G. E. Moore (Arguments of the Philosophers)

358 Pages·1999·22.98 MB·English

by  Thomas Baldwin

G.E. MOORE
The Arguments of
the Philosophers
EDITOR: TED HONDERICH
The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and
history of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book
constitutes a detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher
of major influence and significance.
Plato J. C. B. Gosling
Augustine Christopher Kitwan
The Presowatic Philosophers Jonathan Barnes
Plotinus Lloyd P. Gerson
The Sceptics R. J. Hankinson
Socrates Getasimos Xenophon Santas
Berkeley George Pitcher
Descartes Margaret DauIer Wilson
Hobbes Tom Sore11
Lo&e Michael Ayers
Spinoza R. J. Delahunty
Bentham Ross Harrison
Hume Barry Stroud
Butler Terence Penelhum
John Stuart Mill John Skotupski
Thomas Reid Keith Lehtet
Kant Ralph C. S. Walker
Hegel M. J. Inwood
Schopenhauer D. W. Hamlyn
Kier&egaard Alastair Hannay
Nietzsche Richard Schacht
Karl Marx Allen W. Wood
Gottlob Frege Hans D. Sluga
Meinong Reinhatdt Grossmann
Husserl David Bell
G. E. Moore Thomas Baldwin
Wittgenstein Robert J. Fogelin
Russell Mark Sainsbury
William James Graham Bird
Peirce Christopher Hookway
Santayana Timothy L. S. Sprigge
Dewy J. E. Tiles
Bergson A. R. Lacey
J, L. Austin G. J. Warnock
Karl Popper Anthony O’Hear
Ayer John Foster
Sartre Peter Caws
G.E. MOORE
The Argzlments of the Philosophers
Thomas Baldwin
London and New York
First published 1990 by Routledge
First published in paperback 1992
This edition reprinted in hardback 1999
by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001
Rot&edge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group
0 1990,1992 Thomas Baldwin
Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd,
Chippenham, Wiltshire
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Pubiication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book has been requested
ISBN 0415-20377-5
ISBN O-4 15-20392-g (set)
Publisher’s note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint
but points out that some imperfections in the original book may be apparent.
‘The cow is over there,’ said Ansell, lighting a match and holding it out
over the carpet. No one spoke. He waited till the end of the match fell
off. Then he spoke again, ‘She is there, the cow. There, now.’
‘You have not proved it,’ said a voice.
‘I have proved it to myself.’
‘I have proved to myself that she isn’t,’ said the voice. ‘The cow is noz
there.’ Ansell frowned and lit another match.
‘She’s there for me,’ he declared. ‘I don’t care whether she’s there for
you or not. Whether I’m in Cambridge or Iceland or dead, the cow will
be there.’
It was philosophy.
(E.M. Forster The Longest Joumty p. 1)

Contents
Preface xi
Acknowledgements xv
Abbreviations xvi
I THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM 1
1: Moore as idealist 2
2: Idealism rejected 4
3: The critique of Kant 7
4: Content, concept, and object 12
5: The refutation of phenomenalism 16
6: Moore and Absolute idealism 20
7: Bradley and relations 28
8: Evil and the Absolute 3-5
II PURE REALISM 39
1: Concepts as substances 40
2: Particulars and universals 45
3: Consciousness and the self 50
4: The a priori 55
5: Analysis 61
III THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY 66
1: Background to Principia Etbica 67
2: What is the naturalistic fallacy? 69
vii
CONTENTS
3: Goodness 73
4: The natural/non-natural distinction 80
5: Is there a fallacy? 86
6: Intuitionism 101
7: Emotivism 106
IV IDEAL UTILITARIANISM 111
1: Consequentialism and deontology 111
2: Common-sense morality 119
3: Egoism 123
4: The principle of organic unities 126
5: The ideal 129
6: Free will 134
V PURE REALISM REJECTED 145
1: Naive realism and its problems 146
2: Sense-data introduced and scepticism confronted 149
3; Common-sense 155
4: Propositions denied 161
5: Truth 164
6: Being and existence 169
VI LOGIC AND FICTIONS 172
1: Logical fictions 173
2: Existence 178
3: Imaginary objects 186
VII PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 193
1: Propositions and sentences 195
2: Conceptual analysis and the paradox of analysis 203
3: Why analyse? 214
4: Analysis and ontological commitment 222
5: Moore’s paradox 226
. . .
Vlfl
CONTENTS
VIII SENSE-DATA AND PERCEPTION 233
1: The status of sense-data 234
2: Direct realism 240
3: What are sense-data? 246
4: The nature of sensible appearances 250
IX ‘KNOWLEDGE AND SCEPTICISM 267
1: Perception and knowledge 267
2: Differential certainty 269
3: Pragmatic incoherence 274
4: The dogmatist interpretation 279
5 : The ‘Proof’ and the ‘Defence’ 289
6: The final failure 298
7: Externalism and common-sense 303
Notes 311
Appendix 332
Index 335
ix