Table Of ContentEdited and GURPS System Design Steve Jackson
Illustrated by Managing Editor Andrew Hackard
Gene Seabolt GURPS Line Editor Sean Punch
GURPS WWII Line Editor Gene Seabolt
Additional material by Project Administrator Monique Chapman
Roberto Gasparoni, Design and Production Gene Seabolt
Arturo F. Lorioli,
Print Buyer Monica Stephens
Enrico Negro,
Errata Coordinator Andy Vetromile
Brian J. Underhill, and
Hans-Christian Vortisch Sales Manager Ross Jepson
Playtesters: Jeremy Amanda, Brandon Cope,
C O N T E N T S Peter Dell’Orto, Richard Gadsden,
Vincent Lefavrais, Phil Masters, Gene Moyers,
Introduction .....................2 Robert Prior, and Lisa J. Steele.
1. Italy at War ...................3
GURPS,Warehouse 23, and the all-seeing pyramid are registered trademarks of
2. The Italian Armed Forces ......14 Steve Jackson Games Incorporated. GURPSWWII,Grim Legions,Pyramid,and the
names of all products published by Steve Jackson Games Incorporated are registered
3. Italian Soldiers................20
trademarks or trademarks of Steve Jackson Games Incorporated, or used under license.
Italian Ranks Table . . . . . . . . . . 21 GURPS WWII:Grim Legions is copyright ©2003 by Steve Jackson Games
Incorporated. All rights reserved. Printed in the USA. Some art based on photographs
4. The Italian Armory ............25
copyright www.clipart.com. Some art based on photographs from
Small Arms Table . . . . . . . . . . . 28 the National Archives, the author’s family papers, and other sources.
5. On the Front .................37 The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other
means without the permission of the publisher is illegal, and punishable by law.Please pur-
References and Index ............48
chase only authorized electronic editions, and do not participate in or encourage the elec-
tronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated.
ISBN 1-55634-641-7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
STEVE JACKSON GAMES
INTRODUCTION
A GURPS
BOUT
“If there’s war,the Italians will fight on Ger-
Steve Jackson Games is committed to full
many’s side.”
support of the GURPSsystem. Our address is
–Nazi diplomat Joachim von Ribbentrop
SJ Games, Box 18957, Austin, TX 78760.
Please include a self-addressed, stamped “That’s fair. We had them last time.”
envelope (SASE) any time you write us! –Winston Churchill,in response
Resources include:
Italy considered joining both sides in WWI.
Pyramid (www.sjgames.com/pyramid/).
Finding more to like in the Entente, the nation sent
Our online magazine includes new GURPS
its armed forces marching into a harsh war until
rules and articles. It also covers Dungeons
circumstances proved that it had picked the win-
and Dragons, Traveller,World of Darkness,
ning cause. Afterward, Italy dreamed of being a
Call of Cthulhu,and many more top games –
world-class power. It wasn’t, but it would take
and other Steve Jackson Games releases like
In Nomine,Illuminati,Car Wars,Toon,Ogre another war to prove it. Once plunged into this sec-
Miniatures, and more. Pyramid subscribers ond and even greater conflict, Italians painfully
also have access to playtest files online! learned that they lacked the industry, the technolo-
New supplements and adventures. GURPS gy, and above all, the leadership needed to win.
continues to grow, and we’ll be happy to let you Many of them also discovered that they lacked
know what’s new. For a current catalog, send us a good cause for which to fight, to the point that
alegal-sized or 9”· 12” SASE – please use two they gained a reputation for surrendering eagerly.
stamps! – or just visit www.warehouse23.com. While several factors (discussed in this book) con-
Errata. Everyone makes mistakes, includ- tributed to this, the fact remains that the glory of a
ing us, but we do our best to fix our errors. Up-
boisterous dictator never provides good reason to
to-date errata sheets for all GURPS releases,
die. In WWII, Italians did not find glory and con-
including this book, are available on our web-
quest, but shame, defeat, and tragic losses. Yet even
site – see below.
in tragedy, some of these soldiers showed that
Gamer input.We value your comments, for
honor, patriotism, and a sense of duty were still
new products as well as updated printings of
possible, and they chose to fight, not for the orders
existing titles!
they received, but for those few precious things in
Internet.Visit us on the World Wide Web at
which they could believe. Both the Allies and Axis
www.sjgames.comfor errata, updates, Q&A,
and much more. GURPS has its own Usenet would discover that it was risky to belittle Italians
group, too: rec.games.frp.gurps. who had just a little support and a proper cause.
GURPSnet. This e-mail list hosts much of From the unforgiving Sahara sandstorms to
the online discussion of GURPS. To join, the muddy Balkan trails, from the dark waters of
e-mail [email protected] with “subscribe the Mediterranean to the snow-filled trenches of
GURPSnet-L” in the body, or point your web Russia, this book guides the roleplayer who wants
browser to gurpsnet.sjgames.com. to relive the dark fate of these last, grim legions.
The GURPS WWII:Grim Legions web The following pages will provide history, atmos-
page is at www.sjgames.com/gurps/ww2/
phere, settings, and plenty of detail for any gaming
grimlegions/.
style featuring “Mussolini’s lions.” The book also
Page References offers useful information for Allied or German
campaigns in bloody Italy, or partisan adventures.
Rules and statistics in this book are specifi- So, tighten up your puttees and smooth the
cally for the GURPS Basic Set,Third Edition. feather in your cap, for a long march awaits . . .
Any page reference that begins with a B refers
tothe GURPS Basic Set–e.g., p. B102 means About the Author
p. 102 of the GURPS Basic Set,Third Edition.
Michele Armellini makes a living from for-
Page references that begin with CI indicate
eign languages, and in WWII he would probably
GURPS Compendium I.Other references are
have been more useful manning a dictionary than a
CIIto Compendium II,VE to Vehicles,Wto
mortar. Nevertheless, he’s a wargamer, roleplayer,
WWII,W:HS to WWII:Hand of Steel,W:IC
to WWII:Iron Cross, and W:RH to WWII: and WWII buff. Michele lives in Udine, Italy,with
Return to Honor. The abbreviation for this his understanding wife, Silvia, and although a
book is W:GL. For a full list of title abbrevia- native Italian, he has never eyed any other woman.
tions, see p. CI181 or visit the updated web list No, seriously.He has contributed to several previ-
at www.sjgames.com/gurps/abbrevs.html. ous GURPS and GURPS WWII playtests, and
written for Pyramid.
2 INTRODUCTION
“War is normality,peace is the exception.” performance, blundering diplomats, and general
–Benito Mussolini backwardness combined to ensure that Italians did
not wrest these prizes from their Entente compan-
Like other European nations, Italy entered the
ions in postwar negotiations. The Italians bitterly
Second World War encumbered by expectations
defined WWI as a “maimed victory.”
and scars inflicted in what was, for the Italians,
In addition, the government had promised its
the not-so-Great War.
troops peacetime rewards when they teetered on
On the Italian front, World War I may have
the brink of mutiny in the grim months of 1917-18.
seemed even a bit worse than in Gallipoli. The
The veterans counted on better working condi-
lines mostly ran through difficult terrain. On the
tions and sizable pensions for cripples and wid-
Isonzo river front, bloody trench warfare gave
ows. These prosaic expectations went largely
Italy small gains; among the Alpine peaks, sol-
unfulfilled, as well.
diers had to regress to the lifestyle of cavemen to
survive the winter snow. The Growing Costs
The balance was broken when the Central
Powers beat back the Russians and could afford This unsatisfying victory had cost the nation
the luxury of redeploying troops from the Eastern 650,000 casualties and twice its 1918 gross
Front to the Western and Italian. An infamous national product. Italy’s coffers were depleted,
breakthrough at Caporetto in October 1917 and what could be scraped together by tax hikes
allowed the Austrians to push almost to Venice. went to cover the deficit. The wealthier classes
The Italian commander, Gen. Luigi Cadorna, had subscribed to war bonds, so in the eyes of the
blamed his soldiers’cowardice for the defeat, and veterans, they were profiteering from the war.
remedied that perceived shortcoming with firing Italian industries scaled back to a reduced
squads. Eventually, the Piave river line stood, in peacetime output and laid workers off. Inflation,
no small part because the Austrians had exhaust- unemployment, and hardships weren’t as bad as
ed their supplies. in Germany,but the Italians had hoped their living
The Great War ended with a late Italian offen- conditions would grow better after the war, not
sive on a front that had seen more than its share of worse. The poorer classes grew restless. The
half-measures and clumsy leadership. Certainly, Socialist Party was an obvious outlet, but, having
for the Italians, it left no sense of having been an opposed the war,it was unpopular with veterans.
epic war to end all wars.
Times of Turmoil
In fact, the fighting had left more questions
than it had answered. The strikes and riots seemed a prologue to a
much-feared general insurrection, and the shaky
A Maimed Victory
parliamentary government would be a weak safe-
When WWI began in 1914, Austria-Hungary guard against that. In 1919, Gabriele D’Annunzio,
and Italy already had a tense relationship, because the showy “soldier poet,” led his “legionaries” to
the Austrians ruled over Italian-speaking regions Fiume. They were a rabble of disgruntled veterans,
in the Eastern Alps and Dalmatia. In acquiring troublemakers, and fanatical nationalists. Yet the
those lands as part of the winning Entente war Italian government did nothing to stop them for
effort, Italy achieved its main war objectives; how- quite a long time. The expedition failed, and dis-
ever, interventionists had hoped for more. They qualified D’Annunzio as a leader for a right-wing
felt the Italian sacrifices merited a slice of the for- movement, but it showed that the government was
mer German colonies, the Istrian city of Fiume, slow in reacting against such an organization, and
and influence in the Balkans. Italy’s lackluster war that nationalism was still popular.
ITALY AT WAR 3
masses, then unblinkingly meted out violence
C I
HAMELEON DEOLOGY against the left on behalf of his wealthy backers,
especially landowners.
All kinds of visitors came away from an Despite the violence and murder, the Fascists
interview with Mussolini under the impres- won no parliament seats in the 1919 elections.
sion that he shared some of their ideas. The Socialists won the most, which frightened the
Indeed, his ideology wasn’t cast in middle classes. Recognizing this, the famous
stone. First and foremost, Mussolini was statesman and extraordinary compromiser Gio-
faithful to himself. He always remained vanni Giolitti decided that he could tame and
vaguely fond of Socialistlike ideas, even as exploit the Fascists to form a right-wing coalition.
he became a champion of an aggressive New elections were called in 1921. Amidst redou-
nationalism, but his main aim was personal bled Fascist violence and police inertia, Mussoli-
power and popularity. To that end, he was ni obtained 35 seats, but he wasn’t interested in
willing to promise everything to everyone. being anyone’s junior partner.
Eventually, he’d let most of them down.
Bid for Power
Alliances, policies, and ideals were tempo-
rary means to gain the immediate oppor-
On Oct. 28, 1922, the Fascist squads marched
tunistic end, and while seeking short-term
toward Rome in an amateurish, chaotic, risky
advantages he seldom could pursue long-
gamble. Many officers sympathized with them,
term plans. The one exception was his
but the Army would have easily dispersed their
alliance with Hitler (p. 6).
mobs if King Victor Emmanuel III had ordered it.
The mainstays of his policy were tools
The weak, badly advised king did not. Instead, he
rather than purposes: a totalitarian regime,
invited Mussolini to form a government.
violence, censorship, and favoritism.
From then on, things were easy. Mussolini
Since he lacked a fanatical ideology and
gradually stripped power from every branch of the
feared that extreme measures would weaken
state. He initially fooled or cowed the parliament,
his popularity, Fascism never became as
and in the following years he reformed it into a
totalitarian as Nazism or Communism.
rubber-stamping body. He tamed both the bureau-
cracy and Fascist internal dissidents.
T S M Acrisis arose when Fascist hitmen murdered
HE TRONG AN
a popular Socialist leader, Giacomo Matteotti, in
By 1920, most Italians just wanted some pros- 1924, but Mussolini made it through, as he often
perity, and many thought no parliamentary charade did, thanks to a mix of oratory, threats, and prom-
would bring it. Just before WWI, a new player had ises. By 1925, he was solidly in the saddle.
come to the fore: Benito Mussolini. He had been a
The Italian New Deal
menial worker, a teacher, a journalist. Above all, he
was a power-hungry Socialist agitator. He left the In theory, the Fascist economy was neither
Socialists when he understood their leadership was capitalist nor collectivist; it was based on
not extremist enough, and too solidly entrenched. “guilds.” In the naïve idea that workers in a given
He also abandoned his previous anti-war stance, sector shared more interests with their employers
and in 1914 opened his own vociferous pro-war than other workers, the Corporazioni replaced
newspaper, Il Popolo d’Italia (“The Italian Peo- labor unions. This scarcely masked the advan-
ple”). Industrialists discreetly financed him. tages given to employers; by 1925, the consumer
As an army corporal, he was wounded in an had lost 8% of his purchasing power. Thereafter,
exercise, thus obtaining war-veteran status. In wage cuts repeatedly triggered further declines.
1919, he launched his own movement, later known While the state-controlled economy defended
as Fascism, from Fascioor “bundle,” a term evok- monopolies, from industrial cartels to shopown-
ing the Roman fasces,symbol of forceful authority ers, it also took measures for full employment.
and unity. It also highlighted the role of the indi- This eased the hardships until the 1929 world cri-
vidual as a faceless member of the collective. sis. Mussolini boldly faced this depression with
his own “new deal,” including huge public works,
Vets, Goons, and Landowners
bailouts for key industries, reclamation of
The party had no program: Mussolini recruit- swamps, and “battles” (p. 5). These initiatives,
ed everybody. He offered belligerent rhetoric to together with innovative social benefits for mater-
veterans and nationalists, his party’s backbone. nity and families introduced in these years, did
He made empty Socialistlike promises to the help the common Italian somewhat.
4 ITALY AT WAR
P S
OPULAR UPPORT
F A U
IRST MONG NEQUALS
By 1932, Italians had largely accepted,
Though the first one in power, Mussolini did not if not embraced, Fascism. The king kept
become history’s foremost Fascist. Hitler did. Partly, aloof, but did not encourage opposition.
this reflected that Germans responded to Fascism Some souls would mutter about corrupt
with more vigor than Italians, but it also had to do officials, or laugh about the most boisterous
with Mussolini spending much of his energy on ones, and intellectuals would get some lee-
overindulgence. As a young man, he had liked to way in their magazines, but that was all.
argue, brawl, drink, and womanize. He had stabbed The small opposition was fragmented.
both a schoolmate and a lover, raped a girl and boast- Those that did stand up soon encountered
ed about it. As a ruler, he remained as distractible as the OVRApolitical police. The OVRAusu-
Hitler was single-minded, and once in power he con- ally silenced, imprisoned, or exiled dissi-
tinued to spend hours on newspapers, apparently for- dents – rather than butcher them – but its
getting that the Italian ones wrote what he wanted. relative discretion made it no less effective.
Although married, he established a relationship The approval of many Italians, howev-
with Claretta Petacci, who became an unofficial er, was based on the assumption that all of
“Second Lady” by 1936, but he frequently had other Mussolini’s pugnacious boasts were just
hurried encounters in his office. Many Italian blather. Meanwhile, il Duce was looking
women adored him, and quite a few proved it. ahead, and abroad.
Mussolini had no friends. After his brother’s
A W E
death, he became a loner,distrusting even his oldest ARLIKE MPIRE
comrades. He may have even begun to believe his
own propaganda; an intelligent Fascist official once “Italians must be kept standing up by
remarked, “He’sbecome the statue of himself.” kicking them in their shins.”
The one man he gradually and grudgingly admit- –Benito Mussolini
ted was on par with him was Hitler. Initially, Hitler Dictators needenemies, to justify their
was an intimidated, admiring disciple of Mussolini power, and Mussolini craved prestige and
(who kept aloof). After 1933, the Führer became glory. Nothing would have kept Italy out of
more confident, but Mussolini still thought he was conflict for long.
more clever,and did not like nor trust the Germans.
A Brand-New Colony
By 1938, the Duceenvied and feared Hitler.
Abyssinia, the last independent African
A Cinecittà Façade state of any size, lay between Italian and
British colonies, with unclear borders. Conquer-
At his core, Mussolini remained a propagan- ing it would give glory to the Duce,an empire to
dist, more interested in headlines than actual facts. Italy, and some belligerence to the Italians. Mus-
He wanted to look like a superman. Thus, he often solini believed that he needed all three.
took in his own hands four or five key ministries The French and British hoped Mussolini
at once. This meant actually leaving in charge would help contain Hitler. In exchange, at the
undersecretaries that were often overwhelmed, Stresa talks, they reluctantly gave him an unspo-
since he preferred yes men to clever men. ken go-ahead in Africa. He declared war against
He also thought that solving economic prob- Abyssinia in December 1934, and attacked after a
lems was a matter of will. He launched “battles,” or 10-month buildup. The advance was slow, though
grand public-relations campaigns, for grain pro- the Italians used artillery, tankettes, flamethrow-
duction, against fly infestations, for independence ers, aircraft, and even poison gas against an
from imports. They were great successes, on paper. enemy relying upon harsh terrain, spears, and old
The overall result was a deep divide between rifles. Finally, on May 5, 1936, Addis Ababa was
appearance and reality. Under Mussolini, trains taken. Tribal leaders resorted to guerrilla tactics,
were on time and desperation was rare; in fact, and the Italians to ruthless reprisals and even
Italians never read about delays or suicides. As to more gas bombs, because victory had been cele-
the armed forces, Italian aviators posted flight brated and the “rebels” were an embarrassment.
records, the navy displayed itself on long cruises, The last outburst was a hand-grenade attack
and the army put on showy parades. on the viceroy, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. He sur-
Everything certainly looked impressive in the vived, with some 200 shrapnel wounds, and
newsreels, but it all would come crashing down to ordered indiscriminate reprisals even as his char-
reality with the war. acter took on a new, overcautious nature (p. 8).
ITALY AT WAR 5
The League of Nations could not protect the bad weather, the Italian “fast war” doctrine
Abyssinia, in part because of Great Britain and (p. 15) – and the Fascist forces in general – were
France’s lack of enthusiasm. Trade sanctions were exposed as vulnerable. Mussolini desperately
enforced, but not on oil, which would have wanted to give just the opposite impression, so he
stopped the Italian army at once. Many Italians made his troops press on. By mid-1937, the reor-
concluded that the League had bark, but no bite. ganized Italian corps achieved some success, tak-
Although short-lived, the League sanctions ing Santander. The war dragged on, with
did damage Italy’s economy (p. 14). Regardless, Mussolini uselessly trying to force a faster pace
the Italians thought that they had beaten the rich on a stubborn Franco, until early 1939.
colonial powers that would deny Italy “a place in Some 75,000 Italians served in Spain, but the
the sun.” Mussolini’s image abroad became tar- military did not take away the lessons that the Ger-
nished, but his popularity in Italy peaked. mans did. The troops, experienced but war-weary,
By shifting Italy’s military might to Africa, were not kept together. Given the economic cost,
Mussolini had lost any chance of bullying Austria loss in military prestige, and Franco’s ingratitude,
into becoming a friendly buffer state, a policy he the Spanish Civil War was an utter loss for Italy.
had considered until 1934. Realizing that Ger-
Balkan Bridgehead
many would fill the void, he decided to befriend
what would shortly become his new neighbor. Meanwhile, Hitler’s troops entered Austria.
With gritted teeth, Mussolini expressed satisfac-
tion. In the crisis of Munich, he posed as a peace-
maker, but that was not the role he coveted. He
envied Hitler’sstature as a fearsome warlord.
Ciano suggested that Italy could stage its own
conquest in Albania, a modest country of shep-
herds and already a virtual Italian protectorate. On
April 7, 1939, token Italian forces landed in Dur-
res; the equally token Albanian militia held its fire.
The European powers did not react to Italy’scon-
quest of its own satellite, but this Balkan bridge-
head worried neighboring states, with reason.
Sharing With a Lion
Since 1935, Mussolini had been narrowing his
options as to Italy’salliances. Until early 1937, the
British remained amicable, since they didn’t want
to stir up trouble in the Mediterranean. Then con-
Fascism for Export
tact between Italian and German officials intensi-
Mussolini became more interested in foreign fied. Germany had ignored the sanctions against
affairs, fancying himself the leader of an interna- Italy, and the two were accomplices in fooling the
tional Fascist movement, a Comintern counter- Non-Intervention Committee trying to curb foreign
part. By 1936, Italy was the paymaster of Fascist meddling in Spain. In November 1937, Italy joined
agents, right-wing agitators, and outright crimi- the Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany and Japan.
nals in France, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. On an impulse, Mussolini agreed to a further
Spain seemed another good setting for this military alliance. On May 22, 1939, the Steel Pact
Fascist revolution in July 1936. Galeazzo Ciano, was signed. Ciano called it “dynamite,” as in
the new foreign minister,convinced his father-in- explosively risky, because the terms (under most
law that Fascism had to help the Spanish national- interpretations)required the nations to aid each
ist generals (see p. W10). Mussolini agreed to send other even if one startedawar. (Most such treaties
aid, which proved crucial in transporting National- only demand aid for parties defendingthemselves.)
ist troops from Africa. By December, Mussolini Ciano also had wanted a clause stating that both
decided he could make the most of this war by parties would seek peace until 1942. This was not
sending whole fighting units of the Blackshirts to be; Hitler already was planning to invade Poland
(p. 18), who were passed off as “volunteers.” and to violate the pact’s mandate that both nations
The Italians won at Malaga, then were consult the other before military action.
pushed back at Guadalajara in March 1937, where Ciano, who thought that he was smarter than
their offensive against Madrid bloodily failed. In the Germans, had been fooled by them.
6 ITALY AT WAR
THE GREAT BLUNDER
“I intend to declare war,not to wage it.” The French surrender to Germany put an end
–Benito Mussolini to this underhanded campaign. Hitler wanted to
woo Vichy France, and Italy had little negotiating
As Hitler began WWII, Mussolini agonized
power, so the Italian demands – Nice, Djibouti,
over what to do. He wanted to go to war as a mat-
and Tunis – were dismissed.
ter of prestige, but Italy was in no shape for a pro-
longed fight. Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the chief A F E P
INGER IN VERY IE
of staff, had informed him that, upon mobiliza-
tion, the army wouldn’t have enough shirts, not to
Entering the war for the “opportunity” it pre-
mention rifles. As to key raw materials, the situa-
sented, Mussolini found himself casting about for
tion was already critical (see box).
victims. By July 1940, he had 37 divisions idling in
As the Wehrmacht sewed up Poland and
northeastern Italy, waiting for the Yugoslavs to
turned toward France in 1940, the consummate
offer an excuse. As with France, the pies into which
opportunist devised a neat solution: a short war. If
Mussolini stuck his fingers contained mousetraps.
his intervention was carefully timed, the Germans
When Britain refused to yield, the Ducebelatedly
would bear the brunt of the fighting, while he’d
sent 200 warplanes to aid in the ill-fated Battle of
still get spoils and glory. Rebuffed prior to Poland,
Britain (see p. W17). Meanwhile in Africa, he
Hitler renewed his requests for Italian aid with
wanted “advances” before the British quit.
France, but Mussolini stalled. Meanwhile, like his
colleague, he didn’t want to upset the citizenry Embroiled in Africa
with shortages of consumer goods, but business as
If his Libyan generals had any reservations
usual meant only modest preparations for war.
about the wisdom of focusing on territorial gains
The rapid panzer strikes of May surprised
in a desert, instead of destroying the enemy, they
everybody, including the Duce. He had expected
had even more pressing problems with which to
(and secretly hoped) that the French would prove
contend. Their corps could barely muster enough
far tougher than the Poles. The overwhelming
trucks to move one of their “transportable” divi-
German success meant that he had to move fast,
sions at a time. Anti-tank guns and ammo were in
while an exultant Hitler began telling his now-
short supply, and training was poor. Also, anxious
unnecessary partner that he should wait.
intelligence estimates inflated the size of the
Italy had no reasonable cause for war against
British 60,000-man force.
France and Britain; its claims on Corsica, Nice,
Malta, and some African lands were sheer expan-
R E
sionism. Yet, in those heady days, the war wasn’t UNNING ON MPTY
completely unpopular. Italians believed Mussoli-
By the time that Italy entered WWII
ni’s propaganda, and Hitler had shown that war
proper,Mussolini had already wasted much
could be waged at lightning speed, with the boys
of his ammo. The money spent in Abyssinia
returning home before they were missed. Jumping
could have modernized some 70 infantry
on the winning bandwagon seemed attractive.
divisions, instead. The ensuing trade sanc-
On May 29, Mussolini announced his deci-
tions, though brief and spotty, created a
sion to his generals. Italy would declare war with-
scarcity of steel, rubber, and above all oil.
out any serious preparation, but the war would be
Involvement in Spain further squan-
short. It was his great blunder.
dered assets. Though Franco received most-
Stab in the Alpine Back ly obsolete arms, the Italian navy burned tons
of fuel in a surreptitious blockade. Albania
No attack plans against France were ready.
wasted even more funds. Ashortage of hard
An army group scrambled from a defensive
currency pressed Italy into selling arms,
deployment to an all-out attack. The short battles
some to nations that would soon be foes.
took place in the difficult and heavily fortified
Finally, the hasty declaration of war
Alps, except for a coastal thrust that took Menton.
meant that 212 merchant ships – the largest
French morale did not collapse as expected, nor
and the best in Italy’sfleet – were seized in
did the Italian binary divisions (p. 15) operate
enemy ports or blockaded in neutral ones.
according to plan. In these and many other ways,
Later on, just a couple more tankers would
the bravely fighting troops paid the price for all
have made a difference for Rommel.
the hard realities that Mussolini had shrugged off.
ITALY AT WAR 7
The British were largely motorized, profes- and desperately thrown into the fray. The lack of
sional, and partly trained for desert and mobile tac- good ports strangled reinforcements and supplies,
tics. They easily outflanked static Italian garrisons so that some battalions were airlifted alone with-
and blunted the Italian drive. Libya’s energetic out heavy weapons and immediately put into
governor, Italo Balbo (p. 17), demanded trucks action. Having made some veiled warnings about
and ATguns before “friendly fire” killed him. The this outcome, Badoglio declined responsibility for
grenade-scarred Marshal Graziani replaced him, the disaster even as he resigned. A rival of his,
then repeatedly postponed the offensive, asking Gen. Ugo Cavallero, replaced him.
for trucks (uselessly idled at the Yugoslav border) The Greeks kept attacking until January 1941.
and planes (wasted over the English Channel), They forced several critical withdrawals, taking
until a fuming Mussolini threatened his dismissal. villages and ridges, and achieved a final bloody
Graziani’s mid-September advance masterful- stalemate in the valleys of Tepeleni and Klisura. In
ly made do. Five divisions moved in countless ago- February, the front was stabilized. Beginning
nizingly slow columns, allowing the enemy to March 9, Cavallero mounted a new offensive, a
withdraw to Mersa Matruh. Sidi Barrani was taken, frontal headbutt against the strongest Greek posi-
but the exhausted troops had marched 70 miles on tions. A disgruntled Duce witnessed this bloody
a paltry water ration, and the supply system was failure. The fiasco came to an end with the Ger-
near collapse. The new legions had to stop. man intervention in April 1941 (see pp. W18-19).
In Italian East Africa, similar advances took
C B
place. The geography made logistics just as trou- ALLING THE LUFF
blesome there, and the generals failed to attempt
Mussolini had bluffed. If it was too late for
any decisive thrust other than the costly invasion
the French to raise the ante, Churchill still had
of British Somaliland in August. Instead, they
chips on the table. The British attack at Taranto
launched limited strikes, and tried to defend all
(p. 45) came as a shock for the Italians, but far
the Italian-held lands, while the British sponsored
worse was still to come.
native uprisings, ensured fuel shortages with their
command of the sea, and built up troops. Surrendering in Droves
The Greek Fiasco
While the Italians busied themselves building
a pipeline in North Africa, the British launched
By August 1940, Mussolini longed for a
what was initially a spoiling attack Dec. 9. Their
lightning campaign. Yugoslavia was moved to the
thick-skinned Matilda II tanks easily overran
back burner, but Greece seemed easy prey. Its dic-
Graziani’s 150,000 foot soldiers, who occupied
tator, Metaxás, was virtually a Fascist, though the
poorly fortified camps too far apart to support one
court was pro-British. Mussolini, however, wasn’t
another and at the end of fragile supply lines.
interested in a friendly neutral; he wanted a weak
The Italian officers reacted too slowly, order-
enemy. Ciano also made this his new pet project.
ing units in hopeless spots to stand their ground,
Propaganda and provocations were orches-
then demanding lengthy retreats when it was too
trated. These failed to motivate the Italians, but
late. The British annihilated the Libyan and
warned the Greeks, who quietly mobilized. The
Blackshirt divisions in this confusion.
last straw was Hitler’s surprise “military mission”
In January 1941, the Australians attacked the
(consisting of several divisions) to Romania.
demoralized garrisons in Bardia, then Tobruk. By
Mussolini thought that the Balkans were his pre-
month’s end, both had surrendered. The Italians
serve. He decided to move forward and let Hitler
fell back to the Derna-Mechili area, where a rag-
learn about it from the newspapers.
tag collection of untested armor and men blunted
Yet again, the Italians rushed into an ill-
the British advance on the 24th. The skittish
planned attack. Some 300,000 reasonably well-
Graziani ordered a general withdrawal, while the
trained men had just been demobilized, and
British took a risky shortcut through trackless ter-
nobody worried about a bottleneck at the small
rain and cut around the Italian positions with
Albanian seaports as the offensive began Oct. 28.
some 50 armored vehicles. The ensuing Italian
Eight of the nine divisions in Albania attacked on
retreat became a hopeless muddle, with the few
awide front against an alert opposition.
combat-worthy units mixed with stragglers and
By Nov. 10, the Greeks were counterattack-
civilians. The small British flanking force with-
ing, nearly encircling the thinly spread Julia
stood the piecemeal breakthrough attempts at
alpine division. By December, the Italians were
Beda Fomm. The survivors surrendered. The Ital-
outnumbered 2-to-1 and withdrawing into Alba-
ians had lost some 140,000 men and huge
nia, while raw battalions were scraped together
amounts of materiel in the rout.
8 ITALY AT WAR
