Table Of ContentHUNGERANDTHESWORD
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DUTCH MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT HISTORY
AND ARCHAEOLOGY
,
EDITORS
H.W. PLEKET - F.J.A.M. MEIJER
VOLUMEXX
P. ERDKAMP
HUNGER AND THE SWORD
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PAUL ERO.KAMP
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HUNGER AND THE SWORD
WARFARE AND FOOD SUPPLY IN
ROMAN REPUBLICAN WARS
(264 - 30 B.C.)
J.C. GIESEN, PUBLISHER
AMSTERDAM 1998
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j ) 6--
69
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No pail of this book may be translated or reproduced in any fonn, by print, photoprint,
microfilm~~y other means, without wrillen pcnnission from the publisher.
© by P. Erdkamp, 1998 / .Printed in The Netherlands / ISBN 90 5063 608 X
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.
Introduction.
1
Part One,
Chapter One.
Supplying annies. Problems and methods.
11
Chapter Two.
The soldier's rations.
27
Chapter Three.
Magazines and transport.
46
Chapter Four.
The means of acquisition
84
Chapter Five.
Living off the land.
122
Chapter Six.
Food supply and strategy.
141
Chapter Seven.
Logistical restraints.
A case-study of the Second Punic War in Italy.
156
Part Two.
Chapter Eight.
Civilian food supply in the ancient world.
188
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Chapter Nine.
Agricultural production in times of war.
208
Chapter Ten.
Food supply and survival in times of war.
241
Chapter Eleven.
Population and recovery.
A case-study of the Second Puoic War in Italy.
270
Conclusions.
2'17
Bibliography.
305
Samenvatting.
325
Maps.
Gaul 107
Spain 131
Greece and Macedon 143
Italy and Sicily 157
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Acknowledgements
Many friends, scholars, and colleagues have been generous in their support and
encouragement, foremost my promotores L. de Blois and J.S. Richardson (University
of Edinburgh) and my co-promotor Th. Engelen. I owe special thanks to J.S.
Richardson, who kindly undertook the task of correcting my English. Needless to say,
any slips of grammar or spelling which remain are exlusively mine.
Those who have read and offered advice on the manuscript or specific parts of
it at one stage or another, apart from my promotores and co-promotor, include E.
Badian (Harvard, Cambridge Mass.), G. Lewis (University of Edinburgh), L. de Ligt
(Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht), J.A. Lynn (University of Illinois, Urbana), F. Millar
(Brasenose College, Oxford), H.W. Picket (Rijksuniversiteit Leiden) and C.R.
Whittaker (Churchill College, Cambridge). I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness
to all of them, and to those who are not mentioned for reasons of brevity, but whose
assistance is appreciated not less.
This work could not have been written without the generous financial support of
the Netherlands Organiz:ation for Scientific Research (NWO). Funding for the early
stages of the research leading to this book was provided by the Reiman-de Bas Fonds,
Stichting Dr. C.L. van Steeden Foods, and Stichting Wilcordia. These organiz:ations
provided me with the opportunity to make use of the excellent facilities of the
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, the University of Edinburgh, and Brasenose College,
Oxford.
Finally I want to thank my parents for teaching me the value of a good
education, and express my gratitude to my wife Shirley for her helpfulness and
continuing patience, and for her refreshing lack of interest in Roman history.
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Introduction.
Roman wars, like those of later times, took place in a landscape - a landscape not only
consisting of moUJ1taios, plains and rivers, but also of men tilling the soil, travelling
across sea or land, or employing other means in their struggle for survival (and even
happiness). This book undertakes to examine Roman wars in this context of the natural
and human environment. Roman warfare is generally examined from the viewpoint of
the ancient authors on whose narratives our understanding depends. As a consequence,
however, Roman wars seem to have become events that took place on the pages of a
book rather than in the environment of the Mediterranean world. The way Roman wars
were fought was determined by the geography and climate of the Mediterranean
peninsulas, by the ecological restraints on agriculture and transport, and by the
economic and social structures of the society of which the armies were a significant
part.
This book relates warfare to one of the main conditions of survival: it examines on
the one band the food supply of the many thousand'> that manned the Roman armies,
and oo the other the impact of war on the food supply of those people not waging war.
Ao examination of the military food supply makes clear that the ecological factor bad
not been overcome, as can be seen most clearly from the fact that in most of their
campaigns the Rnmaos had to abort their operations at the approach of winter and bad
to retreat to winter-quarters, where they awaited the return of conditions that would
allow their large armies to be sustained securely while fighting their foes. The Greek
Polybius once remarked on the extraordinary tenaciousness of both sides during the
Roman campaigns in Spain. Only the approach of winter, he says, could disrupt the
continuous fighting.' Though the necessity of feeding thousands of people under often
hazardous circumstances was not the only aspect of the seasonality of war, it was the
major element to impose limits on the generals' plans. On the other band, when an
advantage over their enemy could be gained, generals would undertake operations at the
fringe of the logistically possible. The seasonality of war and the limitations placed oo
campaigns, as well as the accounts of armies threatened by starvation, show that warfare
can not adequately be explained without atteotioo to the armies' food supply.
The generals of Antiquity understood very well that an adequate food supply could
never be taken for granted. The precariousness of the army's provisionment often made
it a welcome target for the adversary's actions. For example, Plutarch informs us that
during bis campaigns against Mithridates (73-67 B.C.), "Lucullus was oot waging war
merely for the show, but, as the saying goes, was kicking in the belly". The fourth
century author Vegetius told bis readers: "to distress the enemy more by famine than
the sword is a mark of consummate skill.• It even was a well-known saying, we are
told, that more succumbed to hunger than to the sword.2 Tactical strength often was a
precondition for successful provisioning, and the limitations posed by logistics could
1 Polybius 35. I.
2 Plutarch, Luc. 11,l; Vegetius, Epit. 3.3; 3.26.
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decide between defeat and victory.
The problems of army logistics should be situated against the background of the
production and distribution of food in Graeco-Roman society as a whole. Historians are
increasingly realizing the importance of food supply in the existence of the population
of Antiquity. The production and distribution of food in the Graeco-Roman world could
guarantee most people no more than a precarious existence between abundance and
hunger, the result of man-made disruption as well as the natural insecurities governing
agriculture and transportation. This precariousness gave rise to many cropping
techniques and social strategies, the purpose of which was to alleviate risk, and which
shaped agriculture and the social relations of the ancient rural society. Even if these
mechanisms were often successful in warding off individual starvation, most people felt
continuously threatened in their survival.
When harvest failures were widespread or disturbance of distribution prolonged, the
coping mechanisms failed and famine was inevitable. Producers would store food as a
precaution against bad years, but they did not always have control over their production,
and thus the balancing out of occasional gluts and shortages was not always successful.
Also the compensation of regional differences often proved difficult, since the obstacles
posed by the landscape had to be overcome by largely animal- and wind-powered
transportation. In such a precarious situation, access to food is best when it is as direct
as possible, as is witnessed by the general emphasis in Antiquity on autarky. The food
supply of the groups within society who depended for their sustenance oo the production
of others was easily disturbed even at best of times. Accordingly, the sheer existence
of ancient cities and towns was based on economic, social and political rights, which
had to stabilize their access to food. These structures are at the heart of a major
discussion in current ancient economic history, concerning the validity for Antiquity of
the concept of the 'consumer city'. Because of their size Roman armies were like mobile
cities, moving across the ancient natural landscape, and having their peculiar place in
the economic and social environment of the Roman world.
Warfare is usually seen as an external factor in the food supply, upsetting and
disturbing a precarious balance, thus leilding to shortage and even famine. Rightly so,
ooe may add. The sources on ancient wars often paint a bleak picture of armies ravaging
fields, plundering stores, burning farm houses, and driving away livestock, thus leading
to flight and starvation. A healthy scepticism towards our sources should not lead us to
reject such a picture a priori. When analyzing the risk-management strategies of the
producers against shortage and famine, it is necessary to distinguish between natural and
man-made disruptions of agricultural production. Cropping strategies that were aimed
at minimizing the risk of harvest-failure were ineffective against plundering and
ravaging armies. War shaped its own set of circumstances in which to judge the
usefulness of alleviating measures. By disrupting production and distribution, and by
draining off all powers of resilience, wars often caused famine, a situation that was
aggravated by the dislocation of the economy as a result of war. In addition, flight and
malnutrition stimulated the rise of epidemic diseases, thus leading to temporary
depopulation. Ancient authors were not exaggerating when describing wars as dreadful
catastrophes.
However, warfare and the mechanisms to sustain the military effort should also be
seen as elements within the structures of society. Roman armies had become a constant
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