Table Of ContentHUSSERL AND THE QUESTION OF RELATIVISM
PHAENOMENOLOGICA
COLLECTION FONDEE PAR H.L. VAN BREDA ET PUBLIEE
SOUS LE PATRONAGE DES CENTRES D'ARCHIVES-HUSSERL
122
GAIL SOFFER
HUSSERL AND THE QUESTION
OF RELATIVISM
Comite de redaction de la collection:
President: S. Usseling (Leuven)
Membres: tL. Landgrebe (Koln), W. Marx (Freiburg i. Br.),
J.N. Mohanty (Philadelphia), P. Ricreur (Paris), E. Stroker (KOln),
J. Taminiaux (Louvain-Ia-Neuve), Secretaire: J. Taminiaux
Husserl and the Question
of Relativism
GAILSOFFER
New School for Social Research,
New York, U.SA.
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Soffer. Ga iL
Husserl and the questlon of relativism / by Gall Soffer.
p. cm. -- (Phaenomenologica ; 122)
Includes blbliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-94-010-5402-7 ISBN 978-94-011-3178-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-3178-0
1. Husser 1. Edmund. 1859-1938. 2. Re latlV1ty--History. 3. Truth
-History. 1. Title. II. Series.
B3279.H94S59 1991
121' .092--dc20 91-17761
ISBN 978-94-010-5402-7
Printed on acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved
© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1991
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1991
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
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Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix
PREFACE xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xvii
CHAPTER ONE / THE CRITIQUE OF RELATIVISM IN THE
PROLEGOMENA TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1
1. The Prolegomena Critique 2
1.1 The Self-Refutation Argument 3
1.2 The Argument by Way of the Meaning of 'Truth' 11
2. Relativism Reconsidered 16
CHAPTER TWO / THE CRITIQUE OF HISTORICISM AND
WELTANSCHAUUNG PHll..OSOPHY IN "PHILOSOPHY AS
RIGOROUS SCIENCE" 29
1. The Critique of Historicism 30
2. The Defense of Philosophy as a Science 39
2.1 The Idea of Science 40
2.2 Philosophy as Weltanschauung and Philosophy as
Science 46
CHAPTER THREE / THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ELUCIDATION OF TRUTH: BETWEEN SKEPTICISM AND
RELATIVISM 59
1. Cartesian Objectivism and the Epistemic Critique 60
2. Truth and Evidenz in the Prolegomena 66
3. Truth and Evidenz in the Sixth Investigation 75
4. Truth and Evidenz in Ideas I 83
5. Summary and Provisional Conclusions 89
vii
viii Table oJContents
CHAPTER FOUR / PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE ABSOLUTE 103
1. Transcendental Phenomenology and the Path to Absolute
Evidenz 105
1.1 Inner Perception, Immanent Perception, and the
Epoche 105
1.2 Noetic-Noematic Analysis: Husserl and Kant 112
2. Adequacy and Apodicticity 120
3. Intersubjectivity: A First Approach 128
3.1 Intersubjectivity and Transcendental Subjectivity 129
3.2 The Evidenz of Intersubjectivity 132
CHAPTER FIVE / RELATIVISM AND THE LIFEWORLD 143
1. Historical Introduction: The 'Tum' to the Lifeworld 145
2. The Plurality and Relativity of the Lifeworld 149
3. The Lifeworld and Truth 158
4. The Priority of the Lifeworld 165
5. The Phenomenological Overcoming of Relativism 171
5.1 Phenomenology as Relativism? 171
5.2 Phenomenology of Universality 180
CONCLUSION 203
BIBLIOGRAPHY 205
INDEX 217
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this work was presented as a dissertation at Columbia
University under the sponsorship of Charles Parsons. I would like to
express my gratitude to Professor Parsons for his encouragement of my
study of Husserl over the course of several years and for the benefit of his
counsel and judgment. My second reader, Charles Larmore, also provided
many years of valuable comments and ideas, including especially useful
indications of the relation of Husserl to other thinkers. Many thanks also to
J.N. Mohanty, David Carr, and Richard Bernstein for helpful conversations
and written remarks during the later stages of this project. I have profited
not only from their penetrating thematic insights but also from their special
wisdom and mentorship.
A research stay at the Husserl-Archives of Cologne was made possible
by a grant from the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst. I am
indebted to Elisabeth Stroker, Ursula Panzer and Reinhold Smid for their
kind assistance during this stay. Thanks are also due to Samuel IJsseling,
Philip Buckley, Ullrich Melle, and Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archives
of Leuven. I greatly appreciated their support of my project and the very
stimulating discussions during my visit to Leuven.
My greatest debt of gratitude remains to my family and friends, without
whose special participation this work would not have been possible.
ix
Preface
The question of relativism is a perennial one, and as fundamental and far
reaching as the question of truth itself. Is truth absolute and universal, the
same everywhere and for everyone? Or is truth historically, culturally,
biologically, or otherwise relative, varying from one epoch or species to
another?
Although the issues surrounding relativism have attracted especially
intense interest of late, they continue to spark heated controversies and to
pose problems lacking an obvious resolution. On the side of one prevalent
form of relativism, it is argued that we must finally recognize the historical
and cultural contingency of our available means of cognition, and therefore
abandon as naIve the absolute conception of truth dear to traditional
philosophy. According to this line of thinking, even if there were univer
sally valid principles, knowledge of them would not be possible for us, and
thus an absolute conception of truth must be rejected in light of the
demands of critical epistemology.
However, when truth is accordingly relativized to some contingent
subjective cognitive background, new difficulties arise. One of the most
infamous of these is the logical inconsistency of the resulting thesis of
relativism itself. Yet an even more serious problem is that the relativization
of truth makes truth itself contingent, thereby undermining the motivation
for preferring one belief or value to another, or even to its opposite. For if
all our beliefs are true only given, for example, the prevailing norms, values
and modes of reasoning of this society, and if these latter are not themselves
true, but simply elements of the cognitive background that happens to be in
effect, then there is no rational ground for the affirmation that our beliefs
are superior to the contrary beliefs of others, beliefs which are equally valid
given some other contingent background. Of course it can be granted that
we do in fact prefer our own beliefs, and perhaps in straightforward
everyday living and choosing cannot do otherwise. However, in moments
of critical reflection it must be conceded that this preference is itself no
xi
xii Preface
more than a contingent fact, rather than an authentically justifiable one.
Thus a consequent relativism results in an extreme pessimism about the
possibility of any rational thought or action.
Husserl is one of the few major thinkers of the 20th century for whom
the problem of relativism is of utmost importance. Writings such as
"Philosophy as Rigorous Science" and the Crisis make clear the magnitude
of what, according to Husserl, is at stake: not merely the resolution of a
narrowly technical philosophical issue, but the intellectual, ethical and
spiritual well-being of human civilization as a whole. The overcoming
relativism stands as a veritable quest for Husserl, and can be seen to be a
guiding motive for the entire development of his phenomenology. A major
contribution of a phenomenological approach to this issue is that it provides
the means for a positive defense of an absolute conception of truth, a
defense which demonstrates that and the extent to which knowledge of such
truth is possible. However, the same phenomenological approach which
makes possible an epistemic justification of non-relative truth makes
possible a justification of relative truth as well. Thus the attempt to employ
phenomenology to overcome relativism in the most conclusive way
possible ultimately results in an affirmation and reconciliation of both a
relative and a non-relative conception of truth.
This work presents a reconstruction and evaluation of Husserl's evolving
position in relation to relativism. The main focus is upon the question of the
relativity of truth. Husserl's responses to this question are analyzed in three
main moments: his critique of relativism; his positive defense of absolute
truth by way of a phenomenological reinterpretation of it; and his ultimate
attempt to reconcile both a relative and a non-relative conception of truth in
light of the analysis of the life world. Thus I argue that despite Husserl' s
early virulent opposition to relativism, and his subsequent efforts to develop
an epistemically sound conception of absolute truth, Husserl' sown
phenomenology itself leads to a limited affirmation of relativism. However,
contrary to critical attacks in the literature suggesting that a consistently
phenomenological approach should have led Husserl to a complete abandon
ment of an absolute notion of truth, I maintain that Husserl' s phenomenol
ogy shows the reconcilability and defensibility of both relativity and the
absolute.
Chapter One is devoted to the critique of relativism in the Prolegomena
to the Logical Investigations. The general approach in this early writing is a
formal one: the thesis of relativism is shown to contain paradoxes and
contradictions, and to depend upon equivocal uses of language. Although
Husserl himself eventually realized the inability of formal argumentation to
