Hume on the Imagination

28 Pages·2016·0.16 MB·English

Hume on the Imagination
Fabian Dorsch
ReroDocDigitalLibrary,Lausanne: ReroDoc,2015,pp. 1-28.
Thisistheoriginal, longerdraftformyentryonHumeintheTheRoutledgeHand-
bookofPhilosophyofImagination,editedbyAmyKindandpublishedbyRoutledge
in2016. —PleasealwayscitetheRoutledgeversion,unlesstherearepassagescon-
cernedthatdidnotmakeitintotheHandbook forreasonsoflength.
1 Introduction
ThischapteroverviewsHume’sthoughtsonthenatureandtheroleofimaginingandhow
the two are linked to the relevant contemporary discussions, with an almost exclusive
focusonthefirstbookoftheTreatiseofHumanNature.1
Over the course of this text, Hume draws and discusses three important distinctions
among our conscious mental episodes (or what he calls “perceptions’).2 First, he divides
them into “impressions” and “ideas” – or, as he also says, into “feelings” and “thoughts”
(1.1.1). Theformercomprise“sensations,passionsandemotions,astheymaketheirfirst
appearance in the soul” (1.1.1.1) – that is, perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and
ba sic feelings of desire and emo tion. By contrast, the latter include “the faint images of
[impressions]inthinkingandreasoning”(ibid.) –suchasmemories,occurentbeliefsand,
indeed,imaginings.
Humethendistinguishestwotypesofideas,namely“ideasofthememory”and“ideas
of the imagination” (1.1.3 and 1.3.5). Finally, the ideas of the imagination are again sep-
arated into “ideas of the judgement” (or “beliefs” or “opinions’) and “ideas of the fancy”
(or “mere fictions’; 1.3.7ff. and the Appendix). Ideas of the fancy comprise what we
call today instances or episodes of imagining – such as visualising or auditorily imagin-
ingsomething,imaginingorsupposingthatsomethingisthecase,orimaginingfeelingor
doingsomething. Bycontrast,ideasofthejudgementincludeoccurrentbeliefsandjudge-
mental thoughts, while ideas of the memory are identical with episodes of remembering
or recalling. All of these ideas are contrasted by Hume with perceptual experiences and
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othertypesofimpressions.
Fromthepointofviewofphilosophyofimagination,allthreeofHume’sdistinctions
are of particular significance. The difference between impressions and ideas is central to
theissueofhowtotellapartsensoryformsoftheimagination(e.g. visualising)fromtheir
perceptual counterparts (e.g. seeing) [Nanay, Imagination and Perception]. The contrast
betweenmemoryandimaginationasdistinctsourcesofideasisrelevantforthedifferentia-
tionofepisodicmemoryfromimaginativeexperience[Debus,ImaginationandMemory].
AndthedistinctionbetweenoccurrentbeliefsandmerefictionsisHume’sattemptatdis-
tinguishing what we would nowadays treat as distinct types of thought or propositional
attitude[Sinhababu,ImaginationandBelief].
Ishalldiscusseachdistinctioninturn(§§2-3). Inaddition,IconsiderHume’sviews
ontheimaginationasafacultyaimedattheproductionofideas(§3),aswellasontherole
thatimaginingplaysinthewidercontextofourmentallives,notablyintheacquisitionof
modalknowledgeandinthecomprehensionofstoriesandopinionsthatwetaketobefalse
orfictional(§4). IclosewithsomeremarksaboutwhyHume’sviewsontheimagination
arestillimportantfromacontemporaryperspective(§5).
2 Seeing, Visualising, and the Copy Principle
Hume’s contribution to the debate about the nature of visualising and other forms of sen-
soryimaginingandtheirdistinctionfromthecorrespondingperceptualexperiencesisen-
capsulated in his conception of the relationship between impressions and ideas. When
describingthisrelationship,HumefollowshisempiricistpredecessorsLocke(1690/2008)
and Berkeley (1710/2009) in claiming that all knowledge or belief has to start with per-
ception. In particular, the concepts involved in our thoughts cannot be innate, but have
to be acquired empirically. We cannot recall, imagine or think about something blue (or
salty,musky,etc.) unlesswehaveexperiencedsomethingblue(orsalty,musky,etc.).
ThisempiricistdoctrineisembodiedinHume’sfamous“CopyPrinciple’,accordingto
which“alloursimpleideasintheirfirstappearancearederiv’dfromsimpleimpressions,
which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (1.1.1.7). The two
typesofmentalepisodearethereforedistinguishedbyHumeintermsoftheirorigin: while
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simpleideasare“nothingbutcopiesandrepresentations”ofsimpleimpressions(1.1.7.5),
simpleimpressionsarenotcopiesofanyprecedingperceptions(Hume1748/2007: §II.17;
Cohon and Owen 1997: § 2; Landy 2006: 124f.). The restriction of the Copy Principle
to simple ideas and impressions is meant to take into account that we can recall, imagine
orthinkaboutmorecomplexthingslikeabluecircleevenifwehaveneverseenone. All
that is required is that we have seen a blue object, as well as a (possibly different) round
object.
Humehighlightsseveralaspectsofthecopyingrelation. First,itisarelationofasym-
metric dependence: every simple idea depends, in one way or another, on the simple
impression that it is a copy of. Second, the relation of copying is also a relation of corre-
pondence: “allsimpleideasandimpressionsresembleeachother”(1.1.1.6). Morespecif-
ically, they resemble each other in what they make us aware of. If a simple impression
makesusawareofsomethinground,thenitscopy,intheshapeofsomesimpleidea,also
makes us aware of something round. Third, these two aspects of the copying relation are
closelyrelated. Forsimpleideasdependonsimpleimpressionsinsuchawaythatthetwo
end up resembling each other. Fourth, the kind of dependence in question is causal: “our
impressions are the causes of our ideas” (1.1.1.8). This means that every simple idea has
to be causally preceded by a corresponding simple impression – which is why we can-
nothave anideaofsomethinground,say,withoutthepriorexistenceofanimpressionof
somethinground.
These four aspects of the copying relation may be summarised by the slogan that
copies are causal reproductions. That is, simple ideas are derived from simple impres-
sions in roughly the same way in which photocopies are derived from the original sheets
ofpaper. Inbothcases,thecopiescausallydependontheoriginalsand,asresult,alsore-
sembletheminrelevantaspects(ibid.: 125ff.). Now,understandingsimpleideasascausal
reproductionsofsimpleimpressionshastwoimportantconsequences,bothofwhichapply
toimpressionsandideasindependentlyofwhethertheyaresimpleorcomplex.
The first is that, because impressions make us exclusively aware of concrete objects
andtheirfeatures,ideasdoso,too(1.1.7;LaurenceandMargolis2012: §2). Thismeans
that, whenever we are recalling, imagining or thinking about a triangle, we always have
an individual and relatively specific triangle in mind (e.g. an equilateral one of a certain
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size, etc.). So there are no genuinely general or abstract ideas: we cannot think about
triangles or triangularity in abstraction from particular instances. Our ideas of triangles
always make us aware of individual triangles with determinate angles, sides, and so on.
One way of understanding this conclusion – though not necessarily the only one – is that
not only experience, but also thought is always imagistic in nature (Prinz 2002: ch. 5;
Martin2006: 76).
The second, and related, consequence is that impressions and ideas “differ only in
degree, not in nature” (1.1.1.5). That only ideas, but not impressions are copies does not
constituteadifferenceinnaturebecausecausaloriginisnotanessentialfeatureofmental
episodes. Similarly, as we have just seen, the two types of mental episode are not distin-
guished by what they make us aware of. Nor do they differ in how they make us aware
of things. Hume is a relationalist and indirect realist about impressions, meaning that he
takes them to acquaint us with internal, mind-dependent objects (1.2.6; 1.4.2; ) or “im-
ages”(Hume1748/2007: §XII.1). Andthesamehastobetrueofideas,giventhattheyare
nothing but causal reproductions of impressions. In particular, Hume does not share our
contemporaryconceptionofthoughtsasnon-relational(orintentional)representations.
Humedescribesthequantitativedifferencebetweenimpressionsandideasasadiffer-
ence“onlyintheirstrengthandvivacity”(1.1.7.5). Hedoesnotcharacterisethisdifference
in much more detail, though, noting that “[i]t will not be very necessary to employ many
wordsinexplainingthisdistinction”since“[e]veryoneofhimselfwillreadilyperceivethe
differencebetwixtfeelingandthinking”(1.1.1.1). Butthisandotherpassagesmakeclear
that Hume takes the difference to be open to introspection.3 Moreover, the introspectible
and quantitative character of the difference really only leaves two options (Govier 1972:
48;Martin2001: 270).4
On the one hand, impressions may differ from ideas in being more detailed or more
determinate in their presentation of their concrete objects. For instance, there is some
plausibility to the claim that, when we are seeing something, we are aware of a larger or
more continuous range of properties, more precise lengths or sizes, or finer distinctions
amonghues,thanwhenwearevisuallyrecallingorvisualisingsomething.
Ontheotherhand,impressionsmaydifferfromideasintheintensityorspecificityof
theirqualitative(andpossiblynon-presentational)aspects. Itseemsreasonabletoassume
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thatactualfeelingsmaybestrongerandmoredeterminatethanrecalledorimaginedones;
orthatvisuallyrecalledorvisualisedcolourslackthe“brightness”ofseenones(1.3.7.5).
Moreover, both differences in degree can be explained by reference to the notion of
causal reproduction. Just as photocopying leads to a loss of clarity and saturation of the
inkmarksonthepaper,recalling,imaginingorthinkingaboutsomethingpreviouslyseen
leadstoalossofdetailanddeterminacyinawareness.
However, Hume acknowledges that this impact of the copying relation on vivacity
doesnotpreventimpressionsfrombeingveryfaint,andideasfrombeingverylively,with
theconsequencethatwecannotalwayscorrectlyidentifythemaswhattheyare(1.1.1.1).
Asaresult,thereisnotalwaysarecognisablethresholdofvivacitywhichstrictlyseparates
impressions from ideas (Landy 2006: 121). Indeed, even though it is unclear whether
Hume would go that far, it seems plausible to assume that there can be certain ideas (e.g.
very vivid memories, or a very detailed visualisations) that are more lively than certain
impressions (e.g. visual perceptions during the night, or in foggy weather; Allison 2008:
16f. Budd 1991: 104). Perhaps all that can be argued is that a given idea can never be
more vivid than the particular impression that it is a copy of. Correspondingly, although
photocopyingmaybeunabletoimprovetheprintqualityofthetextontheoriginalsheet,
say, it is surely possible that some original documents are almost unreadable because of
smearandindistinctcharacters,whilesomephotocopiesshowveryclearandsharpprint.
As a consequence, the recognisable difference in vivacity between impressions and
ideas is merely typical, meaning that it obtains often, but not all the time. That a mental
episode is very lively is thus not always an indication that the episode is an impression
rather than an idea. Given that, for Hume, there are no other features that might reveal to
us in introspection which causal origin mental episodes possess, we cannot always intro-
spectivelytellwhetheragivenepisodeisanimpressionoranidea(Garrett2008: 42f.).
Hume’s resulting empiricist theory of the conscious mind faces several well-known
objections, two of which I will mention here. The first is the famous example of the
missing shade of blue, which Hume acknowledged himself as a counterexample to his
Copy Principle (1.1.1.10). His claim is that it is possible for us to visualise a particular
shadeofbluewithouteverhavingseenit,justonthebasisofseeinganarrangementofall
othershadesofblue,especiallythosethatareverycloseinhuetothemissingshade. Butif
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Humeisrightaboutthispossibility(anditseemsdifficulttodenythis),wehaveasimple
idea that is not preceded by a corresponding simple impression. Hume’sown assessment
ofthesignificanceofthiscounterexampletotheCopyPrincipleisthat“theinstanceisso
particularandsingular,thatitisscarceworthourobserving,anddoesnotmeritthatforit
aloneweshouldalterourgeneralmaxim”(1.1.1.10).
However,itisdoubtfulthatHumecanreallybesononchalantaboutthecase(Stroud
1999: 34; Broadie 2009: 155). First of all, there are probably many more examples like
this (e.g. concerning sounds, smells, tastes, etc.; ibid.: 154; Garrett 1997: 50). But the
main problem is that, if the Copy Principle is indeed just a “general maxim’, “empirical
rule” or “empirical generalization” (Morris and Brown 2013: § 5; Garrett 1997: 50) that
allows for exceptions or “near misses” (ibid.: 52; Garrett 2008: 51), the distinction be-
tweenimpressionsandideascollapses. Forinstance,wemayvisualisethemissingshade
in a very vivid manner. In this case, our imaginative experience may be as lively as the
experienceofsomeonewhoseesthesameshadeofblue. Moreover,bothexperiencesare
originals, rather than copies. Hence, it remains unclear how Hume could still distinguish
ourideafromtheotherperson’simpression,giventhattheydifferneitherintheirvivacity,
norintheircausalorigin.
Inlinewithhisbasicempiricistassumption,Humemightinsistthatitisstilltruethat
ideas, but not impressions, causally derive from impressions. For we arguably form our
idea of the missing shade on the basis of our impressions of the other shades of blue,
notably those that are very close in hue to the missing shade (Russow 1980: 344; Garrett
1997: 50ff. Garrett 2008: 51; Morris and Brown 2013: § 5). But since this is not an
instanceofcausalreproduction,Humewouldbeforcedtosubstantiallyrevisehisoriginal
accountofsimpleideas(Stroud1999: 34). Morespecifically,hewouldhavetoreplacehis
CopyPrinciplewithamoregeneralcharacterisationofsimpleideasascausallydependent
onsimpleimpressions,whichcapturesbothcausalreproductionandthekindofcausation
involvedintheexampleofthemissingshadeofblue.
Alternatively, Hume might maintain that our idea of the missing shade differs from
a comparable impression in not inclining us (so strongly) to form the belief that there is
somethingwiththeshadeofblueinquestioninfrontofus. Thiswouldrequiretheassump-
tionthatbeinginclinedtobelievecomesindegreesandisalsopartofvivacityorstrength
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(Everson 1988; see also § 3 below). For, otherwise, Hume would have to give up one of
his central claims, namely that impressions and ideas differ merely quantitatively. But,
now, the problem would be to rule out that ideas – like ours in the example of the miss-
ing shade of blue – could sometimes be as much belief-inducing as typical impressions,
despitebeingpossiblyequallyforcefulandvividinallotherrespects.
The second major objection to Hume’s treatment of the distinction betweem impres-
sions and ideas – and, hence, between seeing and visualising – is simply that there are
many good reasons to conclude that the two types of mental episode differ qualitatively
intheirnature. Inotherwords,wehavegoodreasontobelievethatvisualisingisnotjust
aweakorfaintformofseeing.
Thefirstthingtonoteisthatvisualisinglackstheimmediacyofseeing(Hopkins1998:
ch. 7; Martin 2002). This is a phenomenological point about how objects are visually
presented. When we see an object, it seems to us to be directly before us, as part of our
actualenvironment. Butthesameisnottrueofvisualising. Ifyousitinyourlivingroom,
close your eyes and simply visualise a car, you do not visualise it as being in your actual
surroundings (e.g. next to the sofa). Taken by themselves, episodes of visualising are
neutral about which objects are located where in our actual environment, while episodes
of seeing are not (ibid.; Dorsch 2010). But this phenomenological difference – which
Malebranche (1674/1997: 79 and 87f.), Husserl (1901/1970: A 413), Sartre (1940/2004:
12f.) and others have tried to capture by saying that objects seen appear to be “present’,
whileobjectsvisualisedseemtobe“absent”–isoneofkind,notofdegree.
Another important qualitative difference between the two kinds of episode concerns
their functional and rational role. Seeing something has an impact on belief and action
that visualising does not have. For example, if we see a glass of water before us on the
table and are unaware of any defeaters, we are normally inclined and entitled to believe
that there is a glass of water before us, and to try to grab it if this would further our ends
(e.g. if we are thirsty). But if we are merely visualising a glass of water while looking
at the table, we are usually neither moved, nor justified to believe in the presence of the
glass,ortotrytoseizeit. Again,thedifferenceatissueisnotaquantitativeone.
Finally, seeing and visualising differ in how they relate to voluntary agency (Dorsch
2012: chs. 13f.). Although seeing may involve, or be intimately connected to, deliberate
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actionconcerningaspectslikethefocusanddurationofattention,orthedirectionofgaze
(O’Shaughnessy2003: partII;Crowther2010),itisneveruptouswhichobjectsweend
up seeing, and how we end up seeing them as being, once we have decided to look with
open eyes in a certain direction. For instance, if there is a red apple before me, I cannot
decide to see a green pear in its stead. Visualising, on the other hand, involves at least
the general possibility to exert this kind of control. Although we may sometimes fail to
produce or banish a certain image, we typically are able to visualise a green pear, say, if
we want to. But, anew, whether something is open to voluntary influence is not a matter
ofdegree.
Because of objections like these, it is probably better to reject Hume’s account of
ideas. The question is only how much of it we should give up. As some Neo-Humean
viewsillustrate,itispossibletolargelyholdontotheCopyPrinciple,andtomodifyonly
one of the four aspects of Hume’s original conception of copies. More specifically, the
suggestion is to continue to understand ideas as resembling impressions because of their
asymmetricdependenceonthelatter,buttodenythatthedependenceinquestioniscausal.
Rather, the constitutive relation between the two types of episode should be taken to be
representational: ideasareinherentlyrepresentationsofimpressions,inroughlythesame
senseinwhichpaintingsareinherentlyrepresentationsofwhattheydepict(Munoz-Dardé
2002: 2; see Cohon and Owen 1997: § 2 and Garrett 2006 for different interpretations of
the“representationality”ofideas).
Copies that are inherently representational differ from causal reproductions in that
they do not require the existence of what is copied. One can paint a man without paint-
ing any particular man that existed prior to or during the act of painting. Good examples
are Dutch genre images from the 17th century, which depict only certain types of people
(e.g. the drunkard or the love interest). Instead, paintings depend on what they depict
in a different sense: they are partly constituted and individuated by what they represent.
No representation could exist without something being represented. And a representa-
tion would cease to be the same if what it represents were to change. It is in this sense
thatNeo-Humeansassumeimaginativeexperiencestobenon-relationalrepresentationsor
“imaginations”ofperceptualexperiences,ascapturedbytheso-calledDependencyThesis
that“toimaginesensorilya𝜑istoimagineexperiencinga𝜑”(Martin2002: 404;seealso
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Peacocke1985andO’Shaughnessy2003: ch. 12).
Ifweunderstandideasascopiesinthesenseofrepresentations,bothobjectionsagainst
the Copy Principle lose their force. The missing shade of blue is not a counterexample
anymore because imagining seeing something with a particular hue does not presuppose
havingseenthathuebefore–justaswecandepictamanwithacertainappearancewithout
everhavingseensomeonewholookedlikethedepicted.
In addition, the difference between impressions and ideas turns out to be qualitative.
Ifimpressionsareassumedtorelationallyacquaintuswithobjects(whetherinternalorex-
ternal),impressionsandideasdifferinkindbecausethelatteraretakentobenon-relational
representations(Dauer1999: 85f.). If,ontheotherhand,impressionsareconceivedofas
inherently representing their objects, the two kinds of mental episode differ qualitatively
because they represent different entities (i.e. mental episodes vs. their objects). It is thus
possibletoaccountforthevariousdifferencesinkindbetweenseeingandvisualising. No-
tably,thelatter’slackofimmediacymaybeduetothefactthatwhatwedirectlyimagine
isjustaperceptualexperienceofanobject,andnottheobjectitself(Dorsch2010).
Ofcourse,theendorsementofsomethingliketheDependencyThesisisnotwithoutits
ownproblems–nottheleastwithrespecttowhetheritcanbeextendedtomorethought-
like ideas, such as judgements (Dorsch 2012: ch. 9). But, at least, it offers a way of
holdingontoempiricismandtheCopyPrincipleinthefaceofsomeofthemainobjections
toHume’soriginalaccountofideas.
3 Recalling, Believing, and Imagining
Hume’s distinction between perceptions and imaginative episodes in terms of impres-
sions and ideas does not yet tell us anything about the latter’s difference from other non-
perceptualexperiencesorthoughts,notablyepisodicmemoriesandoccurrentbeliefs. Hume
addresses this further issue by contrasting the three types of idea already mentioned: (i)
ideas of the memory; (ii) ideas of the judgement; and (iii) ideas of the fancy (Garrett
2008: 45). Thatimpressionsandideasvarymerelyindegreehastheconsequencethatthe
same also holds for the three types of idea. For, if there were differences in kind among
them, not all of them could be of the same kind as impressions. Hence, there can only be
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quantitative, but no qualitative variances in nature between ideas – which explains why
Humeusuallymaintainsthatthethreetypesofideadifferjustintheir“force”or“vivacity”
(1.3.5.3;1.3.7.7;1.3.8.15f.;Cottrell2015: §2).
This raises, again, the question of what it means for certain mental episodes to be
strongerormorelivelythanothers. SinceHumeconceivesofallideasasperception-like
presentationsofobjects,thetwooptionsfordifferencesinvivacitymentionedearlierstill
apply. Accordingly, ideas may differ from each other in the intensity and determinacy of
their qualitative aspects, or in the number, continuity and specificity of the objects and
propertiesthattheymakeusawareof.
However,Humeisnotcompletelyhappywiththisdescriptionofthedifferenceinde-
greebetweenideas(1.3.7.7;1.3.8.15f.). Hewritesthat“thereareotherdifferencesamong
ideas, which cannot be properly be comprehended under these terms” and suggests that
speakingofadifferencein“feeling[...] shou’dhavebeennearerthetruth”(Appendix,22).
In accordance with this thought, Hume identifies the vivacity of ideas (and, incidentally,
alsoofimpressions)withthefeelingof“assent’,which“alonedistinguishes[memoryand
the senses] from the imagination” (1.3.6.7), and also “the ideas of the judgment from the
fictionsoftheimagination”(1.3.7.7).
We can identify at least five different features of assent, as conceived of by Hume
as central to vivacity. First, it is an aspect of mental episodes which is accessible to in-
trospection (i.e. “felt by the mind’; 1.3.7.7). Second, it pertains both to impressions and
to certain ideas, namely memories and occurent beliefs (ibid.; 1.3.6.7). Third, it has an
impact on the causal or functional role of the episodes concerned (1.3.7.7 and 1.3.10.3;
Govier1972: 47;Everson1988). Inparticular,itincreasestheirinfluenceonouragency,
on our emotions and on our imagination-based formation of beliefs. When we see, re-
member or believe that someone is in danger, we have a much stronger tendency to help
him,tofearforhimortoreasontothebeliefthathemightreallydie,thanwhenwemerely
imagine that he is in danger. In this way, Hume can explain, for instance, why we do not
respondinthesamewaystoreal-lifecasesandtofictionalstories(Walton1990). Fourth,
thefeelingofassentrenderstheepisodesconcernedmorepersistent(i.e. “infixesthemin
the mind’; 1.3.7.7), possibly in the form of dispositional mental states (Govier 1972: 48;
Loeb2002: III.2;Marušić2010). Wearemoreinclinedtoacquiredispositionalbeliefson
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