Table Of ContentFUNDAMENTAL
CONCEPTS
IN
MAX WEBER’S
SOCIOLOGY
OF
RELIGION
Christopher Adair-Toteff
Fundamental Concepts in Max Weber’s Sociology of Religion
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Fundamental Concepts in
Max Weber’s Sociology
of Religion
Christopher Adair-Toteff
Palgrave
macmillan
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN MAX WEBER’S SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
Copyright © Christopher Adair-Toteff 2015
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-47217-5
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First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
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Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of Nature America, Inc., One
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ISBN 978-1-349-56140-7
E-PDF ISBN: 978–1–137–45479–9
DOI: 10.1057/9781137454799
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Adair-Toteff, Christopher.
Fundamental concepts in Max Weber’s Sociology of religion /
Christopher Adair-Toteff.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Weber, Max, 1864–1920. Religionssoziologie. 2. Religion and
sociology. I. Title.
BL60.W43A33 2015
306.6092—dc23 2015016505
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Contents
Preface vii
Part I Conceptual Contexts
1 Introduction 3
2 From Roman Agrarianism to Sociology of Religion 9
3 Conceptual Influences and Developments 33
Part II Fundamental Concepts
4 Asceticism and Mysticism 55
5 Prophets and Pariah-People 83
6 Salvation and Theodicy 105
7 Charisma 131
Notes 157
Bibliography 179
Index 199
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Preface
The sociology of religion, and more specifically, Max Weber’s
sociology of religion, has been the focus of much of my
scholarly research for almost a decade and a half. They were
not my original interests; indeed, neither was sociology in gen-
eral. Instead, my interest was originally in philosophy and my
university education reflected this. During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, the dominant philosophy in the United States, as in
Great Britain, was analytical philosophy. So, as an undergradu-
ate, I was trained primarily in that type of philosophy. During
this time, I learned the importance of conceptual clarity, but
what I also learned was that philosophy had been reduced to
being a linguistic tool. It had little use for the age-old questions
about the meaning of life and how one should act; as a result,
in graduate school, I turned increasingly to the study of the his-
tory of philosophy. I went back to ancient philosophy and pri-
marily to Plato’s philosophy. Plato’s metaphysics was intriguing
and how he used it to justify his politics was impressive, but his
division of the world into the ideal and its mere copy was less
than compelling. I moved to study Aristotle and then I really
focused on Kant. I had intended to write my PhD dissertation
on the Paralogisms section of the Critique of Pure Reason and
had successfully defended a dissertation proposal on this when
I was strongly urged not to focus on Kantianism, but instead
on Neo-Kantianism. The resulting dissertation centered on the
long-term Neo-Kantian debate concerning Kant’s conception
of space. This led me to appreciate how often we overlook the
backgrounds of many of the classical German sociologists. For
viii PREFACE
one example, we think of Georg Simmel as primarily a sociolo-
gist, but he was trained as a philosopher and was one who spe-
cialized on Kant’s philosophy. He did not contribute directly to
the Neo-Kantian discussion of space, but he did raise important
points about Kant’s place in philosophy and his lack of interest
in historical issues. Something similar is true about Ferdinand
Tö n nies—that his interest was in political philosophy and he
concentrated not just on Marx but especially on Hobbes. Unlike
Simmel and Tö n nies, Ernst Troeltsch was not educated as a phi-
losopher, but as a theologian; nonetheless, his writings from 1900
on show an impressive knowledge of many aspects of philosophy
and a real mastery of Kantian ethics. Following my PhD I began
to write on Simmel, T ö nnies, and then Troeltsch, and finally to
concentrate on Max Weber. Unlike the first three, Weber never
had any particular interest in any general philosophical top-
ics and he was concerned primarily with logic and concepts.
In W issenschaft als Beruf, he underscores the power of reason
and he extols the importance of concepts. Concepts were crit-
ical to Weber’s social thinking throughout most of his life and
although he continually insisted on conceptual clarity, he often
did not live up to his own standards. As a result, many of his
fundamental concepts are not as clear as they could have been
and scholars have often debated what he meant by them. This
has been especially true in regard to concepts in Weber’s sociol-
ogy of religion. This was certainly problematic for students, but
it became increasing evident that even Weberian scholars were
not always able to comprehend what Weber meant by certain
concepts like “charisma,” “asceticism,” and “theodicy.” This was
made apparent to me while participating in a number of confer-
ences that were devoted to Weber, in lectures, and especially
during discussions. This lack of understanding and even con-
fusion is what helped prompt me to write this book; that and
my own struggles with understanding many of the concepts in
Weber’s sociology of religion. I do not claim to have the defin-
itive answer to what Weber meant by these various concepts,
but I do believe that I have drawn sufficient attention to various
PREFACE ix
aspects about them and that will prompt others to pay closer
attention to how Weber uses these concepts. Weber was never
a philosopher and he evidently never had the desire to become
one but, like any good philosopher, he recognized the critical
importance of concepts. One would never expect to see Weber’s
name alongside Plato, Aristotle, or Kant, but like these great
philosophers, he expected scholars to use concepts properly,
that is, clearly and consistently.
A number of people were especially helpful during the course
of thinking about and then writing this book. These include
Edith Hanke, Sam Whimster, and Richard Swedberg. As always,
I owe a debt of gratitude to my wife, Stephanie, for going over
successive drafts and helping to ensure that my own concepts
are clear and my writing intelligible. I also owe a huge debt of
gratitude to Stephen P. Turner for his encouragement and for
his criticisms. For over 20 years, Stephen has been a continual
source of inspiration for my research and a constant reminder
of the importance of Weber. For all that he has done, and that
he continues to do for scholars, I dedicate this book to Stephen
Turner.
