Hitler's Preemptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

667 Pages·2010·5.94 MB·English

by  Henrik Lunde

Published in the United States of America in 2010 by CASEMATE
908 Darby Road, Havertown, PA 19083
and in the United Kingdom by CASEMATE
17 Cheap Street, Newbury, Berkshire, RG14 5DD
© 2009 by Henrik O. Lunde ISBN 978-1-935149-33-0
eISBN 9781612000459
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C
ONTENTS

Preface & Acknowledgments

Prologue
1. Allied Plans–Flawed, Inadequate, and Hesitant
2. German Plans—Bold, Imaginative, and Reckless
3. Ignored Warnings—Ships Passing in the Night
4. Narvik Area Defenses
5. The German Attack on Narvik
6. Destroyer Battle
7. Confusion and Disarray
8. Beachhead Consolidation and Second Naval Battle
9. The Narvik Front, April 13–26
10. Campaigns in the South
11. The Norwegian-French Offensive, April 29–May 12
12. 2nd Mountain Division to the Rescue
13. The Bjerkvik Landing and the Mountain Offensive
14. The Loss of Nordland Province
15. The Week that Lost the Campaign—Strained Relations
16. Time Runs Out
17. Evacuation, Armistice, and Disaster
Epilogue

Maps
Command Structures
Operational Code Names
Bibliography

P A
REFACE AND CKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are many cogent reasons why the 1940 campaign in Norway has an
enduring importance and why its study should be basic reading for students of
military history, for military planners and operators, and for policymakers. The
fact that it was the first campaign in history in which land, sea, and air forces
were fully involved is sufficient to meet the above criteria. However, there are
other compelling reasons.
For both the Germans and the Allies, the war in Scandinavia demonstrated the
extreme risks and dangers inherent when undertaking a preemptive war or a war
of choice. The Norway campaign remains a perfect example of how things can
quickly unravel when the underlying assumptions governing plans are fallacious.
Furthermore, the Allied and Norwegian responses to the manner and pace of the
German attack provide classic examples of the results of the problems that have
always faced military planners in democracies relying on poorly trained and
equipped conscript forces.
Many writers have concluded that the German plans and preparations were
kept so secret that the attack came as a complete surprise to the Norwegians and
the Allies. In fact, there were numerous intelligence reports pointing to imminent
German actions in Scandinavia. Policymakers and planners gave little credit to
these reports because of their preconceived ideas about German capabilities and
intentions; hence they failed to draw the conclusions that, perhaps, ought
logically to have followed.
The rough geography and severe climate of Norway encouraged the
Norwegians to believe that their country was easy to defend. This belief,
combined with the scarcity of resources in the interwar period, left the country
with inadequate military forces to meet a determined aggressor. The operations
in north Norway show clearly that to commit forces in the Arctic without
adequate equipment and training is a recipe for disaster.
The war was the first direct clash between German and Allied land and air
forces. It was a testing ground for the innovations in equipment and doctrine
developed since World War I. The effect of air power on both land and naval
operations, little understood in Norway and Great Britain, was demonstrated
clearly during the war in Norway, and caused a fundamental shift in how this
new weapon was viewed. The campaign also saw the first use of airborne troops
to seize airfields and key objectives far behind enemy lines.
The Norwegian campaign revealed serious deficiencies in Allied command
structures and inter-allied coordination and cooperation. Failure to achieve unity
of command plagued both sides, but with the Germans the command difficulties
were largely overcome by a high degree of professionalism at the operational
level.
Finally, the campaign in Norway provides a textbook example of two military
operational philosophies: centralized versus flexible control.
The German invasion of Denmark and Norway is usually dealt with in a few
pages in the better-known political or military histories of World War II. This is
understandable. The campaigns of the war were spread across nearly six years
around the world, and the one in Norway was a comparatively small affair, both
in the size of forces involved and in the number of casualties.
Several accounts of the campaign were written shortly after the war by authors
from all participating countries. The Campaign in Norway by T.K. Derry in
1952, which became the official British history of the campaign, is undoubtedly
the most authoritative and most widely read account in English. However, this
excellently written book suffers from some of the same problems that David
Reynolds finds in Churchill’s multi-volume history of World War II. Both
authors present British motives and actions in the most favorable light. For the
most part, facts are presented correctly, but the reader is often misled or
influenced by omissions, lack of balance, distortions, and the shifting of blame
for failure. Although a number of books have been written by British authors
since the 1950s, they are largely unknown on this side of the Atlantic. These
works were primarily written for the British public, and deal mainly with Allied
operations, in particular the naval aspects. Some accounts, by omission or
through a narrow perspective, paint an inaccurate picture of events. While there
are some well-written German and Norwegian accounts, they have not been
translated and are therefore practically unknown outside their own countries.
There are a number of biographies of individuals involved in the Norwegian
operations, both political and military, as well as a number of personal accounts
and unit histories. These sources are valuable but must be treated with care. For
example, it is often the case that writers of a biography fall in love with their
subjects and therefore lose their objectivity, sometimes downplaying,
overlooking, or excusing their subjects’ flaws and weaknesses.
A review of the studies available in English led this author to the conclusion
that the treatment of the campaign, with few exceptions, is unbalanced. The
operations of French, Polish, and Norwegian troops are invariably given far less
coverage and credit than they deserve. Inconsistencies between national accounts
are numerous and the impact of such factors as terrain, climate, training, and
personalities are seldom addressed adequately.
The intent of this book is to treat planning and operations in a balanced
manner, without a national focus, using sources from all participating countries.
The planning and operations are analyzed in the light of what the participants
knew or could have been expected to know. Hindsight analysis is avoided as far
as possible. It is always easy to be wise after the event. While few things are
more dangerous in the writing of a military history than hindsight, the mere
recounting of events without analysis and objective critique makes it a useless
exercise. The focus of this book was originally on military operations in and
around Narvik and on the political decisions and planning leading up to those
operations. However, while Narvik had a seemingly magnetic effect upon
military planners before and during the war—out of all proportion to its actual
military importance—these operations cannot be understood in isolation. I soon
realized that limiting my book to Narvik was unrealistic because that campaign
was entwined with the whole of the war in Norway as well as in Europe
generally.
I owe a special debt to those who have written about the various aspects of the
war in Norway, and they are frequently referenced in text and notes. Among
those who deserve special mention is retired Norwegian Major General Torkel
Hovland, a former commander in north Norway. He provided a number of
references at the outset that would otherwise have been difficult to locate.
The same is true for Hans Haugse, a retired Norwegian headmaster, who also
put me in contact with Petter Sandvik, an individual with personal experiences
from Narvik in 1940. Mr. Sandvik, in addition to his personal observations,
provided materials from various institutions that proved useful. Lieutenant
Colonel Palle Ydstebø of the Norwegian Defense Staff was kind enough to make
available helpful information on the historical aspects of the defenses in north
Norway. Magnor Kr. Fjellheim kindly provided photographs of the area around
Narvik that illustrate the formidable terrain and climatic challenges to military
operations. Colonel (US Army, Ret) Henry Gole reviewed the draft manuscript
and provided valuable perspectives on the issues during our frequent
discussions.
I am grateful to a number of institutions and wish to give the staff of three a
specific mention: the US Army Military History Institute in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania; the Library of Congress in Washington, DC; and the Coyle Free
Library in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. The friendly and helpful staff at the
Coyle Library helped locate and obtain access to sources from all over the
United States.
My friend, Dr. Enoch Haga, has expertly guided me through this project, from
beginning to end. He read every draft and made very helpful suggestions as to
subject matter, organization, style, composition, and illustrations. Whenever
pessimism began to rear its ugly head, Dr. Haga was always there to provide
encouragement and support.
Finally, it is obvious that without the great patience and understanding on the
part of my family, as I became increasingly absorbed in this work over the past
three years, it would never have seen the light of day. My debt to them is
immense.
Despite the diligence of those who provided assistance, comments, and
advice, I must stress that I take full responsibility for all conclusions and such
errors as this book may inadvertently contain.