Table Of ContentThe Official History of
Britain and the European
C onununity
Volume II: From Rejection to
Referendum, 1963-197 5
Stephen Wall
I~ ~~~1~!n~~~up
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 2013
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OXI4 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an irifOmza business
© 2013 Crown copyright
The right of Stephen Wall to be identified as author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, For my son, Matthew
now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book
ISBN 13: 978-0--415-53560-1 ~hbk)
ISBN13: 978--0-203-10327-2 (ebk)
Typeset in Baskerville
by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk
Paper from
ruponalble aourceo
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
!,~ FSC" C004839 TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
Contents
Acknowledgements x
Abbreviations Xl
Introduction
De Gaulle says "No": 1962-1963 7
2 Picking up the pieces: 1963-1964 41
3 The Labour Government: a toe in the water: 1964-1966 80
4 Once more unto the breach: 1966-1967 137
5 We will not take "No" for an answer: 1967 202
6 To woo or to win: Britain, France and Germany: 1967-1969 266
7 The start of negotiations: 1969-1971 332
8 Good thing, bad thing? The terms of entry and a country
divided: 1971-1973 405
9 The year ofliving dangerously: Britain's first year of
European Community membership: 197 3-197 4 457
10 Renegotiation and referendum: 197 4-197 5 511
Notes on principal people mentioned 591
Notes 602
Bibliography 634
Index 636
Acknowledgements Abbreviations
The Cabinet Office series of Official Histories is conducted under the authority of ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
the Prime Minister and I am grateful to the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, ANF Atlantic Nuclear Force
and the then Cabinet Secretary, Gus O'Donnell for appointing me to write this BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
volume. BMC British Motor Corporation
I was given all the access I asked for to official documents. I alone am respon BMG British Military Government
sible for the statements made and the views expressed BOAC British Overseas Airways Corporation
On a day-to-day basis, my access to the National Archives, and all other essen BOT Board of Trade
tial support, including a desk, a cupboard and a computer, were provided by the CAP Common Agricultural Policy
Knowledge and Information Management Unit of the Cabinet Office under the CBI Confederation of British Industry
direction of Roger Smethurst, to whom much thanks. I am especially grateful to CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
Tessa Stirling and Sally Falk, the Head and Deputy Head, respectively, of the CERN European Organisation for Nuclear Research
Official Histories Team for their professional guidance, painstaking review of my CFP Common Fisheries Policy
co
work and for much practical help. Cabinet Office
I was helped by a number of those who were players in the story told in CO REPER Committee of Permanent Representatives of the European
this book and who confirmed (or otherwise), and supplemented, my research Community
in particular, Lord Armstrong, Sir Michael Butler, Sir Michael Palliser, Sir CSA Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
Kenneth Stowe, Lord Owen, Lord Hannay, Lord Howe, Lord Hurd and Lord CSU Christian Social Union of Bavaria
Donoughue. DEA Department of Economic Affairs
Some of those cited in the book are people for whom I worked, notably DTI Department of Trade and Industry
Christopher Soames, Edward Tomkins and Christopher Ewart-Biggs, all of them EC European Community
stars of the British Embassy in Paris. I hope I have done justice to their achieve ECS Ministerial Committee on European Community Strategy
ments. Christopher Ewart-Biggs, who was assassinated in Dublin by the IRA in ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
1976, was one of the most decent people I met in a long career, old-fashioned in EEC European Economic Community
appearance, modern in outlook and a wordsmith of mesmeric ability. EFTA European Free Trade Association
Anyone writing a book needs the tolerance of their loved ones. My wife, ELDO European Launcher Development Organisation
Catharine, bore with me when I hogged our computer at home and encouraged EMU Economic and Monetary Union
me when my always poor imitation ofTrollopian fluency and efficiency slowed to EPU European Payments Union
a feeble trickle. My son, Matthew, to whom the book is dedicated, has been a EQ Ministerial Committee on European Questions
tower of strength. EQO Official Committee on European Questions
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FEOGA European Community Agricultural Guarantee Fund
FO Foreign Office
xu Abbreviations
FPD Free Democratic Party (Germany)
FRG Federal Republic of Germany Introduction
All references to Germany in the book are to FRG (West Germany) unless otherwise stated
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GITA Go-it-alone
GNP Gross National Product
GSP General Scheme of Preferences
HMG Her Majesty's Government
HMT Her Majesty's Treasury
IBA Independent Broadcasting Authority "Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player that struts and.frets his hour upon the stage and then
ITN Independent Television News is heard no more."
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food I thought often about Shakespeare's words as I wrote this book, for most,
MLF Multilateral Nuclear Force though happily not all, of the players whose story this is are now dead. And yet, as
MNF Multinational Nuclear Force you read the meticulously comprehensive official records of the period, it is not
MUA Monetary Unit of Account just their preoccupations, but the people themselves and their personalities that
(N)AFTA (North) Atlantic Free Trade Area spring back to life off the page. For, day by day, the paper files of the period take
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation you back, not just to a past time, but to the exertions, hopes, fears and exaspera
NEC National Executive Committee tions of politicians and civil servants alike.
NSC National Security Council Here is Harold Wilson's unmistakeable green ink in the margin of a telegram
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons from the British Embassy reporting de Gaulle's selection of Pompidou as his
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development successor in waiting, as his dauphin. "I can live with the dauphin,'' Wilson writes.
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries "Send tennis balls?"
PLP Parliamentary Labour Party Here, a few years later, are now-President Pompidou and Prime Minister
PPS Parliamentary Private Secretary or Principal Private Secretary Heath, constructing through a mixture of personal chemistry and painstaking
PS Parti Socialiste (France) diplomacy the beginnings of a historic reconciliation between France and Britain.
PUS Permanent Under-Secretary of State As each story unfolds, be it de Gaulle's two vetoes of British accession to the
PUSS Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State European Community; or the near-collapse of his own Government in May 1968;
RAF Royal Air Force or the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia later in that year, the files recreate, page
RDF Regional Development Fund by page, the build-up of tension, the sense of uncertainty, the questions and doubts
SEATO South-East Asia Treaty Organisation about how to act, how to respond, how to advance the British national interest
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe which those whose responsibility it was to advise and to lead faced day in, day out
SPD Social Democratic Party (Germany); for the duration of their lifetimes in office.
TUC Trades Union Congress Ambassadors and other civil servants play parts that are intimately woven into
UDR Union pour la Defense de la Republique (French Gaullist Party) this drama. This was a period when those in positions of authority, either as
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Soviet Union) Ministers or officials, had shared the comradeship of wartime service. My late
VAT Value Added Tax father-in-law, Norman Reddaway, joined the Foreign Office after World War II
WEU Western European Union and became Private Secretary to a young Foreign Office Minister, Christopher
WTO World Trade Organisation Mayhew. Both men had served together (alongside the film star David Niven) in
the Phantom Regiment. Such stories and such friendships were commonplace and
the relationship between politicians and civil servants was, as a result, different
from what it is today. Politicians and civil servants did not feel that they were
made of different clay. There was, on the whole, greater mutual confidence.
2 lntroductWn Introduction 3
Of course, we have the benefit of hindsight. With that in mind, a leading histo and Monetary Union, and its problems and implications, the trees we are bumping
rian asked me what the basic thesis of my book was going to be. The answer is that into are recognisably those planted during the period of this story.
there is none. I spent 35 years as a civil servant, seven of them working in I 0 When, in October 1972, the Heads of Government proclaimed their intention
Downing Street at three different times. Each Prime Minister, each Cabinet of creating a European Union by 1980, not one of them knew, or sought to define,
Minister, each Government has its policy and its approach. A whole range of what it meant. It was an expression of hope. Rather clearer thoughts had been
factors goes into the formulation of policy, starting with the view of the Party in expressed about Economic and Monetary Union. But the approach was to be one
power of where the national interest lies, but being constantly affected by the pres taken in stages; it was not clear whether the goal was a common currency or a
sures of public and Parliamentary opinion, by events to which a response is single currency and few had confronted the implications, political or economic.
required, by the advice Ministers receive, by the personality, beliefs, judgements An often deliberate ambiguity, combined with Micawber-like optimism, pervades
some of the discussions and decisions.
- and prejudices - of the Ministers themselves, especially the Prime Minister; and
Some of the clearest thinking was done in Whitehall. Whether even a Heath-led
by historical memory.
The purpose of an Official History is to use the official records of the day, rein Government would, in the end, have felt able to embrace a single currency is a
forced by the memories of the participants, to tell the story of why those whose job difficult question to answer. For Heath too it was more aspiration than commit
it was to take decisions on behalf of Britain thought as they did and did what they ment. But no one in Whitehall who looked into the issue at the time was in any
did. I have thought it best to try to let them tell their own story as far as possible. doubt that a single currency would involve a sfogle exchange rate and interest rate
If, sometimes, the prevailing sense is one of uncertainty then that is no more than and the centralised management of economic and fiscal policy. The need for fiscal
a true reflection of what people were feeling at that time. transfers from rich to poor was seen as an inescapable component, as were very
The Governments of Wilson and Heath, like that of Macmillan before them, large transfers of sovereignty from national Governments to a central authority.
came to the painful conclusion that Britain could not maintain influence in the The story I have tried to tell is a political and economic one. Some quite techni
world without joining a grouping of like-minded countries, and that neither the cally complex issues, such as Britain's contribution to the budget of the European
European Free Trade Association (EFTA ) nor an Atlantic Free Trade Area was a Community, are covered in detail because they assumed ever larger economic
viable option. Heath was a European of head and heart; Wilson of the head. To and political importance, going well beyond the period covered in the book. But,
me, Wilson's story, as it emerges from the archives, is the more intriguing for by and large, I have not covered the ins and outs of individual pieces of EEC
being less well known. legislation, significant though they may have been. If you are a negotiator, the
Before I started writing, I read Uwe Kitzinger's book, Diplomacy and Persuasion, process is fascinating. If you are not, it can be deadly, especially 40 years on.
about how Britain joined the Common Market. When I read Kitzinger's comment I have soughno convey, through what was said and written at the time, what
that "Harold Wilson is almost certainly one of those few men but for whom Britain British politicians and civil servants believed about the implications of EEC
could not have entered the Community'', 1 it gave me pause. Heath, surely, was membership for Parliamentary sovereignty and for Britain's ability to continue to
the European; Wilson the man who put Party before principle. I hope I have decide her own destiny.
accurately portrayed the real story for it is, apart from anything else, a vivid illus I think it fair to say that the implications of European Community law-making
tration of the huge complex of issues and factors with which all political leaders were clear to those who studied them. Indeed, much of the Parliamentary opposi
have to juggle. tion to membership was based on the knowledge that European Community legis
My conclusion, after reading the records and talking to people who worked for lation, once agreed in Brussels, could not be changed by Parliament without that
and with him, was that Wilson, once persuaded of the advantages of membership exercise of Parliamentary sovereignty being tantamount to a deliberate decision to
(and the absence of viable alternatives) held to that view, both in Government and breach the terms of British membership of the Community.
Opposition. If, in Opposition after 1970, he had fallen on his sword for the sake of What was much less clear at the time was the extent to which judgements of the
pursuing the European policy he had espoused in Government, the result would European Court ofJ ustice would advance the course of integration. Nor was it at
probably have been the end of his leadership and a Labour Party committed to all clear to Ministers that they would find themselves out-voted in the Council of
withdrawal from the EEC, or deeply riven, or both. Renegotiation and a refer Ministers on significant policy issues. For a start, only a limited number ofTreaty
endum were not heroic, but they were the life-raft that kept a workable policy on articles prescribed majority voting. The big jump in those was to come with
Europe alive within the Labour Party. Margaret Thatcher's agreement in 1985 to the Single European Act. But, even
where majority voting was prescribed, it is clear from the records that British
This book also covers the beginnings of a European journey towards two goals,
those of European Union and Economic and Monetary Union. If the modern Ministers believed that they were safeguarded by the so-called Luxembourg
reader wonders what the difference is between the two, so did those who invented Compromise. In other words, they believed - to a much greater degree than was
the terms some forty years ago. If Europe today is deep in the woods of Economic justified by subsequent events - that if a British Minister, in Brussels, told his
4 Introduction Introduction 5
colleagues in the Council of Ministers that a very important national interest was these were more than matched by deep French fears about Germany's place in,
at stake, discussion would continue until consensus had been reached. Britain and commitment to, a democratic Western Europe. The temptation of a deal with
would not be out-voted. In adhering to that view, Ministers were mistaken. But it the Soviet Union in the interest of German reunification was thought in Paris to
is what they sincerely believed and they were reinforced in their conviction by the be ever-present in Bonn. As late as 1973, Pompidou was expressing to Heath his
fact that the French Government, the inventors of the Luxembourg Compromise, fear that Germany could revert to type, a view echoed 15 years later by President
not only shared their inteipretation, but entrenched it by making British accept Mitterrand to Margaret Thatcher. The true story was one of Germany being
ance of it one of their conditions for admitting her to EEC membership. consistently willing, within bounds, to spend large sums of her national budget on
This is a British story, but it is also the story of Europe as a whole, for the financing the budget of the EEC. And in the oil crisis of 1973 it was not Germany,
reporting and analysis sent to London by Britain's Embassies covered the thinking but rather France and Britain, who were seen to fail to meet their obligations of
of European Community Governments, not just on Britain's approach to Europe, Community solidarity.
but on the progress or otherwise of their own fledgling enteiprise. In this wider The disappointments of a decade cannot be laid solely at de Gaulle's door.
drama, de Gaulle plays a dominant role. De Gaulle strides outrageously, intoler Macmillan's 'events dear boy, events' permeates every chapter of this history,
ably and magnificently across the pages of much of this period, holding the whole most pertinently, perhaps, in 1973, the first year of Britain's membership of the
of Europe to ransom, belittling Britain, bullying Germany and undermining the European Community, a year which began with a glittering, floodlit gala and
coherence of the West just as he rebuilt the self-worth of his compatriots. It is ended in three-day week candlelight. The British drama was, of course, not just
questionable whether Monnet's vision of an ever closer union on federal lines that of our disappointed European aspirations but also of our national struggle to
would ever have come to fruition as he intended. That it did not is much more find economic stability and prosperity. Interestingly, it was not the economics of
down to de Gaulle than to any other single figure. the EEC which most appealed to Heath and to Wilson, for the balance of economic
C S Forester entitled one of his novels Death to the French. At this period, perhaps argument, in study after study, was found to be finely balanced. It was the politics
more than any other in the twentieth century, Britain and France alike revisited born of the realisation, starting with Macmillan, that Britain was a small country
their old rivalry. Each defined itself in contrast, and often in opposition, to the in a world dominated by two super powers, the United States and the Soviet
other. How to deal with the French - meaning how to get round them or defeat Union. All three Prime Ministers believed that only by membership of the Euro
them or convert them - was a constant preoccupation of British policy. There pean Community could Britain hope to exercise influence in a world dominated
were divided views in Whitehall, with a tendency in the Foreign Office to think by two nuclear super powers.
that the five other members of the European Community could be used to gang The Soviet Union looms as a persistent, if gradually diminishing, threat
up on and overwhelm the French. It did not work. Macmillan, Wilson and Heath throughout this history. Soviet nuclear parity with the United States was a real
all realised that British accession would only be possible if an accommodation fear and preoccupation. There is no hint of anything other than the assumed
could be reached with the French. continuation of Soviet domination in Eastern and Central Europe, though de
Macmillan's hopes effectively died in the autumn fog at Rambouillet in 1962. Gaulle had a strong sense of the European destiny of those countries and there are
Wilson skilfully and publicly refused to take 'No' for an answer in 1967, by which glimpses of a similar view on the part of Wilson and Heath as well. The rise of
time all of Europe was silently praying for the General's demise - politically at China is foreseen but not felt; that ofJ apan a new reality. Heath was correct in his
least. The significance of Heath's famous two-day meeting with Pompidou in view that the predominant place of the United States in the world would be chal
1971 lay, not just in the undoubted chemistry between the two men, but in the lenged; he was wrong in assuming that it was the enlarged European Community
careful preparation, largely bypassing Foreign Ministries, conducted by both sides that would be the occasion ofit. Writing a history ofthis kind is a salutary reminder
in readying themselves for the meeting. The one thing most in need ofrestoration that brilliant analysis, and there was plenty of that, is no guarantee of accurate
was trust. foresight.
Relations with West Germany were both less intense and in a way more unsat Heath saw, perhaps more clearly than did Wilson, that US interests would
isfactory. Macmillan had to contend with Adenauer, who had good reason to move away from Europe towards the Pacific. Both shared the British post-war
dislike the British. The robust Erhard was sadly short-lived and Wilson tried view that the safety and freedom of the West depended on American military
valiantly but unsuccessfully to induce his successor, Kiesinger, to stand up just a strength and nuclear commitment. They gave no credence to de Gaulle's view of
little to de Gaulle and.for Britain. It was only with the advent of Willy Brandt that a Europe built in contra-distinction, even opposition, to the United States; nor did
Germany exercised decisive influence on France to allow negotiations for British any of de Gaulle's partners among the Six. It is that refusal to accept de Gaulle's
accession to begin, albeit at a price which Britain is paying to this day. vision and ambition which accounts in large measure for de Gaulle's monstrously
If there were suspicions in Britain that Germany might be hiding her own bad treatment of his German opposite numbers during his time in office. He was
private reservations about British accession behind de Gaulle's very public ones, the author ofreconciliation and resentment in almost equal measure.
6 Introduction
In 1973, as Nixon's chariot began to plunge to earth because of Watergate, US
1 De Gaulle says "No":
relations with the European Community went through one of their scratchiest
periods. Henry Kissinger's personal, occasionally paranoid, diplomacy and his 1962-1963
massively ill-conceived Year of Europe were partly responsible. But the French
reacted with Gaullist hostility and Heath's vexation with Kissinger led him to a
public outburst of irritation which undoubtedly damaged the UK/US bilateral
relationship at the time.
The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on. By the end of 1974, Nixon, Heath
and Brandt had all lost power and Pompidou was dead. Yet the genes of national
instinct and behaviour pass, in politics as in nature, from generation to generation.
Much of this story may seem long ago and emotionally far away. But much of who
we, the British, are, and what we do, today, as questioning, and often sceptical
members of the European Union, was first written in the official files of forty years "I think this man has gone crazy - absolutely crazy".
ago. The British argument for, against and about Europe that we have today is The telephone line between London and Washington was clear on that day, the
recognisably the one we were having forty years ago. 19th ofJ anuary 1963. So there can be no doubt that President Kennedy heard
Shakespeare's stark statement of the human condition does not embrace one Prime Minister Harold Macmillan correctly. "He is", Macmillan continued,
aspect of human life, which his own genius exemplifies to perfection. Men and "inventing any means whatever to knock us out and the simple thing is he wants
women do leave footprints in the sands of time. This book is a detailed study of to be the cock on a small dunghill instead of having two cocks on a larger one". 1
politics and policies, problems and negotiations. But it is above all the story of how The 'he' in question was of course President Charles de Gaulle of France and
serious and dedicated people devoted themselves to trying to find the right answers on 14 January 1963, in a press conference remarkable for its fluency, authority
to one of the great challenges of their generation. I hope it does justice to them and patronising disdain, de Gaulle had dashed Britain's hopes of joining the
and, above all to the memory of Macmillan, Wilson and Heath, the three prin European Economic Community (EEC).
cipal architects of Britain's membership of the European Community. Macmillan's vivid metaphor had not sprung unbidden into his mind. Just
Had he not fallen ill, this book would have been written by Professor Alan five days before de Gaulle's press conference, Britain's Agriculture Minister,
Milward, whose first volume of the Official History of Britain and the European Christopher Soames, had reported a conversation with his French counterpart
Community is a great work of enduring originality and scholarship. I have been which found its way into Macmillan's diary. "Moncher", said the Frenchman,
all too aware, as I have sought to follow in his footsteps, that they were larger than "c'est tres simple. Maintenant, avec les Six, il ya cinq poules et un coq. Si vous
I could hope to fill. joignez (avec des autres pays), il y aura peut-etre sept ou huit poules. Mais il y aura
deux coqs. Alors ce n'est pas aussi agreable"2•
Much anxious British analysis preceded and followed de Gaulle's press confer
ence. In it, he set out both a rationale for the existence and shape of the European
Community as it then was and an argument as to why Britain was not ready to join.
The Treaty of Rome, the founding treaty of the EEC, was, de Gaulle argued, a
treaty between six continental states of an economically similar nature. They were,
moreover, geographically adjacent: "they inter-penetrate; their communications
make them extensions of one another". There were no political rivalries or griev
ances between the Six. Their solidarity was marked by the fact that not one of them
was "bound by a private political or military accord". France had had to put her
economic house in order to be able to cope. But while the Treaty of Rome had
settled a new industrial order, the same was not true of agriculture: "We cannot
conceive, and will not conceive, of a Common Market in which French agriculture
would not find outlets commensurate with its production". But, de Gaulle went on,
no sooner had France got the Common Market's agriculture regime sorted to her
satisfaction than up jumped the British with their application to join. And Britain
did so only after having, so de Gaulle clearly implied, failed in her attempts to
8 De Gaull.esl!JIS 'No': 1962-1963 De Gaulf.e Sl!JIS 'No': 1962-1963 9
scupper the EEC project in the first place. 'England' was asking to join, but on her the destiny of France in his hands. That must be for the entire French nation to
own terms. England was "insular ... maritime. She is linked ... to the most diverse determine. "Now we are in secret session, the House must not be led to believe
and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commer that General de Gaulle is an unfaltering friend of Britain. On the contrary, I think
cial activities and only slight agricultural ones". England, said de Gaulle, as if he he is one of those good Frenchmen who have a traditional antagonism, ingrained
were describing someone guilty of unsocial behaviour, "has in all her doings very in French hearts by centuries of war against the English." Churchill went on to
marked and very original habits and traditions." Could England change in order to give examples of de Gaulle's dishonesty. In the summer of 1941, travelling through
accommodate herself to continental Europe? It was doubtful and, in any case, the French colonies of Central and West Africa, de Gaulle had "left a trail of
England would bring in other countries in her wake. A Community of l l and then Anglophobia behind him" culminating in an intenriew in Brazzaville with the
13 and then 18 would no longer be the Common Market as constructed by the Six. Chicago Daily News in which he had suggested that England coveted the African
At these numbers, there would be no cohesion and soon, instead of a community colonies of France and accused the British of in effect "carrying out a wartime deal
of Europe there would be a colossal Atlantic community under American depend with Hitler in which Vichy senres as go-between". Vichy, de Gaulle had explained,
ence and direction. That was not what France was about. What France was about senred Germany by keeping the French people in subjection and England by
was "a properly European construction". keeping the French fleet out of German hands.
Then, gesturing largely, and at his most magisterial, de Gaulle went on to In July of 1942, Churchill continued, he had facilitated a journey (which he
dismiss the end of Britain's aspirations as a matter of little consequence. Paying could easily have prevented) by de Gaulle to Syria. De Gaulle had promised him
tribute, with some, albeit self-serving, sincerity to Britain's role in two world wars, he would behave in a friendly and helpful manner. But in Syria "his whole object
de Gaulle concluded by congratulating his friend, Harold Macmillan, for having seer:ned to be to foment ill-will between the British military and Free French civil
had the "great honour" of leading his country "on the first steps down the path administration and state the French claims to rule Syria at the highest, although it
which one day, perhaps, will lead it to moor alongside the Continent."3 had been agreed that after the war, and as much as possible during the war, the
British debate then and later centred on de Gaulle's motives. Was this revenge Syrians are to enjoy their independence."5
for perceived humiliations at the hands of the British and Americans in World "If Hitler had danced in London we'd have had no trouble with de Gaulle"6
War II? Was it the deal struck by Macmillan and Kennedy a few weeks earlier in was one of Macmillan's memorable verdicts. But Macmillan was ambivalent
Nassau in which the United States cemented its relationship with Britain by about his nemesis, just as he recognised an ambivalence in de Gaulle. Before
offering her access to the Polaris nuclear missile? Was it hard-headed analysis of meeting de Gaulle at the Chateau de Champs at the beginning of June 1962,
French national interests? Was it a hegemonic pipe dream of a Europe rivalling Macmillan had had a long talk with Edward Heath who, as Lord Privy Seal in
the United States and dominated by France? Macmillan's Government, was the man leading the British negotiating team
Macmillan's own view of de Gaulle, according to his official biographer, Alistair in Brussels. The paradox to Macmillan was that de Gaulle wanted the kind of
Horne, oscillated between admiration and extreme exasperation.4 Churchill and Europe Britain would be readily able to join. Macmillan noted that the British
de Gaulle were among the greatest men Macmillan had known but the literally Ambassador in Paris, Sir Pierson ('Bob') Dixon, (who combined being British
large-headed Churchill was constantly thinking forward, as well as backwards Ambassador to France with the role of official head of the UK Delegation to the
whereas de Gaulle, literally, according to Macmillan, pin-headed, could only look EEC) and who, Macmillan believed, had "the subtlest mind in Whitehall",
backwards. thought that de Gaulle had already decided to exclude Britain. But Macmillan
That was a view Churchill had shared. Under cover of a letter of l February himself was not so sure that de Gaulle had made up his mind. He saw him as torn
1963, Conservative MP Sir David Robertson sent to Macmillan the record of between emotion and reason, the emotion being his hatred of England - and still
Churchill's speech to a secret session of the House of Commons in December more the United States-because of the war, because of France's shame, because
1942. Churchill's speech bears the same mixture of respect and resentment about of Churchill and Roosevelt and because of Britain's access to nuclear weapons.
de Gaulle expressed later by Macmillan. This is hardly surprising since, of all Yet, Macmillan concluded, it was a sort oflove-hate relationship - one that must
British politicians apart from Anthony Eden, Churchill and Macmillan were the soon resolve itself one way or another. 7
ones who, in London and Algiers respectively, had got to know de Gaulle best. In terms of atmospherics and substance, the Chateau de Champs meeting on 2
"I consider", Churchill told the House, "that we have been in every respect and 3 June 1962 was probably the high point of discussion between Macmillan
faithful in the discharge of our obligations to de Gaulle, and we shall continue to and de Gaulle about British accession. De Gaulle "did not show the rather brutal
the end. I continue to maintain friendly relations and I help him as much as I attitude which had been attributed to him''. He was a charming host "with his
possibly can. I feel bound to do this because he stood up against the Men of natural courtesy and old-world manners". But ifMacmillan had been hoping that
Bordeaux and their base surrender at a time when all resisting willpower had his discussions would persuade de Gaulle to lean towards Britain for reason's sake,
quitted France." But, Churchill continued, that was not the same thing as placing rather than against her because of the sway of emotion, there was scant substantial
-- - - -------- -
l 0 De Gaulle says 'No': 1962-1963 De Gaul/.e says 'No': 1962-1963 l l
evidence of a shift. Indeed, de Gaulle trailed many of the arguments he was to use weight of opinion in Germany in favour of British entry into the Common Market.
six months later at his press conference. In particular, de Gaulle argued that But whether that opinion would, in practice, have any positive effect was less
British accession would change the substantive economic and political character certain: "A member of the Chancellor's office told us recently that no one yet had
of the Community to France's disadvantage and that Britain was too tied to the any clear idea as to what, if anything, the Chancellor was prepared to do to over
Commonwealth and, more especially, to the United States.8 come French opposition. The Chancellor was more interested in making progress
Then, as later, the British placed high hopes on the five other EEC members. over European political union than in the negotiations in Brussels."10
They were all unequivocal in their wish to see Britain join and the British could It was probably because of Steel's advice that, on 15June, Macmillan asked the
not quite bring themselves to believe that, in the end, de Gaulle would gainsay German Ambassador in London, Herr von Etzdorf, to call on him. The days are
them. Among the Five, Germany was of course the key player. The European long gone since Ambassadors, even those from important countries, have had
Community was, at heart, a vehicle for Franco-German reconciliation; West regular access to the Foreign Secretary, let alone the Prime Minister. Today, ifthe
Germany's economy was already the motor force of the European Community's Prime Minister wants to get across his view to the German Chancellor, he or she
success, and Germany was the cockpit in which any future nuclear war between either picks up the telephone for a direct conversation or gets one of the No. l O
the West and the Soviet empire would be triggered. So Macmillan took great Private Secretaries to call their opposite number in the German Chancellery. But,
pains, following his meeting with de Gaulle, to brief and flatter the German largely for the reasons already suggested, Ambassadors were still, in the 1960s, an
Government. important vehicle for bilateral diplomatic communication and Macmillan would
In a "Dear Friend" letter of 5 June 1962 to Chancellor Adenauer of Germany have known that calling in the German Ambassador in London for a privileged
Macmillan wrote that he believed de Gaulle understood the sincerity of Britain's first-hand briefing on his recent talks with de Gaulle would be seen in Bonn as
desire to join, and to play her part in, a larger and more coherent European even more significant than if instructions had been sent to the British Ambassador
Community while understanding the British desire to satisfy the legitimate to go in and speak on the Prime Minister's behalf.
economic expectations of the countries of the Commonwealth. "President de The Prime Minister said that he had asked the Ambassador to call because he
Gaulle and I wished that you had been with us to contribute your point of view to thought it would be helpful for him to have a little more background on his talks
what was a very interesting discussion about the future", Macmillan concluded.9 with de Gaulle. Once the Ambassador had been set up to think that he was about
Macmillan's letter crossed with a Despatch to the Foreign Secretary from the to hear something personal and privileged, Macmillan cleverly set out his stall. He
British Ambassador in Bonn, Sir Christopher ('Kit') Steel. Until the advent of IT, did not claim that he had persuaded de Gaulle of the British cause, merely that he
and greater informality in general, overtook them, Despatches were the common thought de Gaulle now better understood the reasons for it. He went on both to
currency of the British Diplomatic Service, not for reporting and commenting on set out the world view that he thought would appeal to Adenauer and to dispel
events as they happened (which was done by enciphered telegram) but for deeper some of the misconceptions about the British negotiating stance prevalent in the
reflection on events, trends and policies, the aim being to give Ministers in London German Chancellery. Macmillan said that he and de Gaulle had discussed the
as accurate a picture of the local scene as the Ambassador and his staff could great changes in the balance of power which had taken place as a result of the two
muster. They were invariably addressed by the Ambassador to the Foreign Secre world wars and he thought there had been broad agreement between them that
tary, were usually printed for distribution in Whitehall and to The Queen and Europe must unite on as wide a basis as possible if it was to recover any of the
often elicited a formal response in the name of the Foreign Secretary himself. In authority "which it had enjoyed for several thousand years". So, as Macmillan
the 1960s, it was rare for one politician to pick up the phone and talk to his oppo had stressed to de Gaulle, success or failure of the negotiations was not about
site number in another country. Telephone communication was not instanta solving the technical difficulties. Nor was Dr Adenauer right to think that Britain
neous or generally secure. Language was often a barrier on both sides. Macmillan, wanted to bring the Commonwealth into the EEC. We had no such intention.
for example, did not speak much German and Adenauer spoke no English. Collec But, in having regard to the Commonwealth, the EEC would be having regard to
tive meetings, of the kind which have rendered European Union Ministers more its responsibilities to the outside world. The goal, Macmillan concluded, should be
familiar to each other than they are to their own Cabinet colleagues, were in their to make Europe strong enough to be a true partner of America. 11
infancy. Bilateral meetings were infrequent and usually formal. In making this last point, Macmillan was trying to insert a very subtle wedge
So it was just such a Despatch from Sir Christopher Steel to Foreign Secretary, between Adenauer and de Gaulle. For de Gaulle's vision of a Europe released from
Lord Home, that was sent across the road from the Foreign Office to No. l 0 American shackles implied to the German Government a Europe deprived of the
Downing Street on 7 June 1962 (probably by messenger but possibly using the protection of American arms, which was politically and militarily unthinkable.
pneumatic tube which ran underground between the two offices, mimicking the It is unlikely that the Macmillan magic had much impact on Adenauer.
system in most Department stores of the day). Steel's view was that it was clearly Adenauer had good reason to dislike the British. He had been Lord Mayor of
to Britain's advantage that Adenauer must pay attention to the overwhelming Cologne before the war and returned, at American request, to run the city after
