Table Of ContentRecent Research in Psychology
Sybe J.S. Terwee
Hermeneutics
in Psychology
and
Psychoanalysis
Springer-Verlag
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Editor
Sybe J. S. Terwee
Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences
Unit of Experimental and Theoretical Psychology
p. O. Box 9555, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands
ISBN -13 : 978-3-540-51806-8 e-ISBN -13 : 978-3-642-83984-9
DOl: 10.1007/978-3-642-83984-9
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CONTENTS
Preface VB
Introduction
1. Psychology and Philosophy of Science 5
2. The Early Reception of Psychoanalysis: 35
Vicissitudes of a Science of Interpretation
3. The Case of Johannes Linschoten's Apostasy: 51
Phenomenological Versus Empirical-Analytical Psychology
4. Rhetorical Analysis and the Question of Relativism: 79
An Examination of the Views of Kenneth J. Gergen
5. The Hermeneutical Conception of Psychoanalysis: 93
Grunbaum's Foundations of Psychoanalysis
6. The Use of Hermeneutics in Psychology: 115
The Case of Ergonomics
7. A Rhetorical Approach to Dream Theories and Dreams 139
Notes 163
Bibliography 177
Indexes 198
Preface
In the chapters which follow, I will discuss various subjects from a
theoretical-psychological perspective. Though the discussion will not be
restricted to a single discipline, but ranges from experimental psychology
to psychoanalysis, in each case the focus of attention is the scientific
status of the theories scrutinized. Earlier versions of four of the chapters
have been published elsewhere. Chapter 1, "Psychology and Philosophy of
Science", is an expanded version of a Dutch paper written for Van Strien
and Van Rappard's volume on the foundations of psychology, Grondvragen
van de Psychologie. Chapter 2, "The Early Reception of Psychoanalysis",
has appeared in an almost identical form in Bem and Rappard's (1988)
volume, Studies in the History of the Social Sciences 5. Chapter 3, "The
Case of Johannes Linschoten's Apostasy: Phenomenological versus Empiri
cal-Analytical Psychology", is an elaboration of the Dutch article, "Het
essentialisme van Johannes Linschoten", published in Psychologie en
Maatschappij in 1987. The substance of this chapter is considerably
different from the earlier paper. Chapter 4, "Rhetorical Analysis and the
Question of Relativism", was published in essentially the same form in a
volume edited by W. Baker et aI, Recent Trends in Theoretical Psychology
(1988). It is based on an exchange of arguments with Kenneth J. Gergen
at the 1987 meeting of the International Society for Theoretical
Psychology in Banff, Canada. Chapter 5, "The Hermeneutical Conception
of Psychoanalysis", is a rewritten version of a 1987 article in Psycho
analysis and Contemporary Thought, entitled "Griinbaum's Foundations of
Psychoanalysis". Chapter 6, "The Uses of Hermeneutics for Psychology:
The Case of Ergonomics", has benefited from discussions in the study
group "Filosofie van de Mens- en Cultuurwetenschappen". I wish to thank
the members of this group, philosophers and researchers in the humanities
VIII
from different universities in the Netherlands, for their helpful comments
on earlier Dutch versions of the chapter. A Dutch version will appear in
a volume edited by Anton Mooij and Guy Widdershoven, members of the
study group, entitled lnterpretatie in de Psychoiogie. Chapter 7, "A
Rhetorical Approach to Dream Theories and Dreams", has been newly
written for the present volume. It is partly based on a paper presented to
the European Association for the Study of Dreams 1988 Conference in
London, and partly on a paper presented at the 1988 Cheiron Meeting in
Budapest. I am grateful to many colleagues and friends -- I mention only
Theo de Boer, Christine Van Boheemen, Kenneth Gergen, Paul Hoch, and
the members of the Theoretical Psychology Department at Leiden
University -- for their critical comments on earlier versions of parts of
the manuscript, and for their encouragement and assistance at various
stages of the project. Finally, I wish to thank Naomi Hylkema, Neline
Ritsma, and Yvonne Weber from the Faculty of Social Sciences at Leiden,
and Angie Pleit-Kuiper (Language Processing) for their kind assistance in
the preparation of this manuscript for publication.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this introduction is to provide an overview of the
philosophical and methodological perspectives common in present-day
psychology. Discussions between these perspectives may lead us to the
theoretical problems of the foundations of psychology that form the
subject of the first chapter. To start with, a few words will be said
about the tension between two families of approaches in psychology
(and related social and cultural sciences): the empirical-analytical and
the empirical-hermeneutical approach. The major part of this book will
consist of discussions between representatives of these approaches.
What exactly is to be understood by empirical-analytical psychology
and by hermeneutics?
The dominant view of scientific method in academic psychology
has evolved out of logical-positivist philosophy as it was formulated at
the beginning of this century in Vienna. Its ideal is a unified method
for all sciences. This method is a logical consequence of the empirical
analytical approach to reality. It is assumed that reality may be
broken up into logically independent variables. These variables are
externally, but not internally, related: i.e., no meaning relations exist
between them. External relations may have the character of universal
laws or statistical correlations. A second assumption of empirical
analytical psychology is that such law-like relations between variables
may be discovered in psychological reality. In this view, the aim of
science is to provide theories consisting of general laws which enable
us to explain, predict, and control phenomena. Within Dutch
psychology, the empirical-analytical approach as outlined above has
been introduced and expounded by J. Linschoten (1964) and A.D. de
Groot (1961). But we can look at virtually any textbook on
methodology in psychology to see these methods and their assumptions
explained and defended.
It is important to distinguish between the empirical-analytical
method as one of the possible methods of research in the sciences,
and the empirical-analytical world view which claims that the structure
of reality is such that it cannot be understood in any other way. As
will be argued in a consideration of the work of Adolf Grtinbaum in
chapter S, the adoption of this world view is not necessary for a
scientist. I will also refer to Linschoten's arguments, presented in
Hermeneutics in Psychology and Psychoanalysis 2
chapter 3, propagating empirical-analytical psychology, without falling
into the trap of a scientistic world view. In other words, the em
pirical-analytical approach is useful for certain purposes, but it doesn't
preclude the possibility of alternative approaches. There is a growing
sensitivity in psychology to the necessity of alternative approaches:
some of these will be outlined in sections 8-10 of the first chapter
and analyzed in more detail in chapters 4 and 6 of this volume. Still
speaking in very broad and generalized terms, the alternatives to the
empirical-analytical approach may be subsumed under the term
"hermeneutics"l, which covers a family of related approaches to the
interpretative character of psychology. These approaches share the
following arguments that set them apart from empirical-analytical
psychology:
(1) There is no need to analyze psychological reality into
independent variables because we are familiar with it before any
formal or scientific analysis. Since human experience is conditioned by
internal relations, it is also doubtful whether such an empiricist
analysis is useful for all purposes. It certainly involves a reduction and
a subsequent disturbance of all sorts of internal relations and
meanings in everyday life. As an example of an internal relation we
may think of borrowing a book, followed by its return. If practical
experience would show that books are seldom returned, the concept of
'borrowing' would gradually lose its meaning. In a Wittgensteinian
spirit, we might say that meanings are only possible within forms of
life and remain dependent on them: a change in everyday practice
would lead to a change of meaning. It seems that internal (meaning)
relations imply certain regularities, as was indeed indicated by
Wittgenstein (1953). Empirical-analytical science concentrates on those
regularities which may be measured and regarded as external relations
without further ado. An experimental psychologist might look for the
relationships existing between operationalizations like "borrowing
behavior" and "returning behavior". Hermeneuticians acknowledge the
legitimate character of such research. They are not denying the
possibility of objective science. Their point is rather that an empiricist
approach is not very fruitful in certain cases; and in any case, it is
only one of the possible approaches. The hermeneutic approach aims
3 Introduction
for knowledge without such reductive operations as those mentioned
above. It consists of an orderly search for internal relations; the
meaning of phenomena may become apparent if we look at their
context and history. Hermeneutics constructs or reconstructs meaning
relations between significant parts of the context and the context as a
whole. More will be said about this in sections 8-10 of the first
chapter. In chapter 6, an ergonomic explanation of accidents at sea
will be scrutinized in order to provide an example of the
hermeneutical approach. A quite different example of hermeneutic
analysis will be presented in the rhetorical approach to dreams
described in chapter 7.
(2) Hermeneuticians claim that explanations do not necessarily
require laws. In explanations which do make use of laws (deductive
nomological explanations, see chapter I, section 6), the phenomenon to
be explained appears as the logical conclusion from a set of initial
conditions and laws. It is a matter of debate whether this type of
explanation is (implicitly) present in every possible scientific
explanation. Hermeneuticians deny this. They claim that explanation is
possible without recourse to laws. The contextual description of
phenomena may lead to several types of explanation, such as narrative
explanations (M. Gergen 1987), teleological explanations (C. Taylor
1971), motivational explanations (R.S. Peters 1958), and contextual
explanations (Terwee 1983). In the field of ergonomics, a subdiscipline
of psychology with an objective-scientific reputation (see chapter 6),
it has been argued that a purposive model might be fruitful (Taylor
1976), and that an adequate framework for the understanding of
accidents and safety behavior (Taylor 1987) may be found in
hermeneutics.
It follows that hermeneuticians believe in the possibility of knowledge
outside the realm of objective empirical-analytical science. There is no
need for empirical psychology to reduce reality into abstract variables
and to search for laws. I will claim in the following that several
forms of hermeneutics may be fruitful approaches to psychology. The
choice of theoretical frameworks and methods is free: to me it seems
Hermeneutics in Psychology and Psychoanalysis 4
a pragmatic question which method is most appropriate for a given
discipline or specialism. As will be shown in various contexts in this
volume, there is a tendency in the social sciences to proclaim the
empirical-analytical approach as the one and only scientific method.
This, I argue, is the consequence of a foundationalist ontology and an
unpractically narrow epistemology. In chapter 2, Freud's scientism
forms the object of attention. In chapter 3, the arguments of the
Dutch psychologist Linschoten are evaluated against an empirical
analytic world view. In chapter 4, I am mainly concerned with the
problem of relativism that is usually associated with hermeneutics.
Chapter 5 evaluates Adolf Griinbaum's rejection of the hermeneutical
conception of psychoanalysis and his empirical-analytical world view.
Chapters 6 and 7 provide examples of hermeneutical psychology, as
mentioned above.
Finally, we may ask what hermeneutical theory has to say about
existing forms of empirical-analytical psychology. On the one hand,
interpretative methods may be seen as alternatives which could coexist
peacefully with the empirical-analytical method. On the other hand,
hermeneuticians have maintained that traditional empirical-analytical
research is based on implicit interpretations. This attitude is found in
the forceful rhetorical analyses of present-day theory by scholars such
as Michael Billig, Kenneth Gergen, and Donald McCloskey. Their
arguments are partly based on methodological principles, well-known to
philosophers of science and generally accepted, for instance that the
neutrality and objectivity of even the most exact research are
dependent on fundamental choices such as theoretical framework (De
Groot 1961), selective viewpoints (Duintjer 1969), and methods of
research (Danziger 1985a). In other words, even the most objective
research is dependent on interpretative choices which are often left
implicit (Gergen 1982). This line of criticism forms the subject matter
of a section on rhetorical approaches in the first chapter.
