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MAP I, Territorial Changes, 1935-9 50 100 150 km
I 11111111111 I
,
Germany
and the
Second World War
Edited by the
Militargeschichtliches
Forschungsamt (Research
Institute for Military History),
Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany
VOLUME I
The Build-up of
German Aggression
WILHELM DEIST
MANFRED MESSERSCHMIDT
HANS-ERICH VOLKMANN
WOLFRAM WETTE
Translated by
P.S.FALLA
DEAN S. McMURRY
EWALD OSERS
CLARENDON PRESS . OXFORD
1990
O:tlford University Press, Walton Strut, O:tlford on 6DP
O:tlford New York Toronto
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Melbourne Auckland
and associated companies in
Berlin lbadan
O:tlford is a trtuU mark of Oxford University Press
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press, New York
© 1990 Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, Stuttgart
All rights reseroed. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retriefXll system, or transmitted, in any form or by any meGns,
e!ectronie, mechanica~ photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without
the prior permission of Oxford University Press
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Germany and the Second World War.
Vol. I, The build-up of German aggression.
I. World War 2
I. Deist, Wilhelm, 1931- II. Mi/itargeschichtliches
940·53
ISBN O-19-822866-X
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen Kriegspolitik. English.
The build-up of German aggression / Wilhelm Deist ... fet al.};
translated by P. S. Falla, Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Oms; edited by
the Mi/itiirgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ReseGrch Institute for
Military History).
p. em. - (Germany and the Second World War; fl. I)
Translation of: Ursachen und Voraussetzungen der deutschen
K riegspolitik.
Includes bibliographical references.
I. World War, 1939-1945-Causes. 2. Germany-Politics and
government-1933-1945. 3. Germany-Military policy-HistOry-2oth
century. I. Dim, Wilhelm. II. Germany (West)
Mi/itiirgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Ill. Title. IV. Series:
Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. English; fl. I.
DD256.5.D43413 flol. 1
fD741}
943.086 S-dc20
f94°·53'437}
ISBN o-I9-822866-X
Typeset by Burns & Smith Ltd., Derby
Primed in GreGt Britain by
Courier Inte:rNJtional Ltd.
Tiptree, Essex
Editor's Preface to the English Edition
THE publication in English of the first volume of Germany and the Second World
War provides a welcome opponunity to explain to a wider international public the
plan of this ten-volume work and the scope of the volumes that have so far appeared
in German. It also affords an opponunity for the editors to assess the reception of
the first four volumes by historians, especially military historians, as well as by
readers of a younger generation, and by those who themselves lived through the
Second World War.
The translation offers the English-speaking public a history of the war from a
German point of view, and that in two senses. The narrative embodies the results of
German research and concentrates attention on the National Socialist rulers of the
Reich, whose decisions are treated against the background of Germany's human and
material resources and are related to the effects of the war. The strategy and
potential of Germany's adversaries are also included in the general picture.
The sixteen contributors to the first four volumes were all born between 1923 and
1948: accordingly, some of them were of an age to experience the war at first hand.
The later volumes will be chiefly the work of younger scholars. In all cases the
authors were at liberty to work without any instructions that could in any way
hamper their academic freedom of research. It has aroused some surprise, as well as
discussion and criticism, that members of a single institute, in their contributions to
a collective work such as the present, should openly express divergent points of view
and accept the fact that a synthesis, however desirable in itself, could not invariably
be attained. This has been the case, for instance, with Volume IV, where it seemed
to the authors that an 'agreement to differ' was preferable to an enforced uniformity.
In its conception and method the work differs fundamentally from the old style of
military history. The modern view of military history as a branch of historiography
has led to an interdisciplinary and comparative approach, so that the work embraces
political, economic, and social factors in a compreheqsive account; this method has
met with general approval, though there has been occasional criticism of the degree
of emphasis laid on different aspects. The original idea of a 'history of society in
wartime' reflected the need, felt especially in Germany, to make up lost ground in
the domain of social history. This approach has been generally welcomed, though if
pursued too exclusively it could lead to neglect of the military factors that often
decide the fate of nations. However, in the first four volumes the two points of view
complement each other harmoniously. Some of the authors have concentrated on
traditional military-historical research, which it has been possible to undertake since
the German archives were released from Allied custody, and which will also be an
objective of future volumes.
The purpose of the ten-volume work is to describe the course of the Second
World War and to 'place' it in the history of Europe and the world. Even more than
the first world-wide conflict born of a struggle for hegemony in Europe, the war of
vi Editor's Preface to the English Edition
1939-45 marked a historical turning-point. When it ended, the German Reich stood
before the 'grave of its past' (Gerhard Ritter). By launching the war, Germany had
drawn the whole world deeply into its own history; it now lay in ruins and had lost
its national unity and identity. At the same time the European age had irrevocably
come to an end-the age 'in which the world was governed from Europe and world
history was concentrated in the old continent' (Count Peter Kielmansegg). Europe
was no longer the hub of world events.
Our authors believe that the study of the origins of the Second World War, and of
the National Socialist war policy in panicular, cannot be confined to the years of
Hitler's chancellorship from 1933 onwards. The increasing economic, military, and
political strength of the Kaiser's Germany led it to put forward new claims in its
ambition to become a European great power and eventually a world power alongside
Great Britain. The abandonment of Bismarck's policy of restraint was epitomized in
1895 by the German sociologist Max Weber, who observed that the foundation of the
Reich in 187I was a 'youthful prank that Germany had played in its old age, and one
which would not have been wonh the cost unless it was intended to mark the
beginning of a world-power policy and not just the end of one.'
The change from a Bismarckian to a world-power policy did not merely reflect the
attitude of the economic and social elite. As Hans Plehn wrote in 1913: 'It is an
almost universal feeling throughout the country that we shall only win our freedom
to playa pan in world politics through a major European war.' This does not
constitute a proof of sole German war guilt in 1914, but it provides an indication of
the nature of Germany's pan in bringing about the First World War.
The background of Prusso-German history confronts scholars with the question
a
of 'special German way' and that of 'constant features in German history'
(Andreas Hillgruber). The idea of the continuity of Germany's great-power policy
and hegemonism, and the pan played in it by dominant economic and social circles,
has fascinated German historians in panicular and is still a subject of lively debate,
as can be seen in the present work. The problem is brought into sharper focus by an
examination of possible alternatives and the meaning of what actually happened.
But the prelude to the Second World War cannot in fact be fully explained by the
continuity of the politico-strategic ideas of ruling circles. Hitler's aims went far
beyond those of the Weimar revisionists, and for that reason he refused the
opportunity offered by the British policy of appeasement, which would have
satisfied virtually all the territorial demands of German revisionists of the 192os.
Mindful of the interconnection of foreign, domestic, and economic policy with
military and ideological factors, the authors of Volume I have staned out from
different viewpoints and have concentrated on various fields of enquiry which
appeared relevant to the causes and preconditions of the German policy of
aggression. This fruitful diversity of approach within the framework of military
history will be a characteristic of future volumes also.
It is accepted by historians that after the National Socialist 'seizure of power' in
1933 the regime was able to establish an 'understanding' (Klaus-Jiirgen Miiller),
based on fundamental identity of purpose, with the military leaders, big business,
Editor's Preface to the English Edition vii
and large sections of the bourgeoisie, and that this provided Hitler with suppon
during the early years of his rule. However, differences soon developed between
Hitler and the military leaders, especially as regards Germany's readiness for war
and above all the extent of the risk involved in a major conflict. There was no
agreement on policy or strategy. On many levels the 'FUhrer state' was afflicted by a
grave lack of co-ordination. Thus, the rearmament programme was subject to
constant variation, and, more seriously, there was no vestige of co-ordination
between the measures of the respective fighting services. The military leaders, for
their pan, were conscious of the nightmare of the four-year struggle of the First
World War and saw the very existence of the Reich as being once more threatened.
Against this background the authors of Volume I point out in their Conclusion
that it would be a superficial interpretation of the continuity thesis to argue that
'the policies of the Nazi regime were essentially a continuation of traditional
tendencies and lines of development'. The hodgepodge of Hitler's ideas, blending a
Darwinian racial ideology with calculations of power politics, was so remote from
traditional Western values, to which the older ruling circles were still largely
attached, that the latter's 'understanding' with the dictator cannot be regarded as an
expression of continuity in the usual sense.
The German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, which began the Second
World War, has been attributed not only to Hitler's war policy but also to 'German
militarism' in general. However, research has convincingly shown that there was no
broad public support for Hitler's action: unlike the situation in 1914, the great
majority of Germans in 1939 considered it a fatal error to resort to war as an
instrument of policy. Although nearly all political groups before 1933 had professed
a warlike ideology, and despite the strenuous propaganda effons of the regime, the
prevailing mood among the population was one of deep apathy, for reasons which
the authors of Volume I are unable fully to explain. It is equally hard to account for
the fact that despite increasing depression and war-weariness, the bulk of the
population stood firm until the very last day of the war without any signs of
widespread resistance.
The Second World War is far too recent for a balanced, self-contained account to
be possible, and moreover the Soviet archives are still closed to Western scholars. A
beginning has none the less been made with the exploration and analysis of the
immensely complicated interrelations of events. Among questions that remain to be
studied. more deeply is the part played by Germany in the rivalries of European
powers in the imperialist era. In this context we may notice a move away from the
narrow type of analysis which treated the events of the two world wars as a process
'growing, like a tree, out of purely German roots' (Ludwig Dehio).
Among questions that need further elucidation, readers and reviewers of the
present work have singled out that of the causes of the German-Soviet war, the
respective responsibilities and basic aims of Hitler and Stalin. The authors of
Volume IV (published in Germany in 1983) were unable to record any generally
accepted view. Given the intricate mixture of ideological vision and political
ambition on the part of the two dictators, the authors themselves differed in their
viii Editor's Preface to the English Edition
assessments, and their work reflects the prevailing divergence of interpretations. It
seems beyond doubt, however, that Hitler and Stalin were both inspired by
ideological dogma as well as considerations of foreign policy.
Historians still argue over Stalin's intentions in 1941, when, after a huge process of
rearmament and after the drastic purge of Red Army leaders, he deployed his forces
close to the frontier in what-in the opinion of one of the contributors to Volume
IV-was clearly an 'offensive configuration', reflecting a politico-military doctrine of
the offensive. It is undisputed that Stalin's intentions and his security interests were
determined by a power-political and ideological calculation that did not exclude an
offensive policy. On the contrary, a war between the capitalist-imperialist powers no
doubt seemed to Stalin to afford an opportunity of transforming the balance of power
on the European continent. It is less probable that he intended to attack Germany in
1941 than that he planned to intervene militarily as late as possible, after the
contending powers had exhausted themselves. The view disseminated by the
German leaders at the time, that Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union to forestall
imminent hostile action by Russia, is rejected in Volume IV of the present work and
was not substantiated by the discussion which took place in German periodicals in
1986 on the subject of the 'war between the dictators'.
Hitler and Stalin both regarded the use of military force as a means of asserting
and enlarging their respective spheres of power and influence. There is no doubt
that Hitler initiated the German-Soviet war; but historians will long continue to
discuss the view put forward in Volume IV, that 'This was Hitler's real war.'
As the foregoing remarks will have shown, the present work must for many
reasons be regarded for the time being as no more than part of a structure, just as
every period of history is a transitional stage opening up new vistas in the light of
the past. The work is not intended to provide a self-contained, cut and dried view of
history; as befits a free society, the way is clear for controversy and criticism, for
each generation is entitled to form its own interpretation of events. The
international comparison of results and standards of judgement, which the English
translation of this work is intended to promote, will be of especial importance for
this purpose.
The Institute and the authors would like to convey their special thanks to the
publishers and translators, especially Mr P. S. Falla, for their unstinting efforts to
ensure the very high standards attained in this work. Thanks are also due to Dr
Wilhelm Deist for supervising every stage of the translation project, and to Mr
Wilfried Radisch for his editorial assistance, especially with the bibliographies.
In revising their contributions for this edition the authors have, where possible,
taken account of the various works which have appeared since the publication of the
German edition in 1979.
Dr GUNTER ROTH,
Brigadier-General,
Director,
Research Institute for
Military History
Preface to the German Edition
THE Second World War brought about fundamental and irrevocable changes in
Europe and the world. The past decades have seen a complete transformation of the
international system as it existed before 1939; the shift of power to new global
centres; profound changes in political and social conditions in the world outside
Europe; a completely new aspect of warfare; and revolutionary progress in
technology. All these developments are to a large extent the result of the course and
outcome of the war, which can thus be seen as a major turning-point in history. Its
causes and effects are rightly an object of continued study to all those who seek to
understand the world as it is today.
The central part that Germany played in bringing about and waging the Second
World War, with its far-reaching consequences for so many nations, and the heavy
burdens endured by the German people itself during the war and subsequently, will
long be the subject of research and historical enquiry. It is a special responsibility of
German historians to investigate these fateful events. There already exists a
profusion of analyses and accounts of the war years, in which attention is paid to
political, military, economic, and social aspects. The Research Institute for Military
History is primarily concerned with the military aspects of events and their
consequences.
The first two inspectors-general of the Federal German defence forces, Generals
Heusinger and Foertsch, created favourable conditions for the performance of this
task by enlarging the scope of the Institute, and took an interest in the first
discussions concerning research into the history of the Second World War. In view
of the deficiency of sources and staff limitations, the Institute first devoted itself to
studies of individual problems. But it soon became clear that such studies, useful as
they might be, were insufficient in the long run. As the post-war generation in
Germany grew to occupy positions of responsibility, questions concerning the
reasons for the war were raised more and more pressingly in a general form, making
clear the need for a synthesis of the accounts so far produced and, above all, a
comprehensive source of information for readers interested in history. Meanwhile,
the release of military archives from British and American custody provided further
material for a general history of the war from the German point of view.
However, the terms of reference for the present study and for the Institute's work
in general diverged from the tradition of nineteenth-century military historiography
and the method followed in the multi-volume German official history of the First
World War, which was only partially adequate from the historian's point of view.
Since 1945 the conditions of work on military history have undergone a basic
change. In the Federal German Republic, as elsewhere, historiography has
transcended the national limitations that characterized earlier works. Military
history has become a recognized subdivision of history in general, and, unlike the
'general staff' histories of former times, includes political, economic, and social
