Google v. Hood

49 Pages·2016·0.3 MB·English

Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/23/2016
No. 15-60205

U S C A
NITED TATES OURT OF PPEALS
F C
FOR THE IFTH IRCUIT

GOOGLE INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES M. HOOD, III,
Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, in his official capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi No. 3:14-CV-981
Before the Honorable Henry T. Wingate

PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING

FRED KRUTZ PETER G. NEIMAN
DANIEL J. MULHOLLAND CHRISTOPHER J. BOUCHOUX
FORMAN WATKINS WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
& KRUTZ LLP HALE AND DORR LLP
200 South Lamar Street, Suite 100 7 World Trade Center
City Centre 250 Greenwich Street
Jackson, MS 39201 New York, NY 10007
[phone] [phone]

CHRISTOPHER W. JOHNSTONE JAMIE S. GORELICK
WILMER CUTLER PICKERING PATRICK J. CAROME
HALE AND DORR LLP BLAKE C. ROBERTS
950 Page Mill Road WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
Palo Alto, CA 94304 HALE AND DORR LLP
[phone] 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006
[phone]
April 22, 2016
Case: 15-60205 Document: 00513477858 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/23/2016
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
No. 15-60205
GOOGLE INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES M. HOOD, III,
Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, in his official capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons
and entities as described in the fourth sentence of 5th Cir. R. 28.2.1 have an
interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that
the Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
1. The Hon. Henry T. Wingate, United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
2. Google Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee
Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly
held corporation. Accordingly, Alphabet Inc. has more than 10%
ownership of Google Inc.
3. Alphabet Inc.
Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly
held corporation. Accordingly, Alphabet Inc. has more than 10%
ownership of Google Inc.
4. Fred H. Krutz and Daniel J. Mulholland, with the firm Forman
Watkins & Krutz LLP, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
i
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5. Jamie S. Gorelick, Patrick J. Carome, Blake C. Roberts, Peter G.
Neiman, Christopher Bouchoux, and Christopher W. Johnstone, with
the firm Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Counsel for
Plaintiff-Appellee
6. James M. Hood, III, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi,
Defendant-Appellant
7. Douglas T. Miracle, Bridgette Williams Wiggins, Alison O’Neal
McMinn, and Krissy Casey Nobile, with the Office of the Mississippi
Attorney General, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
8. F. Jerome Tapley and Hirlye Ryan Lutz, with the firm Cory Watson,
PC, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
9. James Clark Wyly and Sean F. Rommel, with the firm Wyly-
Rommell, PLLC, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
10. John Wimberly Kitchens, with the firm Kitchens Law Firm, PA,
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
11. Carolyn Glass Anderson and Patricia A. Bloodgood, with the firm
Zimmerman Reed, PLLP, Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
/s/ Peter Neiman
PETER NEIMAN
Attorney of record for
Plaintiff-Appellee Google Inc.
ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS .......................................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... iv
THE PANEL ERRED IN ORDERING DISMISSAL OF GOOGLE’S CLAIMS FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING HOOD’S THREATENED
ENFORCEMENT ACTION ............................................................................................... 1
A. Google Brought Declaratory And Injunctive Claims, But
The Panel’s Decision Addressed Only Google’s
Injunctive Claims .................................................................................. 1
B. The Panel’s Ruling That Google’s Declaratory Claims
Regarding Threatened Enforcement Action Are Unripe
For Lack Of An “Imminent Threat Of Irreparable Injury”
Contravenes Supreme Court And Fifth Circuit Precedent .................... 3
C. A Declaratory Claim Is Ripe When There Is A Genuine
Threat Of Prosecution ........................................................................... 7
D. Hood Has Threatened Enforcement Action ........................................ 10
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

iii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
520 Michigan Avenue Associates v. Devine,
433 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2006) ............................................................. 5, 6, 9, 13
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union,
442 U.S. 289 (1979)................................................................................... 8, 14
Brister v. Faulkner,
214 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 2000) ................................................................... 4, 5, 8
Center for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche,
449 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2006) ..................................................................... 8, 13
Cooksey v. Futrell,
721 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................... 9, 13
Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Papa,
200 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1999) ........................................................................... 9
Familias Unidas v. Briscoe,
544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976) ........................................................................... 5
Familias Unidas v. Briscoe,
619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980) ........................................................................... 5
First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v. Morales,
19 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................... 13
Florida Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar,
273 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 9
Harrell v. The Florida Bar,
608 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................... 9
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. 1 (2010) ............................................................................................. 8
International Society for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves,
601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979) ................................................................... 1, 8, 9
iv
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International Tape Manufacturers Ass’n v. Gerstein,
494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974) ........................................................................... 14
Kiser v. Reitz,
765 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... 9, 13
KVUE, Inc. v. Moore,
709 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1983) ......................................................................... 13
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007)........................................................................... 4, 7, 8, 14
Morial v. Judiciary Commission of State of Louisiana,
565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977) ........................................................................... 9
National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh,
714 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 9
New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales,
64 F.3d 1495 (10th Cir. 1995) ......................................................................... 9
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian School,
477 U.S. 619 (1986)......................................................................................... 8
Peachlum v. City of York,
333 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2003) ............................................................................ 9
Pustell v. Lynn Public Schools,
18 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 6
Septum, Inc. v. Keller,
614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1980) ......................................................................... 14
St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner,
439 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................... 9
Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452 (1974)............................................................................. 3, 4, 7, 9
Sullivan v. City of Augusta,
511 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007) .............................................................................. 9
v
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Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) ............................................................................... 7, 12
United States v. Doherty,
786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986) ............................................................................ 6
Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n,
484 U.S. 383 (1988)................................................................................... 8, 10
Wolfson v. Brammer,
616 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) ......................................................................... 9
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) ........................................................................................... 8
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Bray, Samuel L., The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment,
63 Duke L.J. 1091(2014) ................................................................................. 6
Rendleman, Doug, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional Adjudication,
78 W. Va. L. Rev. 155 (1976) ......................................................................... 7
Ritchie de Larena, Lorelei, Re-evaluating Declaratory Judgment
Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes,
83 Ind. L.J. 957 (2008) .................................................................................... 6
Wright, Charles, The Law of Federal Courts § 100 (4th ed. 1983) ........................... 6
13B Wright, Charles et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris.
§ 3532.3 ........................................................................................................... 9
§ 3532.5 ........................................................................................................... 7

vi
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Google respectfully petitions the Court for rehearing on a narrow issue
related to the scope of the panel’s ruling.
The panel directed the district court to dismiss the entire case as unripe
because Google had not shown an “imminent threat of irreparable injury.” Op.22.
But that standard does not apply to Google’s claims for declaratory relief regarding
threatened enforcement action. Under settled law, such claims “need cross only a
low threshold; the Supreme Court requires no more than a ‘credible threat of
prosecution,’ one that is not ‘chimerical,’ or ‘imaginary or speculative.’”
International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809,
821 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Google met that standard. Accordingly,
Google requests that the panel amend its decision to permit Google’s claims for
declaratory relief regarding threatened enforcement action to proceed.
THE PANEL ERRED IN ORDERING DISMISSAL OF GOOGLE’S CLAIMS FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING HOOD’S THREATENED ENFORCEMENT
ACTION
A. Google Brought Declaratory And Injunctive Claims, But
The Panel’s Decision Addressed Only Google’s Injunctive
Claims
The Complaint seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief.1 The district
court preliminarily enjoined Attorney General Jim Hood from enforcing the

1 Paragraph five of the Complaint seeks a “declar[ation]” of “Google’s rights
under federal statutory and constitutional law.” ROA.31. Count Five of the
Complaint (paragraphs 106-107), captioned “Declaration of the Parties’ Respective
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subpoena he had issued and from “bringing a civil or criminal charge against
Google under Mississippi law for making accessible third-party content to Internet
users (as [he had] threatened).” ROA.2025.2 It also denied Hood’s motion to
dismiss Google’s claims for declaratory relief, ROA.2091-2095, 2107, but has not
yet ruled on the merits of those claims, ROA.2107.
Hood filed an interlocutory appeal of “the district court’s grant of a
preliminary injunction.” AOB.1. Hood did not seek leave to appeal the district
court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, and he did not reference the declaratory
judgment claims in his statement of issues on appeal. AOB.1. Neither party
briefed the separate ripeness standards applicable to declaratory judgment actions.
In accordance with that framing of the issues, the panel’s decision
addressing threatened enforcement action focused on Google’s requests for
injunctive relief—not Google’s claims for declaratory relief. Op.19-22. The panel

Rights Under [the Declaratory Judgment Act],” incorporates that request, and adds
specific requests for declarations that (1) “Section 230 of the [Communications
Decency Act (CDA)] and the First and Fourteenth Amendment[s]” preclude
threatened charges under the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (MCPA); (2)
that a charge under the MCPA for “copyright infringement or importation of
prescription drugs is preempted by the Copyright Act, including the [Digital
Millennium Copyright Act], and/or the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]; and (3)
that “enforcement of the Subpoena, as presently drafted … is impermissible” under
the CDA, the Constitution, and certain federal statutes. ROA.61.
2 By letter of April 22, 2016, Hood withdrew the subpoena that Google had
challenged.
2
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explained: “Mindful that an injunction is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ that should
not issue absent a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury
without one, we are persuaded that the district court should not have granted this
relief at this juncture.” Op.19 (citation omitted; emphasis added). The panel stated
that an “imminent, non-speculative irreparable injury” was required. Op.22. And
the panel “conclude[d] that the district court erred in granting injunctive relief
because neither the issuance of the non-self-executing administrative subpoena nor
the possibility of some future enforcement action created an imminent threat of
irreparable injury ripe for adjudication.” Op.22 (emphasis added).
Based on the absence of an imminent threat of irreparable injury, the panel
ordered dismissal of Google’s entire case on ripeness grounds—a ruling
encompassing both Google’s claims for injunctive relief and Google’s claims for
declaratory relief. Op.22-23. Dismissal of the declaratory claims regarding
Hood’s threats of enforcement action went beyond what was necessary to resolve
the appeal. And it was erroneous to apply the “imminent threat of irreparable
injury” standard to those claims.
B. The Panel’s Ruling That Google’s Declaratory Claims
Regarding Threatened Enforcement Action Are Unripe For
Lack Of An “Imminent Threat Of Irreparable Injury”
Contravenes Supreme Court And Fifth Circuit Precedent
As the Supreme Court explained in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974), “requir[ing] that all of the traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance
3