Table Of ContentFROM THE
NORMANDY
BEACHES TO THE
BALTIC SEA
FROM THE
NORMANDY
BEACHES TO THE
BALTIC SEA
The Northwest Europe
Campaign, 1944–1945
Alan J. Levine
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Levine, Alan J.
From the Normandy beaches to the Baltic Sea:
The northwest Europe campaign, 1944–1945 / Alan J. Levine
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-275-96920-7 (alk. paper)
1. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Western Front. I. Title.
D756.L48 2000
940.54′21—dc21 99-059562
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright © 2000 by Alan J. Levine
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be
reproduced, by any process or technique, without
the express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 99-059562
ISBN: 0-275-96920-7
First published in 2000
Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.praeger.com
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this book complies with the
Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To my uncle and aunt,
Ismel and Joy Levine
Contents
Introduction ix
1. Prelude, Planning, Preparation 1
2. The Normandy Beachhead 51
3. The Liberation of Western Europe 77
4. The Fall Fighting on the German Frontier 103
5. The German Counteroffensives in the Ardennes
and Alsace 145
6. The March to Victory, January–May 1945 169
Notes 205
Bibliography 207
Index 215
Introduction
ISntroductiono many books have been written about Eisenhower’s campaign in
1944–1945 that an additional one, at this late date, probably requires
explanation. This book is the result of the realization that there is a
strange gap in the vast (if uneven) literature about this last phase of the
war against Nazi Germany. There is no serious study, and certainly no
up-to-date study of manageable size, that covers the entire campaign
and the operations of all the Allied armies. In fact, there seems to be no
overall study of any size that is truly “Allied” in approach. Chester
Wilmot’s The Struggle for Europe and Russell Weigley’s Eisenhower’s
Lieutenants are magnificent works—and the present book could not
have been written without them (or the many fine official histories of
the war); but the former is decidedly British in orientation, while
Weigley never pretends to be dealing with anything but the American
Army.
A “national” approach to the liberation of Europe is simply inade-
quate. One result is that many people in the United States are surprised
to learn that half, or more, of the fighting in Normandy was done by
the British and Canadians, while the tone of much British writing is
such that it is hard for many to realize that by the last campaign in
Germany the Anglo-Canadian forces formed less than a quarter of
Eisenhower’s command. Curiously, Americans tend to be even more
ill-informed about the efforts of our fellow North Americans than about
those of the British forces. One reason for this is undoubtedly the simple
fact that, by the standards of the NATO era, the American and Canadian
armed forces had remarkably little to do with each other before and
during World War II. But the Canadians, on several occasions, carried
x From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea
out the most important tasks facing the Allies, and I have tried to correct
the common tendency to neglect Canadian operations.
Correcting a lack of balance along national lines is not my only goal.
I have tried to supply an account that explains not only what happened
but why, and the relationship of the campaign in Northwest Europe to
the fighting earlier and elsewhere. Nor have I sought to merely summa-
rize the prevailing accounts of the campaign; as will be apparent to
military historians, some of my conclusions are far from orthodox. I
have tried to emphasize important things that have been relatively
neglected—notably the air, maritime, and logistical aspects of the cam-
paign. The latter did not suddenly cease to be important once the Allies
were established in Normandy. Taking, opening and keeping open
ports to ensure that the Allied armies were properly supplied was a
critical problem that shaped the whole campaign through the fall of
1944 and even after, for Hitler’s purpose in attacking in the Ardennes
in December 1944 was to deprive the Allies of Antwerp, their main
supply base. Recognition of this point also suggests some unorthodox
conclusions about the effectiveness of the “fortress” ports with which
Hitler was so obsessed. My examination of this and other aspects of the
Allies’ logistical problems also suggests some serious qualifications to
the usual assumptions that the Allied, and especially the U.S., armies
always benefited from luxurious supplies during World War II. It is also
critical to my detailed discussion of the great controversy over whether
Eisenhower missed an opportunity to end the war in 1944.
Along the way I have also tried to draw attention to some other
neglected issues and relatively unknown but important aspects of the
campaign—notably, the battles for Chartres, the Mons pocket,
Nuremberg, and above all the fight for the Antwerp approaches.
Though the most important struggle of the fall of 1944, the struggle to
open Antwerp has been relatively neglected by American (though not
British) historians. Some of my conclusions about various operations—
notably, the invasion of southern France and the “Market-Garden”
operation that culminated in the defeat at Arnhem are a bit different
from those that have been prevalent, at least among American histori-
ans. I have also tried to integrate a proper emphasis on air support of
the land battle into my account. It will be apparent that it was powerful,
effective, and costly. One of the striking things about the popular
approach to the air war since 1945 is that, while there has been a
remarkable amount of condemnation—sincere or not—of the suffering
inflicted on German and Japanese civilians by strategic bombing, there
has been very little recognition of the destructiveness of Allied tactical
bombing, although that often troubled not only Allied correspondents
but also soldiers during the war. Even in Germany, direct support of the
ground forces invading the country sometimes caused as much damage
