From Morality to Virtue

288 Pages·1995·15.16 MB·English

by  Michael Slote

FROM MORALITY TO VIRTUE
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FROM MORALITY
TO VIRTUE
MICHAEL SLOTE
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Oxford University Press
Oxford New York
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Copyright © 1992 by Michael Slote
First published in 1992 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1995
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Slote, Michael A.
From morality to virtue / Michael Slote.
p. cm. Includes index.
ISBN 0-19-507562-5
ISBN 0-19-509392-5 (paperback)
1. Ethics. 2. Virtue.
3. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804—Ethics.
4. Common sense.
5. Utilitarianism. I. Title.
BJ1012.S5165 1992 170—dc20 91-38853
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 42
Printed in the United States of America
This sharp distinction of virtue and morality as co-ordinate and inde-
pendent forms of goodness will explain a fact which otherwise it is
difficult to account for. If we turn from books on Moral Philosophy to
any vivid account of human life and action such as we find in Shake-
speare, nothing strikes us more than the comparative remoteness of the
discussions of Moral Philosophy from the facts of actual life.
H. A. Prichard in "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?"
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For David Lewis
and
Derek Parfit
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book has accumulated many debts on the path to completion.
Portions of Chapters 1 and 3 have previously appeared in Owen Flana-
gan and Amelie Rorty, eds., Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in
Moral Psychology (Bradford/MIT, 1990). For helpful criticisms and
suggestions, I would like to thank Marcia Baron, Larry Blum, Keith
Campbell, Louis Pojman, Georges Rey, Amelie Rorty, Ernie Schlaretzki,
Jerry Schneewind, Nancy Sherman, Peter Simpson, and, especially,
Derek Parfit and two readers for Oxford University Press. I am also
grateful to Terry Mackey for secretarial assistance.