Gulf War Air Power Survey - Air Force Historical Studies Division

537 Pages·2004·23.26 MB·English

Gulf War
Air Power Survey
Volume IV
Weapons, Tactics, and Training
and
Space Operations
Washington, D. C.
1993
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gulf War Air Power Survey
p. cm.
Gulf War Air Power Survey directed by Eliot A. Cohen.
Includes an unnumbered summary report by Thomas A. Keaney and
Eliot A. Cohen.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. Planning and Command and Control -- v. 2. Operations and
Effects and Effectiveness -- v. 3. Logistics and Support -- v.4. Weapons, Tactics,
and Training and Space Operations -- v. 5. A Statistical Compendium and Chronology.
1. Persian Gulf War, 1991--Aerial operations. American. 2. United States.
Air Force--History--Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Cohen, Eliot A. 11. Gulf War Air
Power Survey (Organization : U.S.). 111. United States. Dept. of the Air Force.
IV. Title: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report.
DS79.724.U6G85 1993
956.7044’248--d~20 93-30601
CIP
For sale by the US. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
ISBN 0-16-042927-7
Gulf War Air Power Survey
Staff
Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director
Col. Emery M. Kiraly Executive Director
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley Senior Military Advisor
(Retired, USAF)
Dr. Wayne W. Thompson Senior Historical Advisor
Mr. Ernest D. Cruea ANSER Program Manager
Maj. Joseph W. Patterson Executive Oficer
Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek Publishing Manager
Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl Chiej Statistics
Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen Chief, Chronology
Dr. John F. Guilmartin ChieJ Weapons, Tactics
and Training
Mr. Richard A. Gunkel Chiej Logistics, Space,
and Support
Dr. Thomas C. Hone Chiej Command, Control,
and Organization
Dr. Alexander S. Cochran Chiej Strategy and
Plans
Mr. Barry D. Watts Chiej Operations and
Efsects
Dr. Thomas A. Keaney Chiej Summary Report
iii
Gulf War Air Power Survey
Review Committee
Hon. Paul H. Nitze, Chairman
Diplomat in Residence
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Gen. Michael J. Dugan (USAF, Retired)
Multiple Sclerosis Society
Adm. Huntington Hardisty (USN, Retired)
Center for Naval Analyses
Dr. Richard H. Kohn
The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill
Dr. Bernard Lewis
Princeton University
Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Mr. Phillip Merrill
Former Assistant Secretary General
for Defense Support, NATO
Dr. Henry Rowen
Stanford University
Hon. Ike Skelton
U.S. House of Representatives
Gen. Maxwell Thurrnan (USA, Retired)
Association of the U.S. Army
Maj. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr. (USAF, Retired)
Former Assistant Chief of Staff (Studies
and Analysis)
Dr. James Q. Wilson
University of California at Los Angeles
iv
Foreword
From 16 January through 28 February 1991, the United States and
its allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in
history, a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role.
The Gulf War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991
to review all aspects of air warfare in the Persian Gulf for use by the
United States Air Force, but it was not to confine itself to discussion of
that institution. The Survey has produced reports on planning, the
conduct of operations, the effects of the air campaign, command and
control, logistics, air base support, space, weapons and tactics, as well
as a chronology and a compendium of statistics on the war. It has
prepared as well a summary report and some shorter papers and as-
sembled an archive composed of paper, microfilm, and electronic re-
cords, all of which have been deposited at the Air Force Historical
Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Survey
was just that, an attempt to provide a comprehensive and documented
account of the war. It is not a definitive history: that will await the
passage of time and the opening of sources (Iraqi records, for example)
that were not available to Survey researchers. Nor is it a summary of
lessons learned: other organizations, including many within the Air
Force have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides an analytical
and evidentiary point of departure for future studies of the air campaign.
It concentrates on an analysis of the operational level of war in the belief
that this level of warfare is at once one of the most difficult to character-
ize and one of the most important to understand.
The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by
a mixture of civilian and military analysts, including retired officers from
the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was divided into task forces,
most of which were run by civilians working temporarily for the Air
Force. The work produced by the Survey was examined by a distin-
guished review committee, that included scholars, retired general officers
from the Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and current
senior government officials, Throughout, the Survey strived to conduct
its research in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members
had as their standard the observation of Mr. Franklin D’Olier, chairman
of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the
second World War: “We wanted to burn into everybody’s souls that fact
that the survey’s responsibility . . . was to ascertain facts and to seek
truth, eliminating completely any preconceived theories or dogmas.”
V
The Survey attempted to create a body of data common to all of the
reports. Because one group of researchers compiled this core material
while other task forces were researching and drafting other, more nar-
rowly focused studies, it is possible that discrepancies exist among the
reports with regard to points of detail. More importantly, authors were
given discretion, within the bounds of evidence and plausibility, to inter-
pret events as they saw them. In some cases, task forces came to differ-
ing conclusions about particular aspects of this war. Such divergences
of view were expected and even desired: the Survey was intended to
serve as a point of departure for those who read its reports, and not their
analytical terminus.
In the classified version, this volume consists of two reports:
Weapons, Tactics, and Training, which focuses on Coalition as well as
Iraqi air forces and Iraqi surface-based air defenses in the Gulf War, and
Space Operations, which examines the use of space systems, mobilization
of equipment for space operations, and the role of commercial space
systems within a military context. However, because the Space report
contains such an excessive amount of classified detail that the balance
would be incomprehensible, the report is not published in the unclassified
volume.
vi
Acknowledgments
The Survey’s members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary of
the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the project, provided it
with resources, and set for it the highest standards of independence and
objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave generously of their
resources and time to support this effort. Various branches and com-
mands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in providing material for
and, in some cases, personnel to conduct the study. The United States
Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study in different ways,
including the sharing of data pertaining to the air war. A number of the
United States’ Coalition partners also made available individuals and
records that were vital to the Survey’s work. Many participants in the
war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Servic-
es were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Private students of the Gulf War also
made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever
possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the
text.
The Survey’s independence was its reason for being. Each report is
the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily represent
the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force or the Department of
Defense.
vii
Security Review
The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were
submitted to the Department of Defense for policy
and security review. In accordance with this re-
view, certain information has been removed from
the original text. These areas have been annotated
as [DELETED].
viii
Gulf War Air Power Survey
Reports
Summary Report
Volume I:
Part I: Planning Report
Part 11: Command and Control Report
Volume 11:
Part I: Operations Report
Part 11: Effectiveness Report
Volume 111:
Part I: Logistics Report
Part 11: Support Report
Volume IV:
Part I: Weapons, Tactics,
and Training Report
Part 11: Space Report
Volume V
Part I: A Statistical Compendium
Part 11: Chronology
ix