General Marshall's report, The winning of the war in Europe and the Pacific; biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War

225 Pages·1945·48.48 MB·English

by  George C Marshall, United States. War Dept. General Staff., Council on Books in Wartime

Biennial Reports
OF THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY
TO THE
SECRETARY OF WAR
1 July 1939-30 June 1945
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1996
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
United States. War Dept. General Staff.
Biennial reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army
to the Secretary of War : 1 July 1939-30 June 1945.
p. em.
Reports made by George C. Marshall.
Originally published as three separate vols.: Washington, DC :
G.P.O., 1941-1945. With new introductory material.
I. World War, 19 39-1945-Campaigns-Sources. 2. World War,
1939-1945-United States-Sources. 3. United States. Army-
History-World War, 1939-1945-Sources. I. Marshall, George C.
(George Catlett), lBBO-1959. II. United States. War Dept.
m. Title.
D735 .B47 1996
940.54'00973-dc20 96-14075
CIP
Editors' Note
This book reproduces in onc volume the three biennial reports of General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, to the Secretary of War for the period 1
July 1939-30 June 1945. The Table of Contents has been reworked, and the text, maps,
and charts have been renumbered consecutively to eliminate dupHcation or confusion.
Within the text, obvious typographical errors have been corrected, but the punctuation,
capitalization, grammar, and usage arc those found in the original editions.
CMH Pub 70-57
For sale by the U.S. Govemmenl Printing Office
SUperintendent of Documents. Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington. OC 20402-9328
ISBN 0·16·048657·2
FOREWORD
One president called him "the greatest living of Bulgaria. Its half-strength divisions were scattered
American;' and another told him, "I feel 1 could not among numerous posts, its equipment obsolete, its
sleep at night with you out of the country." Sir reliance on the horse increasingly anachronistic.
Winston Churchill found him to be not only "a rugged Given the strength of isolationist sentin1ent and apa-
soldier and magnificent organiser" but also "a states- thy toward a distant war in Europe, prospects for
man with a penetrating and commanding view of the improvement were anything but promising. To
whole scene"; to Britain 's great wartime leader, he Marshall fell the thankless task of pread1.ing prepared-
was "the noblest Roman of them all." Perhaps the ness, of pointing out the need for tl1e United States to
most moving tribute came from Ius wartime boss, at a "put our house in order" before the sparks from the
small, evening ceremony in the Pentagon, the day European conflagration could reach it. The passage of
Nazi Germany surrendered. Secretary of War Henry L. the nation 's fIrst peacetin1e conscription act in the
Stimson, whose own experience with the Army summer of 1940 was largely due to the shock from the
read1ed back almost to the turn of the century, told fall of France, but it also owed much to Marshall 's skill-
his dose associate and confidant, "I have seen a great ful relations witl1 Congress, which came to trust
many soldiers in my lifetin1e, and you , sir, are the implicitly his judgment and integrity. As the country
fmest soldier I have ever known ." mobilized its manpower, Marshall faced the enormous
Acdain1ed by his colleagues and duly praised by his- tasks of organizing and training the new recruits, fInd-
torians of World War II, General of the Army George ing competent leaders, and weighing the critical
C. Marshall nevertheless has been overshadowed in needs of his own forces for new equipment against
popular acceptance by other leaders. In part, the lack the Allies ' desperate pleas. In six years, he presided
of widespread public recognition of Marshall stems over the growth of the Army to a force of over eight
from Ius role as the Army's Chief of Staff, creating the million men, backed by an economic and logistical
armies that others led to glory. In part, it can be traced base of unprecedented proportions.
to his personality. Austere and sometin1es aloof, mod- lf Marshall had done nothing else, his guiding role
est and self-effacing, he lacked MacArthur's flair for in creating the Army that won World War II would
publicity and Eisenhower's common touch . As a have been enough to ensure his place in history; in
superb staff officer in World War 1 and the interwar fact, he did much more. As a global strategist, he
Army, he was accustomed to working behind the adueved a position of preeminence among the Allied
scenes. Still, he remembered that soldiers are human military chiefs, not througl1 bluster or deception, but
beings, not cogs in a machine, and he possessed an througl1 a strength and generosity of character which
unusual appreciation for the citizen-soldier based on commanded respect among his peers. In his relations
his extensive experience with reserve forces. with officers from other services and nationalities,
Associates were struck by Ius relentless perfectionism from the Navy's crusty Fleet Admiral Ernest]. King to
and impatience with military dogma. Most of all, how- the condescending Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, he
ever, they were in1pressed by his strength of charac- displayed a genius for cooperation. He insisted on the
ter: the integrity, self-discipline, sense of duty, lack of same spirit in subordinates assigned to high-level the-
political ambition, and presence which conveyed ater positions.
fIrmness , intensity, and calm. Perhaps it was these Finally, Marshall 's strategy carried the Allies to vic-
qualities that led President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in tory over Nazi Germany. From the first days of
September 1939, to bypass thirty-four generals senior American intervention in the war, he advocated the
to Marshall and appoint him Chief of Staff. earliest possible cross-Channel attack to come to grips
For the feat of transforming the miniscule interwar with German forces near the heart of Axis power on
Army to the great force that defeated the Axis in the Continent. He encountered near-constant opposi-
Africa, Europe, the Pacific, and Asia, no one could tion from the British and even at times from his presi-
dain1 more credit than Marshall. When he took office, dent and colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, in
the 174,000-man U.S. Army ranked nineteenth in size the end, won them over to the Normandy invasion
in the world, behind Portugal and only sligl1tly ahead which sounded the death knell of the Third Reich.
v
Fifty years after the close of World War n, the u.s. overall view of the progress of the war, but the schol-
Army Center of Military History takes pleasure in ar and rniHtary professional will fmd most interesting
bringing together for the first time all three install- Marshall 's comments on such topics as technology,
ments of Marshall 's wartime reports. Published at two- the "9O-division gamble," the replacement system,
year intervals, these reports provide a comprehensive troop morale and the citizen-soldier, and demobiliza-
picture of global war as seen from the perspective of tion. These comments and the other material present-
the Chief of Staff. The frrst report describes the race ed in the reports provide not only a fresh perspective
to mobilize an unprepared country and Marshall 's on the myriad problems of conducting a global war at
appeal on the eve of war for the renewal of Selective the highest levels but also renewed appreciation for
Service, a reminder of how far the U.S. Army had to the man whom Churchill appropriately called "the
come to meet the Axis challenge. The second organiser of victory."
recounts the initial defeats after Pearl Harbor and the
ultimately successful efforts of the United States and
its Allies to turn the tide. The final report describes Washington, D.C. JOHN W MOUNTCASTLE
the drive to victory and outlines Marshall's analysis of 12 February 1996 Brigadier General, USA
the reasons for the Allied triumph. Summaries give an Chief of Military History
vi
CONTENTS
July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941
Page
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The First Phase . . . . . . .. ..... . 3
State of the Armed Forces, July 1, 1939 . 3
The President's Emergency Proclamation
September 8 , 1939 . . ..... . . . . 4
The Second Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The President's Messages of May 16 and May 31 , 1940 . 6
Progress During the Winter of 1940-41 ... 8
Special Problems Incident to the Expansion. 8
Reorganization of Command and Staff . . . . 13
State of the Armed Forces July 1, 1941 . . . . 13
Recommendations for the Elimination of Certain
Legal Umitations and Restrictions. 15
General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix
Organization. .. . ....... . 21
Armored Force . . . . .. ... . 21
Training ..... . 22
Personnel ... . 24
Regular Army . 24
Regular Army Reserve . 24
Enlisted Reserve . . . . 24
Selective Service . . . . 25
Construction and Housing . 25
Armament and Equipage .. 26
National Guard . . . . . . .. 27
Organized Reserves . . . . . . 29
United States Military Academy . 30
Reserve Officers' Training Corps. 30
Citizens Military Training Camps. 31
Civilian Conservation Corps . 31
Morale ........... . .... . 31
July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943
Introduction. . . . . . . . . 35
The Third Phase . . . . . . 35
Extension of Service . ..... . 35
Development of the Army . . . . 39
Reinforcements for Overseas Garrisons. 39
Time Factor . . . . . 41
Changing Situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
The Fourth Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
War Is Declared . . . . . 42
Strategy and Control. . . . . 43
Global War. . . .. ...... . 43
Struggle for the Philippines . 47
Coral Sea-High Tide of Aggression . 48
vii
Page
The Fifth Phase. . . 50
The Solomons . 50
Papua ..... . 50
European Theater 50
United States Troops Move to United Kingdom . 52
Aerial Assault on Fortress of Europe. ..... 52
North African Theater. . . . . 53
The Landings . . . . . . . 57
Diplomatic Negotiations 57
Race for Tunisia . . . . . 57
Fall of Tunisia . . . . . . . 58
Enemy Air Power Shattered 59
Middle East 61
Asiatic Theater .... 63
Operations in Alaska . 67
Summary ..... . 68
Conclusion .... . 69
Organization . 69
Logistics . 69
Training .. 75
Air Forces 75
Planning 75
Notes .... 81
July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945
Introduction . 107
Victory in Europe . . 11 3
The Strategic Concept 11 3
The Fall of Italy. 118
On to the Boot 119
Allied Air Established in Europe 123
The Slugging Battle for Rome . 123
Pursuit to the North. 127
The Final Phases 128
Operation OVERLORD 132
The Preparations. 133
Victory in the Air . 133
The Assault 135
The Breakout 136
Continental Envelopment 137
The Liberation of France . . 139
The Westwall 140
The Wehrmacht's Last Blow . 144
Closing the Rhine . 147
The Watch That Failed 148
The Knockout . 149
Victory Over Japan . 155
The Road to China . 155
Operation CAPITAL 157
Fall of Burma 158
Reverse in China . 160
Unremitting Pressure 162
Pacific Pincers 163
Reconquest of the Philippines 170
Battle of the Visayas . 17 1
Battle of Luzon 176
The Net Closes. 177
Final Victory. 181
Occupation 187
viii
Page
Our Weapons ...... . 191
The Troops ....... . 196
Manpower Balance. 196
Price of Victory. . . 201
Beyond the Call of Duty 203
Information and Recreation . 204
Army Management. . 206
Demobilization . . . . 207
For the Common Defense 208
Charts
No. Page
1. Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, July I , 1939 . 4
2. Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, January 31 ,
1940-227,000 . . . . . ...... . .... . 5
3. Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, August IS ,
1940-280,000 . ................. . 7
4. Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, June 30,
1941-1 ,4 18,097 ............ ... .. . 9
5. Tactical Organization of the United States Army. 10
6. Approved Reception Centers. . 11
7. Replacement Training Centers. . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Officers' Candidate Schools ........ ..... . 14
9. Induction of National Guard into Federal Service. 28
10. Deployment of American Troops with Arrival Date of
First Contingent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
11. Expansion of the Army, 1941-43 . . .. . .. . . . 39
12. Tactical Organization Within the United States .. 44
13. Time and Space Chart-Air and Water Logistics. 46
14. Comparison of U.S. and Enemy Plane Losses in
Southwest Pacific and North African Theaters. 51
15. Prisoner of War Camps ..... . 64
16. Officer Strength, United States Army . . . 70
17. Organization of the Army. . . . . . . . . . 71
18. Organization of the Army Service Forces 72
19. Activation of Army Service Forces Units . 74
20. Organization of the Army Ground Forces. 76
21. Organization of the Army Air Forces . . . . 78
22. Women 's Army Auxiliary Corps, Training Centers
and Schools. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
23. Authorized Capacity, Officer Candidate Schools. 90
24. Major War Construction-Corps of Engineers. 92
25. u.S. Army Battle Casualties, 7 December 1941
TIlfough 30 June 1943 .. . . . 95
26. Replacement Tl"'aining Centers . . ....... . 98
27. Building an Infantry Division ........... . 100
28. Training a Combat Group (Heavy Bombardment) . 102
Maps
No. Page
1. Solomon Islands Area 38
2. New Guinea-Bismarck Area 49
3. French Northwest Africa .. 54
4. Battle of Tunisia, January 12-April 23, 1943 60
5. Final Breakthrough to Tunis and Bizerte .. 62
ix