I have argued

312 Pages·2006·1.91 MB·English

SOCIAL ACTION, ROGUE REACTION:
US POST-COLD WAR NUCLEAR
COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGIES
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES
OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
AlexanderH.Montgomery
September2005
(cid:13)c Copyright by Alexander H. Montgomery 2006
All Rights Reserved
ii
IcertifythatIhavereadthisdissertationandthat,inmyopin-
ion,itisfullyadequateinscopeandqualityasadissertation
forthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy.
ScottD.Sagan
(PrincipalAdviser)
IcertifythatIhavereadthisdissertationandthat,inmyopin-
ion,itisfullyadequateinscopeandqualityasadissertation
forthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy.
JohnMeyer
IcertifythatIhavereadthisdissertationandthat,inmyopin-
ion,itisfullyadequateinscopeandqualityasadissertation
forthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy.
LynnEden
IcertifythatIhavereadthisdissertationandthat,inmyopin-
ion,itisfullyadequateinscopeandqualityasadissertation
forthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy.
DavidJ.Holloway
Approved for the University Committee on Graduate Stud-
ies.
iii
iv
Abstract
Which US post-Cold War counterproliferation strategies towards nuclear aspirants have
been most successful and why? Military capabilities, economic needs, and social desires
provide both motivations for nuclear proliferation and opportunities for states to counter
these motivations. I argue that strategies involving the use of military or economic tools
alonearenotonlyunsuccessfulbutareactuallycounterproductive. Idemonstrateusingthe
cases of North Korea and Iran that including social benefits in the form of symbolic and
diplomaticgesturesiscrucialtothesuccessofthesestrategies.
To generate hypotheses regarding the effects of different types of strategies on nuclear
outcomes, I combine realist, liberal, and constructivist theories with spiral and deterrent
models. I include the effects of three intervening mechanisms: domestic political struc-
tures, positive feedback loops, and the effects of multiple-country interactions. To test
these hypotheses, I break down strategies into individual actions directed at either sup-
pressing the demand for or halting the supply of nuclear technologies to individual prolif-
erants. I use vector autoregression to uncover action-reaction cycles and establish general
interaction patterns between the United States and North Korea. I then use within-case
congruence procedures to compare theoretical predictions of the effects of different types
of strategies with nuclear outcomes in both North Korea and Iran. I find in both cases that
feedback played an important role in amplifying US strategies and that social incentives
were consistently related to success. Finally, I perform a cross-case comparison of how
the structure of proliferation networks among second-tier nuclear aspirants has affected
weapons development times; I find that tacit knowledge constrained the A.Q. Khan nu-
clear network to a hub-and-spoke structure, minimizing its effectiveness. Together, these
findings imply that to stop proliferation, social benefits should be used to target existing
and potential hubs of proliferation networks; future research should find that other prolif-
eration networks are similarly constrained and that social motivations play a large role in
proliferationdecisions.
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Acknowledgements
Thisdissertationistheresultoffiveyearsoffollowinganoccasionallycircuitouspathfrom
an initial inquiry into the effects of social sanctions on nuclear aspirants to the (finally)
finished product. I could not have completed it without the assistance of many individuals
alongtheway. Anyshortcomingsofthiswork (includingforgettingtothankthem)aremy
own;anyvirtuesareinlargepartduetotheirassistance.
I would first like to thank the members of my committee. Scott Sagan provided in-
valuable guidance throughout the project, from compiling an initial reading list to reading
the final draft on a very tight schedule; his suggestions on all parts of the dissertation have
been invaluable. Lynn Eden gave copious advice on numerous occasions, spending a great
deal of time on everything from brainstorming to polishing; her door was always open.
John Meyer brought a very different perspective to the table; his ability to offer concise
and pertinent advice within a day of every draft is unparalleled. I would like to thank
Steve Krasner for comments on early drafts, and David Holloway for readily stepping in
as a committee member late in the process. I would also like to thank Woody Powell for
chairingmydefense.
I received invaluable help from many seminar participants. Ted Hopf and Steve Biddle
offeredusefultipsonanearlyversionofChapters2-4givenasapaperatthe2004meeting
oftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation. ChaimBraun,ChristopherChyba,andDean
Wilkening offered helpful feedback on an early draft of Chapter 6 given as a paper at the
Stanford Center for International Cooperation and Security (CISAC). Gili Drori provided
extensive comments on a version of my prospectus presented at CISAC. I would like to
thankthemaswellastherestoftheparticipantsoftheResearchSeminaratCISAC.
MostofmydissertationwritingoccurredattheKennedySchoolatHarvardUniversity,
where I was a pre-doctoral fellow for two years. I would particularly like to thank Jim
Walsh, Matt Bunn, John Park, Anthony Wier, and Chen Zak at Managing the Atom and
SteveMillerandSeanLynn-JonesattheInternationalSecurityProgramfordiscussionson
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NorthKoreaandIranduringmytimeatBelfer. IwouldalsoliketothankDianeMcCreefor
extensiveeditingonChapter6,whichisforthcomingasanarticleinInternationalSecurity.
IalsoreceivedmanycommentsfromtherestoftheparticipantsoftheManagingtheAtom
Project and the International Security Program seminars at the Belfer Center for Science
andInternationalAffairs.
Financial assistance was provided by a Graduate Research Fellowship from the Na-
tional Science Foundation, the Political Science department at Stanford University, the
StanfordCenterforInternationalSecurityandCooperationattheFreemanSpogliInstitute
for International Studies, and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John
F.KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity. IwouldliketothankJeanetteLee-
Oderman, graduate student administrator in Political Science at Stanford, for sorting out
innumerablebureaucraticcomplicationsaswellasgeneralsupport.
I am fortunate enough to have many colleagues who are also good friends; they pro-
vided support during the long process of researching and writing. My friends Paul Mac-
DonaldandStacieGoddardgavemeearlycommentsonimportantpartsofthedissertation
and helped to keep me sane while I was in Cambridge. Ron Hassner, Taylor Fravel, and
Todd Sechser, my immediate predecessors in security studies at Stanford and fellow fel-
lows in Cambridge, were equally good with their advice and company. Karthika Sasiku-
mar, fellow student of nonproliferation, gave me suggestions on multiple subjects. Emilie
Hafner-Burton,DanNexon,andJaniceBiallyMatternprovidedencouragementduringthe
researching and writing process. Adrienne LeBas was a wonderful commiserator during
thefinalfewmonthsofwriting.
Finally,Iwouldliketothankmyfriendsandrelativesfortheirsupportandpatienceover
the years, both preceding and during the overlong dissertation process. My parents, Judy
andDoug,havebeenverysupportiveduringtheentireprocess,despiteanydoubtstheymay
have had about how long it was going to take to finish the final product. My grandparents
Bill, Jeanne, Edison, and Ruth have been very encouraging of my work whether it was
readable or not. Without their support as well as the support of my entire family and
friends(especiallyBrianandOrion),thisdissertationwouldnothavebeenpossible.
vii
Contents
Abstract v
Acknowledgements vi
ListofTables xi
ListofFigures xii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 DefiningtheQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 CaseSelection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 TheoryandMethod 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 TheTechnologyofProliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.1 ThePlutoniumRoute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5.2 TheUraniumRoute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3 SocialAction,WhatReaction? 57
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 QuantitativeMethodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.1 DataCoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.2 EventScaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
viii
3.2.3 VectorAutoregression(VAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.4 CrisisPeriodsandTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3 US–DPRKInteractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.1 TheFirstNorthKoreanNuclearCrisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.2 TheSecondNorthKoreanNuclearCrisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.A LagLengthsandCoefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.B EventCodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4 NorthKorea 91
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 TheNorthKoreanNuclearProgram,1950–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.1 NorthKoreanMotivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2.2 TheOriginsoftheProgram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.2.3 ThePost-ColdWarProgram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 NorthKoreanActions,USReactions,1990–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.1 TheFirstNorthKoreanNuclearCrisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3.2 TheSecondNorthKoreanNuclearCrisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5 Iran 153
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2 TheRootsoftheIranianNuclearProgram,1957–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.2.1 IranianMotivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.2.2 TheOriginsoftheProgram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.2.3 ThePost-RevolutionProgram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.3 IranianActions,USReactions,1979–2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.3.1 RussiaandBushehr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.3.2 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.3.3 OtherStates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5.3.4 BilateralActions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
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5.4 IranianClandestineAction,1979-2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
5.4.1 IntelligenceEstimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
5.4.2 DomesticandClandestineUraniumExperiments . . . . . . . . . . 187
5.4.3 IAEAinspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
5.5 TheIranianNuclearCrisis,2002–2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6 RinginginProliferation 201
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
6.2 ProliferationDeterminism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
6.3 NewProliferators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
6.3.1 NuclearNetworks: LeapfroggingorFallingDown? . . . . . . . . . 206
6.3.2 TheIrrelevanceofRegimeType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
6.4 ProliferationNetworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
6.4.1 TheStructureofProliferationNetworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
6.4.2 TacitKnowledgeandtheSpreadofNuclearWeapons . . . . . . . . 222
6.5 PastandFutureCounterproliferationEfforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
7 Conclusion 231
7.1 PolicyImplications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
7.1.1 NorthKorea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
7.1.2 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
7.1.3 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
7.2 ResearchImplications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Bibliography 241
Periodicals 269
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