Table Of ContentFree Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
Free Will, Agency,
and Meaning in Life
Derk Pereboom
1
3
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Contents
Acknowledgments vi
Introduction 1
1. DefendingaSourceView 9
2. ProblemsforEvent-CausalandNon-CausalLibertarianisms 30
3. TheProspectsforAgent-CausalLibertarianism 50
4. AManipulationArgumentagainstCompatibilism 71
5. FreeWillSkepticismandRationalDeliberation 104
6. MoralResponsibilitywithoutBasicDesert 127
7. FreeWillSkepticismandCriminalBehavior 153
8. PersonalRelationshipsandMeaninginLife 175
Bibliography 200
IndexofTopics 215
IndexofNames 217
Acknowledgments
ResearchonthisprojectwasfacilitatedbysabbaticalfromCornellUniversityin
Rome,ItalyintheSpringSemesterof2012.Iamgratefultotheparticipantsinmy
graduateseminaratCornellintheSpringSemesterof2011,inwhichIpresented
thematerialincludedinthisbook.Iwouldalsoliketothanktheparticipantsin
my other courses on free will at the University of Vermont and at Cornell
University. Two courses at Cornell were held in the Cornell Law School and
co-taught with Will Provine, Professor of Evolutionary Biology, and David
Levitsky, Professor of Psychology. Two very productive summer seminars on
free will at the Central European University in Budapest were co-taught with
Mark Balaguer, Michael McKenna, Dana Nelkin, Timothy O’Connor, Thomas
Pink, Paul Russell, and Andras Szigeti. Discussions with faculty and students in
allofthesecoursesinseminarsweresplendidandenlightening.
Iwishtothankaudiencesatthefollowingschools,meetings,andconferences
forcommentsanddiscussionofthechaptersofthisbook:Chapter1:University
ofArizonaandUniversityofAlberta;Chapter2:PacificDivisionoftheAmerican
Philosophical Association, San Diego; Chapter3: University of Idaho—Inland
Northwest Philosophy Conference and Université Paris-Sorbonne; Chapter4:
Central European University, Budapest; Chapter5: Florida State University and
the Second On-Line Philosophy Conference; Chapter6: University of Arizona
and University of Tennessee; Chapter7: Università Roma III and University of
Chicago Law School; Chapter8: University of California, San Diego, University
ofFribourg,Switzerland,andUniversityofTennessee.
Thanks in addition to audiences at Yale University; University of California,
Riverside; SUNY Brockport; Brandeis University; City University of New York
GraduateCenter;UniversityofMassachusetts,Amherst;UniversityofSanFran-
cisco; University of Minnesota, Morris; Colby College; University of California,
San Diego; Calvin College; Wheaton College; University of Colorado, Boulder;
Dartmouth College; Washington State University; University of Vermont; Uni-
versity of Alabama; Florida State University; Cornell University; West Point
Military Academy; Georgetown University; University of Miami; Rutgers Uni-
versity; Salisbury University; Marist College; New York University; University
of Rochester; University of Western Ontario; University of Calgary; Victoria
University, Wellington, New Zealand; Canterbury University, Christchurch,
New Zealand; Australian National University, Canberra; Monash University,
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,6/1/2014,SPi
acknowledgments vii
Melbourne, Australia; University of Melbourne, Australia; University of Valen-
cia, Spain; Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Università Roma
III,Rome,Italy;andUniversityofPadua,Italy.
Personal gratitude for valuable discussion is due to Robert Allen, Carla Bag-
noli, Helen Beebee, Karen Bennett, Robert Bishop, Gunnar Björnsson, Mick
Capraru, David Christensen, Randolph Clarke, Justin Coates, Mario DeCaro,
Oisin Deery, John Fischer, Ish Haji, Ian Hensley, James Hobbs, Sofia Jeppsson,
RobertKane,ErinKelly,Hilary Kornblith,ArthurKuflik,DavidLevitsky, Brian
Leiter, Don Loeb, Stephen Mahaffey, Patrick Mayer, Kelly McCormick, Carlos
Moya, Will Provine, Sam Reis-Dennis, Philip Robichaud, Adina Roskies, Paul
Russell, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Sydney Shoemaker, Sean Stapleton, Jordan
Thomson,JonathanVance,ManuelVargas,DavidWiderker,andRuYe.
IamespeciallygratefultoGunnarBjörnsson,AustinDuggan,LouisdeRosset,
CarlGinet,MichaelMcKenna,ShaunNichols,CarolinaSartorio,DavidPalmer,
Al Mele, Seth Shabo, and Patrick Todd for comments on one or more chapters
and valuable discussion of free will and moral responsibility over the years.
Special thanks to Dana Nelkin and Chris Franklin for reading the entiremanu-
scriptandprovidingsplendidcommentsandongoingdiscussion.Thanksalsoto
theanonymousreviewersforOxfordUniversityPressforexcellentcomments.
Chapter1 includes most of “Frankfurt Examples, Derivative Responsibility,
and the Timing Objection,” Philosophical Issues 22 (2012), pp. 298–315, and
featuresafewsubstantialrevisionsandadditions.
Chapter5 is a revised version of my article “A Compatibilist Account of the
Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation,” Journal of Ethics 12 (2008),
pp.287–307.
Chapter6isasubstantiallyreworkedversionof“FreeWillSkepticism,Blame,
andObligation,”inNealTognazziniandD.JustinCoates,eds.,Blame:ItsNature
andNorms,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013,pp.189–206.
Chapter7 is based on “Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Punishment,” in
ThomasNadelhoffer,ed.,TheFutureofPunishment,NewYork:OxfordUniver-
sityPress,2013,pp.49–78.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,6/1/2014,SPi
Introduction
Oneofthemainconcernsinthehistoricalfreewilldebateiswhetherthesortof
free will required for moral responsibility is compatible with the causal deter-
mination of action by factors beyond the agent’s control. An action will be
causally determined in this way if causally relevant factors occurring or active
priortotheagent’scomingtobe,andthusbeyondhercontrol,togetherwithfacts
about the laws of nature, also beyond her control, ensure the occurrence of the
action by a causal process that begins with those preceding causal factors and
endsin the occurrenceof the action.An actionwillalsobe causally determined
by factors beyond the agent’s control if its occurrence is ensured by a causal
processthatoriginatesinGod’stimelesswillingandendsintheoccurrenceofthe
action.SinceHume(1739/1978),thesensethatthecausalhistoryofouractions
threatens the free will required for moral responsibility has prominently been
extendedtowhetheritiscompatiblewithindeterminacyinaction.Theposition
I advocate in this book is that this sort of free will is incompatible with causal
determination by factors beyond the agent’s control and also with the kind of
indeterminacyinactionthatHumehadinmind,andthatasaresult,itisunlikely
thatwehavethefreewillrequiredformoralresponsibility.1
1 Inmyviewit’spreferabletoformulatethefirstofthesehistoricalconcernsintermsofaconflict
between an action’s being freely willed and its being causally determined by factors beyond the
agent’s control (Sartorio ms; cf. Pereboom 2001). The more common formulation, as a conflict
betweenanaction’sbeingfreelywilledandthetruthofcausaldeterminism,ischallengedbyJoseph
Campbell(2007,2008,2010).Campbell’sobjectiontargetstheConsequenceArgument(Ginet1966,
1990; Van Inwagen 1975, 1983), and his claim is that this argument relies on the contingent
assumptionthattheagenthasaremotepast—apastbeforesheexisted—andhencedoesnotshow
thatfreeactionisincompatiblewithdeterminismperse.AliciaFinch(2013)defendstheConse-
quence Argument against Campbell by way of the trans-temporality thesis, on which an agent’s
performingafreeactionatatimerequiresthatatanearliertimeitwasuptotheagenttoperformthe
actionatthelatertime.Finch’sstrategyistoarguethatthelawsandthestateoftheworldatthe
earliertimearenotuptotheagent,andifcausaldeterminismistrue,thisnot-up-to-nesstransfersto
theactionatthelatertime.CarolinaSartorio(2014)respondstoCampbellbydefendingtheview
thatthecoreincompatibilistconcernisnottheincompatibilityoffreewillandcausaldeterminism,
butratherfreewillandactionsbeingcausallydeterminedbyfactorsbeyondtheagent’scontrol,and
Ithinksheisrightaboutthis.
Description:Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original conception of moral responsibility. He argues that if determinism were true we would not be morally responsible in the key basic-desert sense at issue in the free will debate, but that we would also lack this kind of moral responsibility if indetermi
