Sanskrit
School of Languages
Gujarat University
AHMEDABAD-9
Sam gacchadhvam sam vadadhvam,
sam vo * manmhsi janatam.
—RV. 10.191.2
B« J. Institute of Learning and Research
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CONTENTS
Part II-continued
Chapter 13—Is Knowledge Possible ?
Aim of dialectical criticism-problem of Truth and Reality-
sceptical tendeocyr-Sceptics and Absolutists in India—Jayarâsi
Bhatta-Mâdhyamikas-Srïharsa and others-repudiation of the
concept of validity, and of the validity of the recognised
sources of knowledge -in Nägärjuna's Vigraha-vyavartanïAn
Jayaräsi's Tattvopaplavasirhha—m Srïharsa's Khandana-khanda-
khaqlya—different definitions of validity repudiated—Jayarâsi's
repudiation of inference—Sriharsa's repudiation of inference-
Is knowledge of vyapti possible ? definitions of vyapti criticised-
paksa, paksa-dharmata, etc. repudiated—repudiation of all
concepts and categories-Is debate or dialectical criticism
possible evea without ainaittiag the validity of knowledge ?-
remarks—Notes. ... pp. 519-627
Chapter 14 -Problem of Truth
Recognition of pramanas-thsir repudiation by the Sceptics
and the Absolutists-Theories of truth of the Nyäya, Purva-
mïnârhsâ, Buddhist, Jaina, K^valâivaita schools— truth and
validity—are pramanya and apramanya intrinsic (svatah) or
extrinsic (paratah) in respect of utpatti> jndpti and karya ?-
views of the different schools-arguments of Kumärila and
Udayana stated at length so as to clarify the issues involved
and to illustrate the dialectical made of exposition-remarks-
Notes. ... 628-667
PART III
Chapter 15— Growth of Dialectical Criticism as noticed in
Philosophical Works
In Vedas-Brähmanas-Upanisads-Buddhlst Canonical
literature-Jaini scriptures—Eel-Wrigglers—their influence on
philosophical thought—Epics—Sutras —Yoga~~satra — V aisesika-
sütra—Pürva-mimümsü-sütra—Brahma-sütra — Nyaya-sutra—
remarks—Samkhya-karika — Q^rly commentators on the Sutras-
Vätsyäyana, Uddyotakara,Väcaspati,Udayana —Prasastapäda—
Sahara, Kumârila, Prabhâkara—Vyâsa, the commentator of the
Yoga-sutra~Mâth2LT2L—Yuktidipikâ—Tattvakaumudl — Gauda-
päda—Sarikarâcârya-Jayarâsi Bhatta—dialectical thought in
Post-Pitaka Buddhist works— Prajna-paramita sutras —Lanka*
vatara-satra — Nâgârjuna's works - -Aryadeva—Buddhapâlita and
Bhâvaviveka—Candrakïrti-Sântaraksita and Kamalasila—dialec-
tical modes adopted by the Mâdhyamikas—Vijnänavädins—
Vasubandhu—Dirinâga-Dharmakïrti-Sarvâstivâda literature—,
intellectual struggle between the Vaibhâsikas and * the.
Sauträntikas—Abhidharmakoia and its Bhasya- Abhidharmtfdipa—
Atthasalim commentary—Post-Agamic Jaina works—Kunda-
kunda—Umäsväti—Siddhasena- Jinabhadra-Samantabbadra-»'
Akalarika-Vidyänanda-Vädi-Devasöri—Hemacandra—remarks-
Notes. ... pp. 671-758
Chapter 16—Methodology of Mavya-Nyäya
Stages of the development of the Nyäya-school-Udayana-
Garigesa-his contribution-Navya-Nyäya a sure propaedeutic
for philosophical accuracy—technique—concentration on the
preciseness of definitions—technical terminology—ayaechinna-
avacchedaka—nirapita-nirupaka—adhara—adheyata—pratiybgU
anuyogi—abhayiya-pratiyogi-anuyogi— visesya-yisesana] prakara
—îati> upadhi—svarïïpa-sambandha'—dQÎinitions of vyapti, ,as
illustrating Navya-Nyäya technique—Commentators modified
these definitions to make them impregnable—the procedure
illustrated—some other relations-zrarya/?// and visista-nirupitü-
dharata sambandha—vyasaj'ya-vrtti dharma -kalika sambandha—
avyapya-vrtti relations—influence of Navya-Nyäya on other
schools and ^ôstras-dialectic in the works of the Navya-Nyäya
school—Notes. ... pp. 759-790'
Chapter 17—Dialectical Criticism in other Vidyas
Dialectic in works on Dharmasâstra and Arthasâstra—
Àrthasâstra—works on Vyäkarana-sästra—Nirukta—Astädhyayi—
Yarîîikas of Katyâyana-Mahabhâsya-Vïïkyapadîya-ph'\\osophy\
of grammar—influence of grammar on other schools—influence
of other schools—works on Kävyasästra—important problems—
Bhâmaha and others-Änandavardhana-problem of independent
existence of the suggested meaning from the expressed meaning —
Jagannätha--definidonof poetry—different definitions quoted
and repudiated-Appayya Dîksita-Nâgesa — kavyado$as compar-
able to mgrahasfhanas—zvzry branch of learning has its own
methodology—Kamasatra—dialectical mode essential to the
development of all Vidyas—-Notes. ... pp. 791-832
Chapter 18—Actual Debates and Controversies—Philosophical,
Religious, Social
Social significance of debates—accounts of actual debates—
between Sarikara and Mandana Misra—debates presented
in dgamadambara —accounts in the Prabhavakacarita—Valabhï,
Anahillapura, Dhàrâ, centres of intellectual activity—intellectual
rivalry between Anahillapura and Dhävä-^tarka, sahitya, and
laksana, main subjects of study—Sûracârya-Sântyàcârya—
Vïrâcârya—Vädi-Devasuri and Kumudacandra—their intellectual
contest related in Mudritakumudacandra—account in Jalpa-
kalpalatâ—dialectical duels at courts, in temples and monasteries—
poetical contests—philosophical and other contests—enigmas-
brahmodyas as related in the Bmhmanas—controversies and
discussions pertaining to social problems like marriage, divorce,
and other problems—legal dispute—court-scene in Mrcchakatika—-
ordeals—dispute between Udayana and a Buddhist âcârya—-place
of debates in the cultural life of India—influence on the future
career of a person or the history of a sect or school of thought—
Notes.
... pp. 833-875
Résumé
The mystical or spiritual and the intellectual sides of
Indian culture —inquiry into tfcia relation of word and mining,
and the practical importance of medical aad juridical problems
contributed to the growth and development of dialectic—
science arises to satisfy a vital need—jatis—detection of logical
fallacies and aberrations other than logical—its necessity gave
rise to a systematic and scientific study of logic—lo?ic in the early
stages primarily concerned with debate—growing importance
of pramanas—epistemological problems—Navya-N>âya—subtle
and even hair-splitting arguments—man's vanity expressing itself
in hair-splitting subtleties—sceptics and absolutists resort to
reason to show its limitation I—pramanas of Indian logic—some
specialities of IndLn logic—scriptural testimony as a pramana—
philosophical and other problems treated dialectically—even
pramanas submitted to a dialectical examination—hope of a
more efficient 'organ of knowledge'. ... pp 876-886
Appendix 1—Saslra-vinoda in Somesvara's Manasollasa
... pp. 887-890
Appendix 2—Dialectical Examination of the Problem : 'Is
validity intrinsic in Knowledge or is it extrinsic ? '—in
Abbayadeva's Tatlvabodhavidhayim on Siddhasena Diväkara's
Sanmatitarkaprakarana .. pp. 891-941
Errata ... p. 942
Indices ... 943 ff.
ABBREVIATIONS
AdS Advaita-siddhi of Madhusüdana Sarasvati
AYD Anuyogadvârasûtra
AK Abhidharmakoéa of Vasubandhu
AKV Abhidharmakosa-vyäkhyä of Yasomitra
ATV Ätmatattvaviveka of Udayana
Utd.Sü Uttarsdhyayana-sütra
UH Upayahrdaya
Ait. Br. Aitareya Brähma^a
KhKh Khandana-khanda-khadya of Sriharsa
CS Caraka-samhitä
TC Tattva-cintämani of Gangeâa Upadhyäya
TvS Tattva-sangraha of Sântaraksita
TSIv Tattvârtha-sloka-vârttika of V-idyânanda
TPS Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarasi Bhatta
TT Tarka-tândava of Vyâsatïrtha
TS Tarka-sâstra
TS Tarka-sangraha with Dîpika of Annambhatta
TR Tsrkika-raksä of Varadaräja
DMS Dasaslokï-Mâhâvidyâ-satra of Kulârka Pandita
DN Digha Nikäya
NK Nyâyakandah of Sndhara
NKC Nyäyakumudacandra of Prabhâcandra
NKu Nysya-kusumänjali of Udayana
NKuP Nyayakusumânjali-Prakâsa of Vardbamäna
NP NySya-parisuddhi of VenkatanStha
NyP Ny5ya~pravesa of Sankarasvâmin
NyB Nyâyabindu of DharmakTrti
NyBT Nyâyabindu-iïka of Dharmottara
NB Nyaya-bhäsya of Vatsyayana
NM Nyayamanjan of Jayanta
NV Nyaya-värttika of Uddyotakara
1SVTT Nyâya-vârttika-tâtparyatîka of Vacaspati
NVTTP NySya-värttika-tätparyattkä-parisuddhi of Udayana
NyV Nyâya-viniscaya with Vrtti of Akalanka
NS NySya-sütra of Gautama
NSV Nyaya-sütra-vrtti of Visvanatba
NyA Nyäyavatära of Siddhasena Divâkara
PMS Panksämukhasütra of Mänikyanandin
PNTL Pram^na-naya-tattvälokäiankära of Vädi-Devasü ri
PP ?ramâna-paddhati of Jayatïrtha
PM Pramâna-mïmâmsâ of Hemacandra
PV Pramâna-vârttika of Dhannakirti
PKM Prameya-kamala-mârtanda of Prabhäcandra
PB Prasastapäda-Bhäsya
BS Bodha-siddhi or Nyàya-parisista of Udayana
BP Bhâsâ-pariccheda of Visvanâtha
MBH Mahabhärata
MVV Mahâvidya-dasa-slokî-vivarana
MVVT Mahävidyä-dasa-slokl-vivarana-tippana of Bhuvanasundara
MVVi MahavidyS-vidarabana of Vâdîndra
MVViVD Mahavidya-vidambana-vygkhysna-dipika of Bhuvanasundara
MK Mädhyamika-Kärikä of Nagarjuna
MKV Mädhyamika-Karika-Vrtti of Candrakirti
YS Yoga-sütra of Patafijali
LA Lankavatâra-sotra
YN . Vädanyäya of Dharraakuti
YV Vädivinoda of Sankara Misra
ViBfa Visesävasyakabhäsya of Jinabhadra
ViV Yigrahavyävartani of NSgârjuna
VS Vaisesika-satra of Kanada
Sata Br Satapatha Brähmana
SD Sastradïpikâ of Pârthasârathi Misra
Slv Slokavârttika of Kuîuarila
STT Sanmati-tarka-tïkâ of Abhayadeva
SDS Sarvadarsana-sangraha of Mädhava
SK Samkhya Kärikä of ïâvarakrsna
SM Siddhânta-muktâvalï of Visvanâtha
SV Siddhiviniscaya with Vrtti of Akalanka
Sth.Su. Sthananga-sutra
SVR Syadvadaratnakara of Vädi-Devasari
HIL A History of Indian Logic—Vidyäbhüsana
HIP A History of Indian Philosophy—S. N. Dasgupta
Materials...Materials for the Study of NavyaNyäya Logic—Ingalls
CHAPTER 13
IS KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE?
Dialectical criticism may end in the complete rejectioa of
a view or a theory or lead to another suggestion which, if the
examination has been properly conducted, ought to approach
nearer the truth.
The concepts of truth seem to vary in the different systems
of thought; so we may say that dialectic helps thinkers to
approach the problem of truth and reality with an open mind,
with sympathy and due consideration for all possible views,
especially when they are concerned with the ultimate reality
of things. Most of the Indian philosophical systems* are
idealistic in the sense that they do not regard the world as it is
perceived by the physical eye as real unless it be related after
deep inquiry to some higher leality (e.g. the Prakrit of the
Sârhkhya-Yoga) or the ultimate reality (God or the Absolute
Principle). Consequently, perception and the other praniänas
are not wholly trusted as giving full knowledge of things. Bat
they are regarded as reliable in the sense that their knowledge
is not found to be contradicted in empirical experience and they
help us to co-ordinate our empirical experience with our
philosophical or metaphysical beliefs. But excepting the extreme
idealists (Vijnänavädins and Kevalädvaitins) and the sceptics
and the Mâdhyamikas, the different schools do accept the
praniänas as giving knowledge which is never completely sublated,
even though it may be co-ordinated with or merged in the know-
ledge of the Highest Reality to present the whole of Reality
as it is. The sceptics, the Vijnänavädins, the Kevalädvaitins, and
* The Lokayata, and to a great extent the Nyâya-Vaiâesika may be
regarded as exceptions.
1-66
520 Indian Dialectics
the Mâdhyamikas, on the other hand, regard knowledge derived
from the different sources as valid only in empirical experience
and deny any ultimate validity to it. Even among these, the
sceptics and the Mâdhyamikas and the (later) Kevalädvditins
(who believing in the reality of Brahman alone are interested
in repudiating the reality of everything eise-) are very insistent
on the point that the different pramanas (sources of knowledge)
can under no circumstances be relied upon as yielding truth,
because the very concept of pram an a and its object is an
indefinable one. One cannot be sure of any knowledge.
Dialectic would ordinarily proceed on the assumption that
true knowledge can be acquired. But some schools of philo-
sophical thought do not at ail admit the possibility of the valid
knowledge of things. Thus dialectic examining other cognisables
turned upon itself and ransacked its very fundamentals.
In India about the end of the Upanisadic period (-though
the sceptical tendency is evident even earlier-) with the upsurge
of philosophical and critical thought there arose thnkers
who were sceptical—though not necessarily so in actual life
—about virtue and vice (—Pîïrana Kassapa and others) and
the attainment of knowledge or the possibility of the descrip-
tion of reality in words (-Sanjaya Belatthaputta K Their own
works are not extant so we do not have a detailed idea of
their line of argument or their sceptical views. Nevertheless
we find some of their views recorded in the Buddhist and the
Jaina canonical literature and we can say that they were
thinkers whose parallels may be found in the sophists and the
cynics and the sceptics of Greece. Buddha did not encourage
this line of thinking as it was likely to prove morally futile.
But the method of criticism and refutation continued to be
adopted by the theorists of Buddhism expecially by the
Mâdhyamikas; and later dialectical philosophers developed what
is known as the prasangika method,—the method of examining
all possible alternative interpretations of the opponent's proposi-
tion, showing the absurdity of the respective consequences
and chus refuting it.
