How Aristotle Gets By In Metaphysics Zeta

341 Pages·2013·2.02 MB·English

by  Frank A. Lewis

How Aristotle gets by in Metaphysics Zeta
Mosaic by Ralph Carlin Flewelling, from the Hoose Library of Philosophy, University of
SouthernCalifornia. PhotographbyDietmarQuistorf.
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How Aristotle gets
by in Metaphysics Zeta
Frank A. Lewis
1
3
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Preface
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Book Zeta is widely regarded as the text in which he presents
the details of his fully-developed theory of “substance”—his account of the basic
entities on which the reality of things in the sublunary world must be based. In line
with this, earlier writers have been interested most of all in the “bottom line”—the
views Aristotle ends up with in his own formal, “official” account of substance, in
whicharefeaturedthedistinctiveAristotelianconceptsofmatter,(Aristotelian)form,
and form–matter compounds (these last include the “middling-sized objects” of our
ordinaryexperience).ExamplesofthisapproachincludemySubstanceandPredicationin
Aristotle(CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).
This “full throttle”, “Aristotle’s developed theory”, approach faces a significant
obstacle that commentators have increasingly come to appreciate. The obstacle is
that fully two-thirds of Zeta is devoted not to Aristotle’s own theory, but to the
views of others—where these “others” include not only the likes of Democritus and
Socrates the Younger, for example, in cameo appearances, but also to a significant
extentoneoranotherofAristotle’sownotherselvesintheOrganon.1Inthetextsthat
make up the Organon, famously, the notions of form and matter distinctive of Aris-
totle’s most developed theory in Zeta do not appear; at the same time, these texts
representabodyofworkthathasagreatdealincommonwiththeworkofAristotle’s
contemporariesaboveallinPlato’sAcademy.Unsurprisingly,then,themostpromin-
entofthealienpresencesinZetaisthatofPlatohimself.Predictably,Platofrequently
appears as a target in Aristotle’s discussion. At other times, less expectedly, Plato is
friend,notfoe,andisco-optedasspokesmanforviews thatmutatismutandis Aristotle
himself can readily accept. Why does Aristotle suppress so many of the details of his
own“partisan”theory,anddevotesomuchspacetotheviewsofPlatoandothers,or
oneofhisownotherselvesinothertexts?
Aristotle’s discussion of views that may not have a place in his own “official”
theory—at least, not without significant revision—is part of the phenomenon of the
different levels present in Aristotle’s work, and especially notable in Zeta. Of the two
levels, the one is devoted to the official Aristotelian theory, including the distinctive
notions of (Aristotelian) form and matter, and the other to various “received” views,
eventhereceivedinformedviewsofothersandofhisownotherselves,inworksthatare
1 “Aristotle’sownotherselves”:Iamtemptedtowrite“perhapsformerselves”.ButIavoid“develop-
mental” or “chronological” hypotheses in part for fear of the loop from perceived interpretive need to
developmentalhypothesisandbacktointerpretation.IammindfulalsoofthereminderinBurnyeat(2001),
that since the corpus we study today was not published in his lifetime, in principle Aristotle had the
opportunitytogobackandforthbetweenworksatwill.Wecannot,therefore,assumeinthecaseofthe
CategoriesasopposedtoMetaphysicsZeta,forexample,that“simpler”means“earlier”.
vi PREFACE
innocentoftheapparatusofformandmatter.2Thedifferentlevelsreflectthedistinc-
tion already noted between the passages in which Aristotle sets out his own views,
propriapersona,andthosemanyplacesinZetawheretheviewsunderdiscussionmaynot
be (or may no longer be) authentically his. The distinction between levels, and the
repeatedinfusionofviewsthatarenotpartofAristotle’sofficialtheory,arealargepart
ofwhatmakesZetathecomplexentityitisuniversallyrecognizedtobe.
One further point about the received views that form part of Aristotle’s discussion
shouldbemadeattheoutset.Aristotlewillnotholdthatbecauseavieworiginateswith
another,itisnotforhimworthyofseriousattention.Onthecontrary,theseareviews
philosophersgenerally—perhapsevenAristotlehimselfinotherworks—willsubscribe
to,andassuchtheydeserveseriousdiscussion,evenifintheendtheyarerejectedor
amendedtosomesignificantdegree.VariouspartsofZeta,asweshallsee,attesttohow
seriously Aristotle attends to the fit between “received” views, and the details of his
own“partisan”theory.
Inthepresentwork,accordingly,Iaminterestedlessintheconclusionsinhisown
“official”or“partisan”theorythat(Itakeit)Aristotlemustbecommittedto—butsays
so little about in Zeta—and interested more inthe details of how heinterweaves the
philosophicaltraditionandhisown“partisan”theory,asheworksthroughtheagenda
hehassethimselfenroutetotheformalconclusionsofZeta,tobefoundaboveallinits
finalchapter,17.Toexpressmyinterestsslightlydifferently:howisit,ifcommentators
(present writer included) understand Aristotle’s final views as well as they have
sometimes claimed to, that so often they have so little idea of how what he is doing
inagivenpassagecontributestohislargerconclusions?SomyapproachtoZetahereis,
Ihope,moresensitivetothecontextandtoAristotle’sownconcerns.
Devotees of Zeta will already know that the dense thickets of argument in
its seventeen chapters will not respond kindly to broad generalities about their
contents—not, at least, in the absence of a serious attempt to find a way through at
leastsomesignificantportionofthephilosophicalterrain.Atthesametime,itisnotmy
intention to give a blow-by-blow account of every argument in Zeta. For the
occasional complexities in what follows, part of the responsibility is mine, and part
Aristotle’s—inwhatproportion,Ileaveittothereadertodecide.
TheIntroductionsetsoutthemajorvoices—ofothers,andAristotle’sowninother
works—that resonate in the different chapters of Zeta. In Part One, The Shape Of
Zeta, I discuss some general points regarding Aristotle’s attack on his project. I will
arguethatAristotle’sgoalistoproduceadefinitionofsubstance—better,adefinition
ofprimarysubstanceandofthesubstanceofathing;forthisreason,alargeportionofhis
discussionisdominatedby“received”viewsofhowsuchadefinitionshouldgo.The
first order of business, accordingly, will be Aristotle’s review in Zeta 1 of what he
supposes are significant themes in the philosophical tradition as to the contents of a
2 Formoreontheterminologyattachedtothedivisioninlevelsinthesecondaryliterature,seeChapter2,
Section2,andChapter1,n.34.
PREFACE vii
minimum metaphysical theory within which a definition of substance finds its place,
followedinZeta2byareviewoftraditionalcandidatesfor(primary)substanceinZeta2,
and in the opening lines of Zeta 3, by a list of traditional options for the desired
definition.Asweshallsee,thelistintheagendapassageofZeta3shapesproceedingsin
muchofwhatfollowsinZeta.LaterchaptersofZetaofferablendofAristotle’scritical
scrutiny of the deliverances of the tradition concerning the agenda items of Zeta 3,
togetherwith(inlesseramount)sketchesofhisown“partisan”views,andtheirfitfor
betterorworsewiththetradition—oftenwiththebenefitofafriendlyamendmentof
Aristotle’sdevising.Ithasbeensuggestedthatvariousprinciples,labelled“levels”and
“non-linearity”, govern proceedings in these later chapters; these principles require
earlydiscussion.Ialsopresentabird’s-eyeviewofthedifferentsegmentsmotivatedby
thedifferentdefinitionsofsubstanceAristotlefindsinthephilosophicaltradition,and
addsomeremarksaboutthedifferentthinkerswhofindaplacethere.
Laterpartsofthebook—SubstanceasSubject(PartTwo),SubstanceasEssence(Part
Three), and Substance as Universal (Part Four)—follow the course of Aristotle’s
discussion through the different strains he has identified in received views about
substance.(ItwillbenotedthatAristotle’soriginalagendaoffour“received”charac-
terizations of substance in the event shrinks to three; see Chapter 1, n. 18.) This will
bringustotheendofthepenultimatechapter,16,inZeta.Atthislatepointwemay
reasonablyask:ifsomuchofZetaisoccupiedwiththephilosophicaltradition—mostly
incriticalvein—andifsofewofAristotle’sowndevelopedviewsareondisplay,whatis
left of Aristotle’s deepest metaphysical thoughts, which Zeta is so often thought to
contain?ItissometimessaidthatAristotle’spositiveconclusioninZeta,whereonecan
befound,isthatformisthesubstanceofathingandis(primary)substance.Butifthisis
hisconclusion,itisatbestorthogonaltotheannouncedtopicofthebook:itpurports
to settle the “Application Problem”, telling us what counts as primary substance and
thesubstanceofathing—butleavestoonesidethedetailsoftheactualdefinitionthat
mightproducethisresult.WeowetoRichardRortythecontrarianquestion:howfar
doestheconclusionthatformisprimarysubstanceactuallygetus?Platowouldsayhis
forms are the basic entities—the primary substances. Aristotle would say that his are.
Doesitallcomedownintheendtojust(letussay)thedifferentexistenceconditions
forPlatonicandforAristotelianforms?
I will argue that the answer to the Application Problem—that (Aristotelian) forms
aretheprimarysubstances—fallsoutdirectlyfromthesuccessfuldefinitionof(primary)
substance,butthatthisanswerisnotafterallthemainconclusiontoZeta.Aristotledoes
not see the status of forms as primary substances as, in the first place, a consequence
ofhisdefinition.Thestatusofhisforms,rather,isa“given”thatservesasaconstrainton
asuccessfuldefinition.Thisisaresulthisdefinitionmustgive,ifthedefinitionistobe
acceptable. I say more about this style of argument in the Introduction and in
Chapter6,Section6.
InPartFiveItrytoworkoutthedetailsofwhatIsupposeistheactualconclusionto
Zeta, as offered in its final chapter, 17, where Aristotle gives his own, authentic
viii PREFACE
definitionof(primary)substanceandofthesubstanceofathing.InZeta17,evenwhile
abandoningthe“received”candidatesforsubstancefromtheagendapassageinZeta3,
Aristotle continues to rely on outside help of a sort, and he is more than happy to
endorse the views he is using. The outside views in question come from his own
Posterior Analytics.AristotlebringsfromtheAn.Po.aconceptionofdemonstrationin
which themiddletermidentifiesthecause ofagiven event-type;thiscausal notionis
takenoverinZeta17inthedefinitionofthesubstanceofagivenindividualthingasthe
causeofitsbeing.IwillsuggestthatAristotle’sdefinitionisbestthoughtofasrepresenting
the property of being a (primary) substance or being the substance of a thing as, in
modern dress, asecond-orderfunctional property of (Aristotelian) forms, in virtue of
theirroleasthecauseofbeingforcompoundmaterialsubstances.
OnthisrenderingofAristotle’sviews,thepropertyofbeingthecauseofbeingfor
thingsisaroleproperty,anditisrealizedinagivenformbythesetofcausalproperties
appropriate to that very form. So the definition of primary substance as the cause of
being for a thing will apply across the board, to all forms alike, even while different
forms have different sets of realizer properties, varying with the range of things that
haveaformastheirsubstance.Inthisstory,factsaboutagiven(Aristotelian)form—its
existence conditions, its relations with other items in the ontology, its place as the
essenceofthings—allcontributetoqualifyingthatformtoperformasthesubstanceof
athing.Buttherolethatformsmustplayinordertocountasthesubstanceofathing
and hence as a (primary) substance remains constant, across the variety of different
compoundmaterialsubstancesandthevarietyofformsthatarethecauseoftheirbeing.
IendthebookwithabriefdiscussionofAristotle’sownreviewofwhathethinkshe
hasaccomplishedoverthecourseofthediscussioninZeta.
Acknowledgements
Thisbookwaswrittenoveraperiodofsomeyears,andearlierversions,allorinpart,of
Chapters 1,4,6,and 8have already beenpublished.3Other chapters have beenread
atvariousvenues,andIhavebenefitedfromcommentsofthemembersoftheaudience
on each occasion. Different versions of the material in Chapter1 were offered to
audiences at Oxford, Providence (where Mary Louise Gill was commentator), and
Los Angeles. I am grateful to Myles Burnyeat for permission to refer to his then
unpublished Map of Zeta (= Burnyeat 2001) on these different occasions. A version
ofChapter3wasreadataconference,“AristotleonDefinitionandEssence”,atOriel
College,Oxford,inSpring2010;andthatsamesourcewas,indirectly,thestimulusfor
reshapingChapter11intoitspresentform.IamgreatlyindebtedtoDavidCharlesfor
theinvitationtothisandtootherconferencesinOxfordovertheyears.Chapter4was
presentedtoaudiencesattheUniversityofColoradoatBoulder,andatthesymposium
on“TheEssentialAristotle”,withMichaelWedinandMaryLouiseGill,atthePacific
Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association; Chapters 4 and 5
togetherweregivenastheHesperiaLecturesattheUniversityofCaliforniaatDavis.
Chapter6 was read at a Conference on Substance and Essence at Oxford University,
andlatertoanaudienceinLosAngeles.AnearlydraftofwhatisnowChapter8was
readatBrownUniversity,whereMaryLouiseGillwasagaincommentator.Chapter8
alsoborrowsmaterialfromapaperreadattheconference“AristotleonPredication”,at
Rutgers University, and again at themeetings of the AmericanPhilosophical Associ-
ationinChicago.
Atthisdistancefromatleastsomeoftheseoccasions,Icannowdonomorethanlist
thefriendsandcolleagues whohave cometomyaidindifferent ways. Theyinclude
Ara Astourian, Robert Bolton, Myles Burnyeat, Victor Caston, David Charles, Alan
Code, Paolo Crivelli, Norman Dahl, Kit Fine, Mary Louise Gill, Gareth Matthews,
HenryMendell,KathrinKoslicki,DavidManley,AmandaPrintz,JeffPryor,JanSzaif,
and Michael Wedin. I also acknowledge the help of the anonymous advisers for
3 Iamgladtoacknowledgepermissiongrantedbytherespectivecopyrightholdersforthefollowing
previouslypublishedmaterial:“TheHitchhiker’sGuidetoMetaphysicsZeta”,ProceedingsoftheBostonArea
ColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy,Vol.XV(1999)2000,andfor“Predication,Things,andKindsinAristotle’s
Metaphysics”, Phronesis, 56.4 (2011), both published by Koninklijke Brill NV; “Friend or Foe?: Some
EncountersWithPlatoinAristotleMetaphysicsZeta”,TheModernSchoolman,LXXX(May2003);areview
ofMylesBurnyeat,AMapofMetaphysicsZeta,Mind,113.449(2004),158–64,and“ANoseByAnyOther
Name:Sameness,Substitution,andEssenceinAristotleMetaphysicsZ5”,OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,
XXVIII(2005),161–99,bothpublishedbyOxfordUniversityPress;and“IsThereRoomforPlatoinan
Aristotelian Theory of Essence?”, in Georgios Agnostopoulos, ed., Reason and Analysis in Ancient Greek
Philosophy,publishedbySpringerSBMinthebookseriesPhilosophicalStudiesSeries.