FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A FUTURE ACP-EU PARTNERSHIP

28 Pages·2017·1.02 MB·English

Making policies work
ACP-EU

Charting the course to 2020:
FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES FOR THE NEGOTIATION
OF A FUTURE ACP-EU PARTNERSHIP
By Alfonso Medinilla & Jean Bossuyt
January 2018
This paper builds on previous work of ECDPM

Feedback can be given to
Alfonso Medinilla: [email protected]
The authors are grateful for input
and feedback received from Niels Keijzer (DIE),
Geert Laporte, Andrew Sherriff, Alexei Jones,
Mariella Di Ciommo and Meritxell Sayós Monràs
Graphic design: Robin van Hontem
INTRODUCTION 1
1. THE DYNAMICS AT PLAY IN EU EXTERNAL ACTION 4
2. THE REGIONS HOW TO PARTNER WITH REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS? 7
3. THE MONEY FINANCING EU EXTERNAL ACTION AFTER 2020 11
4. THE LEGAL BASIS WHAT TYPE OF PARTNERSHIP FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION? 14
5. THE ACTORS STATE-CENTRIC COOPERATION OR MULTI-ACTOR PARTNERSHIPS? 18
6. THE TOOLS IMPLEMENTING THE NEW PARTNERSHIP AND MANAGING RESOURCES 20
7. THE NEGOTIATIONS SETTING THE TERMS 22
3
INTRODUCTION
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
A NEW MODEL OF COOPERATION
Formal negotiations for the future of ACP-EU relations reports that came out last year3. Changes the EU nor the
should start in August 2018. Unlike previous rounds, this ACP can afford to ignore. There is still a long way to go
renegotiation of a new ACP-EU partnership agreement for the AU before the announced reforms will be fully
will not be business as usual. Since the signing of the implemented but with every step, the AU is becoming
Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000, major a more credible and legitimate pan-African institution.
changes have taken place. These include new geopoliti- It is in the interest of the AU and regional bodies to en-
cal realities, globalisation and regionalisation dynamics, gage now in the negotiation process on the future of
the growing heterogeneity of the ACP group, a changed ACP-EU cooperation. This is particularly true considering
EU, and the emergence of a ‘universal’ 2030 Agenda for that the EU has proposed to conclude a new partnership
Sustainable Development, which transcends the tradi- agreement for an indefinite period.
tional North-South divide and calls for different means
of implementation. Many actors may still see the renegotiation of the ACP-
EU partnership as a technical matter or as a fixed char-
All these factors have led to an increasing marginali- acteristic of EU development policy. Yet it is in fact a rare,
sation of the privileged relationship between the ACP generational opportunity to modernise the overall ap-
and the EU –as the various actors seek to defend their proach to international cooperation; an opportunity to
interests through different continental, regional and update the EU’s relations with Africa and move beyond
thematic bodies1. The best illustration of this evolution a state-centric and donor-recipient partnership.
is the partnership between Europe and Africa. The 2017
Abidjan AU-EU summit saw multiple calls for a deeper Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has
and more equal partnership between the two conti- experimented with its broadened external mandate,
nents, an ambition that was long held back by the do- entering into new partnerships, trying out new tactics
nor-recipient model of cooperation that is enshrined in and approaches – sometimes with a plan, more often
ACP-EU partnership approach. At the press conference in response to problems. Examples include EU Trust
of the summit, AUC Chairperson Moussa Faki openly Funds, the Global Agenda for Migration and Mobility
called to “[...] assess the 42 years old ACP-EU Partnership, and the new European Fund for Sustainable Develop-
together with our European friends. These types of rela- ment (EFSD). The Cotonou Agreement in that sense has
tionships are outdated”2. become an anomaly. It symbolises a particular European
development approach to most of Africa, the Caribbe-
The AU’s entry into the debate changes the terms of an and the Pacific that far predates EU-28; an approach
engagement. It is also in line with the new ambitious that has evolved along with an expanding EU, yet is
and reformist wind that is blowing through the conti- now increasingly overshadowed by AU-EU relations and
nental institutions following the Kagame and Kaberuka more urgent strategic priorities4.
1 For a detailed analysis see Bossuyt, J, e.a. 2016. The future of ACP-
EU relations: A political economy analysis. Policy Management Report 21. 3 Kagame, P. 2017. The Imperative to Strengthen our Union: Report
ECDPM. on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of
the African Union; AU Peace Fund. 2016. Securing Predictable and
2 Authors’ translation of a response of Chairperson Moussa Faki at the Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa
press conference of the 5th AU-EU summit in Abidjan on 30 November
2017. Original: “Il est temps, avec nos amis européens, d’évaluer notre 4 Bossuyt, J., Keijzer, N., Medinilla, A., Sherriff, A., Laporte, G., Tollenaere,
coopération. Les ACP ça fait 42 ans (…) ça va arriver à terme en 2020; je M. de. 2017. ACP-EU relations beyond 2020: Engaging the future or
pense que ce genre de relations a vécu (…)”. perpetuating the past? Maastricht: ECDPM.
1
ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION
Africa is currently at the top of the EU’s foreign policy
agenda. While the official narrative is that Africa is a This publication looks at the core features of ACP-EU
new frontier, a continent of opportunity and future relations in this wider context of EU foreign relations
prosperity, in the eyes of many European politicians, it and outlines the fundamental political choices that
is first seen as a threat, a source of potential terrorism will need to be made in the upcoming negotiations. In
and an endless supply of people coming to their shores. the process, the EU, Africa and the ACP can opt for the
Africa in turn sees an increasingly fragmented Europe path of least resistance, seeking to maintain and pre-
that is still caught in a post-colonial, sometimes patron- serve core elements of the ACP-EU partnership in a fu-
ising logic. That said, Europe’s fate is linked to Africa’s ture hybrid agreement; one that is primarily based on a
by more than the risk of spillover and its shared histo- traditional donor-recipient relationship with individual
ry. There is a clear interest in fostering long-standing states, marginalises other actors, and de facto subordi-
trade and economic relations for greater value creation nates continental/regional bodies. Or they can choose
and mutual market access that goes beyond raw mate- to reshape the ACP-EU partnership, starting from the
rials. As Africa’s markets grow and diversify, European stated objective of mutually beneficial, interest-driven
interests will follow. The challenges ahead however are cooperation, based on multi-actor partnerships and re-
immense. According the Heidelberg Conflict Barome- gional dynamics. This may be more difficult to achieve
ter, Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be the region with in the short run, however it is the way forward in inter-
the most ‘high-intensity’ level conflicts’ (14 of 38 glob- national cooperation, particularly for EU-Africa relations.
ally)5. By 2050, the population of Africa is set to double
with an increase of around 1.29 billion people. Climate To illustrate the various fundamental choices involved
change vulnerability affects Africa more than any oth- in the renegotiation of the ACP-EU partnership in this
er continent. In short, the need for decisive action is wider strategic context, seven aspects of ACP-EU rela-
great but the cost of inaction may be even greater. tions are detailed below. They start from the initial EU
and ACP proposals to renew and extend the partnership
In the next two years we will see the outcome of the while also ensuring a better integration of continental
Brexit negotiations and the European Parliament Elec- and regional dynamics. On that basis we identify critical
tions. The post-Cotonou negotiations also coincide with choices both for the content of the partnership and the
the internal EU budgetary cycle and the revision of the process of the negotiations.
EU’s External Financing Instruments (EFIs) for a post
2020 set-up. All these processes combined are a unique
opportunity. It means that the discussion can go beyond
the age-old question of how to build coherence and
complementarity between existing policy frameworks.
Parallel negotiations may open the door for a more
substantial reform of the EU’s international coopera-
tion model and its relations with Africa -one that is not
defined by the frameworks and instruments that are in
place, but by the challenges and ambitions that drive it.
5 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). 2017.
Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2016. February 2017
2

1
1. THE DYNAMICS AT PLAY
IN EU EXTERNAL ACTION
Between now and 2020, several internal and external EU In 2018, the EU for the first time proposes to bring
processes coincide. This is illustrated with the visual on the two together in the future ACP-EU agreement
the following page. 2018 will be a year of uncertainty as by integrating, and eventually replacing the current Joint
well as a year of choices. The combined outcome of these Africa-Europe Strategy (JAES) as a basis for a regional
processes will shape the EU’s approach to Africa and the compact with Africa7. This is a laudable move that cre-
ACP for at least the next decade. ates new opportunities. However, given the different
languages of both partnerships this will be a difficult
On one side, the EU has pursued an interest and exercise, one that requires a fundamental rethink of how
event-driven agenda, pushing it towards more flexi- the EU engages in Africa and the ACP.
ble partnerships and financing instruments under the
next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF). The im- Paradoxically, the success of this external negoti-
plementation of the EU Global Strategy prioritises the ation will to a large extent depend on the internal
EU’s interests abroad and gives way to a more realist and politics of the EU. The outcome of the Brexit negoti-
pragmatic foreign agenda, not least in the EU’s approach ations will define what role – if any – the UK will play
to migration and mobility. At the same time, the EU is in the EU’s approach to Africa and the ACP and vice ver-
gradually adopting a stronger profile as a security actor6 sa. EU member states and institutions have always had
both abroad and at home. The AU-EU partnership seeks an asymmetrical stake in EU-ACP cooperation, with the
to harness common interests and cooperation on key partnership currently being of most interest to the in-
urgencies including peace and security, migration and stitutions and of low profile in most if not all member
youth employment. The 2030 agenda and SDGs also call states. Many EU13 countries take only a passing interest
for a broader and more flexible partnership approach, in the partnership. France and Germany will likely hold
one that crosses the boundaries of development cooper- significant sway over the direction of the EU positioning.
ation. This is also reflected in the 2017 European Consen- At the same time, smaller member states and ‘coalitions’
sus on Development. can and may yet leave their mark on the debate, as they
have done in the past. The positioning of all these play-
On the other side of the spectrum, the ACP-EU ers – for the first time acting without a strong UK – will
partnership embodies a different model of cooperation, dictate the dynamics and outcome of the process. Linked
that of an institutionalised, contractual and procedural to this, the internal negotiations on the next EU budget
North-South partnership. The history of the partnership and the design of the next series of External Financing
pulls the EU and ACP in a different direction, one that instruments, including a possible 12th EDF or a larger
favours predictability and control over flexibility and ‘single instrument’ extending beyond the ACP, will shape
event-driven politics. the EU’s engagement abroad for the next years.
At the start of 2018, there are more questions than an-
swers on how these processes will unfold in the next
two years. Yet uncertainty can also be taken as an oppor-
tunity to broaden the EU’s perspective on Africa and the
ACP beyond what is defined by its own history and path
6 Two parallel dynamics are at play: on one side, the EU seeks to dependency.
strengthen its common defense capabilities with initiatives such as
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); on the other, a reframing
of the EU’s role as a security actor is underway, both in terms of military
and civilian interaction. One example is the recent adoption of Capacity
building in support of security and development (CBSD), which sets a
precedent for greater support to military actors with EU budgetary 7 The same is proposed for the two regional strategies with the
instruments. Caribbean and the Pacific.
4
1
?
CAN THIS BE
PARALLEL BUT DIVERGING PROCESSES • Resilience agenda and RECONCILED WITH
principled pragmatism THE CPA MODEL?
WHAT ARE THE
BETWEEN NOW AND 2020 • EU Trust funds
NEEDS IN TERMS FLEXIBLE,
• GAMM and migration compacts OF FUNDING AND
• Joined up approach to EU FLEXIBILITY? INTEREST-DRIVEN
external action PARTNERSHIPS
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUGS
2030 AGENDA AND THE GLOBAL GOALS
Deepening the partnership in four strategic priorities:
AFRICA-EU RELATIONS (JAES) November 2017 ?
• Education, Science, technology and skills
5th Africa-EU summit
CONTINUED USE OF
• Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance ?
EDF FUNDING FOR
• Migration and Mobility PRIORITIES OUTSIDE
• Mobilising Investment THE ACP-EU WHICH AFRICA
?
PARTNERSHIP? PARTNERSHIP IN
WHAT FUTURE
EU-UK RELATIONSHIP 2018? HOW TO
IN FOREIGN AND “UPDATE AND
DEVELOPMENT
BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS POLICY? 29 March 2019 REPLACE THE
UK COMMITTMENTS TO EDF
Indicative date for Britain to leave the EU JAES?”
AND BUDGETARY INSTRUMENTS
May 2018 Legislative proposals
MFF NEGOTIATIONS Commission for the new EFIs ADOPTION PROCESS OF THE MFF START OF INTERNAL
SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMMING PROCESS
proposal for the (Commission
(CONSENT) PROCEDURE
post-2020 MFF proposal for EDF) ?
WHAT TYPE OF
EU FINANCING
INTERNAL EU NEGOTIATIONS
AFTER 2020?
A 12th EDF OR BUDGETISATION?
?
LINK BETWEEN
INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL ?
NEGOTIATION?
BUDGETISATION AS
ANNOUNCED IN 2013?
WHAT FLEXIBILITY IN ?
December 2017 THE FUTURE EXTERNAL
PREDICTABLE
INSTRUMENTS?
POST-COTONOU NEGOTIATIONS Presentation and August 2018 BILATERAL AID
discussion of the Start of the ENVELOPES?
negotiation mandate negotiations
SIGNATURE AND APPROVAL PROCESS INSTITUTIONAL,
AID-DRIVEN
APPROACHES
2018 2019 2020
5
1
?
CAN THIS BE
• Resilience agenda and RECONCILED WITH
principled pragmatism THE CPA MODEL?
WHAT ARE THE
• EU Trust funds
NEEDS IN TERMS FLEXIBLE,
• GAMM and migration compacts OF FUNDING AND
• Joined up approach to EU FLEXIBILITY? INTEREST-DRIVEN
external action PARTNERSHIPS
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUGS
2030 AGENDA AND THE GLOBAL GOALS
Deepening the partnership in four strategic priorities:
AFRICA-EU RELATIONS (JAES) November 2017 ?
• Education, Science, technology and skills
5th Africa-EU summit
CONTINUED USE OF
• Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance ?
EDF FUNDING FOR
• Migration and Mobility PRIORITIES OUTSIDE
• Mobilising Investment THE ACP-EU WHICH AFRICA
?
PARTNERSHIP? PARTNERSHIP IN
WHAT FUTURE
EU-UK RELATIONSHIP 2018? HOW TO
IN FOREIGN AND “UPDATE AND
DEVELOPMENT
BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS POLICY? 29 March 2019 REPLACE THE
UK COMMITTMENTS TO EDF
Indicative date for Britain to leave the EU JAES?”
AND BUDGETARY INSTRUMENTS
May 2018 Legislative proposals
MFF NEGOTIATIONS Commission for the new EFIs ADOPTION PROCESS OF THE MFF START OF INTERNAL
SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMMING PROCESS
proposal for the (Commission
(CONSENT) PROCEDURE
post-2020 MFF proposal for EDF) ?
WHAT TYPE OF
EU FINANCING
INTERNAL EU NEGOTIATIONS
AFTER 2020?
A 12th EDF OR BUDGETISATION?
?
LINK BETWEEN
INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL ?
NEGOTIATION?
BUDGETISATION AS
ANNOUNCED IN 2013?
WHAT FLEXIBILITY IN ?
December 2017 THE FUTURE EXTERNAL
PREDICTABLE
INSTRUMENTS?
POST-COTONOU NEGOTIATIONS Presentation and August 2018 BILATERAL AID
discussion of the Start of the ENVELOPES?
negotiation mandate negotiations
SIGNATURE AND APPROVAL PROCESS INSTITUTIONAL,
AID-DRIVEN
APPROACHES
2018 2019 2020
6
2. THE REGIONS
HOW TO PARTNER WITH REGIONAL
ORGANISATIONS?
2
The debate on the regionalisation of ACP-EU relations path dependency and catch up with political and eco-
has evolved. Few will disagree on the need to shift the nomic integration, particularly in Africa.
weight of a future partnership towards the regions. The
EU proposes to do this in the form of regional compacts The following aspects need to be factored in:
standing on an all-ACP foundation, with tailored region-
al priorities as well as specific governance structures to 1. The Georgetown Agreement8 formalises the six geo-
manage and implement the partnership at regional level, graphical regions constituting the ACP: Central Africa,
involving regional institutions. The ACP’s initial position- West Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa and the Carib-
ing is much less clear on this yet the African Union has bean and Pacific. This is a purely geographical division,
announced to be working on a continental position on which is also reflected in the setup of the ACP com-
the future relations with the EU. mittee of Ambassadors, one that coexists and at times
contrasts with the political regional divisions in Africa
While the principle seems fairly straightforward -region- in 8 AU Regional Economic Communities (RECs)9.
al integration is part of the African reality and should be
reflected in an inter-regional partnership with the EU- 2. The 2000 Cotonou Agreement recognises the impor-
in practice this is proving difficult. The EU, ACP and AU/ tance of regional integration, yet it was not until the
RECs may have different expectations as to what a re- 2010 revision that the African Union and ACP ‘Regional
gionalised partnership would look like. Many questions Organisations’ were included as ‘actors’ of the partner-
remain unanswered, and will be politically very sensitive ship. Much like with Non-State Actors (see chapter 4)
to address: what role for which regional organisations in this recognition, with the exception of the Regional
a future partnership? What is the link between regional Indicative Programmes, did not lead to active partici-
partnerships and an all-ACP construction? Where will pation in ACP-EU affairs and related governance struc-
decision-making powers be vested? Who will control the tures. The primary actors of the partnership remain
resources? The weight of this discussion lies in Africa. the EU, the ACP and their respective member states.
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS
3. The EPA negotiations since 2002 added another layer
OF REGIONALISM IN ACP-EU
of regionalism. The RECs were the basis of the negoti-
COOPERATION
ating groups, yet overlapping membership meant that
Over the years the ACP-EU partnership has sought to in- – with the exception of the ECOWAS and EAC groups –
tegrate or contain regional dynamics, by setting up ded- African countries negotiated in dedicated negotiating
icated regional approaches and finding creative ways to groups. Similarly, regional programming in the ACP is
finance regional initiatives within the ACP-EU model. This based on five Regional Indicative Programmes: ‘West
builds on a long history of ACP-EU cooperation that pre- Africa’, ‘Central Africa’, ‘Eastern Africa and Southern Af-
dates the regional institutional landscape of today. Since rica and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO)’, ‘the Caribbean’,
2000, the AU and Regional Economic Communities have and ‘the Pacific’.
increasingly come to the forefront, building up regional
mandates and acting as privileged interlocutors of the
8 2003 revision of the Georgetown Agreement
EU. Trade and political cooperation – two pillars of the
ACP-EU partnership – have been de facto ‘regionalised’. At 9 The 8 EU recognised RECs are: The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA),
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the
the same time, ACP-EU cooperation continued at a differ-
Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), the East African
ent pace, focusing mainly on the remaining development Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the
cooperation pillar of the CPA. Today’s dilemma is whether
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern
or not the ACP-EU partnership can break through its own African Development Community (SADC).
7