Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. An Appraisal and Application

182 Pages·2010·0.67 MB·English

by  Pessi Lyyra

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH
387
Pessi Lyyra
Higher-Order Theories of
Consciousness
An Appraisal and Application
JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 387
Pessi Lyyra
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
An Appraisal and Application
Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston Villa Ranan Blomstedt-salissa
huhtikuun 21. päivänä 2010 kello 12.
Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of
the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä,
in the building Villa Rana, Blomstedt hall, on April 21, 2010 at 12 o'clock noon.
UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ
JYVÄSKYLÄ 2010
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
An Appraisal and Application
JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 387
Pessi Lyyra
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
An Appraisal and Application
UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ
JYVÄSKYLÄ 2010
Editor
Jussi Kotkavirta
Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Jyväskylä
Pekka Olsbo
Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä
Cover picture by Pessi Lyyra
URN:ISBN:978-951-39-3919-9
ISBN 978-951-39-3919-9 (PDF)
ISBN 978-951-39-3848-2 (nid.)
ISSN 0075-4625
Copyright © 2 0 1 0 , by University of Jyväskylä
Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2010
ABSTRACT

Lyyra, Pessi
Higher-order theories of consciousness: An appraisal and application
Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2010, 163 pp.
(Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research
ISSN 0075-4625; 387)
ISBN 978-951-39-3919-9 (PDF), 978-951-39-3848-2 (nid.)

The subjectively experienced ‘phenomenality‘ of consciousness is often taken to
constitute the greatest enigma of the contemporary philosophy of mind, or even
science in general: how can phenomenal conscious experience arise out of its
physical substrate? The so called higher-order theories of consciousness
propose to solve this problem by the cognitive ability of being aware of one’s
own mental states. The first and foremost justification for these theories is the
intuitively appealing idea that only those mental states are conscious, which we
are somehow aware of. In this study, these theories and the core intuition they
rely on are examined. It is claimed that while this intuition holds for everyday
human consciousness, it does not hold equally well for the more primitive
kinds of consciousness, such as infant or animal consciousness. The intuition
also conflicts with the opposite intuition that self-awareness can be detrimental
to the vividness of world-directed consciousness. The intuition itself remains
unexplained, and the theories lack relevant empirical support. To solve these
problems, a novel conception of higher-order consciousness is suggested, a
practical form of consciousness characteristic of human beings called
‘mentalized consciousness’. It essentially involves self-awareness and develops
in the early interaction of an infant and its primary caregivers, as suggested by
recent theories and findings in empirical psychology. It is shown that, while
avoiding their problems, the intuitive appeal of the higher-order theories of
consciousness can be explained by the concept of mentalized consciousness.

Keywords: Consciousness, Phenomenality, Self-awareness, Higher-order
theories of consciousness, Phenomenological theories of consciousness,
Mentalization, Mentalized consciousness
Author´s address Pessi Lyyra
Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
University of Jyväskylä, Finland
P.O.BOX 35, 40014 University of Jyväskylä
[email protected]

Supervisors Jussi Kotkavirta
Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Mikko Yrjönsuuri
Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Reviewers Paavo Pylkkänen
Department of Theoretical Philosophy
University of Helsinki, Finland

Panu Raatikainen
Department of Theoretical Philosophy
University of Helsinki, Finland

Opponent David Rosenthal
Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have received inspiration and support for this project from so many people
that only few of them can be duely mentioned. First of all, I would like to thank
my supervisors Jussi Kotkavirta and Mikko Yrjönsuuri and other people of the
unit of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy of The University of
Jyväskylä for guidance, friendship and making up an exemplary working
environment filled with enthusiasm and freedom of thought. It has been a
privilege to work in a place with so many people with shared interests. People
in the research projects ”The Concept of Person”, ”Limits of Personhood” and
”Human and animal minds in European philosophy 1200–1700” have
influenced this study the most. In our seminars and reading groups most ideas
of this study were conceived, developed and tested during the years. This study
has crucially benefitted from discussions on the issues of it with Professor Antti
Revonsuo from the University of Turku, Professor Dan Zahavi from the
University of Copenhagen, Professor Shaun Gallagher from the University of
Orlando, and Dr. Susanna Radovic from the University of Gothenburg. Mr.
Michael Freeman gave indispensable advice with the English language.
The research has been supported by The Finnish Cultural Foundation, The
Fund of Central Finland of The Finnish Cultural Foundation, respectively, The
Academy of Finland, and The Agora Center of The University of Jyväskylä.
The research project has also been a significant occasion of personal
growth, of self-understanding and becoming the person I am, which is reflected
in the content of the study. I can say that I have lived the best days of my life
during this research project. I owe everything to the “strong Lyyra women” and
other members of my family, especially to my mother Ulla-Riitta Lyyra. I feel
that I have inherited some of her originality and courage to stand behind it.
Finally, I wish to thank the most my wife Hannalea Lyyra and our children
Nana and Jouka for all the support and love – you have taught me what it is all
about.

At Gift Ridge, March 13, 2010
Pessi Lyyra
FIGURES

FIGURE 1 The consciousness tree.………………………………………………..34
FIGURE 2 The consciousness tree, version 2…………………….……………....37
FIGURE 3 The consciousness tree, version 3…………………….……………....42
FIGURE 4 The consciousness tree, version 4….………………….……………...67
FIGURE 5 The consciousness tree, version 5……………………….…………..109

TABLES

TABLE 1 Objections to HO-theories…………………………………………….92
CONTENTS

ABSTRACT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
FIGURES AND TABLES
CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 9
1.1 Consciousness and self-awareness ........................................................... 9
1.2 An itinerary ................................................................................................ 13

2 THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS ......................................................... 15
2.1 On method: The return of speculative psychology? ............................ 15
2.2 Consciousness: basic distinctions ........................................................... 22
2.3 The “easy” and “hard” problems of consciousness ............................. 26
2.4 Empirical approaches to consciousness ................................................ 34

3 THE REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS ................. 42
3.1 Mind and intentionality ........................................................................... 44
3.2 Representational content: narrow or wide ............................................ 50
3.3 Representational content: conceptual or non-conceptual? ................. 57
3.4 Evaluative intentionalism ........................................................................ 62

4 HIGHER-ORDER THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS ................................. 67
4.1 First-order and higher-order representationalism:
a first approximation ................................................................................ 67
4.2 Two basic views: HOP and HOT ........................................................... 71
4.3 Intrinsicalism and relationalism ............................................................. 84
4.4 HOR and language ................................................................................... 88
4.5 Appraisal: Insufficiency of HOR in explaining phenomenality ........ 92
4.6 HOP and HOT: a false opposition? ...................................................... 105

5 FORMS AND PROPERTIES OF HIGHER-ORDER CONSCIOUSNESS . 110
5.1 Objects of higher-order representations .............................................. 110
5.2 Psychological issues in higher-order representations ....................... 116
5.3 Mentalized consciousness and other forms of higher-order
consciousness .......................................................................................... 122
5.4 The intuition of “givenness of consciousness” ................................... 129
5.5 Contenders and counter-arguments .................................................... 133

6 CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................... 136

YHTEENVETO ........................................................................................................... 142
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 147