Table Of ContentHappiness, Morality, and Freedom
<UN>
Studies in Moral Philosophy
Series Editor
Thom Brooks (Durham University)
Editorial Board
Chrisoula Andreou (University of Utah)
Mark Bevir (University of California, Berkeley)
Clare Chambers (University of Cambridge)
Fabian Freyenhagen (University of Essex)
Tim Mulgan (University of St Andrews)
Ian Shapiro (Yale University)
VOLUME 8
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/simp
<UN>
Happiness, Morality, and Freedom
By
Arthur Melnick
LEIDEN | BOSTON
<UN>
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Melnick, Arthur.
Happiness, morality, and freedom / by Arthur Melnick.
pages cm. -- (Studies in moral philosophy, ISSN 2211-2014 ; VOLUME 8)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-28320-6 (hardback : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-90-04-28321-3 (e-book)
1. Happiness. 2. Ethics. 3. Liberty. I. Title.
BJ1481.M47 2014
170--dc23
2014029511
This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters covering
Latin, ipa, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the humanities.
For more information, please see www.brill.com/brill-typeface.
issn 2211-2014
isbn 978-90-04-28320-6 (hardback)
isbn 978-90-04-28321-3 (e-book)
Copyright 2014 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Global Oriental and Hotei Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without prior written permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided
that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive,
Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa.
Fees are subject to change.
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
For John Senters
∵
<UN>
<UN>
Contents
Introduction ix
PART 1
Happiness 1
1 Happiness as Endorsed Contentment 3
2 The Final Good and the Final End 19
3 Reason and True Happiness 38
4 The Happiness of Others 64
PART 2
Morality 87
5 The Fundamental Principle of Morality 89
6 The Content of the Fundamental Principle 112
7 Other Accounts of Morality 136
PART 3
Freedom 161
8 Freedom, Deliberation, and the Self 163
9 Freedom, Ultimate Power, and Ultimate Responsibility 187
Bibliography 207
Index 210
<UN>
<UN>
Introduction
The central place of morality in our lives is threatened on the one hand by the
pursuit of happiness and on the other by a lack of freedom according to which
we can be held morally responsible. If a person’s pursuit of happiness is pro-
moted by doing what is morally wrong on occasion then it is unclear why he
should act against his happiness by avoiding wrong doing. What is the motiva-
tion for a person to go against his own happiness? Even if it can be shown that
there is good reason to avoid wrong doing morality would have no significant
place in our lives if we lack the freedom to avoid wrong doing. Morality would
be an inert ideal capable perhaps of stirring feelings of regret when it is vio-
lated but otherwise incapable of guiding our lives and governing our relation
to one another.
One could try to settle the issue of the place of morality in our lives directly
by considering in its own right what value morality has. Unless however moral-
ity is the ground or source of all value this would leave it open that what else
has value has a claim against morality. Without settling what is at the bottom
of anything’s having value no consideration of values that morality realizes will
secure its predominant place over all other values. But now following Aristotle
it is happiness that is our final good and our final end. Happiness, whatever
else, lies at the bottom of all that we value for our lives and all that we aim for
in our lives. Just as truth is the final good and the final end of our theoretical
endeavors, happiness is the final good and the final end of our practical endeav-
ors. The surest way then to secure the place of morality in our lives is to find a
conception of happiness by which it is the ground of all value and then show
that morality is essential to happiness so conceived. The task of Part One is to
set out a conception of what it is to be happy that in this way secures the place
of morality in our lives.
Being completely self-fulfilled by how our lives are going would seem to be
at the bottom of our values and aims. Something is valuable to us all things
considered if its realization in our lives contributes to complete self-fulfillment
since there is nothing but ourselves for value to be responsible to. Likewise
something is to be aimed for all things considered if what it aims for is valuable
to us all things considered. Part of being self-fulfilled is being fulfilled in
our emotional nature. Only if we are predominantly content or serene or buoy-
ant or blissful in our lives are we emotionally fulfilled in how our lives are
going. We are more than emotional creatures however. When we think of
our lives certain aspects of how our lives are going may or may not appeal to
<UN>
