Table Of ContentGovernance in Nunavut: Capacity vs. Culture?
Graham White
Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes, Volume
43, Number 2, Spring 2009, pp. 57-81 (Article)
Published by University of Toronto Press
For additional information about this article
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jcs/summary/v043/43.2.white.html
Access Provided by York University at 10/16/11 8:42PM GMT
JJoouurrnnaall ooff CCaannaaddiiaann SSttuuddiieess •• RReevvuuee dd’’ééttuuddeess ccaannaaddiieennnneess
Governance in Nunavut: Capacity vs. Culture?
Graham White
A key objective of Inuit political leaders in pushing for the creation of a Nunavut Territory
was the establishment of a governance regime that would not only be numerically control-
led by Inuit, but would also in a real sense be an Inuit government. Among other things, this
would entail developing institutions and processes congruent with Inuit culture and values,
and ensuring that the new regime did not “duplicate Yellowknife”—that is, simply replicate
the structures, processes, and attitudes that characterized the Government of the Northwest
Territories prior to division. This essay assesses the governance regime in Nunavut against
these objectives. Specific attention will be devoted to the basic structure and operation
of the Government of Nunavut, including its decentralization initiative and its efforts to
achieve high rates of Inuit participation in the public service; the political-governmental
role of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the Inuit land-claim organization; the activities
of the co-management and regulatory boards established under the Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement; and municipal government.
Un des objectifs clés des leaders politiques inuits concernant la création du territoire de
Nunavut était l’établissement d’un régime de gouvernance qui ne serait pas seulement
contrôlé du point de vue numérique par les Inuits mais serait également dans un sens réel
un gouvernement inuit. Notamment, ceci comprendrait la mise sur pied d’institutions
et de processus qui sont en harmonie avec la culture et les valeurs inuites ainsi que
l’assurance que le nouveau régime n’est pas un « calque de Yellowknife » – c’est-à-dire qu’il
n’est pas simplement une reproduction des structures, des processus et des attitudes qui
ont caractérisé le gouvernement des Territoires du Nord-Ouest avant la division. Le présent
article évalue le régime de gouvernance de Nunavut d’après ces objectifs. On examine plus
particulièrement la structure et le fonctionnement de base du gouvernement de Nunavut,
y compris l’initiative de décentralisation et ses efforts pour essayer d’obtenir des taux
élevés de participation inuite dans la fonction publique; le rôle politique-gouvernemental
de Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated – l’organisme axé sur les revendications territoriales
inuites; les activités des conseils de gestion conjointe et de réglementation établis en vertu
de l’Accord sur les revendications territoriales du Nunavut; et le gouvernement municipal.
Volume 43 • No. 2 • (Printemps 2009 Spring) 57
Graham White
The speeches delivered at the opening of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly
on 1 April 1999 reflected excitement, optimism, and not a little trepida-
tion at the daunting tasks facing the new territory and those charged with
governing it. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien noted, “Whether it is educating your
fast growing population, alleviating poverty and social breakdown or building the
capacity within your own government to address these challenges, you have your
work cut out for you” (Nunavut Legislative Assembly 1999, 4). Capacity was—and
remains—a critical issue in Nunavut governance. What the prime minister did not
mention, however, was that capacity building in Nunavut is especially difficult
by virtue of the cultural context. Not only was there much work to be done, but
Nunavummiut (the people of Nunavut) expected it to be done in particular, cul-
turally determined ways. Often how a government does what it does is as import-
ant as what it does: “Inuit governance,” it has been said, “is not necessarily about
content, but style” (Price 2007, 96).
Certainly many in Nunavut thought along these lines. A central goal of Inuit
leaders in pushing for a land claim and a Nunavut territory was the establishment
of a government that would not only be numerically dominated by Inuit but
would also operate by Inuit cultural principles. As one academic put it, “the hope
with Nunavut was that the problems which Aboriginal people experienced ... [in
the Northwest Territories] would not be repeated because the objective of creating
a representative public service which respected Inuit values would be present from
the outset of the new territorial government” (Timpson 2006, 519). But just what
would a truly Inuit government look like? How would it be built?
Capacity and culture, and their interplay, loom as perhaps the most crucial
issues facing Nunavut as it enters its second decade. This essay offers a broad
review of governance in Nunavut, focussing on the Government of Nunavut, and
addresses three intertwined questions: 1) how effectively has the Government of
Nunavut dealt with its capacity problems? 2) How successful has been the attempt
to build a truly Inuit government? 3) Is the unquestioned need to build and main-
tain governance capacity compatible with the objective of developing an Inuit
government? Nunavut being very much a work in progress, these questions can-
not be answered with any finality.
The essay is organized as follows. The first section sketches out the govern-
ance regime in Nunavut, touching briefly on the land claim and the federal gov-
ernment; Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI), the principal Inuit land-claim
organization; local government; and claims boards. Following this is an overview
of the Government of Nunavut, concentrating on its administrative features. The
next section looks directly at the question of the territorial government’s capacity,
with principal attention devoted to its bureaucratic apparatus. A final section
examines the question of imbuing the Nunavut government with Inuit values.
58
Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes
The Governance Regime in Nunavut
Though the analysis gives pride of place to the Government of Nunavut, it is
essential to map out the web of institutions that comprise the territory’s gov-
ernance regime. For a numerically small jurisdiction, governance in Nunavut is
remarkably complex, encompassing not only the territorial, but also the federal
government, an extraordinarily powerful Aboriginal government, a set of consti-
tutionally protected co-management boards dealing with wildlife and environ-
mental regulation, and a full array of local community governments, all operating
within the framework of the extensive governance provisions of a comprehensive
land-claim agreement.
The Claim and the Federal Government
The Territory of Nunavut and its government came into existence on 1 April 1999
in fulfilment of a political accord coming out of the Nunavut Land Claims Agree-
ment (NLCA), signed in 1993 between the Government of Canada, the Govern-
ment of the Northwest Territories and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, the
organization representing Inuit of the Eastern Arctic.1 The NLCA, like other com-
prehensive land-claims agreements, enjoys constitutional status under section 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982. It sets the framework for governance throughout
Nunavut, directing and constraining not only the territorial government, but
also the federal government and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the succes-
sor to the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut. Though the Government of Nunavut
is a “public” government, in that all residents—Inuit and Qallunaat (non-Inuit)
alike—are entitled to vote, hold office, and receive services, the land claim defines
the relationship between the Inuit of Nunavut and the Canadian state, and serves
as the touchstone for many governance issues.
In no other jurisdiction (save perhaps the National Capital Region) does the
influence of the federal government loom so large. As discussed below, not only
does the Nunavut government depend almost entirely on the federal govern-
ment for its finances, but Ottawa retains various powers that “south of 60” fall
under provincial jurisdiction, most notably over Crown land and non-renewable
resources. Simply put, the federal government remains a powerful player in Nuna-
vut. Many federal departments are active in the North, but Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada, as the lead department, is by far the most influential.
59
Graham White
Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated
It is scarcely possible to overestimate the role played in Nunavut governance by
the Inuit land-claim organization, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) and
the three regional Inuit associations: the Kitikmeot, Kivalliq, and Qikiqtani Inuit
associations. In no other province or territory does an Aboriginal organization
or government play nearly as integral a role in governance as do NTI and the
regional associations, which the claim recognizes as representing all Nunavut
Inuit—the “beneficiaries” of the claim.2 With its president and vice-presidents
elected by direct vote of all beneficiaries 16 and over, NTI enjoys a very broad
political constituency and legitimacy.
NTI has by a wide margin the largest staff complement of any Canadian land-
claims organization, with roughly 100 direct employees (the regional associations
have their own staffs), more than 80% of whom are Inuit.3 NTI’s headquarters
are in Iqaluit, but it also maintains offices in Cambridge Bay, Rankin Inlet, and
Ottawa. The lion’s share of NTI funding comes from the Nunavut Trust, which
invests and manages the money received through the claim. In the 2006-2007
fiscal year, NTI’s operating expenses amounted to roughly $23 million; it also
transferred $15.2 million to the regional associations (NTI 2007a, 72).
The claim assigns a number of formal governance functions, such as
appointing or nominating members of the co-management boards, to NTI and
the regional associations. NTI is also responsible for ensuring that Inuit rights
under the claim are respected and enforced. This entails close co-operation with
the Nunavut government and with Ottawa on any number of wildlife, economic
development, training, and other issues; but it can also take the form of vigorous
confrontation. NTI is not the least reluctant to engage in tough-minded public
criticism of government as evidenced in its recent attack on the territorial gov-
ernment for failing to make adequate progress on incorporating Inuit culture
and language into the education system (see below). It is also prepared to launch
eye-popping legal action, such as a billion-dollar lawsuit against the federal gov-
ernment over failing to implement key provisions of the NLCA, especially but
not exclusively the provision of adequate funding for Ottawa’s employment and
training commitments under Article 23 (NTI 2006).
NTI could in important ways be characterized as an Inuit government.
Among its manifold activities are programs to promote Inuit culture, to deliver
employment training (usually in partnership with government), to provide finan-
cial assistance to hunters, and to foster economic development—the latter includ-
ing a controversial policy to permit uranium mining on Inuit-owned lands. It
also performs social welfare functions, such as funding annual payments to all
Inuit elders and subsidizing beneficiaries who need to travel for urgent personal
60
Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes
reasons, such as attending funerals, but cannot afford the staggeringly expensive
air fares common across Nunavut. NTI is deeply involved in the development and
implementation of important Nunavut government policies, from education and
health care to wildlife management. It also serves as an advocate for Inuit interests
in federal policy issues, such as the compensation and treatment of residential
school survivors.
For all this, NTI is not, nor does it see itself as, anything like a government
parallel to the Government of Nunavut. It is, however, involved in far more key
aspects of the territorial government’s work and wields far more influence than
any mere interest group in southern Canada, as might be expected in an organiza-
tion that can legitimately claim to speak on behalf of 85% of the territory’s resi-
dents. Tellingly, one of the Nunavut government’s first initiatives was negotiating
with NTI a formal covenant, The Clyde River Protocol, setting out the principles
of their relationship and their responsibilities to one another. Early in the Nuna-
vut government’s second administration, NTI and the territory signed a follow-
up document outlining common objectives and processes for addressing them.
According to Iqqanaijaqatigiit, as this agreement is called,
The GN [Government of Nunavut] recognizes that NTI occupies a special
place in the affairs of Nunavut as the primary Inuit organization with the
mandate to speak for the Inuit of Nunavut with respect to the rights and
benefits of Inuit under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. The GN fur-
ther acknowledges that NTI’s mandate embraces additional responsibilities
designed to protect and promote the interests of the Inuit as an aboriginal
people. (NTI and Nunavut 2004, 1)
In addition to extensive day-to-day interaction between the government and NTI
operational staff, NTI’s chief executive officer meets regularly—usually weekly—
with senior territorial officials (NTI 2007, 27). To be sure, the government does
not always accede to NTI’s exhortations, nor does NTI hesitate to take the ter-
ritorial government to task for its perceived failings. Overall, though, the rela-
tionship is respectful and productive. It is most certainly a relationship unique
within Canada.4
Local Government and Governance Institutions
Given the centrality of community life, as well as the Inuit preference for immedi-
ate rather than distant governance, it is not surprising that community-level issues
are critically important in Nunavut. The structures, responsibilities, and processes
of municipal government in Nunavut were inherited from the Northwest Territor-
ies (NWT) regime and have changed little since 1999. Organized on the familiar
61
Graham White
mayor-and-council model, municipal governments in Nunavut typically exercise
only limited powers (over water, sewage, animal control, and the like) and, save in
the very largest centres, have virtually no own-source revenue. Important as they
may be symbolically, they are highly subservient to the territorial government.
Other local organizations carry significant clout within restricted realms, most
notably the local housing authorities, which manage the local public housing
stocks owned by the Nunavut Housing Corporation, and the hunters’ and trap-
pers’ organizations, which are tied into the regional wildlife organizations and
which render decisions on such matters as harvest quotas and hunting practices.
Local government in Nunavut is nowhere near as complicated as in Yukon
and the NWT. In significant measure, this reflects the fact that Inuit were never
subject to the federal Indian Act, so that Nunavut never had reserves, bands, or
band councils; nor, since Inuit in Nunavut have no equivalent to the Métis, do
Métis locals exist. As well, the public government model underpinning the Gov-
ernment of Nunavut extends to municipal government; unlike elsewhere in the
North, the Nunavut claim makes no provision for any form of Aboriginal self-
government. Accordingly, the highly variable mix of public municipal govern-
ment, band councils, Métis locals, and self-governing First Nations that renders
local government in the NWT and Yukon so complex is not found in Nunavut
(White 2007).
Claims Boards
That they are mentioned only in passing here should not be taken to mean that
the “Institutions of Public Government,” the co-management and regulatory
boards established under the claim, lack importance. The key Institutions of Pub-
lic Government, such as the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board, the Nunavut
Water Board, and the Nunavut Impact Review Board, exercise major governmental
functions in the areas of wildlife management and environmental protection.
These bodies, whose members are nominated or appointed by the Government
of Nunavut, the federal government, and NTI (or the regional associations) exist
independent of government, and while in most instances technically their powers
are advisory only, in reality their recommendations usually carry the day (White
2002, 2008).
62
Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes
The Government of Nunavut
The Basic Design
From its first day, the Government of Nunavut has struggled with capacity issues
and with the task of imbuing its operations with Inuit values and culture. At least
it was not also faced with the challenge of making a new and untried organiza-
tional structure work. The basic design of the territorial government, developed
by the Nunavut Implementation Commission, was quite conventional.5 As Chief
Commissioner John Amagoalik recalled, the commission put a high premium on
ensuring that basic government operations would continue to function effect-
ively after division:
We did not want to introduce anything that people did not really under-
stand. We did not want to try to re-invent the wheel … we did not want to
tinker too much with existing institutions, but we also made sure that if the
people who came into the government wanted to change things, that they
had an opportunity to do that as well. (Amagoalik 2007, 128)
Accordingly, the basic structure of the territorial government looks very familiar
to anyone acquainted with Canadian government organization at the national,
provincial, and territorial levels. A set of “line” departments (Education, Health
and Social Services, and the like) that deliver services to the public are co-ordinated
and controlled by a few small “central agencies” (the Department of Executive
and Intergovernmental Affairs, the Department of Finance, and the Department
of Human Resources). Each department is overseen and directed at the political
level by an elected minister supported by a rigidly hierarchical administrative
apparatus headed by an appointed deputy minister and one or more assistant
deputy ministers. Scale considerations lay behind the decision to establish a small
number of departments (11) with wide remits.6 While rational in organizational
terms, this configuration has had the unhappy consequence of saddling ministers
and senior officials with unusually numerous sets of intergovernmental respon-
sibilities, often requiring extensive travel and preparation (Timpson 2005). All
told, “in reviewing the technical design of the GN [Government of Nunavut], it
is obvious that the GN was not designed to reflect Inuit cultural principles” (Price
2007, 13).
63
Graham White
The Legislative Assembly
Nowhere is the interplay of Inuit cultural values and governmental structures
and processes as prominent as in the Legislative Assembly. The “consensus gov-
ernment” system inherited by Nunavut from the NWT is often portrayed as an
instance of Aboriginal political culture having transformed the Westminster
cabinet-parliamentary system. To be sure, the Nunavut Legislative Assembly
does exhibit significant modifications of the standard Westminster model. Most
notably, though the precepts of British-style “responsible government” remain
the assembly operates without political parties. All candidates—members of the
Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and ministers seeking re-election included—run as
independents. The premier and the cabinet are chosen by secret ballot of all MLAs.
The premier assigns portfolios to ministers but lacks the political authority to
remove them from cabinet; this power is lodged with the “regular” MLAs, who
have on occasion exercised it. Important debates occur and decisions are made in
a closed-door caucus of all MLAs, which attempts to function in consensual rather
than adversarial ways. Compared with their compatriots in the conventional,
party-dominated legislatures of southern Canada, Nunavut MLAs wield—or have
the potential to wield—significant influence on cabinet.
Not surprisingly, Inuit dominate the assembly numerically; only 2 or 3 of
the 19 MLAs in the first two assemblies were Qallunaat, with 1 or 2 serving in
the 9-person cabinet; the October 2008 election produced 4 non-Inuit MLAs, 2
of whom were elected to cabinet. The external trappings of the assembly—the
dominance of Inuktitut in debate, the remarkable civility of House proceedings,
the sealskin vests and kamiks—suggest that indeed Inuit culture is ascendant over
the Euro-Canadian political values that typify parliamentary institutions else-
where in Canada. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that while in
important ways the operation of the assembly is congruent with traditional Inuit
values, the fundamental characteristics of Westminster politics—concentration of
power in the executive, highly formal procedures, aggressive confrontation, and
the like—have been modified somewhat but hardly displaced. MLAs voice strong
commitment to imbuing the assembly with “IQ” (Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, Inuit
principles) but are rather less clear on how to bring this about (White 2006).
Unique Design Features
If conventional overall, the Government of Nunavut has not lacked institu-
tional innovations. The most important pertains to departmental missions and
to the geographical location of key government functions. While most depart-
ments’ mandates have mirrored those elsewhere in Canada, two were explicitly
designed to foster Inuit priorities. The Department of Sustainable Development
64
Journal of Canadian Studies • Revue d’études canadiennes
was established in order to bring a holistic approach to bear on questions of
economic development, wildlife, and environmental protection. The Depart-
ment of Culture, Language, Elders and Youth (CLEY) was charged with promoting
the interests and perspectives of two key societal groups that often receive short
shrift in government and also with developing and implementing government-
wide policies on language and culture. Both innovations proved disappoint-
ing. The integration of functions envisaged for the Department of Sustainable
Development proved unworkable, and in 2004 it was cleft into the Department of
Economic Development and Transportation and the Department of the Environ-
ment. CLEY remains intact, but with the smallest departmental budget and an
unfocussed mandate, it has not wielded anything like the clout over other depart-
ments on cultural matters that its designers had imagined.
A far more sweeping, longlasting, and arguably more successful initiative
has been the decentralization of the territorial government. All governments are
decentralized in the sense of having networks of regional offices, and the pre-
division Government of the Northwest Territories was extraordinarily decentral-
ized by virtue of the field offices it maintained in all but the tiniest communities.
What the Nunavut Implementation Commission proposed and the territorial
government implemented went far beyond merely a government presence in all
communities. In addition to maintaining the web of departmental field offices,
a substantial proportion of what were termed “headquarters functions”—which
in other governments are typically located in the capital city—were dispersed to
small communities throughout Nunavut.
Several objectives underlie this potentially radical innovation. First and
foremost, since public sector jobs are the mainstay of the territorial economy, it
was thought essential to spread the economic benefits of increased government
employment and associated infrastructure as widely as possible throughout Nuna-
vut. In addition, it was hoped that situating management and executive positions
in communities would encourage Inuit to join and remain with the government
by offering promotion opportunities that did not require employees to leave
their home communities in order to advance their careers (the Inuit propensity
to remain close to family and friends was seen as an important cultural value but
one that could potentially limit career development). As well, decentralization
was seen as a means of ensuring good access to government for those living in
small communities, thereby accommodating the Inuit preference for close com-
munity involvement in political-governmental matters over acquiescence to
decisions made in a far-off capital. Finally, if rather unrealistically, the Nunavut
Implementation Commission thought that decentralizing key bureaucratic pos-
itions would contribute to dispersing political power to the community level,
thereby accommodating the Inuit distaste for concentrated, centralized power.
65
