Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation: A Survey of Theories on the Justification of Judicial Decisions

371 Pages·2017·1.45 MB·English

by  Eveline T. Feteris (auth.)

Argumentation Library 1
Eveline T. Feteris
Fundamentals
of Legal
Argumentation
A Survey of Theories on the Justifi cation
of Judicial Decisions
Second Edition
Argumentation Library
Volume 1
Second Edition
Series Editor
Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Bart Garssen, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
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Erik C.W. Krabbe, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
John Woods, University of British Columbia, Canada
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Eveline T. Feteris
Fundamentals of Legal
Argumentation
A Survey of Theories on the Justification
of Judicial Decisions
Second Edition
Eveline T. Feteris
Speech Communication, Argumentation
Theory and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ISSN 1566-7650 ISSN 2215-1907 (electronic)
Argumentation Library
ISBN 978-94-024-1127-0 ISBN 978-94-024-1129-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-024-1129-4
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1st edition: © Springer Netherlands 1999
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Preface
Since the publication of the first edition of Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation in
1999, various developments have taken place in the research of legal argumentation.
To provide a systematic and complete picture of the ‘state of the art’ of research of
legal argumentation, those developments need to be incorporated. For this reason, it
seemed a good idea to update the first edition of this book in a completely revised
version in which those new developments are included.
The reason for writing Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation in 1999 was that
in the period 1970–1990, in different research traditions, lively discussions took
place about the status of a theory of legal argumentation and the nature of its foun-
dations. The basic idea of the book was to provide an introductory overview of
influential and leading theories of legal argumentation from different disciplinary
backgrounds such as logic, rhetoric, argumentation theory, legal philosophy and
legal theory.
Since the 1990s, differences of opinion about the status and the foundations of a
theory of legal argumentation have moved to the background: the necessity and the
status of a theory of legal argumentation have now been generally accepted. At con-
ferences from various disciplines such as legal philosophy, legal theory, argumenta-
tion theory and artificial intelligence and law, argumentation is always one of the
recurring conference themes. There are even conferences that are dedicated entirely
to legal argumentation. Scientific journals in the field publish special issues on top-
ics related to legal argumentation. In legal education at universities and courses for
legal practitioners, legal argumentation is often part of the curriculum. Among
researchers from various disciplines and theoretical orientations, there is agreement
with respect to the foundations of a theory of legal argumentation and the relevance
of the theoretical insights for legal education and legal practice. In recent years, the
discussions concentrate more on further elaborations and refinements of specific
parts of existing theories and a further application in specific fields.
As indicated, various developments have taken place in the research of legal
argumentation since 1999. Influential authors discussed in the first edition of
Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation, such as Alexy, Habermas and MacCormick,
have expanded on their earlier ideas, and have elaborated on certain parts of their
v
vi Preface
theories. Many works by the authors discussed in the first edition have been trans-
lated in various languages with the aim of making their work accessible to a broader
audience. The work of leading authors has inspired new generations of researchers
to elaborate on specific aspects of the theories from new (disciplinary) perspectives
and to develop new lines of research. Furthermore, other disciplines have incorpo-
rated the study of legal argumentation as an important research topic, for example,
disciplines such as argumentation theory, informal logic, artificial intelligence and
law. Finally, there is a growing interest to apply insights from theories of legal argu-
mentation to specific fields of law, such as constitutional law, European law, inter-
national law and human rights.
In this completely revised edition, the first edition of Fundamentals of Legal
Argumentation has been extended in various respects. The central focus remains on
studies of legal argumentation in the context of the justification of judicial deci-
sions. Apart from an update of the various chapters with a discussion of new devel-
opments in the work of the different authors on the basis of recent publications and
debates, I also added two new chapters. The first addition is a new chapter (1) on
legal justification and interpretation that serves as an introduction of the discussion
of the theories of legal justification. The second addition is a new chapter (11) with
a survey of research in different legal systems and countries.
In the new Chap. 1, entitled ‘Legal Argumentation and Legal Interpretation’, I
provide an introduction of the key concepts and distinctions in the theory of legal
interpretation that are relevant as basis for the different theories and studies of legal
justification that are discussed in the book. In the new Chap. 11, entitled ‘A Survey
of Approaches and Studies of Legal Argumentation in the Context of Legal
Justification in Different Legal Systems and Countries’, the basic idea is to provide
a systematic overview of relevant studies of legal argumentation. The chapter con-
tains a survey of studies not only by the influential authors discussed in the previous
chapters but also by other scholars who have contributed to discussions about
(aspects of) legal argumentation and legal justification.
The work for this new edition would have been impossible without the help of
many colleagues in the Netherlands and abroad. Thanks to the information they
have provided me, and thanks to the critical comments they have given me, I have
been able to complete this revision of my earlier book.
First, I want to thank my colleagues in my own research group, the Argumentation
and Rhetoric Group Amsterdam (ARGA), who have assisted me with their com-
ments and critique.
Second, I want to thank various colleagues in the field who have provided me
with their comments and critique that have been of great help in completing the dif-
ferent chapters of the book:
Chapter 1: Maarten Feteris (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, the Netherlands), Janneke Gerards (Utrecht
University, the Netherlands), Harm Kloosterhuis (Erasmus University
Rotterdam, the Netherlands) and Franziskus Weissbarth (University
of Bern, Switzerland).
Preface vii
Chapter 2: Henry Prakken (Utrecht University, Universtity of Groningen, the
Netherlands)
Chapter 3: Bart Verheij (University of Groningen, the Netherlands)
Chapter 5: William Rehg (Saint Louis University, United States)
Chapter 7: Matthias Klatt (University of Graz, Austria) and Georgios Pavlakos
(University of Glasgow, United Kingdom)
Chapter 9: Christian Dahlman (University of Lund, Sweden)
Chapter 10: Frans van Eemeren (University of Amsterdam and Leiden University,
the Netherlands; Jiangsu University, Zhejiang University, China),
Harm Kloosterhuis (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands)
and José Plug (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
Chapter 12 Harm Kloosterhuis (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands)
and Willem Melching (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
Finally, I am grateful to many scholars who have provided me with relevant
information on studies of legal argumentation in their country that I have used as a
basis for Chap. 11 in which I provide a survey of the research of legal argumentation
in different countries:
Chapter 11: Germany and German-speaking countries, Hanna Maria Kreuzbauer
(Salzburg University, Austria); Scandinavia, Christian Dahlman
(University of Lund, Sweden); Poland, Bartosz Brozek (Jagiellonian
University, Kraków, Poland); Slovenia, Marko Novak (The European
Faculty of Law, Nova Gorica, Slovenia) and Marijan Pavčnik
(University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia); Italy, Stefano Bertea
(University of Leicester, United Kingdom) and Giovanni Tuzet
(Bocconi University, Milan, Italy), Spain, Manuel Atienza (University
of Alicante, Spain); Latin America, Virgilio Afonso da Silva
(University of São Paulo, Brazil), Manuel Atienza (University of
Alicante, Spain), Thomas Bustamante (University of Minas Gerais,
Brazil) and Flavia Carbonell (Alberto Hurtado University, Santiago
de Chile, Chile); and China, Minghui Xiong (Sun Yat-sen University,
Guangzhou, China) and Chunshui Wang (Open University of
Guangdong and Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China)
I want to thank Martijn Demollin for proofreading and correcting the
manuscript.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands Eveline T. Feteris
April 2017
Contents
1 Legal Argumentation and Legal Interpretation ................................... 1
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 1
1.2 C entral Problems in the Application and Interpretation
of Legal Rules ................................................................................. 2
1.2.1 Clear Cases and Hard Cases ............................................. 3
1.2.2 Exceptions to Legal Rules: Defeasibility
and Exclusionary Reasons ................................................ 5
1.2.3 The Distinction Between Legal Rules
and Legal Principles ......................................................... 6
1.2.4 The Solution of Conflicts Between Norms:
Conflict Rules, Weighing and Balancing .......................... 7
1.2.5 The Status of Legal Rules, Principles and Precedents
as Arguments in Legal Justification .................................. 8
1.3 I nterpretation Methods, Types of Legal Reasoning
and the Justification of Legal Decisions ......................................... 9
1.3.1 Methods of Legal Interpretation and Types of Legal
Reasoning ......................................................................... 9
1.3.2 Interpretation Strategies and Argumentative Patterns
in Legal Justification ......................................................... 12
1.4 L egal Interpretation and Argumentation in the Context
of EU Law and International Law .................................................. 14
1.5 L egal Interpretation and Legal Justification: The Law
as Argumentative Activity .............................................................. 18
References ................................................................................................. 19
2 The Logical Approach of Legal Argumentation ................................... 23
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 23
2.2 Logical Validity and Acceptability of Legal Argumentation .......... 24
2.3 Various Logical Theories ................................................................ 25
2.4 Logical Analysis of Legal Argumentation ...................................... 28
ix
x Contents
2.5 T he Discussion of the Importance of Logic
for Legal Argumentation................................................................. 30
2.6 T he Role of Logic in Legal Justification in Approaches
of Artificial Intelligence and Law ................................................... 33
2.6.1 The Defeasibility of Legal Reasoning and Legal
Argumentation .................................................................. 34
2.6.2 AI and Law Models for Defeasible Reasoning
About Conflicting Claims, Rules and Interpretations ....... 36
2.6.3 AI and Law Models for Defeasibility
and Argument Schemes .................................................... 38
2.6.4 AI and Law Models for Defeasible Reasoning
in Dialogue and Mediation Systems ................................. 39
2.7 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 41
References ................................................................................................. 43
3 Toulmin’s Argumentation Model ........................................................... 49
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 49
3.2 Toulmin’s Argumentation Model and the Stages
of a Legal Process ........................................................................... 51
3.3 A pplications of Toulmin’s Model in the Theoretical
and Practical Literature on Legal Argumentation ........................... 54
3.4 R efinements and Extensions of the Toulmin Model
in the Literature on Artificial Intelligence and Law ....................... 55
3.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 59
References ................................................................................................. 60
4 Perelman’s New Rhetoric ....................................................................... 63
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 63
4.2 Perelman’s General Argumentation Theory ................................... 64
4.3 Perelman’s Legal Argumentation Theory ....................................... 67
4.4 Applications of Perelman’s New Rhetoric in the Literature
of Legal Argumentation .................................................................. 70
4.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 73
References ................................................................................................. 74
5 Habermas’s Discourse Theory and the Rationality
of Legal Discourse ................................................................................... 77
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 77
5.2 H abermas’s Discourse Theory and Rational Consensus ................ 78
5.2.1 The Theory of Rational Practical Discourse
and the Communicative Character of the Rational
Acceptability of Moral Claims ......................................... 79
5.2.2 The Relation Between Rational Moral Discourse
and Rational Discourse in Legal Settings ......................... 83