How Much Is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969

396 Pages·1971·13.172 MB·English

by  Alain C. Enthoven, K. Wayne Smith

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“McNamara’s decisions were not always right. But a lucid new
book by two of his former Whiz Kids demonstrates that his choices
usually were based on ‘explicit criteria of the national interest.’
Decisions by the military services are often compromises to protect
‘various institutional, parochial or other vested interests.’”
—New York Times, March 1971
“Makes a superb contribution to public understanding of the
critical and volatile McNamara years. It is not written as the
defi nitive ‘insider history’ of that era; but it is the best view we’ve
had so far of how McNamara decisions were shaped, told in sharp
detail by men who helped frame some of his most diffi cult choices.
The authors make an articulate, convincing plea for sanity—
for more analysis, instead of ‘appeals to authority’—in defense
decision-making. Their logic is exciting, their candor is refreshing,
and their clarity of expression (simple but elegant English)
make the book a delight to read.”
—Armed Forces Journal, February 1971
“Well written . . . [this book] is more than a ringing defense
of systems analysis. It reveals new aspects of in-fi ghting within
the Pentagon, particularly over Vietnam. . . . To his credit,
Enthoven’s concern goes beyond the status and trappings
accorded the systems analysts. The larger issue is what kind of
manager a defense secretary elects to be, for that choice will
determine how he uses systems analysis.”
—Business Week, January 1971
“A great deal of nonsense is written about the Pentagon
and military decision making in this country. This is a book
that tells, probably better than any other, just how it is
possible to come to a reasonable compromise with that
unanswerable question, How Much is Enough?”
—Evening Star, Washington, DC, March 1971
“The authors were key assistants in the McNamara
Defense Department and personally participated in the
actions and events they describe. Because of their involvement,
only one side of the debate is presented. Conveniently omitted
is any meaningful discussion of the failures of systems analysis.
That does not diminish the signifi cance of the contribution
they are making. Although we shall have to wait for the
other side in this debate, this excellent book is by far the clearest
statement of the McNamara approach to defense management
published to date.”
—Defense Management, May 1971
“A clearly written and defi nitive insight into critical aspects
of Defense Department life: McNamara’s struggle to
gain control of DOD, how systems analysis works, and the
limits of military expertise.”
—Federation of American Scientists, March 1971
“A ‘must’ acquisition of all college and university libraries . . .”
—Choice, June 1971
“. . . Recommended for large public and all academic libraries.”
—Library Journal, December 1970
“Hackles of stiff-necked militarists may quiver a little
at some of the charges, but those with broader perspectives and
more acute discernment will fi nd much that is compatible
with their own thinking. This is an important book, and if ever a
time demanded such information that time is now.”
—Seattle Times, April 1971
How
Much Is
Enough?
Shaping the Defense Program
1961–1969
Alain C. Enthoven
K. Wayne Smith
How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969
was originally published by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., in 1971.
This RAND edition reflects the original layout with the addition of an
introduction to the new edition and a new foreword.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Enthoven, Alain C., 1930–
How much is enough? : shaping the defense program, 1961–1969 /
Alain C. Enthoven, K. Wayne Smith.
p. cm.
“CB-403.”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8330-3826-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Military planning—United States—History—20th century. 2. Military
administration—United States—History—20th century. 3. United States—Armed
Forces—Cost control—History—20th century. 4. United States. Dept. of
Defense—History—20th century. I. Smith, K. Wayne. II. Title.
U153.E58 2005
355'.033573'09046—dc22
2005018910
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Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russo
© Copyright 1971 by Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith
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To the memory of Charles J. Hitch, founding Chief of the
Economics Division at the RAND Corporation and father
of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
To Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense 1961–1968,
the brilliant leader who made it happen.
Last, but not least, to our wives.

Introduction to the New Edition
Resource allocation issues have long loomed large in Department of
Defense (DoD) deliberations. As such, they continue to be the subjects
of much of the RAND Corporation’s research on behalf of the DoD.
How Much Is Enough? grew out of our early experience in fashioning
workable methods for systematically evaluating the choices posed in
allocating resources. It is being brought back into print by RAND now
as both a classic account of the application of new and powerful means
of analysis and a cautionary history of the controversies that inevitably
arose from those efforts. The question and the lessons of How Much Is
Enough? are fully applicable in today’s national security environment,
where new challenges and new technologies further complicate the al-
location of resources entrusted to the DoD. The book was originally
funded by RAND, and this edition includes a new foreword by Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Ken-
neth J. Krieg and Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readi-
ness David S. C. Chu.
James A. Thomson, President and CEO, RAND Corporation
Michael D. Rich, Executive Vice President, RAND Corporation
vii