From the Unconscious to the Conscious

348 Pages·1920·20.981 MB·English

by  Gustave Geley

FROM THE UNCONSCIOUS
TO THE
CONSCIOUS
by
GUSTAVE GELEY
: Director of the International
Metapsychical Institute* Paris. TRANSLATED from the
FRENCH STANLEY DE BRATH,
by M.INST.C.B.,
FORMERLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OP
INDIA PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM COLLINS SONS
AND CO. LTD. : 48 PALL MALL, S.W. i
GLASGOW MELBOURNE AUCKLAND
: :
Copyright 1920
TO
SIGNOR PROFESSOR Rocco SANTOLIQUIDO,
ITALIAN COUNCILLOR OF STATE, DEPUTY,
GRAND OFFICER OFTHE LEGION OF HONOUR,
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK
WITH RESPECT, GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION
G. GELEY
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
IN the opening chapter of the Origin of Species Darwin
states that the * on which selection and
variability/
adaptation have to work, *is governed by many unknown
laws.*
In ^translating a book which fills this gap in the
Evolutionary Theory by assigning a psychic cause as
the origin of Variation (thus traversing the arguments
of later biologists who refer that origin to chance or to
the pressure ofthe environment); a book which modifies
the conclusions of many schools of thought, both new
and old; which replaces Bergson's famous elan vital
by a concrete energy, and defines that energy as an
influence forming all the varieties of cellular tissue out
ofone primordial substance, and moulding those tissues
into organic form under the impulsion of a Directing
Idea, the translator has a most responsible task.
One duty, and one only, lies upon him to be
No
faithful to the author's meaning. attempt at literary
finish can palliate or excuse the slightest departure from
that duty in a work which, however scientific in essence,
is necessarily somewhat controversial in form. When
to this duty there are added the obligations which the
honour of personal friendship involves, faithfulness in
rendering the idea becomes doubly imperative. To
this all other considerations must give place.
The Italian adage, 'Traduttori traditori,' is one
which the translator must ever bear in mind ifhe would
not be a traitor also. He has therefore kept a number
ofwords which, though used by classical English writers
on may seem more or less uncouth and
philosophy,
foreign to those who are unfamiliar with such authors.
It is quite inevitable that a book which presents an
entirely new application and extension of psychology
vii
Translator's Note
should compel the use ofa terminology which some may
find obscure.
* *
Psychism,' Dynamo-psychism,' Representation/
1 Transrormism,' are words of this kind, and are all
used to express ideas which, even when not absolutely
new, are strange to the unaccustomed ear.
'Psychism ' is a word which is, or should be, well-
known; meaning the animating psychic energy which
is the subject-matter of psychology*
1 Dynamo-psychism * is considered cumbrous, but
what other word is there that expresses a psychic energy
acting as forming and motive power ? It is of the very
essence ofthe theory put forward.
4 Representation ' in ordinary use, means thedelinea-
tion ofan actuality existing elsewhere: the philosophical
sense is the same, but the actuality is in the Unseen;
the representation is in, and by, Matter, Kncrgy, or
Idea. It is used by Sir Win, Hamilton (Logify by
G. H, Lewes, by Herbert Spencer, and by J, \Yard
(EncycL Brit?) in this way.
Transformism,1 i.e. the doctrine of transforma-
bility of individuals or species, is used by Huxley'.
(Cray*fPiaslh.i)ngene+si^7s *^wis=used in its correct meaning
(^=2again production), a new or second
birth: the equivalent 'reincarnation* has been spoiled
by those who ignore the profound distinction between
the Person and the Self, and has been intentionally
avoided by the author.
* Modality ' is used as it is by Caird, in the logical
sense of modes hypothetically necessary on the pre*
supposition of something else. The list might be
extended: but in every case where a word seems to
carry an unusual meaning, reference has been made to
standard authors for its justification.
S. DB BRAIH.
WEYBRIDGS, February^ 1920.
via
PREFACE
AND METHOD
OBJECTS
THIS work is the logical sequel to my study of The
Subconscious Being. Its intention is to include both
collective and individual evolution in a larger and more
complete synthesis. Its form is governed by the same
procedure : to express the ideas with the utmost
the and conciseness that
simplicity, greatest clarity
may be possible; to avoid lengthy analyses and develop-
ments; and above all to put aside easy digressions of
an imaginative or poetical character.
My primary aim was to make the work a synthesis,
and this synthesis should be considered as a whole,
without reference to details which have been omitted
or intentionally set aside. In fact, an exhaustive study
of any single one of the questions treated would be a
life work, but this is for those who devote themselves
to analysis, and I leave it to them; my purpose is
different, it aims at theideal questofawide philosophical
generalisation, based on facts*
Obviously such a philosophy, in the actual state
of human knowledge and consciousness, can claim to
be no more than an endeavour, a sketch, or as it might
be called, a general plan, in which only main outlines
and a few details are clearly drawn.
Necessarily incomplete, this philosophy cannot claim
to be entirely original Most of the solutions proposed
are naturally to be found here and there, more or less
sharply defined and more or lessvaried, in other natural-
istic or metaphysical systems.
The general idea of this work is that which has
ix
Preface
inspired most of the great metaphysical systems, and
finds its clearest and most concrete presentment in the
works of Schopenhauer, Its premises are the same;
but the developments and the conclusions are totally
different; my endeavour has been to bridge the chasm
that Schopenhauer leaves between the Unconscious
and the Conscious. Thence follows an different
entirely
interpretation of the evolution of the individual and
ofthe universe. This interpretation, instead of leading
to pessimism, leads, I will not say to optimism (the
term being loose and ^questionable), but to the abiding
ideal ofHumanity, an ideal which is built on its highest,
calmest^and most lasting hopes ofjustice, ofjoy, and
ofindividual
persistence.
But the real originality of the idealist philosophy
here outlined, the only originality that is claimed, i*
that //is scientific. Unrestricted by dogmatic or mystical
forms, and resting on no a priori or intuitional formula;*
it is based on positive demonstration. It is on thr
ground ofscientific philosophy, and on this ground alone,
that this work should be studied or discussed*
To build up my demonstration I have endeavoured
to^take account ofall known facts whether in the natural
sciences, in general biology, or in admitted data relating
to the and
physiological psychological constitution of
the individual man. In the choice ofthe main npbim*
tory hypotheses I have sought those which present the
double character of being logical deductions from fiu-M
and adaptable to all the facts ofa group. My conamf
aim has been to reach wider and more
comprehensive
ffenanlitttinna until there should issue, if possible, a
" - vMW M*A*TWA0W*
But I have been led, little by little, by the sui>Ur"maSi
to adopt at first tentatively, and then systematically, a
Preface
methodoftreatment, secondaryindeedbutstillimportant,
concerningwhich itis necessaryto enterinto some detail.
In considering the different biological and psycho-
logical sciences, and in studying the inductions, deduc-
tions, and received hypotheses founded on their data
and accepted by most contemporary men of science,
I was struck by serious and obvious errors due to a
tendency to forget of the general method of treatment
above referred to.
There is no single one of the main academic
hypotheses on evolution, on the physical or psychological
constitution of the individual, or on life and conscious-
ness, which is capable of adaptation to all the facts of
evolution, ofphysiology or ofpsychology; nor,^ afortiori,
is there one which can embrace general and individual
evolution in a whole.
synthetic
Further, most of these hypotheses are, as I shall
demonstrate, certainly in opposition to at least some
well-established facts.
In seeking the first origin and cause of these errors
in generalisation I have been led to discover them
pre-eminently in the choice ofthe primaryfacts on which
the framework of contemporary scientific philosophy
is based.
In all sciences, and especially in ^biology and
psychology, facts selected with a synthetic conclusion
in view, may lead to antagonistic method, and con-
sequently to concepts which may be divergent or
even opposed. Two principal methods may be out-
lined, each resulting from the selection of primary
facts
The first of these methods starts from the principle
that science should always proceed from the simple to
the complex. This method, therefore, takes as its
point ofdeparture the most elementary facts, endeavours
to understand them, then passes on to rather more
complex facts of the same order, applying to them the
Preface
formula derived from an exhaustive study
explanatory
of the simpler, and so onwards from the base to the
summit.
The second starts from the pri.nci.ple that ffor any
order of facts there can be no true explanation
given
which is not capable of application to all the facts of
that order. This method seeks first for an explanation
capable ofcovering the most complex phenomena; ami
this being easily extended afortiori, to the simpler ami
lower ones, will necessarily be conformable to all the
available data.
This method thus proceeds from the summit to
the base.
It frequently happens, we must concede, that the
second method ends in an It will do
impossibility
so whenever the data of fact are insufficient* It must
then be admitted to be inapplicable, and should be
held in reserve, disregarding minor points in which
it may be satisfactory, such details being necessarily
inadequate as a basis of reasoning since they refer to
only one aspect of the problem.
Of these two methods, the former being primarily
analytic, pertains to pure science. The second, primarily
synthetic, pertains to pure philosophy.
Now when questions arise which pertain both to
philosophy and to science, it is necessary to comulrr
which of these two methods should be
adopted.
Once a general truth has been established it matters
litfle whether the explanation of different phenomena
leading to a known conclusion starts from the base or
the summit; the line of synthesis being known, it ttf
not possible to stray. But when the task before us i
to ascertain truth and to establish a synthesis, it becomes
to choose and to consider with care which
necessary
method is likely to prove the more sure and fruitful
ofresults. The firstmethodis theonealmostexclusively
employed as the foundation for current theories. Its
xu*
Preface
use follows on an unquestioned dogma ofcontemporary
science. Before deciding which method to employ, let
us now look somewhat closely at some ofthe established
results to which this method has actually led.
In a philosophic study of the phenomena of life,
if we proceed from the apex to the base, from man to
the superior animals, and from them to inferior types,
we are constrained to admit that Consciousness is that
whi^ch i^s most ^important in all life, because it is that
which is most important in man. We are then led to
discover that consciousness, with all that it implies,
extends, with a narrowing field, down to the least
evolved animals, in which it exists merely in outline.
If, on the contrary, we proceed from the base to
the summit, the conclusion that we draw from the
phenomena of life is an opposite one. It is the con-
clusion that Le Dantec, among others, has endeavoured
to bring out.1
The chemical reactions of their environment suffice
to determine the vital phenomena of animals very low
down in the scale. The * ascending ' method therefore
permits of the affirmation that in all the phenomena
of life, even those of the superior animals, it is use-
less to seek for but the result of chemical
anything
reactions. Even the specific form of an animal is for
Le Dantec, as we shall see, merely a function of these
reactions.
The plastidia show rigid chemical determinism,
and there is no reason to attribute to them either will
or of action. It would follow that bio-chemical
liberty
determinism is the same in the entire animal series;
and will or liberty, even in man, is but illusion.
The notion ofan animal consciousness is superfluous
for the plastidia; if therefore it exists for superior
animals it can be only an epiphenomenon ' resulting
1Le Dantec: Diterminisme Biologique*
*A sequential or asecondary phenomenon.
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