History of Strategic and Ballistic Missile Defense Volume II 19561972

15.1 MB·English

by  Barry Leonard

HISTORY OF
STRATEGIC AIR
AND
^ BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE
V Volume II
1956-1972
*
ExecutiveSummary
A. Introduction
Thisisthesecondoftwodraftvolumesonthehistoryofstrategicairandballisticmissiledefensefrom
1945to1972.Itcoversthe1955-1972portionofthelargerperiod,andisorganizedintofiveinterrelated
andprogressivelymoredetailedchapters.ChapterIprovidesacomparisonofU.S.andSovietstrategies,
ChaptersIIandIIIdealwithU.S.strategyandSovietstrategy,whileChaptersIVandVcoverU.S.systems
andSovietsystems.
ThisExecutiveSummaryisdrawndirectlyfrom,andhighlightscriticaljudgmentsof,thesefivechap-
ters.Assuch,itoutlinesthesubstanceofthemuchlargerbodyofprimaryevidencecontainedinthesepa-
ratebooksinthisdraftvolumewhichwasgatheredtoaddressthereasonsunderlyingpolicyformulation
anddecisionmakingforstrategicdefenseandtherelationshipbetweenthesuperpowerswithinthathighly
complexsecuritypolicyarena.Resultsofresearchconcerningfactorsinfluencingattitudesofpolicy/deci-
sionmakersatcriticaltimesappearinChaptersIIandIII.
ThisExecutiveSummaryhasthreemajorgroupings:one,toreflectthecontextualsettingofdeci-
sion-making,circa1955;thesecond,tohighlightstrategicairdefensepolicycomparisonsandcontrasts,
1955-1972;andathird,topresentjudgmentsandconclusionsabouttheresultsoftheplayoffactorsand
perceptionswhichmoldedairdefensedecisionsduringtheseyears.Thesethreesectionsderivefromand
arefirmlytiedtoanevidentialbase;however,timeanddocumentationconstraintshavelimitedtheeffortto
developthatbase.Consequently,importantelementsofthestorymayappeartobeslighted.Theessential
andsignificant,however,arehere.
CentralquestionsfacedtheU.S.andSovietdefenseplanners.Fundamentallytheyasked:"Howto
defendthecountry?"and"Howmaywebeattacked?"
B. TheSetting
1. InfluentialFactors
Duringthisperiod,U.S.andSovietperceptionsofstrategicairandmissiledefenserequirementswere
stronglyinfluencedby(1)scienceandtechnology,(2)uncertaintiesinthefutureenvironmentastothe
continuityoftheother'spoliciesandnuclearstrategies,and(3)thegrowingwishtomovetowardsome
limitationsonarms.
2. Contextin1955
a.U.S.StrategyandPolicy
U.S.nationalpolicycalledforastrongandeffectivesecurityposturewithemphasisonstrategicretal-
iatoryforcesandanintegratedcontinentaldefensesystem.U.S.continentaldefensepolicycalledfor
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HistoryofStrategicAirandBallisticMissileDefense,1956-1972:VolumeII
intensificationandaccelerationofprogramsinordertobepreparedagainstaSovietthreatanticipatedtobe
grievousby1957.Disarmamentarrangements,ifpracticable,wouldbesought.
b.SovietStrategyandPolicy
SovietstrategyintheSpringof1955builtonafundamentallychangeddoctrineofpreemptiondesigned
tofrustrateanenemyattack.Thisprovidedthebasisforhavingstrategicforcesnotonlyforoffensive
employmentbutalsotodisruptaWesternsurpriseattack.Inaddition,theSovietshadanactivedefense
systemtohelpsecureagrowingstrategicdeterrentforceandtodefendthehomeland.Amissiledevelop-
mentprogramwasbeingpushed.
3. GeneralOverview
a.FactorsInfluencingDeterrence
Concernoveraperceivedvulnerabilitytoasurprisenuclearattackledbothnationstodeveloppowerful
deterrentforcesandsupportingpostures.Technologywasthepredominantfactorinfluencingthecharacter
ofthestrategicchoicemadeduringthisextendedperiodfornationaldefense.Deterrentstrengthwasbasic
tonationalsecurity.
TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionsharedthebasicchoicethatwasmade.Bothlookedtoaninte-
gratednationalairdefensesystemasoneelementofdeterrence.TheweightedemphasisoftheU.S.choice
wenttothestrategicoffensiveelementofthedeterrent;theSovietdeterrentinclinedtoamorebalanced
posturebetweenoffensiveanddefensivecomponents.
Asthedeterrentforceofthetwonationsevolved,threatperceptionsinfluencedtheircharacter.
Baseduponaperspectiveofthemid-1950's,theUnitedStatesdecidedthatthedeterrentstrategy
requiredthehighprioritydevelopmentoflong-rangemissiles.Theequivalentlevelofprioritydidnot
attendprogramsforstrategicairandmissiledefensealthoughthethreatprojecteddistinctiveneeds
foractivedefense.
AreversedsetofprioritiesguidedtheSovieteffort;responsetothethreatofU.S.strategicoffen-
sivepoweremphasizedtheneedforanactivedefensethroughoutthisperiodwhilebuildingupstrategic
forces.
b.FactorsInfluencingAirandMissileDefenseDecisions
Inthecontextoftheexistingbasicnationalsecuritypolicy,U.S.strategicairandmissiledefense
contributedtotheU.S.deterrentposturewhilethethreatchangedandnewtechnologicaldevelopments
appearedtochallengevariousaspectsoftheestablishedstrategy.PrimefactorsbearingontheU.S.strategic
decisionsconcerningairandmissiledefenseduringthisperiodincludedthethreat,technology,andbudget-
aryconstraints.
Sovietstrategicconceptsandplanningforacontinuing,upgradedairdefensestructureandABM
deploymentwereinfluencedbythesamefactorsandthisaccountsforobvioussimilaritiesinthepatternof
basictrends.ThenatureandrationaleofSovietdecisions,however,involvesspeculationalthoughtheavail-
ableevidenceclearlyshowsthatthepoliticalleadershipsetprioritiesforstrategicdefenseandregularly
allocatedasubstantialresourcecommitmenttothateffort.
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ExecutiveSummary
C. StrategicActions
1. ParallelDecisionsDuringthePeriod
ActionsofconsequencetotheU.S.andSovietstrategicairandmissilesystemsaredetailedinChapters
IIandIII.Amongthoseactions,certaindecisionsstandout.Noteworthyfortheirrelativesignificance,
thesedecisionshaveaddeddimensionbecausetheU.S.andSovietUnioneachchoseparallelroutesintheir
approachestosecurity.
a.Mid-1950sBuild-Up
TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnioneachdecidedearlyintheperiodtobuildupthestrategic
airdefensestructureexistingatthetimebaseduponperspectivesofthecurrentandanticipatedmanned
bomberthreat.Ineffect,thesedecisionsextendedandreinforcedearlierdecisionstoestablishthenational
airdefensesystems.Givenaddedimpetusinthemid-1950'sbydecisionsforbuild-up,eachofthenational
systemsgeneratedamomentumforacontinuationoftheestablishedpatternofactionwithrespecttoair
defense.Eachacquiredaself-sustainingdimension.
IntheSovietUnionthisinfluencedsubsequentdecisionsinvolvedintherevampingoftheNational
AirDefenseForceswhichtookplaceaspartofKhrushchev'sgeneralreorganizationofthearmedforces
(SectionC,ChapterIII,"MajorDecisions").Reductionsinfighteraircraftandthevirtualeliminationof
antiaircraftartillerywerenoteworthyelementsofthisrestructuring.Theseactionscoincidedwiththeavail-
abilityofanewsurface-to-airmissilesystem,theSA-2,andtheadvanceddevelopmentoftheSA-3.
1) FactorsRelatedtoSovietDecision
Theavailabilityofthesemissilesystemsandnewfightersandimprovedearlywarningandcommuni-
cationslinks,itispresumed,enabledKhrushchevtoaccomplishresourcesavingswithinthestrategicair
defenseforceinkeepingwithhislarger,basicreo—rganizationofthearmedforces.Thus,itcanbeinferred
thattheavailabilityoftheproductsoftechnology thenewSAMs,fighteraircraft,radarsandcommunica-
—
tionlinks resultingfromdecisionsandactiontakenearlierfacilitatedthisSovietdecision.Theeconomic
situationremainedgenerallypoordespiteariseinmilitarybudgetsaboutthetime.Sovietthreatperceptions
hadtotakeintoaccountabout1,500U.S.strategicaircraft,includingtherecentlyintroducedB-52.U.S.
navalaircraft,theRAFandanembryonicballisticmissilethreatwereaddedproblems.Confidenceamong
theSovietleadership,however,washighasadirectresultofthestunningachievementoftheSputniks;
Khrushchev'sauthoritywasaccepted;hewasrespectedastheprincipalleaderandhehadalreadymadethe
largerstrategicdecisionsonoffensivemissiles.Toupgradethenationalairdefensestructurewastherefore,
anaturalprogression.
2) FactorsRelatedtoU.S.Decision
a) ThreatPerceptions
Threatperceptionsanddecisionprocessesappeartobetheprimefactorsinthisdecision.Anupdated
specialintelligenceestimatecurrentatthestartofthisperiodheldthatby1957theU.S.S.R.coulddevelop
thecapabilityoflaunchingapproximately1,000aircraftinaninitialairoperationagainsttheUnitedStates.
WhileitconsidereditmorelikelythattheU.S.S.R.wouldelecttocommitsubstantiallyfewer,thisestimate
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believedthat550missionaircraftwouldconstitutethemaximuminitialeffort(ChapterIandAnnexV,
ChapterII).
EssentiallylimitedprogresshadbeenmadeintheairdefenseprogramsalreadydirectedbyPresident
Eisenhower.TherewasconcernbecauseofrevisedintelligenceestimatesconcerningtheSovietnuclear
stockpileandfeararousedbytheprospectsofthefallouthazard.(AnnexV,ChapterIIdealswithestimates,
assessmentsandkeydecisionsatthetime.)TherealsowasgrowingCanadianconcern.TheKillianreport,
"MeetingtheThreatofSurpriseAttack,"pointedupSovietcapabilitiesinearly1955,andindicatedcritical
U.S.targetswererelativelyfewsayingthat"200nuclearbombs...woulddecisivelydefeatusand...a
firstattackcouldbefatalifweweresurprisedandunprepared."TheKillianreportspecifiedanumberof
deficienciesoftheU.S.airdefensesystem.WSEGReportNo.15,"ContinentalDefense,"whichcirculated
duringthesummerof1955,containedavarietyofrecommendationsonthesubject.Manyseparategroups
wereurginghighlevelU.S.Governmentactionforimprovedairdefense.
b) DecisionProcess
InthehighlystructuredU.S.nationalsecurityorganization,thepolicyprocesswasinstitutionalized,
butdependentonvariousadhocgroupsfortechnicalassessmentsandevaluations.Decisionsresulted
fromtheevidencesuchgroupsdevelopedconcerningtheneedforactiononstrategicprograms.In1953,
PresidentEisenhower'sReorganizationPlanNo.6hadrevisedthefunctionsoftheU.S.ArmedForcesand
thechainofcommand,abolishedtheMunitionsBoardandResearchandDevelopmentBoard,established
sevenAssistantSecretariesofDefense,and,intheNationalSecurityCouncil,majorpolicyquestionsand
securityissueshadbecomethepurviewofthePlanningBoard,madeupofrepresentativesdrawnfromthe
DepartmentsofState,Defense,andTreasury;theOfficeofCivilandDefenseMobilization;andtheBureau
oftheBudget.
ThisBoard,whichincludedadvisorsfromtheJCSandCIA,hadmemberspersonallyappointedbythe
PresidentuponnominationofthedesignateddepartmentsandagenciesandtheapprovalofthePresident's
SpecialAssistantforNationalSecurityAffairs,RobertCutler,aprominentBostonbanker.ThePlanning
Board,whileonlyasmallpartoftheNSCsystemunderPresidentEisenhower,constitutedtheheartof
theU.S.securitystructuresinceithadthecentraltaskofformulatingpolicyfortheconsiderationofthe
CouncilandtheapprovalofthePresident.Boardconsiderationofanissuebeganwiththepreparationofa
preliminarystudyanddiscussion.Followingthisadraftwouldbeprepared,modified,andclearedthrough
inter-agencycoordination.Specialstudiesofairdefenseproblemsabounded.
b.Long-RangeMissileDevelopment—Deployment—Mid-1950's
TheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStateseachdecidedearlyintheperiodtopursueaccelerateddevelop-
mentanddeploymentoflong-rangeoffensivemissilesystems.Thesedecisionsweresignificantbecauseof
theirdirectconsequenceswithrespecttothechoiceofbasicstrategyandbecauseoftheaddeddimension
theygavetotheevolutionofthreatperspectives.
1) FactorsRelatedtoSovietDecision
Thepromiseoftechnologyappearstohavebeenaprimaryfactorinthisdecision.TheSovietsneededa
deterrenttoneutralizeU.S.strategicairandmissilebasesinEurope,toholdEuropehostageagainstaU.S.
threatofaction,andtosupportstrategicconceptsfortheoperationsthecombinedarmsagainstEurope.
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ExecutiveSummary
AstrongSovietsecuritypositionwasneeded;adeterrentforcecontributeddirectlytothedefenseofthe
homeland.Technologyofferedtheprospectofanimpressivesolutiontothethreat.Khrushchevwouldboast
thatthestrategicattackaircraftwasobsolete.Hehaddecidednottoproducealargebomberforce.Rockets
andmissilesweremanifestationsofagrowingSovietemphasisonthesenewmeansforwieldingnuclear
power.
NuclearpowerhadalreadyprovenusefulforSovietstrategicpurposes.TheUnitedStateshadshown
interestindetenteduring1955and,despiteitscommitmentto"massiveretaliation,"eventsinSuezand
Hungary'thefollowingyearindicatedthatthepatternofpowerinworldpoliticswaschanging.Eventsinthe
fallof1956showedthateffortstoimposepoliticalchangebyforceattheexpenseofanothermajorpower
couldinducegreatriskinthenuclearera.Sovietnuclearthreats,however,wereblatantatthetime;their
diplomaticsuccessnowseemsincredible.
2) FactorsAffectingtheU.S.Decision
ConcernovertheSovietbomberprogramandtheICBMthreatcombinedtomakethreatperceptiona
principalfactorrelatingtothisU.S.decision.Technologyalsowasofgreatsignificance,andrelatedtothis
decisionwasanintense,bitterwrangleoverrolesandmissionsandbureaucraticpolitics.TheSovietICBM
testandlatersuccessfullaunchofSputnik,however,actedasacatalystwhichfusedseveralseparatefactors
andimpelledthedecision.U.S.decisionmakingalsofeltthepullofotherinfluences.Disarmamentpropos-
alsprovidedoneofthese.
2. ContrastsinChoice
a.U.S.Choice
U.S.strategicthinkinggaveprimaryemphasistotheemploymentofoffensiveforcestodefendU.S.
interestsaspartofadesiredstrongsecurityposture.Thatconceptwasreaffirmedbythestrategicdecisions
madeearlyinthisperiod.Effectively,airdefensewassecondary.Inkeepingwiththestrategicconceptthat
itwasdesirabletodestroyanattackerasfarfro—mthetargetaspossible,the—UnitedStates,overthisperiod,
emphasizedmassivestrategicoffensiveforces bothaircraftandmissiles tomeettheperceivedthreat.
U.S.strategy,however,includedanintegratedcontinentalairdefensesystem.Thatsystemgrewinkeep-
ingwiththescaleoftheanticipatedSovietbombercapabilitiesandcontractedastheSovietmissilethreat
intensified.Fromthebeginningofthisperiod,U.S.policyandstrategysoughttoexplorethepossibility
ofreachingpracticablearrangementsforarmslimitationswiththeSovietUnion.Tomaintainacredible
retaliatorydeterrentinthefaceofthegrowingSovietmissilethreattheU.S.strategylookedtoadequate
warningandadeclaredconceptofsufficientstrategicstrikecapacitytobeabletoabsorbamassiveSoviet
attackandtohavesurvivingresidualcapabilitiesadequateenoughtopermitpenetrationofSovietdefenses
todeliverunacceptabledamagetotheSovietUnion.
Fromaninitialobjectiveofimprovedactivedefenseaspartofitsdeterrentstrategy,theU.S.subse-
quentlyshiftedtoconceptsofassureddestructionandlater,tosufficiency.Bythemid-1960's,withtheshift
toassureddestruction,U.S.continentalairdefensehadeffectivelyrunitscourse.Decisionsmadeinthe
twilightyearsoftheEisenhowerAdministration,however,weresignificanttotheoutcome.Earlierdeci-
sions,moreover,appeartodemonstratethatthebasicU.S.strategicchoiceinvolvedatechnologicalrace.
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b.SovietChoice
TheSovietstrategysoughttoprovideasecuredeterrentthroughactiveairdefenseinordertolessenthe
extremevulnerabilityofdeterrentforces.Concurrently,however,theSovietsalsopursuedthedevelopment
anddeploymentofimprovedstrategiccapabilities,includingmissilesystems,foroffensiveanddefensive
employment,andacoordinatedcivildefenseprogram.ContrarytothegeneralbeliefthattheSovietsrou-
tinelyadheredtoapredilectionfordefense.ChapterIIIshowsasubstantialandsustainedSovietcommit-
menttothestrategicoffensivecomponent,greaterthantheprioritygiventodefenseofthehomeland.(Table
19containscomparativebudgetdata.)Complementingandextendingthestrategy,Sovietbomberswere
widelydisplayedandadvertised.NuclearblackmailwasalsousedtosupportfundamentalSovietobjec-
tives;threatswerecarefullytimedagainstactionondisarmamentgoals.
ItisdifficulttoextrapolateSovietstrategicplansfromtheoperationalforcedeploymentsandrelatedevi-
denceofresourcecommitmentsfordefense.Noofficialpresentationofdecisionsisavailable.Afterthefact
judgmentconcerningSovietstrategicdecisions,basedupontheappearanceanddeploymentofweaponsys-
tems,permitsinferencestobemadeabouttheSovietapproachtostrategicplanning.Relevantintelligenceand
thegrowingvolumeofSovietliteraturedealingwithquestionsofdoctrineandstrategy,alsoenablespecialists
inSovietaffairstodemonstratethatSovietstrategicdoctrinereflecteda"classic"warstrategyfocusingonthe
relativeoutcomeandtheneedtocomeoutbestratherthantoachievespecifiedlevelsofdestruction.Active
airandmissiledefensecouldhelptosurviveanuclearattack.TheSovietpositionfromthemid-1950'show-
ever,alsoopenlystressedtheutilityofnuclearstrikeforcesasadeterrenttoWesternattack.Fromthattime,
increasedemphasiswasgiventotheimportanceofSovietnuclearforcesasamajorfactorrestrainingaggres-
sionagainsttheU.S.S.R.Continuingconcernfortheirsecurity,however,isdemonstratedbytheextended
commitmenttoactiveairdefense.Theevidenceismixedwithrespecttotheactualgoalinthedevelopmentof
Sovietstrategicforces;whether"superiority"wasthegoal,airdefensewasprominent.
3. Tactics—U.S.-SovietAirandMissileDefenseStrategy
a.FromtheBeginningtoSputnik(1955-1957)
Impelledbytechnologyandtheprospectthateffectivedefenseagainsttheperceivedbomberthreatwas
practicable,boththeUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionaugmentedtheirexistingstrategicairdefensestruc-
turesinthemid-195CPs.SpecificobjectivesfortheU.S.includedanincreased"kill"potentialforair-to-airand
surface-to-airmissiles.Operationalconceptsrecognizedthedesirabilityofdestroyinganattackerasfarfrom
thetargetaspossible;however,attritionoftheattackingforceremainedthebasicU.S.concept.Eachsidehad
alreadybegunsurface-to-airmissiledeployments;thesewouldaccelerateduringthefollowingperiod.
b.TheEarlyMissileEra(1958-1961)
TheSovietUnionandtheU.S.proceededwiththedeploymentoffirstgenerationlong-range,surface-
to-surfacemissilesystemsduringthisperiodalthoughtheSovietsheldbackonsubstantialdeployment
oftheICBMsystemwhichhadlaunchedSputnik.However,eachsidenowhadmissilestrikecapabilities
aspartofagrowingdeterrentstrength.Vulnerabilitiesoffirstgenerationsystemscausedchangesinthe
characteristicofthemissileforce.
BytheendofthisperiodtheSovietstransferredresponsibilityforcivildefensetotheMinistryof
Defenseandemphasizedthisfunction.AcceleratingSovietABMdevelopmentprovidedforextensivetest-
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ExecutiveSummary
ingand,intheairdefensefield,anationwidedeploymentofSAMmissiledefensesgaveaddedevidence
ofthegrowthofPVOcapabilities.Sovietdecisionmakersalsoapprovedanewgenerationofall-weather
fighters.TheSovietprogramsforairandmissiledefenseprovideasharpcontrasttotheU.S.effort.
AsPresidentEisenhower'ssecondtermapproacheditsend,anumberofU.S.airdefenseprogramsfelt
theeffectsofdecisionsfortheircancellation.Thus,intheperiodofthisrelativelyshortspanofyears,the
NORADsystemwasfirstaugmentedduring1958withthedeploymentofnew,longerrangeNike-Hercules
missileunitsandtheDEWlineandSAGEsystemcommencedoperating;however,betweenthesummerof
1959and1960,theF108programwascancelled;theSAGESuperCombatCenterwascancelled;DEWline
radarimprovementswerecancelled;programmedBomarcsiteswerecutto10;U.S.Navyshipswerewith-
drawnfromoperatingaseabarrier;anumberofprogrammed,radars,primeandgap-fillerwerereduced;
andtherequirementforanewaircraftearlywarningandcontrol(AEW&C)aircraftwascancelled.
CoincidentwiththispatternofcancellationsandreductionsNORADstrategy'appearedtoshiftwhen,
inJanuary1959,theNorthAmericanAirDefenseObjectivesPlan(59-69)includedthestatement:
AoatlfltytrihdteeiseonnttroiorfyeitnNhgeortethnehemeAynm'eesmryif'cosarcnteostcaonlnotoiflnfoeennngtseiwrvielclofnonsrotcitetbuotenespiotdssesffiiebrnslsteem.wiis.ts.hiio.nnTsht.ehe.a.rire.sCdooeufmrepcnlesseetoemfuaCsnatdnbaaedbascoalapunatdbeltephreooftUenvciitrtiteoudn-
States.Thereforedefenseforcesmustbedeployedtodefendthevitalelementswhichanimateournational
structure.
c. 1961-1968,McNamaraYears
Asthisperiodbegan,theSovietthreattotheUnitedStatesincreasinglyreflectedICBMdevelopments;
U.S.airdefenseplanning,therefore,requiredconsiderationofpossibleattackbyamixedSovietnuclear
force,probablytoconsistofinitialmissilestrikesfollowedbymannedbomberattacks.Thatplanningwas
measuredagainstthedevelopingdoctrinesofflexibleandcontrolledresponse.
Controlledresponse closelyinvolveddamagelimitation; airandmissile defensewereasnatural
complementstothebasicdoctrine.Withtheshiftfromdamagelimitationtoassureddestructionbythe
mid-1960's,however,theU.S.airdefensestructureunderwentsignificantreductions.From1965to1968
fighter-interceptorstrengthwentdown50percent.TheNavyfirstreducedandthenceasedalloperations
ontheDEWlineextensions.InMay1965,themid-Canadalineceasedoperations.Bylate1965,Nike-
HerculesdefensesatSACbaseswerebeingeliminated.By1967,areexaminationoftherolethatNike-
Herculeswouldplayinamixedmissile/bomberthreatenvironmentledtofurthereliminations.TheSentinel
programfounderedinthefaceofaconcertofvariedopposition.
Sovietairdefenseemphasizedacontinuedprogramofmodernizationtomeetthethreatposedby
increasedspeed,higheraltitude,andelectroniccountermeasurescapabilitiesofmannedaircraftandcruise
missiles.ThetransitiontoimprovedorganizationandoperationofPVOStranyincludedactiontobegin
deploymentoftheSA-5missilesystem,probablydesignedtocounterahigh-velocity,medium-tohigh-
altitudeaerodynamicthreat.ASovietABMdefensewasoperationallydeployedatMoscow.
d. 1968-1972
The sharpcontrastalreadyevidencedbetweentheU.S. and Sovietairdefense systemsreceived
increasedemphasisduringthisperiod.CINCNORAD'sreducedmissionincoveringcriticalareaswould
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HistoryofStrategicAirandBallisticMissileDefense,1956-1972:VolumeII
be"partially"satisfiedwithforcesavailable.AthreatassessmentbytheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,
builtonanewandgreatlyreducedthreat,believedNORAD'sreducedforceshadthe"capabilitytodefend
againstasmallattack(about10bombers)afteronedayofwarning...."(SectionE,ChapterIVdetails
this.)
Sovietairandmissiledefensedevelopmentsinthisperiodunderscoredthegrowingcoherenceofthat
system,anditsimpressivestrengths,whichnowincludedintegrationofthesystemwiththeWarsawPact
countries.Astheperiodclosed,theSovietanticipationappearedtobepointedtoactivedefenseconsisting
mainlyofantimissiledefenses.
D. Conclusions
1. SummaryJudgments
Technologicalchangeswerethepredominantfactoraffectingairandmissiledefensestrategyduring
theperiodprimarilyastheyrelatedtothedevelopingoffensivethreat.Theirscopeandpaceintroduced
considerableuncertaintyandgreatlystrainedthestabilityoftheU.S.-Sovietrelationship.Bytheirpaceand
thenatureofthechangesprojected,technologicalinnovationsraisedfundamentalchallengestoprevious
conceptsofhowtodefendtheUnitedStates.
U.S.strategy,inturn,builtonthevarietyofnewweaponsystemdevelopments;Sovietstrategicair
andmissiledefensetrends,datingfromthemid-1950's,demonstratedSovietanticipation,awarenessand
responsetodevelopmentsinU.S.strategicoffensiveforces.Thescaleandcharacterofthethreatvaried
overtheperiodfrombomberstomissileswhichcomplicatedthechoiceofstrategies.
Basicfunctionsremainedunchanged;thedefensehadtodetect,identify,intercept,anddestroythe
attacker.Scienceandtechnologyhelpedgreatlybut,astheperiodprogressed,thetimeavailableforreaction
grewless.Thisbecameofincreasingconsequencefromthebeginningofthenuclearera.Tobeinstantly
ready,thedefensehadtohaveahighorderofcompetence,dedication,andvigilance.Nolongercouldplan-
nersdependonalongmobilizationperiod.
2. Conclusion
Thebasicpatternsofactionweresetbyinitial,andearly,strategicchoices.Thereafter,thestrategic
problemcenteredontechnologicaldevelopment.Threatperceptionsincreasinglyinvolvedpossibleappli-
cationbytheSovietsofnewtechnologiesinordertodefineordelimitfuturethreats.Perceptionsoffuture
threatswereinfluencedbytheviewofavailabletechnologies,whetherornottheSovietshaddemonstrated
thecapacitytoapplythem.Availableorknowntechnologieswereextrapolatedtoassessfuturethreats.Itis
difficultfromthisresearchtoconcludewhether"worstcase"assessments,builtonmirror-imaging,influ-
encedU.S.strategicchoices.
Interactionwasinherentinthepremises;however,adirectaction-reactioncyclewasnotafactorinthe
developmentofU.S.andSovietstrategicairandmissiledefensesystems,althoughtacticalandoperational
considerationsnecessarilyinfluenceddevelopmentsanddeployments.
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Chapter
I
U.S.andSovietStrategiesStrategicAirandMissileDefense
1955-1972
AComparison
A. Introduction
Duringthisperiod,U.S.andSovietperceptionsofstrategicairandmissiledefenserequirementswere
stronglyinfluencedby(1)scienceandtechnology,(2)uncertaintiesinthefutureenvironmentastothe
continuityoftheother'spoliciesandnuclearstrategies,and(3)thegrowingwishtomovetowardsome
limitationsonarms.
Technologicalchangeswerethepredominantfactoraffectingairandmissiledefensestrategyduring
theperiodprimarilyastheyrelatedtothedevelopingoffensivethreat.Theirscopeandpaceintroduced
considerableuncertaintyandgreatlystrainedthestabilityoftheU.S.-Sovietrelationship.Bytheirpaceand
thenatureofthechangesprojected,technologicalinnovationsraisedfundamentalchallengestoprevious
conceptsofhowtodefendtheUnitedStates.
U.S.strategy,inturn,builtonthevarietyofnewweaponsystemdevelopments;Sovietstrategicairand
missiledefensetrends,datingfromthemid-1950's,demonstratedSovietawarenessandresponsetodevel-
opmentsinU.S.strategicoffensiveforces.Thescaleandcharacterofthethreatvariedovertheperiodfrom
bomberstomissileswhichcomplicatedthechoiceofstrategies.
Basicfunctionsremainedunchanged;thedefensehadtodetect,identify,intercept,anddestroytheattacker.
Scienceandtechnologyhelpedgreatlybut,astheperiodprogressed,thetimeavailableforreactiongrewless.
Thisbecameofincreasingconsequencefromthebeginningofthenuclearera.Tobeinstantlyready,the
defensehadtohaveahighorderofcompetence,dedication,andvigilance.Nolongercouldplannersdepend
onalongmobilizationperiod.Warninggrewinimportance,soonitwouldbemeasuredinminutes.
B. WhatWasDifferentfromtheFirstDecade?
1. 1955Environment
a.StrategicInteractionintheGeneralSituation
By1955Sovietnuclearcapabilitiesandthepotentialsofscienceandtechnologydirectlychallengedthe
chosenU.S.securitypolicyinstrument,massiveretaliation.Hardrealitiesanduncertaintyconfrontedthe
basicU.S.policyofdeterrenceandaffecteditscontinuity.
AsitoriginatedearlierandlaterbuttressedU.S.nationalsecurity,deterrencewassetinthecontextof
U.S.globalresponsibilitiesprojectedintotheindefinitefuture.Whilethetwosuper-powerscouldengagein
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