Table Of ContentHOMEGROWN
i
ii
HOMEGROWN
ISIS in America
Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes
and Bennett Cliff ord
iii
I.B. TAURIS
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Copyright © Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes and Bennett Clifford, 2021
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iv
CO NTENTS
Acknowledgments vi
IN TRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
TH E I SLAMIC S TATE IN A MERICA 11
Chapter 2
TH E T ERRORISTS 31
Chapter 3
TH E T RAVELERS 55
Chapter 4
TH E EA CTIVISTS 85
Chapter 5
TH E I DEOLOGUES 111
Chapter 6
CO UNTERING V IOLENT E XTREMISM IN AM ERICA 149
CO NCLUSION 169
Notes 175
Index 225
v
AC KNOWLEDGMENTS
Th is book is the culmination of years of research, made possible and enhanced by
a smart team of colleagues who shared their time, expertise, and brilliance. Th is
includes a cadre of extremism experts at George Washington University’s Program
on Extremism. Th e Program is led by Lorenzo Vidino, who gave us both the
personal encouragement and the professional freedom to follow the research
wherever it took us. We are grateful for the support and scholarship of Audrey
Alexander, Jonathan Lewis, Andrew Mines, and Haroro Ingram who read,
commented on, and corrected numerous draft s. Without their feedback, this
would be a lesser endeavor. We are also appreciative of David Sterman and Daniel
Byman, who provided key insights as the research progressed and acted as sage
sounding boards. Finally, we thank the countless number of sources, from both
government and the public, who trusted us to tell their stories in a serious and
respectful manner.
Finally, while professional support is always needed, personal support cannot
be ignored. We would be remiss if we did not thank those in our lives who, unlike
us, do not spend their days reading and researching terrorism, but nonetheless
support our concerning eff orts to do so. Alexander would like to thank his family,
in particular his wife Lee-Anne. Similarly, Seamus would like to thank his wife,
Alison, his three children, and other loved ones who supported him throughout
this research project. Bennett thanks Dawn Wullschleger, Dr. Jeanne Cliff ord, and
Ralph Cliff ord for their constant support.
vi
IN TRODUCTION
Since 2014, the United States has faced the most sustained period of domestic
jihadist activity in its history. Compared to previous waves of participation by
Americans in jihadist terrorist groups, the scale of current American involvement
is unprecedented. Th is is mainly due to the activities and outreach of one specifi c
group, namely the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Th e Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) is actively pursuing over 1,000 investigations related to the
group in all fi ft y states.
While the majority of American ISIS supporters sought to leave their country
and join what they came to believe was an Islamic utopia in the territories held by
the group overseas, there have also been deadly ISIS-inspired attacks in California,
Minnesota, Ohio, Florida, and several other states. Others, meanwhile, found their
calling online, using various forms of online technology to recruit, spread
propaganda, and even use cryptocurrencies to fundraise for the group. Similar to
the methods they pursued to further the goals of ISIS, the backgrounds of America’s
ISIS supporters and activists vary widely, from an underage minor interested in
traveling from South Carolina to the caliphate to a 32-year-old man coordinating
Syrian extremist organizations’ pledges of allegiance to ISIS from a New York pizza
shop.
For some, this wave of jihadist activity came as a shock. During the previous
decade, jihadist attacks and plots in the United States appeared to be on a steady
decline, as were instances of Americans leaving the country to join jihadist groups
overseas. In the eyes of many, America was witnessing what amounted to the
beginning of the end for the global jihad movement. Over a decade of sustained
military pressure in jihadist safe havens, coupled with the FBI’s aggressive pursuit
of jihadists at home, had taken its toll on al-Qaeda and, so the thinking went, the
domestic threat level was only going to continue to decline.
Th en, on the morning of December 2, 2015, the threat of the Islamic State
became a reality for many Americans. Aft er using her Facebook account to pledge
allegiance to the group’s now deceased leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Tashfeen
Malik, along with her husband Syed Rizwan Farook, went on a shooting spree in
San Bernardino, California, murdering 14 and injuring another 24 before they
were killed in a shootout with the police. Neither Malik nor Farook had any direct
connections with ISIS or any of its members. Th ey were inspired to act aft er
1
2 Homegrown
hearing a September 2014 speech by ISIS’ former spokesperson Abu Muhammad
al-Adnani, in which he urged ISIS supporters around the world to commit
atrocities in the group’s name. Soon aft er the killings, offi cial and unoffi cial ISIS
media outlets released statements praising the attacks. While not claiming credit
for directing Malik and Farook’s operation, one of its media arms, Amaq , praised
ISIS supporters in America and hailed their willingness to sacrifi ce all they held
dear for the advancement of the caliphate.
Unlike Europe, where most major attacks with a nexus to ISIS involved direct
interactions between ISIS members in Syria and Iraq or returned foreign fi ghters,
this type of decentralized, inspired attack characterized the nature of the ISIS
threat in America. San Bernardino was soon followed by media coverage of dozens
more plots, along with reports of hundreds of Americans leaving their homes to
wage jihad in Iraq and Syria. Almost all of these activities were carried out on
behalf of ISIS, the new spearhead of the global jihad movement. Americans were
increasingly inspired to travel as the group took over a large swathe of territory
spanning both nations and covering an area roughly the size of Great Britain. In
doing so, the Islamic State used its newfound success as an insurgency to launch
an international outreach campaign which, in the West, has dwarfed the eff orts of
its jihadist predecessors in terms of levels of activity and lethality.
Th e result of this outreach was twofold. Firstly, ISIS attracted unprecedented
numbers of Western Muslims to travel to its territory to join its self-proclaimed
state. Secondly, the group used its popularity to launch a terrorist campaign
targeting Western nations involved in the international eff ort to fi ght the group in
Iraq and Syria. Th ose who could not travel were encouraged to become jihadis in
their home country and conduct indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks without
fi rst seeking advice or permission. As ISIS’ spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani
stated in his 2014 speech, “Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s
verdict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the
same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers.”1 In some cases travelers trained to
become terrorists and returned to their country with an even deadlier assignment:
plan and execute large-scale and lethal attacks.
In the West, it is Europe that has taken the brunt of this eff ort, but attacks like
San Bernardino are a reminder that Americans are not immune to the ISIS call.
While a topic of much interest in the media, ISIS-related activity in the US rarely
receives in-depth analytical treatment. Th is book attempts to provide a clearer
understanding of how and why the group was able to gain a foothold in the country
and how that presence has changed since the Islamic State lost its geographical
caliphate.
Although few authors focus solely on ISIS, the studies which have analyzed the
jihadist movement in America can be broadly divided into two categories. Some
have taken a qualitative, historical approach, explaining why jihad in America
became “homegrown” aft er the September 11, 2001, attacks and how the threat has
evolved since. 2 Other studies have relied more on statistics, explaining the nature
of the threat through analyzing metrics such as demographics, attack type,
frequency, and regional activity. 3
Introduction 3
Th is book combines qualitative and quantitative approaches to provide a
comprehensive picture of the contours and dynamics of ISIS in America. Drawing
on an array of exclusive primary sources, including interviews with American ISIS
members and the agents tasked with thwarting them, this book will reveal how
and why the Islamic State is able to successfully radicalize and recruit a new
generation of jihadists in America. In doing so, it off ers a number of new and
unique insights and arguments about this multifaceted and constantly evolving
phenomenon. Above all, we argue that, unlike in other Western nations, the
Islamic State presence in America is surprisingly self-contained. While ISIS
activity in many other Western nations is the result of long-standing and deep-
rooted international networks based on connections to jihadist battlefi elds in Iraq,
Syria, and beyond, in America (barring some notable exceptions), it has had little
direct input and infl uence from external actors beyond the propaganda the group
is able to spread via the internet. Th us, the story of ISIS in America off ers a useful
case study for furthering our understanding of jihad in the West, demonstrating
the resiliency and adaptability of a movement that has faced, and to some extent
overcome, seemingly overwhelming odds.
Before going any further, it is important to briefl y discuss our decision to focus
specifi cally on ISIS in America, rather than the wider homegrown jihadist
mobilization which has taken place in the country since 9/11. Th ere is no doubt
that there is a signifi cant ideological and operational overlap between al-Qaeda
and ISIS in America. It can be argued that dividing these two is an arbitrary
exercise. Indeed, in some cases Americans who have acted on behalf of the latter
also claimed inspiration from al-Qaeda. 4 However, this division is nonetheless
justifi ed. Firstly, this is because the Islamic State is unique in that it was able to
transform an insurgency into a large-scale proto-state with a variety of messages—
from ultra-violence to utopian-society-building—that appealed to Americans.
Secondly, and most importantly, while they share a similar ideology and
recruitment strategy, there is no doubt that ISIS has been much more successful
than al-Qaeda at attracting Americans and inspiring them to act. As such, this
phenomenon is worthy of study in its own right.
Th ere are a number of reasons why ISIS has been more eff ective than al-Qaeda
at recruiting Americans. In practical terms, by controlling territory and largely
prioritizing travel to the Islamic State over domestic terrorism, involvement with
ISIS appeared to be a much more realistic, attainable, and fruitful prospect.
Between 2014 and 2016, it was relatively easy to travel and join ISIS, certainly
more so than it was to join any al-Qaeda-linked groups. Europeans and Americans
could catch fl ights to Turkey, make their way to towns bordering Syria and arrange
with Islamic State facilitators to be smuggled across the porous border to begin
their training with ISIS. Th e group and its supporters even published instruction
manuals with details of how to join them without getting caught.
As well as attracting unprecedented numbers of foreign fi ghters, however, ISIS
also outperformed al-Qaeda in its ability to inspire Americans to commit domestic
terrorist attacks in its name. In many ways, it has al-Qaeda to thank for this; its
predecessor had spent years developing and promoting an “individual jihad”
