Table Of ContentOUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/7/2022,SPi
Ignorance and Moral Responsibility
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/7/2022,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/7/2022,SPi
Ignorance and Moral
Responsibility
MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/7/2022,SPi
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Preface
Thereisalongtradition,stemmingfromAristotle,accordingtowhichonebears
moralresponsibilityforsomeeventjustincaseonesatisfiestwoconditions.The
firstconditionisthattheevent’soccurrencemusthavebeenwithinone’scontrol.
The second is thatits occurrence must have been within one’s ken. It isthe first
conditionthathasreceivedthelion’sshareofattentionfromphilosophers.Much
of this attention has been devoted to the puzzle posed by the apparent fact that
satisfactionofthisconditionisconsistentwithneitherdeterminismnorindeter-
minism.Indeed,itwasmyintroductiontothispuzzleinanundergraduatecourse
thatItookover50yearsagothatfirstsparkedmycuriosityaboutmoralrespon-
sibility,andmyinterestintheconcepthasneverwanedsince.
ItwasinpartbecauseIdespairedofeverfindingasatisfactorysolutiontothe
puzzle about control thatIturned,some10yearslater,toaconsiderationofthe
secondconditionofresponsibility.ButIquicklyranintoanotherpuzzlehere,too,
whichissimplythatmanyofoureverydayascriptionsofresponsibilityapparently
fail to conform to this condition. For although we often treat ignorance as an
excuse for wrongdoing, we also often don’t. We don’t when we judge that the
personinquestion“shouldhaveknownbetter.”Evenifthisjudgmentisaccurate,
though, how is it supposed to suffice for responsibility for the wrongdoing in
question?Thispuzzlestruckmeaslikelytobemoretractable,andsoIdecidedto
look into it. I came to the conclusion that ignorance provides an excuse for
wrongdoing far more often than is commonly thought, and hence that many of
our everyday ascriptions of responsibility are mistaken. I took a first stab at
presentingmyargumentforthisconclusioninthemid-1980s,andIhaveoffered
variousversionsofitsincetheninacontinuingefforttoimproveonit.
Theepistemicconditionofmoralresponsibilityisnolongerneglected.Onthe
contrary,ithascomeunderincreasedscrutinyinrecentyears,someofwhichhas
beendevotedtomyargument.Althoughsomeofthosewhohaveconsideredthe
argument are prepared to accept its conclusion, many are not—which is hardly
surprising, given itsrevisionarynature. Tobegin with,much ofthe resistance to
theargumentprettymuchtooktheformof,“Thatcan’tberight.”Ifeltentitledto
ignore this reaction, since no attempt was made to identify just where the
argument supposedly went wrong. More recently, however, there have been
several critical discussions that purport to provide reasons for rejecting one or
otherofthepremisesintheargument,anditbecamecleartomethatIneededto
revisititandtheissuessurroundingit.Thisbookistheresultofmydoingso.
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In Chapter1I present a case—“based on a true story,” as the saying goes—in
which a tragedy occurs, one that it seems could easily have been prevented. In
casesofthissortthequestionnaturallyarises,“Whoistoblame?”Inthiscasethe
tragedy would not have occurred, had one or more of many people behaved
differently. These people thus appear to satisfy the control condition of moral
responsibility.(Insosaying,Iamofcourseputtingthepuzzleaboutthiscondition
tooneside.)Butthevastmajorityofthesepeoplehadnoideathatsuchatragedy
might occur, and so it’s not clear how they could properly be said to satisfy the
epistemic condition. The common view is that, if any of these people could and
should haveforeseenthetragedy,then thefact thatthey didn’t foresee itaffords
them no excuse. But this claim raises the question how foreseeability in the
absence of foresight is possible and why, if it is, it undermines an excuse that
one would otherwise have. Consideration of this question leads me to my
argument—which in this book I call the Argument from Ignorance—that igno-
rance provides an excuse for wrongdoing far more often than is commonly
thought. I present a first draft of this argument toward the end of the chapter
and note that it applies not only to what I call incidental moral ignorance
(ignoranceofwrongdoingthatisrootedinsomenon-moralmistake)butalsoto
whatIcallfundamentalmoralignorance(ignoranceofwrongdoingthatisrooted
insomemoralmistake).
The Argument from Ignorance is, of course, an argument about the relation
between ignorance and moral responsibility, and in the chapters immediately
following the first I undertake an extended inquiry into these concepts. In
Chapter2 I distinguish between various kinds of responsibility, both moral and
non-moral,andhomeinonthatparticularkind—moralblameworthiness—with
which the Argument is concerned. My discussion prompts a reformulation—a
refinement—of the Argument, after which I embark on a lengthy investigation
intothenatureofmoralblameworthiness,attendingseparatelytoboththeblame
andtheworthinessinvolved.InChapter3Iturntoaconsiderationofthenature
ofignoranceandexplainwhyitisthat,forthepurposesofthisbook,weshould
focusinparticularonthefailuretobelievethatoneisdoingwrongandoncasesin
which the wrongdoing in question is to be attributed to such a failure. This
discussion prompts several further reformulations of the Argument. Then, in
Chapter4, I turn my attention to the control condition of moral responsibility,
sincethisconditionplaysakeyroleintheArgument,despitethefactthatitisthe
epistemicconditionthatoccupiescenterstageinthebook.
Oncethesepreliminariesareoutoftheway,Iinvestigatetheimplicationsofthe
Argument from Ignorance regarding culpable ignorance (Chapter5), negligence
(Chapter6, in which I offer two further reformulations of the Argument), reck-
lessness(Chapter7),andfundamentalmoralignorance(Chapter8).Mypurpose
in doing so is, first, to reveal the nature of these much-discussed but, I believe,
often-misunderstood phenomena and, second, to explain just how it is that the
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Argument’s implications regarding them are revisionary. Finally, in Chapter9,
IaddressanumberofchallengestotheArgumenttobefound,eitherimplicitlyor
explicitly, in the recent literature. I concede that many of these challenges have
meritbutcontendthattheArgument,reformulatedonelasttime,survivesthem.
My overarching aim in the book is simply that of improving our grasp of the
nature of moral responsibility. The outline that I have just provided is very
meager, but it should provide some idea of the contents and the purpose of the
book. A perusal of the Tableof Contents should also be of some help, as would
taking a look at the opening paragraphs in each of Chapters 2 to 9, where a
summaryisgivenofwhatistocomeinthechapter.
Finally, I should perhaps say something about the relation between this book
andmylastbook,whosetitleisIgnoranceandMoralObligation.Thatbookwas
concernedwithhowitisthatignoranceaffectsourobligationsregardinghowthe
futureistounfold—atopiconwhichIbeganworkamere20yearsago.Thisbook
is concerned with how ignorance affects our responsibility for how the past has
unfolded. For reasons that I give in Chapter2, these two issues are largely
independent of one another; as a result, there is very little overlap between the
twobooks,althoughmyfindingsintheearlierbookdoplayanimportantrolein
mydiscussionofrecklessnessinChapter7ofthisbook.
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Contents
ListofChartsandFigures xiii
Acknowledgments xv
PART I: INTRODUCTION OF THE ARGUMENT
FROM IGNORANCE
1. TheArgumentfromIgnorance 3
PART II: EXAMINATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE
ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE
2. MoralResponsibility 27
2.1 Varietiesofresponsibility 29
2.1.1 Somekeydistinctions 29
2.1.2 Therelationbetweenblameworthinessandwrongdoing 32
2.1.3 Agent-evaluationandact-evaluation 37
2.1.4 Threekindsofmoraljudgments 38
2.2 Blameworthiness 41
2.2.1 Thebasisofblameworthiness 41
2.2.2 Diversementalqualities 43
2.2.3 Control 45
2.2.4 Therelationbetweentheobjectandthebasisofblameworthiness 45
2.3 Theblameinblameworthiness 48
2.3.1 Thinblame(andpraise) 48
2.3.2 Thickblame(andpraise) 51
2.3.3 Thickblame(andpraise)andthereactiveattitudes 57
2.3.4 Thickblameasessentiallyemotional 60
2.3.5 Thickblameasessentiallyinvolvingcertaindispositions 62
2.3.6 Thickblameasessentiallycallingforananswer 62
2.3.7 Thickblameasessentiallyconversational 66
2.3.8 Thickblameasessentiallyinvolvingamoralcommunity 69
2.3.9 Aconceptualcircle 74
2.3.10 Breakingthecircle 78
2.4 Theworthinessinblameworthiness 81
2.4.1 Fromfittingnesstoworthiness 81
2.4.2 Theethicsofblame 84
2.4.3 Betweenblameworthinessandblamelessness 87
