Table Of ContentINCARNATION
A Philosophy of Flesh
Michel Henry
Translated from the French by Kar! Hefty
Northwestern University Press
Evanston, Illinois
firsr puhlished as lncamatirm: Urie phil,n,pMe
u,
de ,·hair by Edition.~ du Scuil, 2000.
'.\!orthwestern L"nivenily Press
www. nup ress.northwestern .edu
CopyrighL <&: 2015 by Northwestern I lnive,·sity Press. Puulishcd 2015. All rightc;
reservt'.rl.
Printed in the UniLed Slates of America
10 9 8 7 6 ~ 4 3 2 1
library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
I lenry, Michel, 1922-2002, author.
[Incarnation. F.nglish]
luca:mation: a philo~ophy oftlesh / Michel Henr~; Lranslatcd and with a
preface by Karl HcfL~
pages c:m. - (Northwe.slem University studie§ in phenemenology and
exislenlial philosophy)
Includes biblio~raphirnl references and index.
ISBN 978-0-810l-3Ii5-5 (cloth: alk. paper) - ISBN 978-0--810l-J1~6-i
(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Incarnation. 2. Flesh (Thcologr) J. Theological anthropolu~)'
Christianity. 4. Phenomenology. 5. Phenomenological theology. I. I lefty, Karl.
translaLUr, writer of preface. 11. Title. III. Title: Philosophy of flesh. IV. Series:
Xorthwestern Univc1sily studies in phenemenology & existential philosophy.
li'l 701.2.IT42413 2015
Contents
Translator's Preface x1
Abbreviations. to Frequently Cited Works xix
Introduction: The Question of Incarnation 3
The Reversal of Phenomenology
§ 1. ObJect of Phenomenology: The Question of "Appearance." 22
§2. The lnit:al Indeterminacy of the Phenomenolog cal
Presuppositions of Phenomenology. The "Pr:nciples of
Phenomenology." 25
!)3. The PreJudice Hicider in :he Presuppositions of
Phenomenology. The Ruinous Reduction of All ''Appearance"
to the World's Appearing. 30
§4. The Crisis of Phenomenality i1 I leidegger. The Ontological
Destitution of the World's Appearing. 36
§5. The Criterion of LangL.age. The Breakthrough and Limits of the
Phemw1P11ologicn: lnterpretdticm of L<1119udye. 41
§6. The Paradox of the "World" as a Pov11er to Derealize. 44
§7. The Now Crucial Question of the Impression, Understood as
Founding Rea:ity. I he Problem of It-; Phenomenologicnl St;1tv,
lntentio'1ality and Impression. 47
§8. When the Impress.ion Comes outside Itself and Is Destroyed
in the Temporal Flow 51
§9 The Origin of the "Originary Impression." The Inevitable
Reference of the Phenor1enology of the Impression to the
Phenomenology of Life. 55
§ 10. The Originary Passivity of the Impression, and Its "Passion"
ir1 Life's Trans.c.endental Affeclivily. The Living Present. 59
§ 11. The Question of Originary Appearing arid Descartes's Cogi~o.
Three Fundamerital Questions It Involves. 64
§ 12. Husserl's Mi~ir1tP.rpretat1on of Descartes's Cogito and ll,;
Con,eouerces: Den;grating Sinqular Li''e aml Replacing It
with Life's "Esscrcc-" in Lh~ Phenorrenologirnl 1'.'1ethod's
Themc1ticTurn. 71
§1 :-:l ..4 nalysis of the Thcma"tic Tur1. The Apori-.1 of the
Phenome,ologirnl Method. JI
§14 ..4 Final Attemrt to Ove-rcome t:-,e Aporia. The Queslion of
Invisible Life "Giver in lrr.ig,natio,,." 79
'i 15. T,e Or:gina1y Self-ReveliJ lion of Ufe as the Foundation cf the
Phenomenological Method. A Response to the G!-'neral
P!--ilosophical Prob!em Concerning the Possibility of
Thnkinq Life. 84
2 Phenomenology of Flesh
§ 16. Appearing and Cnntent cf the INorld: The Question of the
"Smsible 1/•lorld." 93
~ 17. The P.adic.i! Critique of I'll-' Sensible VVor;d_ The Impact and
Limits of Gi-:11:leo·s Reduct:or. 96
§ rn Descartes's Coumer-RedLction. 103
§ 19 . Husserl's Cr1lique cf C,ali/eo's Reduction in the Kr/sis. 1O "i
§20. A P.f't:Jrn to the Analysis of the Worldly, Sensible Borly
The Reference of the Ser:5ed Body ID the Transcendental Body
thilt Senses ll. Thf' Arnbiva!ence of be Concept "Sensible." 1U H
§21. The Attempt :o Overcome the Opposition between the Sensing
Body and the Sensed Bouy: lhe 15,ue Facir,g the Later
Me(eau~Ponly ;md ~he i>.bsolutization o. . the· Sensible. 1U
§22. Splitting tre Tra.1scerdertal Body, F ndinq in Life thf' Fssence of
Origi1ary, lmrn~ner,t Corpo'.eity. 116
§23. 'he Generdliw, n-:' Hesh ir. 1\bsolute Li+e. The Oriqinary
Phenomeno:ogical Chari.lcterstics er' Flt·~h that .... rise from This
Generation. ·1 ·19
§24. Frorr· the Hf'ilenic Corception ot the Body to the Phenumenolog,'
of I esr-,. The Fundamcnt.:il Problems of lrem,e11s and Tertullian. 125
'i25. The Radical lnte ore':aton or Fle~h as the Pheromcnologic.il
0
IVdll-'ri;;I of Life and as Its Sc:t-Reve!ation. lre•1ae1h\
Cnristia1 Cogi:o. 131
§26. An.ily;:ic cf the'', C;-;n_" The Power-to-Move as Condition of the
Powrr-to-Touch, and cf E~el"y Power A.ttributed to the Body.
Concillac Jnd \,1aine de Bi1ar1. 136
§27. Flesh: lnvriemor1,d l'v1emcry of the Vl/orld.
§28 rlesh: Site of Givenness of an Unknown Body, Given before
Sensation and betore Vv'orld. Structuration and Properties o~ the
"O~ganic Body." 146
§29. The O,;gina: Pos:.ibility of Action as a Carnal Ddve of the Organic
Sody. The Invisible Practicar Reality of the \IVc-rld's Co,,tcnt.
Ccmstitu1'irm il'";d S,iitus of One\ O•:.,n Objective Body_ 150
§CJO. The The>ory of the Con-;titution of Dnp's; Owr Body ,n Ch;,pter j
of ldeen If. The Threefold ConcealMent cf the Transcendental
Possibility of the "I Car," of the Exi'>'.:ence of the Orgac"iic
Body, and of the Loca'ization of Our lmp;esslons upor, It 155
§31. Re-:urn to the Chi.ismoi. VVhoit "Being-l::,ucr.ed" Mea.--,s.
· Phenomenuloyy of Skin "'~ A(h:evemenl uf the Theory of Lhe
Cons:itution of One's Own Body. 159
§32. A Return to CondiHac's Thesis. The Statue's Au:o-Erotcisrii:
F,es.-, as the Site or Perdition. The Necessary Transitio", from a
Phe~,ornenology of Flesh to a Phenomenology of lnrnrnation. 16"i
3 Phenomenology of Incarnation: Salvation in the Christian Sense
§33. Recupiwlation of Results Obtained from the Rev-:::rs.i1 ot
l'he:-,ornenolog,· and the Phenoro1Pnologica; .l>.rulysis of f-le,h 168
§34. The Question of the "I Can" in a Phenomenology o~
lncarnator. 172
§35. lll11sio11 ;md Reality oLhe "I Can." 178
§35. Forgettirg Lite and Recalling It in 'the Pathos of Eve~1ca1r Praxis. 184
§37. Forqettir,q Life ar.d Recailinq !t with Pathos in Anxie:,,,_ 188
§JS. The Duplicily cf Appe<.lri11g and I.ht:! Re>duplication uf Anxiety. 194
§39. Desire and the "Leap into Sin." 198
§40. Two C.ises of T,oinscendent.il Flesh in the Erotic Relation.
fhe F.go of Description 204
§41. The Erotic Rela:ion in life's Immanence: Desire·s Failure. 208
§42. The Erotic Relation ;n the World's Apoearing. Repetition of the
r-;:iilure. JH
i:j43. The Reduction of the Erotc Relation to Sexuality ir- the Time o'f
Nihilism. 217
§44. Life ls without a VVhy. Ue Is Good. 222
§45. The Degrees of Passiv:ty; From Genesis to the Prologue of John. 226
§46. The ·way of Salv.,Lion according to lrenaeus and Augusti11e. 231
~47 The Experience of ::he Other in a Phenomen::ilogy of Life_ 23/
§48. The Relation to the 0-ther Accordnq to Ch,istan'ty: The Mystcal
Body of Chri<;t. 24:i
Concbsion: Beyond Phenomenology ,md Theology: Johannine
Arch-lntellgibility )53
Index 263
Translator's Preface
incarnation: A Philosophy ofF lesh is a book that aim.s to elucidate what Mi
chd Herny c.;;:1.lh ,;incarnation," or cxistcncc-in-thc-flc1~h. To be incarnate.
for Henry, docs not. mean to hn.rJ~ a hocly, h11t. to hf. one, anrl not jw;r. an)
kind of body, but a living one that feels it.self, .suffers, enjoys itself, anc
moves itself. The living body, or "ile~h," is capable of sensing. It can toucli
a. ho<ly in t.he worlri, hut can also he touched by one-and it can touch
itself. This power to feel itself ·will forever distinguish it from all othet
bodies. To 8ay sometl1ing about exislcncc in tl1c .fJe~h, Lhen, is noL Lo ~a)
anything about the world of things it makes possible, the "sensible world'
and everything in it, but rather to say something about what comes befon
flesh and m::ikes it possible. How does life come in flesh:, That is the un
usual question that \'lill become the primary motif of the phenomenolog}
of incarnation.
And yN, ag the reader will soon discover, the life rhat comes in flesb
and makes it living is not some mysterious principle that by a flick of th~
magic wan<l comes to animaLc an inert mass already there. Life "reveal;
it~df" in flesh in a. v,:ay that no an. of thought, philosophical or othen\oiKe
can do, since it is only by being alive that we know, ·with an invincible cer
tainty, whaL life is. In Lhe immanence oflife iu fk:sh, all of lift:'s modali
ties ,ire revealed-as what they are: hunger and thirst, but also satiety
sutlering of all kinds, but also joy. Jn the sense in which Henry means it
lifo in flesh is rea111fc in ,cal flc:~h. the life: thal. allows each of us al: ever)
moment to say, and say with certainty, "I am alive.'·1 Such a proposition
in Henry's view, is possible only on the basis of a prior relationship oJ
every flesh wiLh the life thal gives iL, in a singular wa.y, life. To ducidal.t
the original form of that relationship, one might say, is the subject and
La::;k of Lhi~ book. Thal i~ lhc life lnrnmation is abouL.
Wl1ar, rhr.n, rloc~ this hook aim to ac.hicvc? C.:m philosophy tdl m
who we are? The book's subtitle reads, "a philosophy of flesh." But whJ
is a philosophy of flesh needed if philosophy cannol add :.mything Lt:
wh::ir life itself has ;i\ready said in flesh? ·what can its intellectual elabo
ration offer to the humble, the poor, or the sutl:ering, who may well be;.u
the ,-veight of llfe far better than an erudite philosopher? If the death oJ
philosophy (:mil of the human sciences too) is indexed by its near-tot.a 1
1,odal, cultural, intellectual, anti pr,u·.tical impotence today, perhaps this
is only the natuntl conscquenct> of the original impolcucc of philosophy,
of any thought, before life ..A nd yet, reading the suhlitlc in reverse, start
ing from flesh, an entirely <liffrrcnr agenda emerges, and a different pic
ture of philosophy. Tr is clear that Henry i.:mlcavors to initiate a renewal
of philosophy itself, and a renewal so complett> that it will require philo8-
ophy "to rethink. everything, .if one can Think reality.~2
Michel Henry (1922-2002) was one of the ~rc;n French philoso
phers working within, and aho in ~ome way5 against, the tradition of
philosophy known as ''phenomenology," inaugmau.:d by F.dmund 1-lus-
serl (1859-1938) ar the beginning of the lwcnticth century. Henry's con
tribution to that tradition, and to philosophy as a whole, is only al the
early stages of its apprai:;al, hut. its impact is already beginning robe felt:
"'Lite," for Henry, is "phenomenological." By Lhis he does not mean that
life is one thing among others, appearing in world alongside other phe
nomena. Rather, life i~ phenomenological "in the sense that it denotes
phenomenality ifsf'lf, givenness itself." Arni far more, "'the givenness of
1:,rivcnneso;_"? Totally unique int.he way that it gives itself, life cm in no ·way
be reduced to the "world" or to anything "in" the world. Life gives it.self
origiuallr in ito;elf: life and self-givenness are one. lly redeilning iu; moRT
ba.~if: <'-Oncept, Henry ha~ not mcrety suggested a nev.' region or snhfield
for phenomenology to consider, he has allen:tl in :m essential way what
pheuomcnology is and does.
In the first part of lnr:arn.ation, Henry oHers a critical rereading of
historical plH.:nomcnology, framed within a global indictment of the
whuk of modem Western philomphy from Galileo to Heidegger. Th.:c
reappraisal ofphenomcuo1ogy in this part ofthe book cmm:s to a point
in Henry·~ engagement ·with Husserl, 1,irn.:c it is pt>rhaps to Husserl that
Hcury remains closest, and thus also perhaps in relief again:-it Husserl
that the stakes of Henry\ argument appear in lhcir finest distinction.
Husserl saw a necessary connection Lclwccn givenness and life, but his
Lala.I mistake, in Henry's view, was made from the beginning. In pl:=ice
::-if life in its origina1y givcnnes.-, Husserl substitutes lhc self-constituting
ego, and through this process of sub:aliturion, replaces life's singular liv•
mg reality with its "essem;c." Not only is the reality of Lhc "impression"
.ost in this substitution, Henry claims, but the reality of time itself is too,
Since flesh is hy definition impre~siuual, t.hf'~e critical remarks in part 1
ire prerequisite to the phenomenology of flesh that Ht:my thr:n develops
.n a positive way in the second part.
Before discussing the argumeut hc. offers in part~. it ls \~orLh mak
ng .~everal additional remarks ;.ihout Henry's reading ufHu~~crl. An im-
port:mt distinction between them has to do ,'vith the form of the relation
of the ego to its Oi-\'11 life, and thus also to itself, and to the Lime that it
constitutes, Husserl says that the phenomenologic..\l reduction opens me
to "the whole stream of my experiencing life [1:1fahn;ru/,m, lA,ensl ,'' which
is "continually there for me" and given "with the most originary original
ity a,~ it it.~clf'½ "Rdler.ring, T em ar any rime look at this original living
r. ..
an<l notP. partkll 1a rs 1, " he say~, and "rhe: worl.d experienced in this
reflectively grasped life goes on being for me (in a certain manner) 'ex
perienced' as before."~ But does il? Hcmr doe.~ rtol. 1liiuk so. The fir~I g-ap
opened up by reflection tears life away from its originary li11ing reality,
turning life's pathos-filled "emLrncc" into a synthetic, constituted unit)'
As Henry sees it, everything is at stake in the difference. ~ot only is the
method of phenomenology decided here, but philosophy itself, and in
deed lite's meaning, hang in the balance.
Many Lhat follow in Husserl's wake, Hcirlcggc-:r notably, h11t ;;ilso
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others, refuse to follow the so-called tran
scendental turn Husserl makes in the Ideas. One might think this is be
cause lhcy pn:frrrcci a phcnomt>nolof;)' rooted firmly in time, in all of its
historical, existential, and perceptual dimensions, Henry is distincLive in
that he dor.~ remain faithful to Husserl on this issue: "Phenomenology is
;;i transcendental philosophy."n But what does "transcendental" mean in
this context? 1n Husserl's sense, it means all that Descartes means by tl1e
wor<l cogi.lo: "Lhc: bci11g of the pmc <~go and it"I mgi.tationes, as a being that
is prior in itself, is antecedent to the natural being ofthe 1\ovrld."• Henry's
position differs from Husserl's, howeve1-, i11 l.haL for Henry Lhe scusc of
"Lram;cemlculal" i11 not an ideal one. It dc;;<:ribc:,i life as l!m:h, anrl to rhat
extent also flesh. 1\J1 entirely new meaning is assigned to the idea of a
"transcendental" philosophy. It cannot be said to abstraelfrom time, be
came only in life i;,1 t.imc re;il. Anrl j'P.t, in .m far a.sit is ;i living present, life
in itself has no past or future, 'fo "reverse" phenomenology thus means:
with respect to the series of impressions Lhal toi;eLhi.:r give form to time,
it is not a qneMion ofwh:H comes afrer an original impression makes its
presence felt, but ofwhatcomes before an original impression and makes
it effective.
The second part oflncamation allmvs 11enry to explore what a true
phenomenology of flesh implies, and lo test how fa1 ilis capable uflhink
i.ng: life's own sdf-givenncs.s, in il!! Jiving actuality, in flc.~h. The central task
1n this part of the book is to distinguish a phenomenology of the sensing
body, a body that has the power l.o move itself and lo Louch it.•H:lf, from
what philosophy has 1mrler5tood under the ambiguous heading "sensible
body.'' To ex.plain what is capable of sensing itselt and feeling itself by ret~
erence to something else that is sensed by it is to fail to understand what
