Game Theoretic Approaches for Spectrum Redistribution

109 Pages·2014·11.166 MB·English

by  Fan Wu (auth.)

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN
ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING
Fan Wu
Game Theoretic
Approaches
for Spectrum
Redistribution
123
SpringerBriefs in Electrical
and Computer Engineering
Forfurthervolumes:
http://www.springer.com/series/10059

Fan Wu
Game Theoretic Approaches
for Spectrum Redistribution
123
FanWu
DepartmentofComputerScience
andEngineering
ShanghaiJiaoTongUniversity
Shanghai,People’sRepublicofChina
ISSN2191-8112 ISSN2191-8120(electronic)
ISBN978-1-4939-0499-0 ISBN978-1-4939-0500-3(eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-1-4939-0500-3
SpringerNewYorkHeidelbergDordrechtLondon
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2014931419
©TheAuthor(s)2014
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Preface
This book presents a systematic study of game-theoretic approaches for dynamic
spectrum redistribution. The objective of this book is to provide readers with a
comprehensive understanding of fundamental design methodologies for efficient
spectrumallocationwithstrategicparticipants.Thebookcanbeusedasagraduate-
level seminar textbook and as a reference for academic and industrial researchers
andstudentsworkinginthisfield.
In this book, Chap.1 begins with an introduction of the problem of game-
theoretic spectrum redistribution. A short tutorial of solution concepts in game
theory is presented in Chap.2. Chapter 3 covers state of the art in the literature.
Chapter 4 provides two complementary game-theoretic approaches for channel
allocation in a clique. In Chap.5, the focus shifts to game-theoretic approaches
in multi-hope wireless networks, where spectrum can be spatially reused. Finally,
Chap.6summarizesthecontentsofthisbookandpointsoutopenproblems.
Theonlyprerequisiteknowledgeforthisbookisabasicunderstandingofgame
theory.Forthosewhoarenotfamiliarwithgametheory,pleaserefertoChap.2for
ashorttutorial.Acomprehensiveintroductionofgametheorycanbefoundin[46].
Background in wireless communication is recommended but not required, as the
necessaryunderlyingprinciplesarecoveredinthegame/auctionmodels.
Manypeople’seffortsresultintheappearanceofthisbook.Iwouldliketothank
Sheng Zhong, Chunming Qiao, Nitin Vaidya, Guihai Chen, Tingting Chen, Nikhil
Singh,TianrongZhang,QianyiHuang,ZhenzheZheng,RuihaoZhu,andYixinTao
for their insightful contributions to this book. I gratefully acknowledge the help
fromXuemin(Sherman)Shen.Finally,thankstoSusanLagerstrom-Fife,Courtney
Clark,andJenniferMalatfortheirvaluableadvicethroughouttheproductionofthis
book.
This work was supported in part by the State Key Development Program for
Basic Research of China (grant no. 2014CB340303, 2012CB316201), in part by
China NSF grant 61272443 and 61133006, and in part by Shanghai Science and
Technologyfund12PJ1404900and12ZR1414900.
Shanghai,People’sRepublicofChina FanWu
v

Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................... 1
2 AShortTutorialonGameTheory.......................................... 5
2.1 StrategicGames.......................................................... 5
2.1.1 DefinitionofStrategicGame.................................... 5
2.1.2 NashEquilibrium................................................ 6
2.1.3 DominantStrategy............................................... 6
2.2 MechanismDesign....................................................... 7
3 StateofArtonChannelAllocation ......................................... 9
3.1 CooperativeChannelAllocation ........................................ 9
3.2 ChannelAllocationwithSelfishParticipants........................... 9
4 Game-TheoreticChannelAllocationinClique............................ 11
4.1 OptimalAllocationofFixedChannels.................................. 11
4.1.1 StrategicGameModel........................................... 12
4.1.2 AchievingGlobalOptimality ................................... 13
4.1.3 ComputingGloballyOptimalChannelAllocation............. 15
4.1.4 EvaluationResults............................................... 16
4.2 OptimalAllocationofAdjustableChannels............................ 20
4.2.1 StrategicGameModel........................................... 20
4.2.2 ExistenceofNashEquilibrium.................................. 23
4.2.3 AchievingGlobalOptimality ................................... 26
4.2.4 ComputingGloballyOptimalChannelAllocation............. 31
4.2.5 EvaluationResults............................................... 32
5 Game-TheoreticChannelAllocationinMulti-Hop
WirelessNetworks ............................................................ 39
5.1 AuctionModel ........................................................... 40
5.2 AuctionMechanismforHomogenousChannelAllocation............ 41
5.2.1 AuctionDesignwithSingle-ChannelBids..................... 41
5.2.2 ExtensiontoMulti-ChannelBids............................... 45
5.2.3 EvaluationResults............................................... 46
vii
viii Contents
5.3 AuctionMechanismforAdjustableChannelAllocation............... 49
5.3.1 AuctionDesign .................................................. 50
5.3.2 EvaluationResults............................................... 62
5.4 AuctionMechanismforHeterogeneousChannelAllocation.......... 64
5.4.1 ModelofMulti-UnitCombinatorialChannelAuction......... 66
5.4.2 AuctionDesign .................................................. 70
5.4.3 EvaluationResults............................................... 75
5.5 PrivacyPreservingChannelAuction.................................... 78
5.5.1 AGenericStrategy-ProofChannelAuction.................... 79
5.5.2 CryptographicTools............................................. 80
5.5.3 AuctionDesign .................................................. 81
5.5.4 ExtensiontoMulti-ChannelBids............................... 88
5.5.5 EvaluationResults............................................... 93
6 SummaryandOpenProblems .............................................. 97
References.......................................................................... 99
Chapter 1
Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a rapid development of wireless
communication technology. Unfortunately, naturally limited radio spectrum is
becoming a more and more serious bottleneck of ongoing growth of wireless
applications and services. Most of the countries have specific departments to
regulate spectrum usage, e.g., Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [19]
in the US and Radio Administration Bureau (RAB) in China [48]. They statically
allocate spectrum to wireless application service providers on a long term basis
for large geographical regions. Such static management leads to low spectrum
utilizationinspatialandtemporaldimensions.Largechunksofradiospectrumare
left idle most of the time at a lot of places, while new wireless applications are
starvingfortheradiospectrum.Therefore,anopenandmarket-basedframeworkis
highlyneededtodynamicallyredistributetheradiospectrum,andthusimprovethe
utilizationoftheradiospectrum.Openmarkets,suchasSpectrumBridge[53],have
alreadyappearedtoimprovespectrumutilizationbyprovidingservicesforbuying,
selling,andleasingidlespectrum/channel.
Inthisbook,westudytheproblemofspectrum/channelallocationfromagame-
theoretic perspective, in which the nodes in the wireless network are rational and
always pursue their own objectives. Similar as most of the existing works, we
first model the problem as a strategic game, and analyze the existence of Nash
equilibrium(NE),whichisafundamentalsolutionconceptfromgametheory,when
thereisnoexogenousfactortoinfluenceparticipants’behavior.However,NEdoes
notprovideanidealsolutiontotheproblemofspectrumallocationinmanycases.
Therearethreereasons.
(cid:129) NE is not a very strong solution concept. Specifically, when in a NE, a player
of the game has incentives to keep its equilibrium strategy only under the
assumptionthatalltheotherplayersarealsokeepingtheirequilibriumstrategies.
Whenthisassumptionisnotvalid,NEdoesnotprovideincentivesforthegame
player.
F.Wu,GameTheoreticApproachesforSpectrumRedistribution,SpringerBriefs 1
inElectricalandComputerEngineering,DOI10.1007/978-1-4939-0500-3__1,
©TheAuthor(s)2014