In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness

163 Pages·2017·0.55 MB·English

by  Robert J. Hartman

In Defense of Moral Luck
This terrific and timely monograph provides a thorough introduction to
and significantly advances the important debate over the nature and scope
of moral luck. After critically assessing the main competing views, Hartman
develops and defends an unorthodox but highly promising position that
countenances not only constitutive and circumstantial but also resultant
moral luck. This book will be of great interest to any who work in ethics or
philosophy of action, and to many who work in philosophy of law, social/
political philosophy, or epistemology.
—E. J. Coffman, University of Tennessee, USA
The problem of moral luck is that there is a contradiction in our common-
sense ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we
believe that a person can become more blameworthy as a matter of luck.
For example, two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and
one but not the other kills a pedestrian. We blame the killer driver more than
the merely reckless driver, because we believe that the killer driver is more
blameworthy. Nevertheless, the idea that luck affects moral responsibility
contradicts another feature of our thinking captured in this moral principle:
A person’s blameworthiness cannot be affected by that which is not within
her control. Thus, our ordinary thinking about moral responsibility implies
that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy.
In Defense of Moral Luck aims to make progress in resolving this con-
tradiction. Hartman defends the claim that certain kinds of luck in results,
circumstance, and character can partially determine the degree of a person’s
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. He also explains why there is a puz-
zle in our thinking about moral responsibility in the first place if luck often
affects a person’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Furthermore, the
book’s methodology provides a unique way to advance the debate about
moral luck with arguments from diverse areas in philosophy that do not
bottom out in standard pro-moral luck intuitions.
Robert J. Hartman received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from St. Louis Uni-
versity, USA, in 2016, and is currently a postdoctoral research fellow with
the Gothenburg Responsibility Project at the University of Gothenburg. His
main interests include moral responsibility, ethics, metaphysics, and philos-
ophy of religion. His research has been published or is forthcoming in P hil-
osophical Studies, Philosophia , and the J ournal of Philosophical Research.
Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory
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38 In Defense of Moral Luck
Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness
Robert J. Hartman
In Defense of Moral Luck
Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness
and Blameworthiness
Robert J. Hartman
First published 2017
by Routledge
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and by Routledge
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2017 Taylor & Francis
The right of Robert J. Hartman to be identified as author of this
work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and
78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
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explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Hartman, Robert J., author.
Title: In defense of moral luck : why luck often affects
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness / by Robert J. Hartman.
Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series:
Routledge studies in ethics and moral theory ; 38 | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016052281 | ISBN 9781138293441 (hardback :
alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Ethics. | Fortune—Moral and ethical aspects.
Classification: LCC BJ1031 .H37 2017 | DDC 170—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016052281
ISBN: 978-1-138-29344-1 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-23204-1 (ebk)
Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
For my wife, Hillary

Contents
Acknowledgments ix
1 Introducing the Problem of Moral Luck 1
2 The Concept of Moral Luck 23
3 Against the Skeptical Denial of Moral Luck 42
4 Against the Non-skeptical Denial of Moral Luck 60
5 In Defense of Moral Luck 90
6 Error Theory for the Luck-Free Intuition 118
Index 147

Acknowledgments
This book is a heavily revised version of my dissertation completed at
St. Louis University under the supervision of Eleonore Stump, my director,
and John Greco and Dan Haybron, my committee members. I am grateful
for their comments and guidance on this project from its inception through
the dissertation defense. I am also grateful for early input during my pro-
spectus exam provided by Jon Jacobs, Colleen McCluskey, and Ted Vitali.
I have been thinking about the problem of moral luck ever since Gre-
co’s Mind and Agency seminar in spring 2011. As a result, I have discussed
this topic at length with many people and have acquired a large number of
debts. I am grateful to Jessica Adkins, Jay Anderson, Joshua Anderson, Mark
Anderson, Joshua Beckett, Daniel Berntson, Godehard Brüntrup, Donnie
Bungum, Jason Chen, Daniel Choi, Ian Church, Errin Clarke, Tom Flint,
Richard Fry, Everett Fulmer, Audra Goodnight, Steven Hales, Ben Hart, Hil-
lary Hartman, Kenneth Hartman, Josh Heter, Anne Jeffrey, Gideon Jeffrey,
Josh Johnson, Corey Katz, Minghe Li, James Lincoln, Kathryn Lindeman,
Ian McCready-Flora, Al Mele, Dane Muckler, Justin Noia, Faith Pawl, Josh
Rasmussen, Brandon Rdzak, Corey Reed, Jon Reibsamen, Noël Saenz, Nick
Setliff, Roy Sorensen, Grant Sterling, and George Terzis. And I am especially
grateful to Joel Archer, Jeremy Skrzypek, and two anonymous referees from
Routledge for reading an entire draft of the book.
I have presented parts of this book at various conferences. I am thankful for
audience participation at two meetings of the Indiana Philosophical Associa-
tion, two meetings of the Kentucky Philosophical Association, a meeting of the
Illinois Philosophical Association, a meeting of the Iowa Philosophical Associa-
tion, the Northwest Philosophy Conference, and the Felician Ethics Conference.
I am grateful to the editor of P hilosophical Studies for permission to reuse
material from “Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility” in a revised and
expanded version of that argument in Chapter 4 .
Finally, I thank Su Hartman, Jim Hartman, Daniel Hartman, Kenneth
Hartman, Ann Hartman, Bud Hartman, Daniel Imhoff, and Carole Imhoff
for a lifetime of encouragement and aid to pursue my goals. I thank Jim and
Sharon Croxton for care for our children that enabled me to complete this
book on time. And I am grateful to my wife, Hillary, for her grace, love, and
encouragement that sustained me through this project. She enriches my life.
To her, I dedicate this book.