Free Will and Action Explanation: A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account

252 Pages·2016·1.866 MB·English

by  Scott Sehon

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
Free Will and Action Explanation
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
Free Will and Action
Explanation
A Non-Causal, Compatibilist Account
Scott Sehon
1
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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
For Kristen
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
Contents
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
1. What’s at Stake in the Free Will Debate? 7
1.1 Criticism and Punishment 8
1.2 Praise and Reward 13
1.3 Reactive Attitudes 15
1.4 Free Will vs. Moral Responsibility 20
Part I. The Teleological Account of Action
2. Teleology and Interpretation 25
2.1 Reason Explanation as Irreducibly Teleological 25
2.2 Rationalizability and Interpretation 27
2.3 Some Illustrative Examples 29
2.4 Multiple Goals 32
2.5 Omissions 34
2.6 Degrees of Goal-direction 36
3. Rationalizability and Irrationality 39
3.1 Emotions and Agency 40
3.2 Irrational Actions 42
3.3 Irrational Agents 47
4. Other Objections to the Teleological Account 56
4.1 Mele’s Objection: Norm and the Martians 56
4.2 First Person Perspective and Transparency 63
4.3 The Truthmaker Worry 66
4.4 Simplicity and Mystery 70
5. Rationalizing Principles and Causal Explanation 74
5.1 The Systematic and Unavoidable Use of Rationalizing Principles 74
5.2 The Need for a Causalist Explanation 77
5.3 Possible Causalist Explanations 79
6. Deviant Causal Chains 90
6.1 The Nature of the Problem 90
6.2 A Suggested Solution from Mele 93
6.3 Schlosser and Causation by Content 98
6.4 Aguilar and Reliability 103
6.5 Conclusion 107
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
viii Contents
7. The Commitments of Common-Sense Psychology 109
7.1 The Basic Argument 109
7.2 First Premise: Nature of the Causal Theory of Action 111
7.3 The Second Premise: Causation and Reification 114
7.4 The Third Premise: Reification and Existence 121
7.5 The Argument Revised 124
Part II. The Teleological Account of Free
Will and Responsibility
8. Application to Free Will: Non-Causal Compatibilism 129
8.1 The Basic Proposal 129
8.2 Determinism and Freedom 131
8.3 Degrees of Freedom 136
8.4 The Philosophers’ Distinctions 143
9. Irrational Actions and Freedom 145
9.1 Stupid Behavior 146
9.2 Immoral Actions 148
9.3 Weakness of Will 152
9.4 Conclusion 158
10. Extraordinary Cases 159
10.1 Frankfurt Cases 159
10.2 Psychopaths 163
10.3 Coercion 167
10.4 Brainwashing 170
10.5 Conclusion 172
11. How the Teleological Account Undermines Arguments
for Incompatiblism 174
11.1 Kane’s “Ultimate Responsibility” Argument 174
11.2 The “Completely Fixed” Argument 177
11.3 The Consequence Argument 178
11.4 Fischer and the Basic Argument 183
11.5 “Could Have Done Otherwise” Argument 185
11.6 Manipulation Arguments: Pereboom’s Four Cases 188
11.7 Conclusion 194
12. Epistemic Problems for Other Accounts of Free Will 195
12.1 Kane 196
12.2 Fischer and Ravizza 203
12.3 An Objection Considered 207
12.4 Conclusion 211
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/04/2016, SPi
Contents ix
13. Concluding Thoughts 214
13.1 Isn’t It Obvious? 214
13.2 The Irrelevance of Determinism in Ordinary Practice 216
13.3 The Appeal of Incompatibilism 219
13.4 Wittgenstein’s Fly-bottle 222
References 225
Index 235