In the Aftermath of War US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause

91 Pages·2016·10.1 MB·English

by  Shultz Richard H.

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IN THE
AFTERMATH OF WAR
US Support
for Reconstruction and
Nation-Building
in Panama Following
JUST CAUS
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Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

ISBN 1-58566-058-2
FirstPrintingAugust 1993
5 SecondPrinting May 1996
ThirdPrintingJune 1998
FourthPrintingDecember 2000
Disclaimer
Thispublication was produced inthe Departmentof Defense school environmentinthe interestof
academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views ex-
pressed inthis publication are thoseofthe authorand do not reflect the official policyorpositionof
the DepartmentofDefense orthe UnitedStates government.
This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for
publicrelease.
Contents
Chapter Page
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vii
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
1 THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF
THE COLD WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 PANAMA 1989: THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES
OF PRAETORIAN RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Origins ofPraetorianism . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 5
The 1968 Coup andtheEmergenceofOmar Torrijos . . . . . . . 6
NoriegaandthePanamanian DefenseForce . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR RESTORATION . . . . . . . 15
GenesisofIntervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Planning ChallengesandObstructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Blind Logic: AReappraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4 JUST CAUSE AND THE BREAKDOWN OF
BLIND LOGIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 THE MILITARY SUPPORT GROUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
OriginsoftheMilitary SupportGroup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
PersonnelandStructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Military SupportGroupTaskingandthe
Panama Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
i~
Chapter Page
6 ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Creating aPanamanian Security Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Infrastructure Reconstruction andNation-Building . . . . : . . 55
Psychological Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Military SupportGroupLiaisonwiththe
Panamanian Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
InteragencyCoordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7 LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RELEVANCE . . . . . . 67
.
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
iv
Foreword
In a morebenign post-cold war international system, where no threat approaches
thatofthe former Soviet Union, the rationale for the use ofUS military powercannot
be based solely on the national interest. It ill have to reflect concern with and
support for such issues as self-determination, democratization, human rights, and
economic development. The United States must have a postconflict reconstruction
assistancepolicy thatcontributes to apositive consolidation ofthe situationand that
promotes developments seen as contributing to stability and positive change. The
use of force without a policy for the postconflict situation will be politically
precarious.
Additionally, in this new international security environment the employment of
armed forces in missions outside of or short ofwar has become increasingly impor-
tant and frequent. Several indicators suggest thattheseoperations will continue to
grow in prominence on the US national security agenda. What do these nontradi-
tional operations encompass? The two thathave received the mostattention to date
are peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Very recently, a third, peace
enforcement, hasbeenaddedtothe list.
However, peacekeeping and peace enforcement only focus on the violence or com-
bat that is taking place. Neither addresses the complex issue ofwhat takes place
afterthe termination ofhostilities. Following peacekeeping andpeaceenforcement is
another nontraditional use ofthe military: postconflict/postcrisis reconstruction as-
sistance missions. Inthe future, the US is likely to find itselfinvolved in the after-
math ofcrisis and conflict situations where it may or may not have been one ofthe
initial belligerents but is part of a bilateral or multilateral effort to resolve the
problem and assistinthe reconstruction.
Professor Shultz addresses the need for a postconflict policy that takes into ac-
count all ofthese considerations. This study is an important contribution to policy
analysis and planning. Itshouldbereadbycivilianand militaryplanners alike.

About the
Author
Dr Richard H. Shultz, Jr., is director ofthe International Security Studies Pro-
gram and associate professor ofinternational politics at the Fletcher School ofLaw
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr Shultz frequently lectures at US military
academies and war colleges. Hehasbeenaresearch associateatthe Consortiumfor
the Study ofIntelligence and a consultant to various US government agencies con-
cernedwithnational securityaffairs. He has beenanonresident fellowofthe Hoover
Institution onWar, Revolution, andPeace, and arecipient ofan Earhart Foundation
Research Fellowship and a United States Institute of Peace Research Fellowship.
During 1988-89 he was a secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow and a
member of the Strategy Department of the Naval War College. Dr Shultz is the
author of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices and
Regional Comparisons(1988),and has coauthoredoredited 12otherbooks, including
Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (1984); The Future ofAir Power
in the Aftermath ofthe GulfWar (1991); The United States Army: Challenges and
Missionsforthe1990s(1991); U.S.DefensePolicy in anEra ofConstrainedResources
(1990); Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (1984); and Lessons from an Unconven-
tional War: Reassessing U.S. StrategiesforFuture Conflicts (1981). Hisarticles have
appeared in numerous professionaljournals, including The Annals oftheAmerican
`Academy ofPolitical and Social Sciences, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Sur-
vival, Conflict, Harvard Journal ofLaw and Public Policy, WorldAffairs, Strategic
Review, Journal ofPeace Research, Journal ofInternational Affairs, Polity, Western
Political Quarterly, and TheJournal ofPolitics.
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