Gendered Structural Barriers to Job Attainment for Skilled Chinese

27 Pages·2003·0.1 MB·English

GENDERED STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO JOB ATTAINMENT FOR SKILLED
CHINESE EMIGRANTS IN CANADA
Janet Salaff
Department of Sociology, U of Toronto
[email protected]
Arent Greve
Department of Strategy and Management, The Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration,
[email protected]
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POPULATION GEOGRAPHY, 9: 443-456, 2003.
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com).
ABSTRACT
Our study examines the career achievements of 50 professional couples that immigrated from
China to Canada. We compare their job attainment when they left China with that gotten years
after immigration. We apply concepts of human capital and institutional theory to understand
why the job status of the majority drops after immigrating. Human capital concepts account
for most career advancement in China. Human capital theory falls short in explaining the
structural barriers to achievement that affect those in the controlled professions, and especially
women, in Canada. The institutional framework views immigrants’ unemployment and a drop
in job levels and wages as a status change. Structural concepts handle job deterioration, and in
particular women’s loss of status, in terms of social recognition of career paths. Structural con-
cepts explain why immigrants’ past career paths are poorly understood or are blocked in a new
context. We conclude that institutional theory is more widely applicable than human capital
theory for understanding the loss of job status for our sample of skilled immigrants from
China.
1
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the social and institutional mechanisms that channel skilled, recently
immigrated Chinese men and women into jobs in Toronto. Along with other developed coun-
tries that vie for highly educated immigrants, Canada’s skilled-based immigration system
attracts hundreds of thousands of immigrants yearly. Since 1998, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) has contributed the largest number, most of whom are professionals and techni-
cal workers. In 1999, the year that the majority of our respondents arrived, there were 189,922
total immigrants, with those originating in the PRC accounting for 15.33%. Yet, many suffer
unemployment and a drop in status and wages, compared with their former careers. Women
fare the worst (Badets and Howatson-Leo, 1999; Basran and Zong, 1999; Tang, 1993; Wright
and McDade, 1992). We draw on human capital and institutional theories to learn why profes-
sionals and skilled workers, especially women, cannot easily transfer their credentials between
Chinese and Canadian labor markets. Is the human capital of immigrants insufficient despite
their prior screening? Or do they not fit the institutional environment, as conjectured by insti-
tutional theory?
Human capital refers to an individual’s skills and work experiences, which contribute to their
earning power (Becker, 1975). Arguments center on the value of the employee’s education and
experiences as exchanged in the labor market. Theorists assume that so long as they have all
available information, employers can evaluate the human capital of a job seeker. Superior
skills and qualifications will fetch higher status jobs, and foreign trained professionals can
progress in the Canadian market as they did abroad. Women and men with equivalent creden-
tials and experiences will also earn the same amount. If skilled immigrants do not get good
jobs, it is likely that their English is not up to standard, they lack suitable training, or in other
ways are perceived as not competent. Alternatively, risk aversive employers, who are uncertain
about what immigrants know, may not recognize their human capital (McDade, 1988;
Schoeni, 1998; Shapira, 1995).
Institutional theory views the definition of careers and the structure of profession as following
socially constructed patterns. A professional career starts with education, apprenticeship, and
certification, followed by successive jobs with increasing responsibilities and managerial con-
tent. Because a person’s prior achievements influence that person’s current status, careers are
path dependent. The professions define career achievements as signalling competence, but
2
these milestones are not universally valued. Professions are embedded in social structures,
which consist of repeated patterns of behavior, norms and expectations, that vary in different
jurisdictions (Granovetter, 1985). Many North American professions are powerful enough to
set standards for suitable employees, based on their definitions of human resources (Collins,
1979). These then become institutionalized at the broader level of labor market structures
(Scott, 2001). By closing the labor markets to outsiders, the professions create internal labor
markets for their members (Osterman, 1984). When the qualifications of ideal workers
become socially defined in this manner, employers often ignore those whose past career paths
and achievements do not conform to recognizable patterns (March & Olsen, 1989). For
instance, recent Asian immigrants are often viewed as unsuitable for management positions
that require leadership of local employees, and as best fit for the lower ranks of the high tech-
nology sector (Basran and Zong, 1999 Boyd and Thomas, 2001; Fernandez, 1998; Li, 2000;
Sandhu, 2002; Tang, 1993; Wright & McDade, 1992). Professional labor markets are similarly
differentiated by gender, channelling women and men into separate careers. Further, interpre-
tations of suitable occupations for women and men often differ in the two countries (Boyd,
1990; Hanson, Schaub, and Baker, 1996; Hughes, 2001; Kats, 1982; Kofman, 2000; Pedraza,
1991; Wright and Ellis, 2000).
We apply these two perspectives to the key job placement mechanisms that channel profes-
sional and skilled women and men into positions in the two countries. We focus on the assess-
ment of credentials, the structure of careers, the organization of professional labor markets,
and gendered employment systems. Our approach is broadly comparative in several ways. We
contrast immigrants’ past careers in their country of origin with those in the host country, link-
ing people’s past experiences, education, and status attainment with their job opportunities in
Canada. We compare jobs women and men get. Further comparisons include the ease of find-
ing work for immigrants in different occupations, and how these change over time.
There are practical as well as theoretical implications to our study. Human capital theory
implies that if the jobs that most skilled workers get do not make full use of their human capi-
tal, it is because employers lack information to assess them. In this case, it should be only a
matter of time until their qualifications are recognized. On the other hand, if institutional
structures block immigrants’ ability to use their talents, newcomers may not “break in.”
Instead they need to develop different, locally recognized skills. Furthermore, if the jobs that
3
most skilled women get make less use of their human capital than the jobs of men, Chinese
immigrant women will face two liabilities: being foreign and being female.
The structure of the paper
We first turn to our methods and then describe the characteristics of our sample of 50 new
immigrant couples, studied with qualitative and quantitative methods. In Part 3, we discuss the
structure of professional jobs and their distribution by gender and positions in China. Part 4
views these couples’ experiences Canada.
METHODS
To understand what the immigrants do to get jobs, we interviewed 50 PRC couples that immi-
grated to Canada starting in 1996, the majority in 1999. They applied in the skilled immigrant
category. The chief applicant, who is the husband in 46 cases, has a good education, practices
a profession that equips him for admission, and has some English language ability.1 Finding a
job prior to landing is not required, and only one had done so in a branch of the German firm
in which he worked. On landing, one or both of the spouses normally try to locate work imme-
diately. One, but rarely both, also might delay the job search while studying English.
Our target population is mature women and men of working age, with families. The median
year of birth of our sample is: males, 1963; females, 1965. They averaged 35 years of age at
immigration. The vast majority has BA degrees or higher (Table 1, below). Two-thirds have
careers in engineering, medicine, accountancy and computer science. All had a single child
when they left China, as dictated to the urban elite (Croll, Kane, and Davin, 1985). We
expected that having dependent families requires them to get jobs quickly. To test this, we
interviewed several couples without children, finding that indeed they are likely to return to
school to upgrade their credentials. In this, their behavior differs from our main sample, which
is constrained by necessity to earn money. As a result, we only include in our data base mar-
ried couples with dependent children.
We excluded from our study those with student and investment immigrant visas on the suppo-
sition that they do not need to find a job immediately. Since students expect to upgrade their
credentials or otherwise “localize” themselves, their experience cannot directly help us under-
stand why Canadian employers do not recognize the credentials of foreign professionals.
4
We met most of these couples soon after they landed, and maintain contact with nearly all to
the present. We chart the progress of husband and wife in finding work, to learn how their
skills are evaluated in the job market over a period from two to seven years. Although a short
period, it is enough to reveal how those in varied professions and with diverse experiences and
personal characteristics adapt to the Canadian labor market.
We located half of our contacts through the rosters of a large NGO immigration agency in Tor-
onto. The agency, which offers ESL classes and workshops on the job search to hundreds of
newcomers yearly, is well known in the Chinese community. We conducted focus groups, did
participant observation in job search workshops, and joined reunions and other social outings
of workshop participants. There is no alternative random data base from which to choose this
sample, and the NGO is held in high regard by their clients. Those we contacted generously
agreed to share their experiences, and introduced us to eligible acquaintances for the remain-
der of our sample (called a snowball sample).
The immigrants we study are a suitable group for assessing how professional and skilled
women and men are channeled into jobs. While we do not claim that our sample represents the
range of Chinese immigrants to Toronto, our respondents are not atypical. Most recent emi-
grants from China are well educated and from urban centers (Liang, 2001; Statistics Canada,
1999; Zweig and Chen, 1995). On the other hand, the agency’s rosters may be slanted towards
those who cannot find professional jobs through friends, agents or otherwise on their own.
Those who know many Canadians might be able to get jobs soon after they arrive, and have
less reason to sign up for these workshops. However, most of those we met through personal
contact also signed up for workshops, to get a window onto Canada. Further, few in our sam-
ple, whether participants in the NGO or those we met by snowballing, know locals that are
well established and can tell them about good jobs.
The chief author, as principal investigator, carried out most interviews in Mandarin Chinese,
aided by a PRC-Chinese research assistant, herself a recent immigrant. Using a topical inter-
view guide, in the first 3-hour session we learned about husbands’ and wives’ family and work
histories and personal networks. Follow up interviews, informal social events, e-mail
exchanges, and phone calls keep us up to date with their work and family experiences. We
scheduled our interviews jointly with both spouses in order to learn the details of each per-
son’s background characteristics and experiences, unless one spouse chooses to discuss per-
5
sonal issues separately, or one is not available. We averaged 2.3 interviews with each
respondent couple, and have updated information on all through late 2002.
Although we use qualitative methods to gather data, and a number of papers that draw on our
qualitative data are published or in press, our intent here is mainly to analyze our material sta-
tistically. By quantifying qualitative data, we draw on our detailed qualitative information on
their work lives to set up concepts, scales, and indicators sensitive to an individual’s response
(Creswell, 2002). We analyze their job status in the two countries statistically with SAS-JMP.
Using multiple ordinal logistic regression, we predict achievement of job rank in both coun-
tries by their education, having a technical profession, foreign sector experience, age, and gen-
der, chosen as indicators of human capital. Multiple regression shows the relative contribution
of each variable in the equation, controlling for the effects of the other variables. The depen-
dent variable is an ordinal ranking of jobs using ranking procedures described in the text
below. Table 1 gives the distributions of the variables used in the regressions.
Table 1. Distributions of Selected Socio-Economic Variables in China
Sample Males Females
Mean years education1 16.5 17.2 15.8***
Standard Deviations (mean years) (1.94) (1.77) (1.89)
Age, mean years at emigration 35.6 36.4 34.7
Standard Deviations (age) (4.96) (4.72) (5.10)
Profession within a technical field,%2 71.0 78.0 64.0
Worked in JV or foreign firm in China% 46.0 58.0 34.0*
1) Refers to level attained in China at the time of emigration.
2) Technical fields include accounting, computer science, engineering, medicine and other sci-
ences.
Difference between Males and Females: significance, X2 tests: † < 0.10; * < 0.05; ** < 0.01;
*** < 0.001; N = 100
6
GETTING SKILLED IN CHINA
Background: Opening Internal Labor Markets
Until recently, China did not have an open market for education or labor. Strong state controls
shaped students’ skills, their choice of majors, and length of schooling. Students took tests to
get into college, and the majors and universities they entered were chosen for them mainly
through universalistic criteria. The labor market was organized around state sector firms, and
few workers moved easily between them. Workers expected to enjoy lifetime employment,
called the “iron rice bowl.” The state firms operated like an internal labor market. Workers
entered a particular firm at the start of their careers, remained there, and were rewarded for
their experiences in the firm (Kalleberg and Rognes, 2000; Williamson, Wachter, and Harris,
1975). Centralized control at the firm level, the key structural feature of professional employ-
ment through the 1980s, gave the Chinese state and the work unit power over professional hir-
ing (Bian, 1994; Walder, 1986).
In force when most of our respondents got their first jobs, this system began to change in the
1980s, with great consequences for their careers. In 1978, the internal labor market opened to
outside investors in the form of Joint Venture Corporations (JVs) between the state and foreign
investors. Chinese private enterprises also greatly increased their employment share (Davis,
2000; Walder, 1989). The state sector transferred and laid off workers, and labor mobility
increased.
The foreign sector exposes workers to a performance based management system, which makes
great demands on workers’ time and energy, but rewards their accomplishments. Technically
trained employees find great demand for their skills, and are promoted on the local career lad-
der. They travel widely, go abroad for training, return to school for further degrees, and learn
more English. Some changed their jobs to marketing and sales, which have become recog-
nized occupations (Pearson, 1997). Although many state sector firms also participate in the
global economy, there are fewer opportunities for workers to broaden their experiences in
these ways.
It is widely found that state legislation helps equalize disadvantages for marginalized workers
(Beller, 1985). At the time our cohort entered the labor force, state control over the labor mar-
ket gave a powerful boost to gender equality. During the Cultural Revolution, women were
7
exhorted to work hard. Arresting slogans such as “the iron girls,” “women hold half the sky,”
staged women as laborers that put their jobs ahead of personal goals. When the Cultural Revo-
lution ended and schools reopened in 1977, intelligent women that passed the tests entered
university. It was a time of scarce human resources, and women and men who received more
education and experience got ahead.
While these massive changes touched most of the urban, educated elite, women and men had
somewhat different careers. Researchers detail institutional limits to gender equality (Andors,
1983). Despite China’s centralized system of training and allocating professionals to jobs,
state oversight can not ensure that women and men received the same education and experi-
ences, or human capital. Professional men and women are channelled into divergent indus-
tries, occupations and sectors. This is due in part to the high social value Chinese society
places on family roles, which takes a toll on women’s careers (Stacey, 1983). Finally, women
face stereotyping and discrimination (Loscocco and Wang, 1992). As a result, women and men
wove their careers around what was expected of them in the Chinese setting.
Education
Both human capital and institutional theories expect education to relate to job status, and we
start by detailing the credentials and fields of our sample. Our elite sample earned high
degrees and enjoyed on-the-job opportunities to upgrade their skills. They concentrated in a
few disciplines. Table 2 provides a comparison of male and female educational qualifications,
while Table 3 compares the subjects men and women majored in.
Table 2 Comparisons of Males’ and Females’ Education1
Ph.D Master Bachelor Diploma High school Total
Males 4 19 26 1 0 50
Females 1 10 27 9 3 50
Total: 5 29 53 10 3 100
1) Refers to level attained in China at the time of emigration.
We assess their educational level at the time they left China. Men earned more of the post-
graduate degrees. All but one has a Bachelors. This sole man with a diploma was sent by his
private sector firm to nearly two years of training courses. Men mainly studied technical sub-
8
jects that qualified them for the industrial jobs in demand. Over half enrolled in engineering,
and many of the rest majored in chemistry, computer science, medicine, and physics. A minor-
ity graduated with non scientific-technical degrees, in art and design, foreign languages or lit-
erature, law, or business.
Table 3 Comparisons of Males’ and Females’ Majors (numbers)1
Male Female Total
Engineers 28 10 38
Medical practitioners 2 6 8
Computer science 8 5 13
Accountants 0 8 8
Other sciences 2 3 5
Nonscience 10 18 28
Total 50 50 100
1) Refers to level attained in China at the time of emigration.
Fewer women have Ph.Ds and Masters degrees, and women account for nearly all of those
with diplomas and high school degrees. They shared an interest in science and technology, and
many studied engineering and other sciences, medicine, accounting, and computer science.
However, more women than men majored in non-technical subjects of education, humanities,
law, business, nursing, and social sciences
Because many couples first met in school or on their first job, there was initially considerable
educational equality between husbands and wives. At the time they left China, nearly half of
the husbands and wives had the same educational level (21 couples). Moreover, the degrees
held by 20 couples differ by only one educational level; only 9 couples have two levels differ-
ence in their degrees. Even at this point, however, educational attainment within spouses had
already grown apart. More men (30%) than women (6%) had further training after they had
married, including all the Ph.D.s (four men, one woman). Wives underwrote their husbands’
further education. They did not need to pay for their husbands’ schooling, but they maintained
the family, enabling their husbands to have both a family and career. By championing his
return to school, wives’ human capital fell behind their husbands.’ Their improved education
enabled the husbands’ careers to progress further than those of their wives.
9
Job status
We develop two measures to gauge whether men and women with the same human capital get
the same job status. First, we refer to the job status as measured by the rank in the organiza-
tional and professional hierarchies of the last job they held in China before emigrating. Sec-
ond, we indicate whether they have ever held managerial jobs.
Professional status
We classify their jobs as high, medium, and low status. Top ranked are full fledged profession-
als, with a bachelor or higher degree, whose fields require professional certification, such as
architectural designer, electrical engineer, and construction site manager. Middle status work-
ers are semi professionals, with a bachelor degree or diploma, in white collar jobs that do not
require certification. Examples are computer programmer, delivery coordinator, sales person,
and construction site supervisor. Skilled clerical workers with high school education held low
status jobs. (Table 4).
Table 4. Job status in China at time of emigration
Professional Semi-prof Skilled clerical Study1
(High) (Medium) (Low) (Low)
Males 39 10 0 1
Females 25 17 8 0
Total: 64 27 8 1
N= 100
1) Study (l man) is grouped with skilled clerical as low job status.
Relatively more men held high status jobs, and only women held low status skilled positions.
However, this gender difference in job status is not a result of discrimination against individual
women. Controlling for their human capital, there is no difference in the likelihood of holding
the same status positions. The ordinal logistic regression shows that educational level and a
technical profession determine job status. Since men are more likely than women to have tech-
nical education and higher degrees, they are more likely to be higher status professionals. In
sum, human capital commands high status jobs.
10