Incompatibilism's Allure: Principle Arguments for Incompatibilism

225 Pages·2008·8.28 MB·English

by  Ishtiyaque Haji

“ This book is the most comprehensive study of T he role of freedom
arguments for the incompatibility of free will and in assigning moral
determinism to have appeared in several decades. responsibility is one
Incompatibilism’s Allure
Haji examines the strengths and the weaknesses of the deepest problems
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of a wide variety of arguments for incompatibilism in metaphysics and moral h
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with the perceptiveness and attention to detail that theory. Incompatibilism’s Allure iy
characterize his other influential writings on free provides original analysis of a principal arguments for incompatibilism
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will and moral responsibility.” the principal arguments for
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Robert Kane incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque H
University Distinguished Teaching Professor, Haji incisively examines the a
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University of Texas at Austin consequence argument, the
Ishtiyaque Haji
direct argument, the deontic
“ Incompatibilism’s Allure offers by far the most com- argument, the manipulation
prehensive and accessible treatment of the thesis argument, the impossibility
that determinism is incompatible with both free argument and the luck objec-
will and moral responsibility. Haji has carefully tion. He introduces the most
examined every major argument for incompati- important contemporary dis-
bilism, exposing each to thorough scrutiny, and cussions in a manner accessible
offering a judicious assessment of the credibility to advanced undergraduates, I
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of this age old thesis. An especially noteworthy but also suited to professional
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asset of Incomaptibilism’s Allure is its teachability. It philosophers. The result is
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is clear, accessible, and organized in the best way a unique and compelling
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possible for the purposes of introducing these account for incompatibilism’s
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complex ideas to the uninitiated. Nevertheless, continuing allure.
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Haji also manages to make important contribu-
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tions to work on free will and moral responsibility. i
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Anyone with an interest in this topic will certainly
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profit from Haji’s fine effort.” l
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Michael McKenna Ishtiyaque Haji is Professor s
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Professor, Florida State University of Philosophy at the University
of Calgary. He is the author ’
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“ Haji lucidly explains and critically assesses the lead- of Freedom and Value: Freedom’s
A
ing arguments for the view that determinism is Influence on Welfare and Worldly
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incompatible with free will and moral responsibil- Value (Springer, 2009); Deontic l
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ity. I strongly recommend Incompatibilism’s Allure Morality and Control Cambridge
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for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses University Press, 2002); and
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on free will and moral responsibility. Students will Moral ppraisability: Puzzles,
find this book extremely useful, and people who Proposals, and Perplexities
publish on Haji’s topics will benefit from it as well.” (Oxford University Press, 1998).
Alfred R. Mele
William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of
Philosophy, Florida State University
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Incompatibilism’s Allure
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Incompatibilism’s Allure
principal arguments for incompatibilism
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Ishtiyaque Haji
broadview press
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p y © 2009 Ishtiyaque Haji
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All righCts reserved. The use of any part of this publication reproduced, transmitted in any form
eorw by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or stored in
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Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Haji, Ishtiyaque
Incompatibilism’s allure : principal arguments for
incompatibilism / Ishtiyaque Haji.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-55111-919-9
1. Free will and determinism. 2. Responsibility. I. Title.
BJ1451.H33 2008 123’.5 C2008-906134-9
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments 9
one IntroductIon 11
1.1 The robert Harris case 11
1.2 The Ann/Beth cases 13
1.3 Responsibility, Causal Determinism, and Free Action 15
1.3.1 Two Views About the Concept of Responsibility 15
1.3.2 Free Action 17
1.3.3 Causal Determinism 18
1.3.4 Some Definitions: Incompatibilism, Compatibilism,
and Libertarianism 19
1.4 Different Pathways to Incompatibilism 19
1.5 Prospectus 25
two tHe consequence Argument 29
2.1 The consequence Argument 29
2.1.1 The Logical Modalities 29
2.1.2 Peter van Inwagen’s Version of the Consequence
Argument 31
2.2 A Problem Concerning the Interpretation of ‘Can’ 34
2.2.1 The Hypothetical Sense of ‘Can’ 34
2.2.2 The Categorical Sense of ‘Can’ 35
2.3 The reformulated consequence Argument 37
2.4 Control 38
2.4.1 Active Control 38
2.4.1.1 The event Causal Theory of Action and
Deviance 38
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p y2.4.2 Ultimate Control 41
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vie Origination 42
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Origination 43
2.4.2.3 Compatibilist Conceptions of Ultimate
Origination 46
2.5 Assessing the reformulated consequence Argument 49
2.6 The Basic Version of the consequence Argument 52
Appendix Local miracle compatibilism 56
A.1 Local Miracle Compatibilism 56
A.2 An Objection to Local Miracle Compatibilism 61
three ALternAtIVe PossIBILItIes And morAL
resPonsIBILIty 63
3.1 The consequence Argument and Freedom to do Otherwise 63
3.2 Frankfurt-Type Examples and Freedom to do Otherwise 63
3.3 The dilemma objection 64
3.4 Mele and Robb’s Reply to the dilemma objection 65
3.5 Another Reply to the dilemma objection 67
3.6 Luck and Alternative Possibilities 71
four tHe dIrect Argument 77
4.1 Introduction 77
4.2 The direct Argument 78
4.3 transfer nr and two-Path cases 79
4.4 David Widerker’s Response to the direct Argument 82
4.4.1 Widerker’s Concerns 82
4.4.2 Reply to Widerker 83
4.5 A New Counterexample 89
4.5.1 On the Epistemic Condition of Moral
Responsibility 90
4.5.2 A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for
Obligation 91
4.5.3 An Informal Presentation of the Counterexample to
transfer nr 94
4.5.4 Filling in the Details of the Counterexample 97
five tHe deontIc Argument 101
5.1 Introduction 101
5.2 The deontic Argument 102
5.3 Problems with the deontic Argument 104
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p y 5.3.1 Genuine Moral Dilemmas and “Ought” Implies
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vie 5.3.2 Self-Imposed Impossibility and “Ought” Implies
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5.3.2.1 Changing Obligations with Passing Time 106
5.3.2.2 Reply to the Objection 107
5.3.3 Negative Duties and “Ought Not” Implies “Can
Refrain From” 108
5.4 Does Blameworthiness Require Wrongness and Does
Praiseworthiness Require Obligatoriness? 110
5.4.1 A Counterexample to the Principle that
Blameworthiness Requires Wrongness 110
5.4.2 Supererogatory and Suberogatory Actions 114
5.4.3 The Coming Apart of Blameworthiness and
Wrongness 115
5.4.4 Blameworthiness and Frankfurt Examples 116
six tHe mAnIPuLAtIon Argument 119
6.1 The Basic Contours of the Argument 119
6.1.1 The manipulation Argument 119
6.1.2 Hard Incompatibilism and the Four-case
Argument 120
6.2 McKenna’s Hard-Line Response to the Argument 124
6.2.1 The Hard-Line Reply 125
6.2.2 Concerns with the Hard-Line Reply 126
6.3 On Pereboom’s Principle o of Ultimate Origination 132
6.3.1 Principle o, Magical Agents, and God 133
6.3.2 Principle o and Indoctrination 135
6.3.3 Principle o and Control 136
6.4 A Proposal 138
seven AutHentIc sPrIngs oF ActIon 141
7.1 Toward a Soft-Line Reply to the manipulation Argument 141
7.2 Internalism versus Externalism 143
7.3 Magical Agents and Global Manipulation: An Argument for
Internalism 145
7.4 Why the Argument Fails 148
7.4.1 An Agency Requirement of Responsibility 148
7.4.2 Children and the Authenticity of their Developing
Evaluative Schemes 151
7.4.3 Authentic Evolved Schemes 156
7.4.4 Some Objections and Responses 158
7.4.4.1 evaluative Schemes and Personal Identity 158
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p y 7.4.4.2 evaluative Schemes and Drastic Change 159
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vie ‘Autonomy’ 160
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7.5 Internalism’s Domain 162
7.6 A Soft-Line Reply to the Four-case Argument 166
eight tHe ImPossIBILIty Argument 169
8.1 Introduction 169
8.2 The Impossibility Argument 170
8.3 Assessing the Impossibility Argument 172
8.3.1 A Problem Concerning Magical Agents and God 173
8.3.2 A Problem Concerning Agency 173
8.3.3 A Problem Concerning Control 174
8.3.3.1 The Impossibility Argument and Negative
Ultimate Control 175
8.3.3.2 The Impossibility Argument and Agent-Causal
Ultimate Control 176
8.3.3.3 The Impossibility Argument and Compatibilist
Ultimate Control 179
nine LIBertArIAnIsm And tHe Luck oBjectIon 183
9.1 Libertarianism and Luck 183
9.2 Event Causal Modest Libertarianism 184
9.2.1 Nonaction-Centered Modest Libertarianism 185
9.2.2 Action Centered Modest Libertarianism 186
9.3 Introducing the Luck objection 187
9.4 Luck, Explanation, and Control 193
9.4.1 Akratic Action 193
9.4.2 Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Akratic Action 195
9.4.3 Luck’s Persistence 197
9.5 Clarke’s Hybrid Account and the Luck objection 197
9.5.1 Accounts of Causation 198
9.5.2 Clarke’s Hybrid Agent-Causal Account 199
9.5.3 The Hybrid Account and Luck 200
9.6 Mele’s Daring Soft-Libertarian Reply 201
9.6.1 Akratic Action vs. Actions that Manifest Agency
Breakdown 202
9.6.2 The Daring Reply 204
9.7 Brief Wrap-Up 207
References 209
Index 217
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Acknowledgments
It is my happy duty to acknowledge the help that I have received from oth-
ers in the writing of this book.
I thank the students in my course on incompatibilism given at the
University of Calgary in the fall of 2007. Special thanks to Tyler mcGraw
and Kathleen Ganley for their comments and suggestions on an early draft
of the manuscript.
A number of anonymous referees, both for Broadview Press and for
certain journals, provided highly instructive criticism and helpful advice
regarding sections of the manuscript. I am very thankful for this help. Parts
of this book are based on previously published works of mine. They are
listed in the References as: Haji (1998); (2000a); (2000b); (2000c); (2002);
(2003); (2004); (2005); and (2006).
many thanks to Robert martin for proofreading the manuscript and his
helpful recommendations; to Alex Sager, Philosophy editor at Broadview
for his diligent work; to Ryan Chynces, former Philosophy editor at
Broadview who initiated this project; and to Tara Lowes, Production editor
at Broadview; their valuable contributions are very much appreciated.
For comments on various, chapters, sections, or topics, I am deeply
indebted to Joe Campbell, Randy Clarke, John Fischer, Leonard Kahn, Bob
Kane, michael mcKenna, Derk Pereboom, and michael J. Zimmerman.
I owe a special debt to Alfred mele. Al provided helpful written com-
ments on a late draft of the entire manuscript. In addition, I have had
many, many extremely fruitful conversations with Al on almost every topic
in the book. His penetrating insights on free will, agency, and the philoso-
phy of action have been invaluable to me. Anyone acquainted with his
work will immediately see how much I have lifted from it. It is to Al that I
dedicate this book with great pleasure, gratitude, and respect.
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