I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again

278 Pages·2017·2.03 MB·English

by  Beatrice Longuenesse

I, Me, Mine

I, Me, Mine
Back to Kant, and Back Again
Béatrice Longuenesse
1
3
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Contents
PrefaceandAcknowledgments xi
Conventions xix
1. Introduction 1
Part I. Back To...
2. Usesof‘I’ 19
2.1 WittgensteinandHisCriticsontheUseof‘I’asSubject 20
2.1.1 Wittgenstein’sDistinction 20
2.1.2 Shoemaker’sAmendment 21
2.1.3 Usesof‘I’asObject 21
2.1.4 Evanson‘I’-Thoughts 23
2.2 KantonConsciousnessofOneselfasSubject 26
2.3 PsychologicalCaseStudies 32
2.4 ConcludingRemarks 37
3. Non-TheticSelf-ConsciousnessandUsesof‘I’ 44
3.1 Sartreon“Positional”or“Thetic”ConsciousnessofObjectand
“Non-Positional”or“Non-Thetic”(Self-)Consciousness 45
3.2 Wittgensteinon“Useof‘I’asSubject”and“Useof‘I’asObject” 48
3.3 Usesof‘I’andConsciousnessofOne’sOwnBody 51
3.4 SartreonNon-TheticConsciousness(of)theBody 54
3.5 Anscombeon‘I’andSartreonNon-TheticSelf-Consciousness 59
3.6 TakingStock 64
Part II. ...Kant
4. Kanton‘IThink’ 73
4.1 Descartes’s‘Cogito,ErgoSum’ 74
4.2 Kant’s‘IThink’ 77
4.3 ‘IThink’=‘IExistThinking’ 82
4.3.1 KantonDescartes’sCogitoArgument 82
4.3.2 ThreeKindsofConsciousnessofMyOwnThinking 86
4.3.2.1 TheMereConsciousnessoftheActofThinking 86
4.3.2.2 TheIndeterminatePerceptionthatIThink 87
4.3.2.3 TheEmpiricallyDeterminedConsciousnessofthe
SequenceofMyMentalStates 91
4.3.3 KantandDescartesonPerceivingthatOneThinks 92
4.4 Interlude:AndersononLonguenesseonKantonDescartes’
CogitoArgument 93
4.5 ConcludingRemarks 94
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5. Kanton‘I’andtheSoul 102
5.1 AmbiguitiesinKant’sTerminology 103
5.1.1 TranscendentalUnityofApperception 103
5.1.2 IThink 104
5.1.3 I 107
5.1.4 Subject 108
5.1.5 Soul 109
5.1.6 Self 111
5.2 “TheFirstParalogism,ofSubstantiality” 112
5.2.1 TheFirstParalogisminA 113
5.2.1.1 CommentsontheMajorPremise 113
5.2.1.2 CommentsontheMinorPremise 115
5.2.1.3 WhereistheParalogism? 115
5.2.1.4 AnotherWaytoGo 121
5.2.2 TheFirstParalogisminB 121
5.2.2.1 Kant’sStatementoftheParalogisminB 121
5.2.2.2 AbouttheMajorPremise,ComparisonofAandB 124
5.2.2.3 AbouttheMinorPremiseandtheConclusion,
ComparisonofAandB 124
5.3 “TheSecondParalogism,ofSimplicity” 125
5.3.1 TheSecondParalogisminA 125
5.3.1.1 TheMajorPremise 126
5.3.1.2 TheMinorPremise 128
5.3.2 TheSecondParalogisminB 129
5.3.3 LogicalSubjectandSubjective‘I’ 130
5.4 ConcludingRemarks 131
6. KantontheIdentityofPersons 140
6.1 Kant’sCriticismoftheParalogismofPersonality 141
6.2 “I,asThinking,”andConsciousnessofIdentityinDifferentTimes 142
6.3 ConsciousnessofIdentityandPersonhood 146
6.4 Kant’sPerson,andtheMoralStandpoint 152
6.5 KantandStrawsononPersons 158
6.6 ConcludingRemarks 163
Part III. ...And Back Again
7. Kant’s‘I’in‘IThink’andFreud’s“Ego” 173
7.1 PreliminaryRemarks 173
7.2 Kanton‘I’in‘IThink’ 176
7.2.1 ‘I,’DiscursiveThinking,andBeingConsciousofOne’sRepresentations 176
7.2.2 DiscursiveThinkingandSynthesisofImagination 181
7.2.3 Weare“SeldomEvenConscious”oftheSynthesisof
Imagination 181
7.2.4 ‘I’andConsciousnessofOne’sOwnBody 183
7.3 Freudon“dasIch”(“theEgo”) 185
7.3.1 ConsciousnessandWhatisUnconscious 185
7.3.2 “Ego”and“Id” 186
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 ix
7.4 Kant’s‘Ich’in‘Ichdenke’andFreud’s‘Ich’ 188
7.4.1 ‘I,’DiscursiveThinking,andConsciousnessofOne’sRepresentations 189
7.4.2 Kant’sSynthesisofImaginationandFreud’sPerceptualImages
OrganizedAccordingtotheRulesoftheEgo 190
7.4.3 MentalActivitiesofWhichWeare“SeldomEvenConscious” 191
7.4.4 ‘I’andtheBody 193
7.5 ConcludingRemarks 194
8. Kant’s‘I’intheMoral‘IOughtTo’andFreud’s“Super-Ego” 204
8.1 PreliminaryRemarks 204
8.2 Kant’s‘I’in‘IOughtTo’ 209
8.2.1 TheMoral‘IOughtTo’andMentalConflict 209
8.2.2 ‘IOughtTo’andPre-DiscursiveDeterminationoftheWill 212
8.2.3 MotivatedBlindnesstotheGroundsofOne’sActions 213
8.2.4 ‘I’in‘IOughtTo’andConsciousnessofOne’sBody 216
8.3 Freud’sSuper-Ego 218
8.4 Kant’s‘I’in‘IOughtTo’andFreud’sSuper-Ego 220
8.4.1 MentalConflict 220
8.4.2 Discursive,Pre-Discursive,Non-DiscursiveMentalActivity 221
8.4.3 MotivatedBlindness 222
8.4.4 ‘I’in‘IOughtTo,’Freud’s“Super-Ego,”andEmbodiment 224
8.5 ConcludingRemarks 226
9. Epilogue 231
Bibliography 239
GeneralIndex 247
NameIndex 255