Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism

225 Pages·2007·0.894 MB·English

by  Robert J. Maddox, Robert J. Maddox

HIROSHIMA
IN HISTORY

HIROSHIMA
IN HISTORY
THE MYTHS
OF REVISIONISM
EDITED WITH AN
INTRODUCTION BY
ROBERT JAMES
MADDOX
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI PRESS
COLUMBIA AND LONDON
Copyright © 2007 by
The Curators of the University of Missouri
University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65201
Printed and bound in the United States of America
All rights reserved
5 4 3 2 1 11 10 09 08 07
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hiroshima in history : the myths of revisionism / edited
with an introduction by Robert James Maddox.
p. cm.
Summary: “Analysis of Truman’s decision to use nuclear
arms against Japan through essays written by military and
diplomatic historians”—Provided by publisher.
Includes index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-8262-1732-5 (hbk. : alk. paper)
1. Hiroshima-shi (Japan)—History—Bombardment, 1945.
2. World War, 1939–1945—Historiography. I. Maddox,
Robert James.
D767.25.H6H6335 2007
940.5492521954—dc22
2006100945
øTM This paper meets the requirements of the
American National Standard for Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984.
Text design: Foleydesign
Jacket design: Susan Ferber
Typesetter: The Composing Room of Michigan, Inc.
Printer and binder: The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group
Typefaces: Palatino and Trixie
For acknowledgments and permissions, see p. 215.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Gar Alperovitz:
Godfather of Hiroshima Revisionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
ROBERT JAMES MADDOX
The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision
to Surrender—AReconsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
SADAO ASADA
Intelligence Forecasting for the Invasion of Japan:
Previews of Hell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
EDWARD J. DREA
“AScore of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas”:
President Truman and Casualty Estimates for
the Invasion of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76
D. M. GIANGRECO
Half a Million Purple Hearts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
D. M. GIANGRECO AND KATHRYN MOORE
Advocacy or Assessment?
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
of Germany and Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120
GIAN PERI GENTILE
Hiroshima and the Trashing of Henry Stimson . . . . . .146
ROBERT P. NEWMAN
v
vi HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY
Enola Gayat Air and Space:
Anonymity, Hypocrisy, Ignorance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .171
ROBERT P. NEWMAN
Racing the Enemy: ACritical Look . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .190
MICHAEL KORT
About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .199
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203
HIROSHIMA
IN HISTORY

Introduction
T
HE USE OF ATOMIC BOMBS AGAINST JAPAN at the end of
World War II remains one of the most controversial issues in
American history. Those who defend the decision claim that
it ended a bloody war that would have become far bloodier had the
planned invasion of the Japanese home islands proved necessary.
Although the primary consideration was saving American lives,
according to this view, millions of Japanese also were spared the cat-
astrophic effects of an invasion coupled with round-the-clock con-
ventional bombing, naval bombardment, and blockade. Those who
have become known as “Hiroshima revisionists” contend that this
version of events is nothing more than a postwar myth concocted by
Harry S. Truman and his advisers to make more palatable what was
basically a political rather than a military decision. The “real” reason
for using the weapons was not to defeat an already-defeated Japan,
but to make the Soviet Union more “manageable” by demonstrating
the enormous power now in American possession. Never before has
such a monstrous charge—that tens of thousands of people were
callously incinerated for no better reason than to gain diplomatic ad-
vantage—been supported by such flimsy evidence. The essays con-
tained in this volume show just how insubstantial Hiroshima revi-
sionism really is.
The core of revisionist indictment is that Japan had been willing to
surrender as early as the spring of 1945 provided only that its sacred
emperor be retained as head of the Japanese polity. Truman and Sec-
retary of State James F. Byrnes knew this through intercepted Japa-
nese messages but refused to act upon it because they wanted the war
to continueuntil the atomic bombs were ready for use. They deliber-
ately forestalled a Japanese surrender by insisting on peace terms
they knew would be unacceptable. Thus, not only were they willing
to sacrifice countless Japanese in pursuit of their goal, but were equal-
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