Table Of ContentArgumentation Library
Gábor Tahin
Heuristic
Strategies in
the Speeches of
Cicero
Heuristic Strategies in the Speeches of Cicero
Argumentation Library
VOLUME 23
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Gábor Tahin
Heuristic Strategies
in the Speeches of Cicero
Gábor Tahin
Downside School
Stratton-on-the-Fosse
Radstock, UK
ISSN 1566-7650
ISBN 978-3-319-01798-3 ISBN 978-3-319-01799-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-01799-0
Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London
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Nearly every philosopher likes necessity,
but not chance; they want peace. But even
philosophers need chance.
Hannes Böhringer,
Immer kommt etwas dazwischen
Preface
In the following work, I will be introducing a concept of strategic and probabilistic
reasoning called heuremes in order to describe the argumentation of speeches in
classical oratory. After the discussion of theoretical considerations, these forms of
arguments I will explain these forms of arguments through the analysis of four
speeches from Attic orators and six from the Roman orator M. Tullius Cicero.
At the start of my research in classical oratory, I asked the question to what extent
analytical tools provided by ancient rhetorical theory could be used successfully in
the argumentative analysis of classical speeches. After the study of several speeches
with the help of classical terminology, I concluded that in many respects classical
handbooks did not give an in-depth and comprehensive view of the argumentation
of Greek and Roman forensic and political speeches. It seemed that the elaborate
terminology of classical rhetoric does not take into account the variety of argumenta-
tive strategies in forensic oratory. Somehow, rhetoric as a scholarly subject appeared
to have been developing independently of practical oratory for centuries and built
up a highly specifi c terminology, which does not necessarily refl ect the most complex
forms of persuasive reasoning in Greek and Roman courts.
Therefore, building on the results of classical scholarship on Attic and Ciceronian
oratory, I decided to move beyond the extant terminology and create a concept
infl uenced by the notions of uncertainty in sophistic rhetoric and heuristic reasoning
in the psychology of decision-making and in mathematical problem solving. In the
detailed analyses of the speeches, I identifi ed different forms of heuristic reasoning,
all of which represent a form of probabilistic argumentation which aims at manipu-
lating the mental decision-making processes of the jury. These analyses concentrate
on the detailed interpretation of passages where the nature of evidence requires
probable reasoning.
In the fi rst two chapters, I will outline the process which led me from classical
scholarship to the application of rhetorical heuremes. I attempt to explain as briefl y
as possible the complex relationship between classical rhetoric, informal logic,
cognitive psychology and heuremes. I will also provide a description of each
individual heureme. In the third chapter, I will present a detailed introduction to
vii
viii Preface
the meaning of probability in Greek and Roman oratory and the early history of
arguments from probability, which could be considered the precursors of heuristic
arguments.
In Chap. 4, I will offer short analyses of Greek forensic speeches which I believe
will shed light on the question how Cicero could (in part) fi nd models for forms of
heuristic reasoning. In Chaps. 5–10, I will give detailed descriptions of six
Ciceronian speeches, P ro Flacco , Pro Sulla , Pro Murena , Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino ,
Pro Milone , Pro Cluentio . The speeches represent some of the best examples of
Ciceronian oratory from his early and mature period. What is common in these
cases is that they all argue about questions of fact and therefore rely to a greater or
lesser extent on probabilistic reasoning. The order of the speeches is not chronological,
but it indicates an increasing level of complexity in their argument. The conclusion
will bring together some of the theoretical observations which arise during the analysis
as well as provide some suggestions about the further applicability of the concept.
Introd uction
The analysis of M. Tullius Cicero’s forensic oratory has gradually become a fi eld of
intense study, after a number of scholarly works 1 identifi ed strategies which ancient
rhetorical handbooks did not account for. Inspired by these works, I initially planned
to give an analysis of selected speeches fi rmly rooted in classical theory whilst
taking into account the development of rhetorical analysis in recent decades.
However, in the course of my research, I realised that although modern studies try
to move beyond or extend the scope of classical theories, they still rely on its divisions
and assumptions in most areas, such as parts of speech or forms of arguments.
T his phenomenon is indicative of both the positive and the negative aspects of
the enduring appeal of classical rhetoric. On the one hand, it shows that classical
terminology established elements of persuasive oratory and that these may possess
universal validity. On the other hand, the same terminology may condition the mind
of modern researchers in a way that could make the discovery of certain forms of
arguments diffi cult. Thus, a close reading of certain speeches presented me with
problems related to argumentation which I could resolve neither with the help of
ancient terminology nor by consulting modern reference works on rhetoric or argu-
mentation theory. It seemed that classical treatises offer comprehensive practical
advice on the production of a speech for would-be orators and excellent theoretical
discussions on the nature of rhetoric, yet, in some respects, they do not give a detailed
overview of extended forensic argumentation. Furthermore, although modern studies
on Greek and Ciceronian oratory did refi ne the categories of classical systems, these
developments were still, for the most part, guided by the conceptual framework of
ancient rhetoric. As a result, they mostly failed to notice a major aspect of forensic
arguments in Greek and Roman speeches – their exposure to the contingency of
rhetorical situations. Argumentation theory also proved to be useful in identifying
elements of logical reasoning and schemes of arguments, but its results are not
1 To name only a few, and the most recent ones, we can cite Alexander (2002), Craig (1993),
Dominik and Hall (2006), May (ed.) (2002), Porter (1997), Powell and Paterson (eds.) (2004),
Riggsby (1999), Steel (2001), Vasaly (1993).
ix
