Table Of ContentAc ademy for Peace and Development Ac ademy for Peace and Development
kaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka kaademiga Nabadda iyo Horumarka
Hargeisa, Somaliland Hargeisa, Somaliland
European Commission
VOTE FOR PEACE II
A Report on the 2010 Somaliland
Presidential Election Process
Hargeysa, Somaliland
Vote for Peace II:
2
A Report on the 2010 Somaliland
Presidential Election Process
Hargeysa, Somaliland
APD Hargeysa, Somaliland
Tel: (+252 2) 520 304
Email: [email protected]
http://www.apd-somaliland.org
APD Burco, Somalil and
Phone: (+252-2) 712 980/ 81/ 82
Email: [email protected]
http://www.apd-somaliland.org
Acknowledgements
This Report was prepared by the Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace Regional Office
for Eastern and Central Africa.
Lead Researchers: Mohamed Hassan Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Hersi
Senior Research Advisor: Abdirahman Osman Raghe
Editor: Sabhita Raju
Design and Layout: Cege Mwangi/Gecko Media
Printers: Kul Graphics Ltd.
Front cover photo: Woman voting in the 2010 Presidential Election
© Asia Abdulkadir
Back cover photo: Peaceful transfer of power: President Siilanyo takes the oath of office
© Interpeace
ISBN 978-9966-1556-8-9
Copyright: Academy for Peace and Development/Interpeace
Published: July 2012
This report was prepared by the Academy for Peace and Development and Interpeace and represents
exclusively their own views. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the
contributing donors and should not relied upon as a statement of the contributing donors or their services.
The contributing donors do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor do they
accept responsibility for any use made thereof.
Contents 3
Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...............................................................................2
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .............................................................5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................7
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................13
1.1 Partners in Peace-building ..................................................................15
1.2 Background .......................................................................................16
2. KEY ISSUES ...............................................................................................19
2.1 The Extension of the Guurti’s Term .....................................................19
2.2 Appointing a New National Electoral Commission ..............................20
2.3 Limiting the Political parties ...............................................................21
2.4 Voter Registration ..............................................................................24
2.5 The Political Climate ..........................................................................24
2.6 Political Stability and Security ............................................................25
2.7 Key Stakeholders ..............................................................................27
3. ACTIVITIES ...............................................................................................41
3.1 Public Forums .....................................................................................41
3.2 Consultative Meetings .........................................................................42
3.3 Support to the National Electoral Commission ....................................43
3.4 Behind-the-Scenes Activities ...............................................................43
3.5 The Audio-Visual Unit and Media .........................................................44
4. KEY EVENTS AND IMPACT .......................................................................45
4.1 The Passing of the Voter Registration Act ...........................................45
4.2 The Formation of the Second National Electoral Commission ............46
4.3 The First Timeline Agreement .............................................................52
4.4 The Second Timeline Agreement ........................................................54
4.5 Preparation of the Education Manual for Voter Registration.................57
4.6 Education Campaign for Voter Registration .........................................57
4.7 The Fourth Election Postponements ....................................................59
4.8 Turbulent Period ..................................................................................62
4.9 The Formation of the Third NEC ..........................................................69
4.10 Observation Mission on the Recruitment of Regional
and District Commissioners ...............................................................70
4.11 Civil Society Advisory Group ..............................................................71
4.12 Training Members of the Media .........................................................72
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A Report on the 2010 Somaliland
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4.13 The Election Monitoring Board (EMB) ................................................73
4.14 Deployment of Mediators at the Registration and Polling Centres ......74
4.15 Walk-Through Exercise on the Election Day Process .........................74
4.16 Observing the Polling Day .................................................................75
5. THE ROAD TO SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS .............................................81
5.1 The Third NEC Kept the Ball Rolling .................................................81
5.2 Finalising the Voter Registration List ..................................................83
6. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED ......................................................93
6.1 The Importance of the Dialogue and Consultative Process .................93
6.2 Conflicts in Politics ..............................................................................94
6.3 Legitimacy Matters .............................................................................97
6.4 Voter Registration ................................................................................101
6.5 International Intervention ......................................................................104
6.6 The Importance of NEC’s Leadership .................................................106
6.7 Political Competition ...........................................................................108
6.8 Mandate Extensions in the Case of No Elections .................................110
6.9 Election Results ..................................................................................113
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................119
APPENDIX 1: ELECTION TIMELINE .............................................................125
APPENDIX 2: THE SIX-POINT AGREEMENT ..............................................127
APPENDIX 3: POLITICAL PARTIES CODE OF CONDUCT...........................129
APPENDIX 4: MEDIA CODE OF CONDUCT .................................................148
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................155
Tables
Table 1: List of Public Debates held by APD.....................................................41
Table 2: Regional Breakdown ..........................................................................58
Table 3: Regional Distribution of Votes .............................................................110
Table 4: Regional Distribution of Votes in Somaliland’s
Presidential Elections .......................................................................................114
Charts
Chart 1: Share of Each Region ........................................................................103
Chart 2: Regional Distribution of Over-Registration .........................................113
Chart 3: Comparison of Results of the 2003 and
2010 Somaliland Presidential Elections ............................................................115
Chart 4: Vote Distribution by Party ...................................................................115
Chart 5: Shifts in Regions from the 2003 to 2010 Presidential Elections ...........116
5
Abbreviations
Abbreviations and Acronyms
APD Academy for Peace and Development
AVU Audio-Visual Unit
CHD Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
EMB Electoral Monitoring Body
EMC Electoral Monitoring Committee
FOPAG Forum for Peace and Governance
ICU Islamic Court Union
Interpeace International Peacebuilding Alliance
IRI International Republican Institute
ISG Independent Scholars Group
MP Member of Parliament
NAGAAD The Network for Women’s Organisations
NEC National Electoral Commission
NGOs Non-governmental Organizations
NPGM National Programme Group Meeting
PMT Project Management Team
UCID Justice and Welfare Party (Ururka Cadaaladda iyo Daryeelka)
UDUB United Democratic Party (Ururka Domuqraadiga Ummadaha Bahoobay)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
RAC Registration of Associations Committee
SFUK Somaliland Focus UK
SOLJA Somaliland Journalist Associations
SONSAF Somaliland Non State Actors Forum
SONYO Somaliland National Youth Organization
SORADI Social Research and Development Institute
SSC Sool, Sanaag and Cayn
SSJW Somaliland Society for Journalist and Writers
VOA Voice of America
Executive Summary 7
Executive Summary
On 26 June 2010, the people of Somaliland went to the polls to elect
a new president for the second time since declaring independence.
The incumbent President Daahir Rayaale Kaahin lost to the main
opposition candidate Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud Siilaanyo in an
election considered credible by local and international observers,
which was followed by a peaceful transfer of power to an extent
rarely seen in African politics.
For a political and economically fragile the voter registry, all of which led to
state only recently having re-established four successive postponements of
autonomous governance and beginning the Presidential Election. It was a time
the reconstruction process after a in which political uncertainty over the
significant period of marginalisation and democratic future of Somaliland was
wartime destruction, the consolidation palpable.
of a democratic electoral process was
not without challenges. The ill-defined Ultimately, though, the will of the
relationships between branches of Somaliland population for a continuation
government and the relatively untested of its country’s democratic consolidation
nature of a newly adopted constitution and progression, coupled with intense
created opportunities for those with international pressure (and conditional
vested interests in certain political funding), led to a series of last minute
outcomes to pursue these interests by deals that culminated in the holding of
circumventing or distorting bureaucratic elections in 2010. Preventing the above-
mechanisms. mentioned disagreements from spiralling
out of control were key interventions
Clashes over numerous issues on the part of many within and outside
occurred, ranging from the extension of the governmental fold in the form of
both the Guurti (House of Elders/Upper public forums, consultative meetings,
Chamber) and the President’s terms of support for the National Electoral
office, the formation of a new electoral Commission (NEC), and “behind-the-
commission, and the nullification of scenes” mediation exercises. Such
Vote for Peace II:
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A Report on the 2010 Somaliland
Presidential Election Process
interventions absorbed and redirected of a new NEC, the implementation of
frustrations around the handling of the voter registration, and the conducting of
political process in ways that allowed the actual voting for the 2010 elections,
for compromise and which led to the the Academy conducted a variety of
ultimate settlement of most major civic education campaigns, consultative
outstanding points of contention. The meetings, technical support projects and
Academy for Peace and Development other behind-the-scenes activities that
(APD), with the support of Interpeace, served to make these exercises more
played a major part in implementing transparent and less confrontational.
these various forms of reconciliation and Through holding public forums, APD was
accommodation procedures. able to bring in experts and interested
parties to clarify and work out the
APD’s ability to perform the role of details of Somaliland’s democratisation
mediator stemmed from both its ability advancement. In addition, such public
to provide a neutral space in which all forums intended to generate public
views and ideas could be aired freely support, explore and resolve challenges
and objectively, as well as its deep, and reconcile differences in the areas
bipartisan connections with most of voter registration, the criteria for
levels and segments of Somaliland citizenship, the stipulations of the
society—including ministers, legislators, Somaliland Constitution, the details
international agencies, political party of the Media Law, and the problem
leadership, traditional elders, women of political cohabitation. This was
and youth groups, and other civil accompanied by a mapping exercise
society organisations. In an environment conducted by APD as part of its Pillars
where mistrust and fear surrounding of Peace Programme in which a broad
the outcomes of the development of cross-section of Somaliland society from
institutional mechanisms for political all of its six official regions were able to
contestation are pervasive, having such discuss the state of political pluralism
a neutral body with the ability to bring within the country, and prospects for the
all main stakeholders to the table to future.
discuss issues of mutual concern is of
paramount importance to the peaceful Overlapping influence, political alliances
resolution of disputes. and competing agendas between the
Executive, House of Representatives,
During the decision-making processes Guurti, Supreme Court and the NEC
related to the length of the mandates of prevented internal mechanisms of
the presidency and Guurti, the formation checks and balances from resolving
Executive Summary 9
contestations over electoral preparations intransigence on one particular issue
and implementation on their own. reflected less a strong stance towards
Government institutions therefore had a specific position, than a desire to gain
to be supplemented and reinforced the upper hand in the larger competition
by ad-hoc interventions on the part of between political factions that plagued
actors such as APD to make sure that the entire development of the electoral
the necessary technical and political framework. Such was the case with
preconditions for credible and timely the formation of the second NEC, in
elections were put in place. Through which APD identified and coordinated a
consultative meetings, behind-the- committee of nine mediators to engender
scenes negotiations, shuttle-diplomacy compromise over the nomination and
and intensive lobbying of political actors confirmation of new appointees to
on the part of the Academy, many of its leadership that had caused such
the political deadlocks that threatened controversy so as to threaten to derail
to derail the election process were the entire electoral process.
overcome.
A similar situation unfolded during two
With regard to the passing of the Voter sets of negotiations over the timeline for
Registration Act, this meant putting the election, where a manipulation of
constant pressure on the two Houses different bylaws by both parties to suit
of the legislature to move forward with their own interests and the unilateral
its ratification so as to guarantee its extension of the Guurti’s mandate by
inclusion in the election process in a the president both endangered the
way that would not delay the election prospects of the election being held at
itself. This, plus further lobbying to make all. Once the latter was compounded by
sure that the stipulations of the Act were the threat of a reciprocal extension of
as conducive as possible to fair voting, the president’s mandate, tensions ran
not only addressed the competing so high that talk amongst the opposition
concerns of the incumbent presidency of establishing a parallel government
and the opposition parties by fostering in defiance was a distinct possibility. It
a compromise, but also ensured that was only through a consensus-based
ambiguities within the original act were agreement and successful negotiation
clarified to make voting fraud less likely. over the electoral timeline fostered by
intensive behind-the-scenes negotiation
During the period leading up to the on the part of APD and the NEC that
eventual 2010 elections, mistrust the voting procedures were eventually
compounded mistrust to the point that carried forward.
Description:Hargeisa, Somaliland Vote for Peace II: A Report on the 2010 Somaliland SORADI Social Research and Development Institute